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2ABSTRACT
The aim of this research is to investigate whether the Reagan administration 
was influenced by ‘New Right’ ideas. Foreign policy issues were chosen as test cases 
because the presidency has more power in this area which is why it could promote an 
aggressive stance toward the United Nations and encourage withdrawal from 
UNESCO with little impunity.
Chapter 1 deals with American society after 1945. It shows how the ground 
was set for the rise of Reagan and the New Right as America moved from a strong 
affinity with New Deal liberalism to a new form of conservatism, which the New 
Right and Reagan epitomised.
Chapter 2 analyses the New Right as a coalition of three distinctive groups: 
anti-liberals, New Christian Right, and neoconservatives. Each group is examined in 
turn.
Chapter 3 looks at whether the Reagan administration was a New Right 
administration. The chapter is divided into three sections: economic, social and 
foreign policy. In each domain one can see the administration’s attempt to fulfil its 
New Right agenda with varying degrees of success.
Chapter 4 investigates Kirkpatrick’s approach to the United Nations. Her 
themes at the UN (‘America First’, liberty and the Western political system, 
politicisation and the ‘rights debate’) were very much in line with what the New 
Right was seeking of Reagan both internally and externally.
Chapter 5 examines the reasons behind the American decision to withdraw 
from UNESCO in 1984. It demonstrates that the reasons for the withdrawal were 
essentially political, as the justifications given by the administration were weak.
In conclusion the essence of the thesis is to show that the Reagan presidency 
embodied many of the ideas of the New Right. Although in domestic policy its 
success was debatable. However, in foreign policy and especially in US-UN and US- 
UNESCO relationships the ideas of the New Right were predominant.
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7INTRODUCTION
As we head toward a new millennium we are witnessing the 
transformation of our society. The twentieth century has been an eventful one 
as mankind entered outer space, cyberspace and the deep oceans in a desire to 
conquer a new frontier. We have witnessed the removal of social and political 
barriers that have existed for decades and centuries in some cases with 
tremendous ramifications for the development of contemporary society.
Most of the achievements and revolutions of this century have emanated in 
one form or another from the United States of America which stands high 
above many of the previous empires that have graced human history. The US 
emerged out of the ashes of the Second World War as the most powerful 
country in the world, while the Cold War enabled it to shape much of the 
postwar world, in many instances in its own image, as Japan and Germany can 
testify.
The elections of 1980 in the United States not only brought in a new 
president, they also marked the beginning of revolution in American society. 
The suggestion that Reagan presided over a revolutionary period in American 
history may at first glance be rather surprising as Reagan was one of the most 
ideologically conservative presidents in American history (and conservatives 
are suppose to oppose radical change). However, Reagan with his rather 
simplistic message was greatly responsible for a major domestic 
transformation, while in foreign policy he restored American predominance 
and arguably hammered the final nail in the Soviet Union’s coffin.1 
The 1980 elections brought into the political fray a new force in the shape of 
the t£New Right.” This force remained even after Reagan and his successor, 
George Bush left the White House and it is arguably its legacy that has been 
responsible for an internal crisis in the United States that the successes of Pat
1 C. Weinberger. Fighting For Peace: Seven Critical Years At the Pentagon. London: 
Michael Joseph, 1990; G.P Shultz. Turmoil & Triumph: Mv Years as Secretary of State. 
NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993. Shultz suggests that it was Reagan’s toughness and 
vision concerning SDI that hastened if not dealt the fatal blow that led to the collapse of the 
Soviet empire.
8Buchanan in the Louisiana, Ohio, and New England primaries2 and the Oklahoma 
bombing3 have highlighted. Another prime example of Reagan’s and the 1980s 
New Right legacy is the power that the Religious Right wields in US and 
Republican Party politics, especially through the Christian Coalition (which could 
be regarded as the Moral Majority’s successor).4 This is why when the Coalition 
held its annual convention in Washington DC (September 8 and 9, 1995,) a long 
procession of presidential hopefuls came to gain its support. Social conservatives 
such as Patrick Buchanan, Robert Doman, and Alan Keyes received an 
enthusiastic reception from the delegates. Candidates such as Richard Lugar, 
Robert Dole, and Lamar Alexander, whose natural party constituency lay among 
the Grand Old Party (GOP) moderates, made brave efforts to show themselves as 
social conservatives. The majority of the GOP candidates believed that it would 
be difficult to win their party’s nomination without at least the ‘tacit acquiescence 
of the Christian Right.”3 Thus, the philosophical conservatism that emerged with 
the Reagan presidency was far from dead,6 especially as after Mondale’s failure in 
the 1984 presidential election a group of prominent Southern and Border states 
Democratic politicians formed the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) which 
essentially was meant to represent and promote Democratic conservatism. In 
other words, the formation of the DLC could be seen as an attempt to place the 
Democratic Party on a more conservative footing, after more decades of postwar
2 Buchanan gathered slightly less than one-quarter of the Republican votes cast in the primary 
session and seventy-eight (four percent) of the delegates. In New Hampshire he won 37 percent 
of the vote to Bush’s 53 percent; in Florida he won 32 percent; and, in Georgia 36 percent. P.R 
Abramson, J.H Aldrich and D.W Rohde. Change and Continuity in the 1992 Election. 
Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994, p26, p30.
3 R. Abanes. Rebellion. Racism & Religion: American Militia. Downers Grove: InterVarsity 
Press, 1996; P. Lamy. Millennium Rage: Survivalists. White Supremacists, and the Doomsday 
Prophecy. London: Plenum Press, 1996.
4 D.M Oldfield. The Right and the Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican 
Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996.
James Carney has reported that House Republicans were informed that they must keep Christian 
Right leaders happy or they would lose their support. Moreover, Newt Gingrich also promised 
not to give another speech without mentioning the investigations of Clinton. J. Carney, “The 
G.O.P. Mantra: Keep Dobson Happy.” Time May 11,1998
5 C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996, p3; see also D.M Oldfield. The Right and the Righteous: The Christian 
Right Confronts the Republican Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996.
6 Reagan’s influence is clearly seen in N. Gingrich. To Renew America. NY: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1995.
9liberalism domination.7 The 1980s had placed America on a conservative path 
which at the moment seems to be is very entrenched. The question that one is 
therefore faced with is not whether the conservative legacy of Reagan will remain, 
but whether the more ideologically entrenched conservatives will win? or, if the 
moderate conservatives could sustain their dominance? America and as a result 
the world waits to see what would happen as a new century dawns upon us as the 
conclusion of the internal conflict in the United States will have a great impact on 
world development and on the United Nations which will find it far more difficult 
to operate as conservative opposition to it will only intensify.'
A study of the Reagan era requires an understanding, or at least an 
awareness of American history especially following the end of World War II and 
the ensuing Cold War. This is because much of the Reaganites’ view was based 
on interpreting the hopes and aims of the Founding Fathers. For the Reaganites 
the United States was created with the purpose of fulfilling John Winthrop’s 
notion of a City on the Hill, which following the Second World War was 
transformed into a fortress on a hill. American conservatives believe that their 
country was meant to preserve the best of mankind as it has a “Manifest Destiny.” 
For religious conservatives, America has a holy mission to fight the forces of evil 
and prepare for the ultimate battle with the forces of the Antichrist (the Soviet 
Union).9 This is perhaps why the words of Edward Gibbon ring true for them as 
he had forewarned, at the close of the eighteenth-century, that if Europe was to 
be attacked by hordes of barbarians from the east, then “...ten thousand vessels 
would transport beyond their pursuit the remains of civilised society; and Europe 
would revive and flourish in the American world, which was already filled with
7 N.C Rae. Southern Democrats. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p58-59, for DLC see 
pi 11-127. Clinton is a former chairman of the DLC; M. Walker. Clinton: The President They 
Deserve. London: Fourth Estate, 1996.
8 There is a debate amongst conservative Americans about US involvement in the UN. The 
failure of the Senate to pass a bill that would pay US arrears failed because of Christian Right 
pressure for an extraneous provision which prohibited federal funding of family-planning 
organisations that condone abortion as an option. J. Carney, “The G.O.P. Mantra: Keep Dobson 
Happy.” Time May 11, 1998.
9 P. Lamy. Millennium Rage: Survivalists. White Supremacists, and the Doomsday Prophecy. 
London: Plenum Press, 1996, especially pl-30; G. Halsell. Prophecy and Politics: Militant 
Evangelists on the Road to Nuclear War. Westport: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1986.
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her colonies and institutions.”10 Since its inception the United States has been or 
rather had claimed to be, a safe-haven for all those seeking either refuge from 
persecution, hardship, or just the prospects of happiness through financial 
betterment. “Give me your tired, your poor / Your huddled masses yearning to 
breathe free.”,11 are the words that have welcomed millions of new arrivals to 
America. In 1980, and even more in the 1990s, the free world, and its champion, 
the United States, appeared to face a threat from an “evil empire” that lay in the 
East12 which was the result of an insidious strategy. That is, postwar liberalism, 
the United Nations, the liberal Eastern Establishment and the Soviet Union, had 
combined to work together to topple American sovereignty and freedom and with 
it take-over the world.13 Thus, to understand the mind of the New Right of the 
1980s, one must have an understanding of the United States since the end of 
World War II, which is done in Chapter 1 of the thesis. This is followed by an 
examination of what is the New Right. Once a definition has been provided it is 
important to examine whether the administration was a New Right one. This is 
done is Chapter 3 of the thesis. The last two chapters act as a testing ground as to 
whether the Reagan administration sought to implement its New Right agenda 
which is where the UN and UNESCO come in.
10 E. Gibbon. The Decline & Fall of the Roman Empire. Middlesex: Penguin Classics, 1985, 
p627.
11 W. LaFeber. The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home & Abroad. 1750 to 
Present. 2nd ed., NY: W.W Norton & Co., 1994, p218.
12 Due to their belief in Biblical inerrancy, fundamentalists look to current events for signs of 
the beginning of Armageddon. The Bolshevik Revolution confirmed for many the earlier 
prophecy that the Beast would come from Russia. Modem fundamentalists also believe that 
Armageddon would come in the shape of a nuclear holocaust. R.C Chandler, “The Wicked 
Shall Not Bear Rule: The Fundamentalist Heritage of the New Christian Right”, D.G Bromley 
and A. Shupe. (ed.) New Christian Politics. Macon: Mercer University Press, 1984, p44; G. 
Halsell. Prophecy and Politics. Militant Evangelists on the Road to Nuclear War. Westport: 
Lawrence Hill & Co., 1986, especially p21-27; W.F Jasper. Global Tyranny... Step bv Step: The 
United Nations and the Emerging New World Order. Appleton: Western Islands, 1992.
13 For example: P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991; W.F 
Jasper. Global Tyranny... Step bv Step: The United Nations and the Emerging New World
Order. Appleton: Western Islands, 1992.
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Chapter 1 - The United States. 1945-1980: A Brief History of a 
Superpower
In the first chapter of the work a domestic analysis of the development of 
the United States since the end of the Second World War is provided. The 
underlying theme is that as the post-war period developed, the country moved 
from a liberal ideology in which social welfare was actively promoted by the 
federal government to a more conservative one where government intervention is 
sought to be limited. Policymakers, immediately after the end of World War II felt 
that America’s omnipotence could enable it to help those less fortunate became 
better off, while also standing up to communism, wrong-doing and evil. America 
would not only act as an example, it would actively assist people and nations 
multilaterally and unilaterally to emancipate themselves from their historical, 
cultural or political shackles, by adopting the American model. However, by the 
mid-1960s, primarily as a result of social reforms and foreign policy, Americans 
faced increasing difficulties that carried severe implications for the New Deal 
coalition that had been responsible for the transformation of postwar-America. 
The coalition from the mid-1960s began to slowly disintegrate, while the 
conservative movement began to gather momentum, especially following the 
1964 presidential campaign.
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 represented the culmination of a process 
that had been in the making essentially since the mid 1960s. It emphasised that 
conservatism had finally attained an ascendance over post-war liberalism in 
American society.14 Moreover, the Reagan era, in many respects lay the 
foundation for the development of the radical right of the 1990s which is far more 
focused on foreign policy than its predecessor.15
14 K.P Phillips. Post-Conservative America: People. Politics & Ideology in a Time of Crisis. 
NY: Vintage Books, 1983. Put very simply Phillips’ thesis is that the rise of Reagan and the new 
brand of conservatism were the result of the economic and political decline of the US in the 
previous two decades.
15 W.F Jasper. Global Tyranny... Step bv Step: The United Nations and the Emerging New 
World Order. Appleton: Western Islands, 1992. Japser’s book is a prime example of the belief 
of a growing number of Americans that the UN is part of a large conspiracy to create ‘world 
government’ that would enslave and rob them of their cherished liberty.
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Chapter II - The New Right: The Development of An Ideology
Ronald Reagan came to lead a highly diverse movement that has been 
dubbed the “New Right”. In recent years, the term had been used to describe the 
more extreme right organisations that seem to dominate American news due to 
the fear that they evoke. The federal government had several highly publicised 
altercations with anti-government groups throughout the 1990s, ranging from 
Ruby ridge to Waco to the Oklahoma bombing, to the Michigan militia for 
example.16 Thus, the term is somewhat elusive which is why within the scope of 
this research the “New Right” will be portrayed as a conservative populist 
movement composed of three main groups, each with its own emphasis on what 
was wrong in America. The “New Right” of the 1980s was active in politics and 
in working from within the system to foster change.17
The first group that made-up the New Right in the 1980s were the “anti­
liberals,” the real descendants of traditional Republican conservatism. The anti- 
liberals were unhappy with the growth of the New Deal which meant the 
abandonment of America’s ancestral ideology of self-reliance and rugged 
individualism and the adoption of liberal welfarism that was far more symptomatic 
of Europe at best, and the Soviet Union at its worst.18 Their interest was with 
domestic policy and their involvement in foreign policy was merely an extension 
to Reagan’s claims that the defence build-up would have positive effects on the 
economy, although all were anti-communists.19 The anti-liberals were able to 
provide much support for their cause by securing posts for their people in the 
administration (David Stockman), and Congress (Jack Kemp), while also
16 R. Abanes. Rebellion. Racism & Religion: American Militia. Downers Grove: InterVarsity 
Press, 1996. These incidents are used by the Radical Right to show how one cannot trust the 
federal government and the existence of a conspiracy against the American people by their 
government.
17 R.A Viguerie. The New Right: We’re Ready to Lead. Falls Church: The Viguerie Co., 1981.
18 David Stockman, Reagan’s first director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has 
claimed that Social Security has been sweetened by politicians so much that the notion of need 
disappeared and had nothing to do with what workers put into the fund. Stockman describes this 
as “closet socialism.” D.A Stockman. The Triumph of Politics: the Crisis in American 
Government and How It Affects the World. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986, pl94.
19 See for example M. Anderson. Revolution. NY: Harecourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988.
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mobilising support from outside of the political arena (Heritage Foundation, 
American Enterprise Institute and Hoover Foundation20 Paul Weyrich21 et. al.).
The second main group of the New Right was the New Christian Right 
which has attracted the attention of many political commentators and academics 
fascinated by the phenomena.22 The movement was highly diverse and it united in 
some instances various types of Protestant churches with Catholics and Jews. 
However, the driving force within the Religious Right were conservative 
evangelicals. The group rose to prominence mainly as a result of the 1973 
Supreme Court ruling legalising abortion in the United States (there was some 
activity following the Court's recognition of secular humanism in the 1960s as a 
distinctive way of life23 but the main thrust began following the abortion ruling). 
Throughout the 1970s the Religious Right mobilised and developed an effective 
political movement. Its interest was principally with social policy, particularly 
abortion and education.24 Its involvement in foreign policy was due to its concern, 
if not fear, of Soviet expansionism, as the USSR was not only the antithesis of the 
United States, but the embodiment of evil. Reagan’s description of the Soviet 
Union as an “evil-empire”,23 was widely endorsed. This was supported by the
20 N. Ashford, “A New Public Philosophy”, J.D Lees and M. Turner, (ed.) Reagan’s First Four 
Years: A New Beginning. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, pl6-18.
21 Paul Weyrich was one of the founders of the New Right. For his involvement in American 
politics see R. Bellant. The Coors Connection: How Coors Family Philanthropy Undermines 
Democratic Pluralism. Boston: South End Press, 1991.
22 For example: C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American 
Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996; S. Brace. The Rise & Fall of the New Christian Right: 
Conservative Protestant Politics in America. 1978-1988. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988; D.M 
Oldfield. The Right and the Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party. 
London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996.
23 For a Christian Right view of secular humanism: J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton 
Books, 1980; P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991; H. Lindsey. 
Planet Earth 2000 A.D.: Will Mankind Survive?. Palos Verdes: Western Front, 1996.
24 J.D Hunter. Cultural Wars: The Straggle to Define America. NY: Basic Books Publishers, 
1990.
In the 1990s, groups from the Religious Right became more interested in UN activities due to 
fear of world government and the loss of American sovereignty. See for example “Policy 
Concerns” of the Concerned Women of America'. “U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.” 
February 1995; “The World Food (and Population) Summit: The U.N. Makes Another Grab for 
Power.” December 1996 (revised); Sovereignty Under Siege: U.N. Biospheres Take U.S. Land.” 
May 1997.
25 A C Loveland. American Evangelicals and the U.S. Military 1942-1993. London: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1996, especially p211-225; RC Chandler, “The Wicked Shall Not Bear 
Rule: The Fundamentalist Heritage of the New Christian Right”, D.G Bromley and A. Shupe. 
(ed.) New Christian Politics. Macon: Mercer University Press, 1984; J. Falwell. Listen. 
America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980; J. Falwell, E. Dobson and E. Hindson. (ed) The
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efforts of Christian Right leaders such as Falwell, Robertson, the Bakkers - to 
name but a few - who wrote books, gave speeches and public appearances 
highlighting their views which meant engaging in secular politics to promote their 
agenda.26 Jews and Catholics, were sympathetic to Reagan conservative social 
policy while his foreign policy stance won him their support due to the 
discrimination that their brethren suffered in the hands of the Soviets and their 
supporters throughout the world which explains their alliance with the Protestant 
Christian Right.
The neoconservatives composed the final group in the New Right 
paradigm. The neoconservatives were mainly Jewish intellectual Democrats 
unhappy with the way the Democratic Party had evolved by the 1970s especially 
in the area of foreign policy. Their literature is rather diverse, although consistent 
in its calls for greater commitment to defence expenditure which would lead to a 
more aggressive and ‘America first’ foreign policy. They wanted the US to stand 
up for democracy and western values which could only be the achieved through 
building up America’s defence capabilities that had suffered especially as a result 
of Vietnam and government policies.27 The neoconservatives although being 
disorganised and even divided were very prolific writers, and they expressed their 
views in several magazines ranging from Commentary to Policy Review to The 
National Interest. They too, like the anti-liberals, were able to place several of 
their people in the administration and especially in the State Department.28 The 
leading neoconservative in the administration was Jeane Kirkpatrick who served 
as America’s ambassador to the UN.29
Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The Resurgence of Conservative Christianity. NY: Doubleday & 
Co., 1981; P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991.
26 There was much debate especially among fundamentalists on whether preachers should 
engage in mainstream political discourse. D.M Oldfield. The Right and the Righteous: The 
Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
1996. The reality, however, was that these preachers felt that political debate had direct impact 
on the well-being of America and therefore they should be involved.
27 See for example I. Kristol. Reflections of a Neoconservative: Looking Back. Looking Ahead. 
NY: Basic Books Publishers, 1983; J.J. Kirkpatrick. The Reagan Doctrine & US Foreign Policy. 
Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, The Fund for an American Renaissance, 1985.
28 J. Ehrman. The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. 
London: Yale University Press, 1995, especially pl37-172.
29 Kirkpatrick had a cabinet seat and she formulated the Reagan Doctrine. Her role is analysed 
in greater depth in Chapter 4 of the thesis, where some of the above points are re-examined.
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These were the main members of the New Right and as one can see they were 
certainly diverse. The chapter focuses on the different groups that made up the 
New Right, especially as at first glance one would not have expected to see the 
Christian Right allied with neoconservatives due to the traditional animosity 
between Protestant fundamentalism and Judaism. Yet, in 1980 these diverse 
forces decided to put aside or rather suspend their differences and support Ronald 
Reagan for president.
Chapter III - The Reagan Presidency. 1981-89: Success & Failure of A 
New Right Agenda
The election of Ronald Reagan highlighted that ‘new conservatism’ had 
reached the pinnacle of American politics as it was present both in the White 
House and Congress.1 However, American politics is notoriously harsh on 
ideologues as it demands compromise if policies and agendas are to be carried 
out. Thus, the aim of the chapter is to provide a brief examination on whether the 
administration was able to pursue its New Right ideology in general, and thus 
qualify for the title of being a New Right administration.2
The chapter argue that the Reagan administration qualified as being heavily 
influenced by New Right ideas. To say that it was conservative is insufficient as it 
sought to fulfil many of the ideas, aims, and hopes of the people who composed 
the New Right.3 For example, the anti-liberals were able to persuade Congress to 
pass many aspects of their economic agenda which according to Reagan ended
1 The 1980 election brought unprecedented number of conservatives into Congress. C.J Bailey. 
The Republican Party in the US Senate. 1974-1984: Party Change and Institutional 
Development. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.
2 Bellant in two publications by the Political Research Associates Old Nazis, the New Right, 
and the Republican Partv: Domestic Fascist Networks and their Effect on U.S. Cold War 
Politics, and The Coors Connection: How Coors Family Philanthropy Undermines Democratic 
Pluralism, show that Reagan had very close ties with members of the New Right. This would 
suggest that the movement was able to push many of its policies and ideas due to its connections 
in Washington DC. Bellant certainly paints the administration as one with very strong ties to 
the Right, sometimes even the Extreme Right
3 On the transformation of conservatism see K.P Phillips. Post-Conservative America: People. 
Politics & Ideology in a Time of Crisis. NY: Vintage Books, 1983.
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America’s worst recession,33 although burdening the country with a huge national 
deficit and many other social, economic, and political problems. The Religious 
Right was less successful as its major victories came in the shape of the limited 
Equal Access Act and the failure to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).34 
The neoconservative program was carried through with the implementation of the 
largest ever peace-time defence build-up in American history and Reagan’s 
pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy especially when dealing with the Soviet 
Union.35 On many issues the New Righters were disappointed but those failures 
were not necessarily the administration’s fault. To paraphrase David Stockman, 
politics often proved triumphant.36
Chapter IV - The New Right & The United Nations: The Kirkpatrick Era, 
1981-1985
The aim of this part of the research is to show that the Reagan 
administration’s approach to the United Nations was based on a New Right 
agenda. The Reagan presidency has attracted much attention from scholars as has 
the New Right and both have been studied from different angles and perspectives. 
However, not much work has been done on the relationship between the Reagan 
administration, the New Right and the UN, despite the fact that the Reaganites’ 
approach to the United Nations was curious. This is because although New 
Righters and the administration continuously pointed to the failures and 
deficiencies of the organisation, there was no real concrete or organised effort (as 
was the case with UNESCO), to bring about an end to American participation in 
the UN. The administration decried the way the United States was being treated 
in and by the organisation, as it sought to reform the UN from within, something
33 See Reagan’s comparison between the Quebec Economic summit in 1981 and the 
Williamsburg Economic summit in 1983. R. Reagan. An American Life. London: Hutchinson, 
1990.
34 Hadden and Shupe argue that the Christian Right was very successful during the 1980s as 
Reagan largely implemented many of their general desires. J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. 
Televaneelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry Holt & Co., 1988.
35 For Reagan’s defence policy see for example M.E Goldstein. Arms Control and Military 
Preparedness from Truman to Bush. NY: Peter Lang Publishers, 1993, pl95-232.
36 D.A Stockman. The Triumph of Politics: the Crisis in American Government and How It 
Affects the World. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986.
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that it was not prepared to do in the case of UNESCO for various reasons which 
will discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
The United Nations prefigured very highly in the Reaganite foreign policy 
program. The organisation was part of an overall strategy of restoring American 
prestige and confidence both at home and abroad.37 The UN was one of the most 
prominent places that one could see the apparent loss of prestige as this was after 
all an organisation that America had played a central role in creating which is why 
restoring American status was so important there. This perhaps explains why, 
firstly Jeane Kirkpatrick was appointed to the post of US permanent 
representative to the UN as she was not only the formulator of the Reagan 
Doctrine, but a neoconservative.38 Secondly, Kirkpatrick spent considerable time 
shuttling from New York to Washington in an attempt to fulfil America’s foreign 
policy goals.39 In other words, the Reaganites considered the United Nations 
important enough to keep a close eye on events there despite its numerous 
failings. As Kirkpatrick, herself noted the United Nations is “an important 
institution.” It reflected the state of the world, and is not, as some seem to think, 
“a world unto itself’. Thus, the UN for better or worse "... is not only influenced 
by its environment, it influences the environment. The pattern of interaction inside 
the United Nations - the alliance and the rhetoric that develop there - have 
consequences cumulatively important beyond Turtle Bay. The relationship
37 Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 96th Congress, 2nd Session, 1980, Washington DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1981. Included in the volume is the text of the Republican Party 
Platform.
38 Kirkpatrick encountered some problems due to State Department obstinacy (as they disliked 
her un-diplomatic approach) and with Alexander Haig, but this was countered by the closeness 
of William Clark to Reagan. A. Gerson. The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without Apology 
America at the United Nations. 1981-1985. NY: The Free Press, 1991.
Kirkpatrick in her nomination hearings noted that she and Reagan shared many views and 
outlooks which must have aided her when she dealt with Reagan, or sought presidential support 
for her style in the UN. “Nomination of Jeane Kirkpatrick.” hearing before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, US Senate, 97th Congress, 1st Session, January 15, 1981, Washington DC: 
USGPO, 1981.
39 “38th Session of the U.N. General Assembly.” September 19 - December 20, 1983, Report of 
Congressional Delegates to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 
September 30, 1985, Washington DC: US GPO, 1985, p i7.
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between the United Nations and the outside world receives less attention, I 
[Kirkpatrick] believe, than it deserves.”40
Mrs. Kirkpatrick was a prolific speaker and her ideas and views have been 
collected in three main publications. The core of her argument which she 
promoted aggressively was that America was the aggrieved party in the United 
Nations which is why the US should - and would - act against policies and 
programs that it saw as inimical to its interests (it would end the policy of 
“damage limitation”). America would not be afraid to assert its values while 
attacking and emphasising deficiencies in other political systems and by 
implication countries.41
The relationship between the Reaganites and the United Nations was largely 
consistent throughout Kirkpatrick’s tenure. This probably assisted an already 
conservative Congress to adopt a more aggressive or national chauvinistic style 
when dealing with the United Nations, which was seen in several pieces of 
legislation such as the Kassebaum Amendment.42 It is also noteworthy that 
Kirkpatrick’s approach was similar to that of Daniel P. Moynihan, a 
neoconservative who served at the US Mission in the mid-1970s, where he 
actively promoted American national interests. By the 1980s, Moynihan had 
become a US senator.43
40 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “Making Things Worse”, address before the Foreign Policy 
Association, New York, New York, January 26 1982, p204. All quotes from p204 [italics in 
text]; same speech appears in Kirkpatrick’s The Reagan Phenomenon & Other Speeches on 
Foreign Policy. Washington: AEI for Public Policy Research, 1983, entitled “The Problems of 
the United Nations.”
41 J.J Kirkpatrick. The Reagan Phenomenon & Other Speeches on Foreign Policy. Washington: 
AEI for Public Policy Research, 1983; Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. 
Vol. I & II, Oxford: Transaction Books, 1988.
42 Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983, Washington DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984.
43 For the importance of Moynihan to the neoconservative cause see J. Ehrman. The Rise of 
Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. London: Yale University Press, 
1995.
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Chapter V - UNESCO & The United States: The Reagan Years. 1981- 
1984
The American decision to withdraw from UNESCO in 1984, rather 
surprisingly has not attracted much attention from commentators.44 An important 
factor when dealing with the Reagan administration’s approach to UNESCO is to 
be aware of the role that external forces played in pushing for the withdrawal as it 
was there that one sees the clearest examples of New Right influence.
Generally most of the work that has been done concerning the United 
States and UNESCO covers an array of issues and is rather scattered although 
some of it is very useful, as will be seen later on. R.A Coate’s book Unilateralism. 
Ideology & U.S. Foreign Policy, examines America’s decision to withdraw from 
UNESCO. Coate concludes that the pullout was due to political considerations 
rather than the reasons given by the administration, whose officials often 
misunderstood or lacked knowledge about UNESCO and other international 
organisations. The administration criticisms of the agency became more vague by 
1984 as UNESCO worked very hard to introduce reforms which Coate describes 
at some length, but proved futile in preventing the withdrawal.45 Mark Imber’s 
book looks mainly at the issue of politicisation, for example how it was used, the 
role of functionalism in the debate, and so on. Imber concedes that UNESCO was 
different from the two other case studies that he looks at - the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
This is because with UNESCO, the Americans were also concerned with 
punishment and there was no real interest by the administration to return to the 
agency once reform has been implemented.46 The Hope and Folly book provides a
44 There are four main books: C.A Gifford. UNESCO and the Media. London: Longman, 1989; 
M.F Imber. The USA ILO. UNESCO and IAEA: Politicization and Withdrawal in the 
Specialized Agencies. London: Macmillan Press, 1989; W. Preston Jr., E.S Herman and H.I 
Schiller. Hope & Folly: The United States and UNESCO. 1945-1980. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1989; R.A Coate. Unilateralism. Ideology & U.S. Foreign Policy: The 
United States In and Out of UNESCO. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988.
45 R.A Coate. Unilateralism. Ideology & U.S. Foreign Policy: The United States In and Out of 
UNESCO. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988. Coate’s thesis is examined in greater 
depth in Chapter 5.
46 M.F Imber. The USA ILO. UNESCO and IAEA: Politicization and Withdrawal in the 
Specialized Agencies. London: Macmillan Press, 1989. Imber’s thesis is described in greater 
depth in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
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long term look into US-UNESCO relations while also looking into the 
communications debate and its development.47
C.A Giffard’s examination of UNESCO and the American media, and what role 
the media played in pushing for the withdrawal is very important to this research. 
Giffard shows the relationship between the State Department and interest groups, 
and how often the State Department used those organisations in its attempts to 
devalue UNESCO’s contributions to international society. A context analysis, 
according to Giffard, was made to check the correspondence between the 
Heritage Foundation views and documents on UNESCO and the State 
Department’s press releases, briefings and statements at congressional hearings. 
The analysis showed that speakers for the State Department “...reiterated both the 
language and the emphasis provided by the Heritage reports.” There were some 
differences but other than changes in emphasis “...both the arguments and 
rhetoric were almost identical ”48 In other words, there was a symbiotic 
relationship between political organs such as the State Department and 
conservative / New Right think-tanks like the Heritage Foundation, or interest 
groups such the Anti-Defamation League. Thus, the administration was supplied 
with ammunition to attack UNESCO by outsiders who wanted to see an end to 
American membership in UNESCO.
When looking into US-UNESCO relations during the Reagan presidency 
the main sources are congressional hearings, staff reports commissioned by 
Congress and statements by members of Congress, the administration and 
experts.49 Most of the discussions about UNESCO were not initiated by President
47 W. Preston Jr., E.S Herman and H.I Schiller. Hope & Folly: The United States and UNESCO. 
1945-1980. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
48 C.A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. London: Longman, 1989, p257, [My Italics]. This 
point is also made by R. Coate in Unilateralism. Ideology & U.S. Foreign Policy: The United 
States In and Out of UNESCO. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988.
49 See for example “U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Human Rights and International Organization and on International Operations of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives 98th Congress, 2nd Session, April 25, 
26, May 2, 1984, Washington DC: US GPO, 1984; “US Withdrawal From UNESCO”, Report of 
A Staff Study Mission, February 10-23, 1984 to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of 
Representatives, Washington DC: US GPO, April 1984; “Improvements Needed in UNESCO’s 
Management, Personnel, Financial, & Budgeting Practices”, Report to the Committee on
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Reagan, as the crusade was carried out at lower levels.50 An important area is the 
close relationship between the State Department, the Reagan administration and 
outside think-tanks, especially the Heritage Foundation which had many staff and 
associates in the administration.51 The role that men such as Owen Harries and 
Thomas Gulick played (both of the Heritage Foundation) in the development and 
the pursuit of policy especially concerning UNESCO was substantial.52
CONCLUSION
The New Right phenomenon brought about much change, and the impact 
of the movement was such that it arguably forced the Democratic Party to drop 
much of its postwar liberalism that many Americans came to consider as too 
radical as it placed too much emphasis on minority groups and the federal 
government while losing the essence of Americanism as promoted by the 
Founding Fathers. The Reagan presidency restored some pride into conservatism 
and began the process of rolling-back the welfare state which arguably culminated 
with President Clinton’s famous welfare bill.
Ronald Reagan was able to restore America to its pre-Watergate and even 
pre-Vietnam era which had shocked the country and knocked out some of its 
zest. If one compares America’s position in 1989 to that of 1979 one could see a 
significant change just in national pride especially following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and its Eastern Europe hegemony. This is why the United States has 
been and continues to be dominant in international affairs, every country is aware 
of it, and seeks to win favour from it, not to mention its approval. To be 
blacklisted by the United States could mean hardship and great suffering, to win 
favour means prosperity and happiness.
Foreign Affairs and Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives”, by the 
Comptroller General of the United States, Gaithersberg: US GAO, 1984, GAO/NSIAD-85-32.
50 The Reagan style was very managerial as he would note his general unhappiness, and his 
aides would take care of the situation (Irangate). Another possible explanation, is that UNESCO 
was simply not seen as important enough to bother the President with by his subordinates who 
organised his schedule.
51 N. Ashford, “A New Public Philosophy”, J.D Lees and M. Turner, (ed.) Reagan’s First Four 
Years: A New Beginning. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, pl6, pl7.
52 See especially C.A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. London: Longman, 1989.
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America of the 1990s is expanding again as NAFTA and the financial 
support that was given to Mexico have emphasised. In many respects America is 
returning to its century old belief that only through expansion of trade and an 
active national chauvinist foreign policy does prosperity and by implication 
civilisation survives.33 However, there are many Americans who are very troubled 
with the path that their country is on and they are determined to be heard, often at 
a frightening cost. The eight years of Reagan laid the foundation for the rise of 
conservatism which reached new heights with the 1994 Congressional elections 
which saw more conservatives entered the legislature. Their attitude to the United 
Nations and international relations has at times being harsh, as they have had to 
satisfy a growing constituency of disgruntled Americans unhappy with the foreign 
policy of their country, which they perceived as liberal, internationalist and 
dangerous for their survival.
53 The argument is developed from N. Gingrich. To Renew America. NY: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1995; B. Clinton. Between Hope and History: Meeting America’s Challenges For 
the 21 St Century. NY: Random House, 1996.
23
CHAPTER I
THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1980: 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF A SUPERPOWER
The surrender of Japan on board the USS Missouri on September 2, 
1945 ended the most devastating war in modem history. Yet, the task faced by 
the postwar politicians was a mammoth one compared with the wining of the 
war. The postwar world was a broken one, and the leaders of the victorious 
countries were entrusted with the job of devising a plan that would include 
reconstruction and reconciliation, while also ensuring that such conflicts never 
happen again. The Alamogordo Test in New Mexico on July 16, 1945, 
followed by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ushered a ‘new world 
order’ in which the US was expected to play an central role, as it had during 
the war.1 Americans themselves, after four years of war, became aware that 
they could no longer rely on the great oceans to protect them. The legacy of 
Pearl Harbor was that the Pacific and the Atlantic were turned from great 
unbreachable barriers defending John Winthrop’s City on the Hill, to mere 
canals vulnerable to long range bombers, aircraft carriers, and submarines. The 
defence of the United States in the postwar period had become more complex 
and expensive, especially if appeasement was to be prevented (Munich had 
shown what could happen if dictators are allowed to get away with their 
demands). The more idealistic and national chauvinist Americans realised that 
the world (which had lost much of its infra and super-structure) was ready to 
be moulded by them according to the American ideal. This would have the 
duel benefit of creating more enlightened societies (as the US was clearly one) 
while fulfilling the hopes of the Founding Fathers and America’s own manifest 
destiny.
1 The US provided over $100 billion worth of supplies and equipment to its allies and over
12 million people during the war. American military leaders directed most of the Allied war 
effort. For example, the Normandy invasion and the drive to the Elbe were co-ordinated by 
General Eisenhower, while General Bradley commanded 1.3 million soldiers in the drive 
across Europe. The island-hopping campaigns in the Pacific was directed by General 
MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. L.J Korb. The Fall & Rise of the Pentagon: American 
Defence Policies in the 1970s. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979, p3.
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The Second World War led to significant social, political and cultural 
changes. The US became more of a middle-class society as personal incomes 
more than doubled during the war and were distributed more fairly. The share of 
the national income, for example, earned by the wealthiest five percent declined 
from more than twenty-three percent in 1939, to almost seventeen percent in 
1944. From 1940 to 1945, the US spent nearly twice as much as it had spent in 
the preceding 150 years. The annual budget was more than ten times what it had 
been in the pre-war years ($100 billion in 1945 alone), while the national debt 
increased from $43 billion in 1940, to $269 billion in 1946. In 1939, only four 
million people paid tax, by 1942, that figure rose to seventeen million, and by 
1944 to forty-two million people.2 The war also had the effect of bringing women 
and other minorities into the workforce on unprecedented levels as wages in 
munitions plants and aircraft factories were about forty percent higher than in 
non-defence factories.3
In terms of scientific achievements the United States made great advances (both 
militarily and non-militarily). Scientists developed the bazooka, which enabled 
infantrymen to pierce a tank; the radio proximity fuse, which exploded according 
to nearness to the target; and napalm flame-throwers. Navigational aides were 
improved (radar and sonar were perfected) and amphibious vehicles for landing 
on beaches were created. Medical breakthroughs were achieved especially in new 
techniques to aid the wounded, which included new drugs and insect repellents. 
The War Department’s Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) 
headed by Vannevar Bush of MIT spent $2 billion on the secretive atomic bomb 
project. In the three “atomic cities” - Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Hanford, 
Washington; and Los Alamos, New Mexico - nearly 150,000 people conducted 
research, refined uranium, and produced weapons. The facilities rivalled in size 
the entire automobile industry. Further government funds helped universities build 
scientific laboratories. Universities also received further support by enrolling
2 G. Jeansonne. Transformation and Reaction: America 1921-1945. NY: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1994, p i99-201; H. Stein. Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy 
from Roosevelt to Reaean & Bevond. 2nd ed., Washington DC: AEI for Public Policy Research, 
1988, p65.
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several hundred thousand officers in Army and Navy programs for accelerated 
degrees. The private industry also spent on research facilities and by the end of 
the war almost 2,500 private industrial research laboratories were employing
133,000 people, twice the prewar number.4 Thus, the war in many ways aided 
American society, while the country (in terms of human life and inconvenience) 
paid a relatively small price as compared to the Soviet Union or Germany.3 All in 
all, the war increased standards of living in the United States,6 while lowering 
unemployment (in June 1940 it stood at 9 million by September 1943 it was 
780,000).7
Truman and his administration were faced with the enormous task of 
having to convert a wartime economy to one of peace (without causing a severe 
depression) especially at a time when people came to believe that government 
offered the solution to many of their problems especially as a result of the New 
Deal. Many Americans in fact came to see the New Deal programs and the role 
that the federal government played in dealing with the Depression to be 
paramount in keeping America buoyant.* It is, however, noteworthy that 
Americans made a distinction between peace and war which is why, when
3 M. Schaller, V. Scharff and R.D Schulzinger. Present Tense: the United States Since 1945. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1992, p21-40; M.C.C. Adams. The Best War ever: America and 
World War II. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994, p85-86.
4 G. Jeansonne. Transformation and Reaction: America 1921-1945. NY: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1994, p201; M. Schaller, V. Scharff and R.D. Schulzinger. Present Tense: the 
United States Since 1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., p24-25.
5 About 300,000 Americans died with a further one million wounded of whom 500,000 were 
seriously disabled. The Japanese lost 2.3 million, Germany about 5.6 million, China about 10 
million and the Soviet Union roughly 20 million people. Put another way, during the American 
Civil War (1861-65) the death rate was 182 per ten thousand population while during World 
War II the rate was 30 per ten thousand. M.C.C. Adams. The Best War ever: America and 
World War II. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994, p6.
6 In areas that were most effected by mobilisation average incomes rose tremendously - from 
$2,207 to $5,208 in Hartford, $2,227 to $5,316 in Washington DC, from $2,031 to $3,469 in 
Los Angeles. By 1944, the average purchase at Department Stores had increased from $2 before 
the war to $10 in 1944. W. Chafe. The Unfinished Joumev: America Since World War n. 3rd 
ed, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995, p9 and throughout; M.C.C. Adams. The Best War ever: 
America and World War n . Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994, p6.
7 M.A Jones. The Limits of Liberty: American History. 1607-1992. 2nd ed , NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p503.
8 Truman was able to defeat Thomas Dewey in 1948 because people did not wanted the New 
Deal reformed or reversed. W.E Pemberton. Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer & Cold Warrior. 
Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989; R.J Donovan. Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. 
Truman. 1949-1953. NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1982.
26
relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated they found themselves in a real 
quagmire as in war one tolerates certain government restrictions and actions that 
are unacceptable in peace-time.9 The relatively inexperienced Truman had to deal 
with calls to ‘bring the boys home’ as quickly as possible (by April 1946 almost 
seven million men had been demobilised10) while also focusing on postwar 
reconstruction. His situation was made even harder by the fact that he had to live 
in the shadow of Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom Americans revered.
The American economy suffered some fluctuations as Bowles, Snyder, 
Vinson and others who dealt with the reconversion failed to forecast correctly the 
economic conditions that would ensue in the immediate months after the war. 
They and many other experts had expected to see an economic collapse and a 
return to a depression instead they had to deal with inflation. Truman, therefore 
had to decided between pursuing an anti-inflationary or anti-depression program 
while also dealing with the tremendous pressure from powerful organised interest 
groups. Thus, by October 1945, 275 strikes were under way which involved
400,000 workers, while the National Labour Relations Board (NLRB) had 
received notice of 416 more strikes votes. By late January 1946, 1.3 million 
workers were on strike and by the end of 1946, 4.6 million workers were on the 
picket-line as a result of 5,000 disruptions.11
In an attempt to help the economy survive the transition Congress passed 
the Employment Act (although not the version that Truman had wanted). The act 
stated that government had to do all that it could to create employment. A 
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) was set up to report directly to the 
President on the means of attaining maximum employment. The act was a
9 M.E Goldstein. Arms Control & Military Preparedness from Truman to Bush. NY: Peter Lang 
Publishers, 1993, p5; W.E Pemberton. Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer & Cold Warrior. Boston: 
Twayne Publishers, 1989.
10 D.W Grantham. The United States Since 1945: The Ordeal of Power. NY: McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., 1976, p4.
11 W.E Pemberton. Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer & Cold Warrior. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 
1989, p57-58. During the war years the government could react differently: for example during 
40 cases of dispute Roosevelt seized plants to guarantee production. In 1944, when a national 
railway strike threatened, the government took over the railroads for three weeks until the 
president arbitrated the dispute. Work stoppages involved the equivalent of only one day per
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recognition that economic planning and projections were part of the 
government’s responsibility and functions. In the words of one commentator the 
legislation: “...marked the beginning of the acceptance of a carefully 
circumscribed role for the state in the management of economic activity.”12 
Keynesianism had captured economic policy.13
The most famous piece of postwar legislation - and another example of how 
determined American society was to aid its former troops - was the Service 
Readjustment Act of 1944, otherwise known as the GI Bill. This legislation 
provided financial aid to ex-servicemen for further education, training or 
businesses. The Veterans Administration (VA) offered loans of up to $2,000 to 
GIs who wanted to start their own business. The Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) granted access up to $2,000 for a GI who wanted to buy a home with the 
Administration ready to underwrite mortgages of up to 80 or 90 percent of a 
home’s value. This meant that with the price of an average house being less than 
$20,000, millions of GIs were able to buy homes without even putting a down 
payment from their own savings.14 Thus, with the help of the VA and the FHA the 
construction industry boomed especially as by 1948 over 2 million married 
couples were living with relatives. Between 1950 and 1960, more than 13 million 
homes were built in America of which 11 million were in the suburbs (during each 
day of the fifties developers bulldozed some 3,000 acres of farmland into 
suburbia)13 all helping to develop and expand the middle class and the interest and 
power of the federal government and bureaucracy.
worker for the duration of the war. G. Jeansonne. Transformation and Reaction: America 1921- 
1945. NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1994, p201.
12 R. Griffith, “Forging America’s Postwar Order: Domestic Politics & Political Economy in the 
Age of Truman”, M.J Lacey, (ed) The Truman Presidency. NY: Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars & Cambridge University Press, 1989, p70.
13 R. Garson and C. Bailey. The Uncertain Power: A Political History of the United States since 
1929. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990, p39-40.
14 W.H Chafe, “Postwar American Society: Dissent & Social Reform”, M.J Lacey, (ed) The 
Truman Presidency. NY: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars & Cambridge 
University Press, 1989, pl59; M.A Jones. The Limits of Liberty: American History. 1607-1992. 
2nd ed, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995, p524.
15 W. Chafe. The Unfinished Joumev: America Since World War n . 3rd ed, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, pi 17; T.H Anderson. The Movement & the Sixties: Protest in America 
from Greensboro to Wounded Knee. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p8.
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The outcome of the 1948 presidential election was probably the most 
surprising in modem American history. The belief that Thomas Dewey would be 
victorious was so strong that in Chicago, the Tribune went to press with the 
headline “DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN.”16 The victory, however, vindicated 
Truman and made him determined to continue in the Rooseveltian tradition of 
seeking to use government to help elevate hardship.17 Truman was hoping in his 
second term to raise taxation and with a reduced military budget to cut the deficit 
while still providing such benefits as low-cost housing, higher Social Security 
payments, and federal aid to education. When Truman launched his bid for a 
second term he believed that he would essentially have four relatively quite years 
to promote his Fair Deal agenda. This was coupled by the fact that the Democrats 
were able to regain control of Congress, which they had briefly lost after the war. 
Thus, the 1948 election filled Congress with liberals with such visions of reforms 
as a repeal of the Taft-Hardy Act, a better civil right program, and so forth.1*
All in all Truman4 s Fair Deal introduced many new programs into American 
society which included an increase in unemployment compensation payment, 
while also extending this coverage to new workers; and a rise in the minimum 
wage. The Fair Employment Practices Commission which protected the rights of 
blacks and other minorities was made also permanent.19 In other words, Truman 
was hoping to continue the transformation of American society which Roosevelt 
had begun.
Americans, perhaps subconsciously were hoping to show the world that 
following its success in leading the charge against fascism20 the United States now
16 RJ Donovan. Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman. 1949-1953. NY: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1982, pl3.
17 M.J Lacey. “Introduction & Summary: The Truman Era in Retrospect”, M.J Lacey, (ed.) The 
Truman Presidency. NY: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars & Cambridge 
University Press, 1989,
18 R.J Donovan. Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman. 1949-1953. NY: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1982, p22.
19 W.E Pemberton. Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer & Cold Warrior. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 
1989, p63.
20 M.C.C. Adams. The Best War ever: America and World War n. Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1994. Americans generally believed that they were largely 
responsible for the Allies’ victory and this notion has increased in strength with the passage of 
time.
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intended to create the ultimate society, dedicated to life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness, thus upstaging the vague communist hyperbole about collectivism. 
One should remember that following the First World War and throughout the 
1920s and 1930s there was a growth in support for communism the United 
States.21 Postwar Western Europe appeared to be heading toward embracing the 
Soviet ideology due to the revulsion with right-wing doctrines which is why left- 
wing political organisations were very visible after the war throughout Western 
Europe. By promoting the New Deal and Fair Deal programs, Americans hoped 
that an effective example was being sent: that one could reconcile economic 
capitalism, liberty and social development.
The Second World War had the effect of making international relations 
more important in the eyes of Americans, and of dealing a serious, perhaps even 
fatal blow to the cause isolationism. Americans realised that they could no longer 
withdraw from the world as they had done following World War I which may 
explain American support for the United Nations. They hoped that the UN would 
protect international peace and security by fostering better co-operation between 
the different nations, thus making the world a better and safer place to live. This 
change of attitude is best epitomised by a man like Robert A. Taft, the leading 
Republican politician at the time. Taft came to support the UN because he felt 
that the United States could no longer exist in isolation and the United Nations - 
an organisation that America was instrumental in creating - would ensure 
international justice and peace which would thus preserve and protect American 
national interests.22 America’s atomic capability, coupled with its economic 
superiority and total dominance would ensure that the US could fulfil its ‘manifest 
destiny’ of mass conversion.
21 “Since the Bolshevik revolution, the Soviet experiment had provided radical and progressive 
intellectuals with an example of an alternative organization for politics and economics.” J. 
Ehrman. The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. London: 
Yale University Press, 1995, p4.
22 J.P Armstrong, “The Enigma of Senator Taft and American Foreign Policy.” Review of  
Politics 17 (2 1955), 206-231; RA Taft, “The Republican Party.” Fortune (April 1949), pl08- 
118.
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Europe posed considerable concerns for Americans following V-E Day, as 
its eastern part was under Soviet domination while it also appeared that the 
western part was on the verge of succumbing to Soviet control. Within nine 
months of the defeat of Germany, de Gaulle had resigned, Churchill was replaced 
by a Labour government, there was a bloody communist-inspired civil war in 
Greece, while communism in France and Italy were on the rise. The British 
economy due to the war and the sudden curtailment of lend-lease in August 1945 
was on the brink of collapse which is why on July 1946, Truman authorised a 
$3.7 billion loan to Britain. On February 21, 1947, H.M Sichell, First Secretary at 
the British Embassy in Washington, handed the US State Department two 
documents. The first dealt with Greece and stated that unless the Greek 
Government received $200 million immediately, the communist guerrillas would 
win the civil war, while the second document warned that a similar fate awaited 
Turkey unless certain measures are taken.23 In other words, within months after 
the end of the war, the Soviet Union and America were on the verge of clashing 
in Greece, Iran, Turkey and Germany.24 Commentators have long debated the 
origins of the Cold War but what is important to note here is that by 1947 
relations between the two countries had seriously deteriorated.23
The new state of affairs led to the annunciation of the Truman Doctrine 
which confirmed that America would not permit Soviet expansion and would 
assist those nations seeking to oppose communism. The Doctrine was not unique 
as it was part of a new package of US foreign policy commitment, and soon after, 
NSC 7 (a study suggesting that the United States should take a stronger stand
23 J. Ranelagh. CIA: A History. London: BBC Books, 1992, p49-50 and throughout.
24 On March 5, 1948, General Lucius Clay informed Washington that whereas he had 
previously thought that war was ten years away, it could now break out suddenly. Eleven days 
later the CIA, advised Truman that war was improbable only for the next sixty days as after this 
date all bets were off. On March 17, Truman addressed a joint session of Congress and 
requested the introduction of universal military training and selective training. In other words, 
the deterioration of relations and the hope in a better future took place rather suddenly. M. 
McCauley. The Origins of the Cold War. 1941-1949. 2nded., London: Longman, 1995, p96.
25 Beisner argues that Acheson in the early part of 1945 was hopeful that relations between the 
US and the Soviet Union would continue to be good, and he in fact called upon America to 
share its atomic information with the Soviets. However, as time progressed he began to shift his 
stand to one of greater hostility and intolerance towards Soviet behaviour (it was the Soviet- 
Turkish conflict that finally pushed Acheson to end his patient attempt at US-Soviet co­
operation). R.L Beisner, “Patterns of Peril: Dean Acheson Joins the Cold Warriors, 1945-46.” 
Diplomatic History 20 (3 1996), 321-55.
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against the Soviet Union attempt to impose world communism) was circulated. 
America, the document stipulated, should strengthen non-communist countries, 
with priority given to Western European countries.26 Thus, with the Truman 
Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the NATO alliance (the first peace-time alliance 
in American history) America felt ready to deal with the potential threat that the 
Soviet Union seemed to pose to its way of life.
The development of American history in the twentieth century cannot be 
understood without emphasising the power that communism and the Soviet 
Union on American society. To Americans the emergence of the Soviet Union 
was frightening and they have never been comfortable with communist ideology 
which was seen as an antithesis to their own way of life. Throughout their history 
Americans have exalted private property, individual freedom, money, capitalism 
and religion, things that to many conservative Americans, a communist society 
sought to abolish which is perhaps communism was never able to set strong roots 
in the US.27
The animosity towards communism/socialism could be traced to the early part of 
the century and especially with the immediate aftermath of the end of the First 
World War and the rise of the Bolsheviks in Russia. Throughout 1919, there were 
several clashes in the US between the authorities and strikers which led to some 
loss of life.28 In two cases that were decided in 1919 (Schenck v. United States 
and Abrams v. United States) the Supreme Court upheld the restraint of free 
speech and freedom of the press imposed by the wartime Espionage and Sedition 
Acts. The anti-communist fever reached new heights on November 7, 1919, when
26 R.J Donovan. Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman. 1949-1953. NY: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1982, p47.
27 P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991; J. Falwell, E. Dobson 
and E. Hindson. (ed.) The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The Resurgence of Conservative 
Christianity. NY: Doubleday & Co., 1981.
28 February 1919, saw a general strike in Seattle (the Bute walkout) and a textile strike at 
Lawrence, Massachusetts. From March until August, over 1,800 strikes erupted. In September 
1919, the Boston Police went on a strike and troops were brought in to restore order which was 
done at the cost of three lives. Next a quarter-million steelworkers left the mills, only to be 
followed in November by a coal strike. The workers were attacked as politicians and labour 
opponents found red-baiting to be a useful tool against the strikers. Fried writes “Four million 
workers walked out in 1919, but sensationalist reactions by politicians and the press obscured
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Attorney-General Palmer launched raids in twelve cities against the offices of the 
radical Union of Russian Workers. Three hundred people were arrested, some 
were beaten and many were put in jail. A month later (December 21, 1919), 199 
aliens were rounded up in raids and fifty others were put on the Buford for 
deportation to the Soviet Union. The majority’s guilt was their radical views. On 
January 20, 1920, Palmer’s agents swept into Communist and Communist Labour 
Party meeting halls in thirty-three cities and arrested - often without warrants - 
over 4,000 suspected members. Many of those arrested were denied counsel and 
some were manhandled while there were also a number of people who had no ties 
to communism. Americans who were caught in the raids were turned over to the 
states for prosecution under state sedition laws. Aliens were held for 
deportation.29 All this was taking place against the great American tradition of 
liberty and individual freedom as the fear of communist subversion or sedition 
simply meant that such methods were acceptable, as what the authorities were 
seeking was to protect the American way of life from an evil subversive 
movement.
In defence of some of the above actions one must remember that the end of the 
First World War forced the United States to face a new situation. Urbanisation, 
immigration and industrialisation, caused considerable tension in American 
society. Economic, social and cultural changes altered the relationship between 
the individual and the government, society, employer, and neighbour.30 Out of the 
chaos movements that claimed to stand for tranquillity, traditional ways, old-time 
religion, undiluted patriotism and unhyphenated Americanism emerged.31 Thus, by 
the mid 1920s and 1930s the far right received support for example from such 
leading politicians as Mayor Ole Hanson of Seattle, Senator Lee Overman (D-
their usually moderate goals.” R.M Fried. Nightmare in Red: the McCarthy Era in Perspective. 
NY: Oxford University Press, 1990, p40-41 (quotation p41).
29 M.A Jones. The Limits of Liberty: American History. 1607-1992. 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p433; RM Fried. Nightmare in Red: the McCarthy Era in Perspective. 
NY: Oxford University Press, 1990, p42.
30 Adams provides many examples of uneasiness that existed within America’s armed forces. 
This could be regarded as an example of the tensions within civilian society. M.C.C. Adams. 
The Best War ever: America and World War II. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1994.
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N.C.), Attorney-General A. Mitchell Palmer, to name but a few. In addition, there 
was also rise in vigilante groups. The second Ku Klux Klan, founded in 1915, 
attracted at least two million members by the mid-1920s and for a time dominated 
the politics of several states. Other groups included the National Security League, 
which collected contributions from Henry Clay Frick, J.P Morgan, John D. 
Rockefeller to oppose the spread of Bolshevism.32 Thus, the attitude of post-1945 
America was essentially based on the continuation of the somewhat irrational fear 
of communism, as when people are unhappy or worried about their future they 
have a tendency to search for scapegoats and seek new philosophies.33
In 1949, two events shocked Americans to the core: the first was the 
announcement by President Truman on September 21, 1949, that the Soviets had 
successfully exploded an atomic device; and, the second, which came about three 
months later, was the fall of the Chinese Nationalists and their retreat to the island 
of Formosa under Chiang Kai-shek.34 Americans have had for more than a century 
and half a romantic love-affair with China which is why to their mind the idea of a 
Communist China was such an anathema. The ‘loss” of China meant the loss of a 
billion people to the monolithic and highly dangerous communist ideology.
These two major events gave credence to the hardening of American attitudes 
towards communists and fellow-travellers while emphasising how dangerous and 
evil their ideology. A good example of the shift in policy could be seen in 
America’s attitude toward Ho Chi Minh. By early 1945, OSS ‘Deer Team’ and 
Ho’s forces were working together rescuing Allied pilots who had been shot
31 R.M Fried. Nightmare in Red: the McCarthy Era in Perspective. NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1990, p41; D.M Chalmers. Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan. 2nd 
ed., London: New Viewpoints, 1981.
32 L.P Ribuffo. The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right From the Great Depression to 
the Cold War. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983, p6-7; D.M Chalmers. Hooded 
Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan. 2nd ed., London: New Viewpoints, 1981.
33 Lamy argues that the rise in millennial and survivalist views in America in the 1980s was due 
to social, economic, political crises and people looked for someone to blame. P. Lamy. 
Millennium Rage: Survivalists. White Supremacists, and the Doomsday Prophecy. London: 
Plenum Press, 1996.
34 C. Mathews. Kennedy & Nixon: The Rivalry That Shaped Postwar America. NY: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996, p67.
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down, and sabotaging Japanese supplies and communications. However, by 1949, 
the US could no longer support a communist, even if he was a nationalist.35
One of the main foreign policy crises that Truman faced was the invasion 
of South Korea by Kim Il-sung, in June 1950. This was clearly a challenge to 
Truman’s stand on communism and the developing containment policy which is 
why he had to responded quickly and forcefully.36 The war itself had a great 
impact on American society due to the timing as it seemed to vindicate the claims 
made by NSC-68 (1950) with its calls for more alertness and preparedness in 
countering the movement of international communism. America, the document 
stated, should be ready to defend allied nations wherever they were in the face of 
Soviet aggression. Containment needed to be taken a step forward. Thus, in early 
1951, Truman submitted a defence budget in the amount of $50 billion; he 
doubled the number of air groups to 95, boosted the size of the Army by fifty 
percent to 3.5 million men, and obtained new military bases in Morocco, Libya 
and Saudi Arabia. In calendar year 1950, national defence consumed 5.2 percent 
of the gross national product (GNP), by 1953, the figure stood at 13.5 percent of 
an expanded GNP.37 Korea began a process in which American efforts to contain 
Soviet and Chinese operations in the Third World became more military in their 
pre-occupation and global application, especially when one compares US policy 
during the Marshall Plan which was more concerned with the promotion of 
democracy.38
To the American public the action of North Korea was against what they 
perceived or were told was a democratic country, and an ally. Kim Il-sung was
35 Following the war and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam, Ho 
worked to win American recognition and he had “...strong support in many quarters in 
Washington...”. J. Ranelagh. CIA: A History. London: BBC Books, 1992, p98-99.
36 R.J Donovan. Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman. 1949-1953. NY: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1982.
37 W. Chafe. The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War H 3rd ed., NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p249; figures from M.E Goldstein. Arms Control & Military 
Preparedness from Truman to Bush. NY: Peter Lang Publishers, 1993, pl8.
38 M.D Shulman, “On Learning to Live With Authoritarian Regimes.” Foreign Affairs 55 
(1977), p325-338; J. Ranelagh. CIA: A History. London: BBC Books, 1992, p98-99; W.E
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seen as a pawn of Stalin, who was on a quest for world domination. Moreover, 
the reason why the North Korean invasion was regarded as very dangerous was 
because by the 1950s it appeared as if America would not be able to remove the 
communist threat by conventional means due to the Soviet atomic capability.39 
The invasion also seemed to validate some of the allegations that a certain junior 
Senator from Wisconsin had been making since February 9, 1950. Joseph 
McCarthy in a speech at Wheeling, West Virginia, declared that the State 
Department was riddled with communist spies and communist sympathisers. 
Despite being unable to produce truly concrete evidence to support his outlandish 
accusations, McCarthy still won tremendous support. This was possibly because a 
few weeks before his infamous speech, Alger Hiss, an important State 
Department official under Roosevelt, was convicted of perjury, and sent to prison 
(Mao’s success came three weeks after Hiss’s conviction and a few days after it 
was revealed that Canadian citizen Klaus Fauchs gave the Soviet Union atomic 
secrets).40 Thus, the timing of the North Korean invasion was very important in 
psychological terms to a nation already very concerned about the growth of 
communism.
The Eisenhower presidency is one of conflicting imagery which is also the 
result of international changes as one initially saw a thaw in the Cold War. 
However, in many respects the docility and lax image of America in the 1950s 
conflicts with the international scene as the US in the first part of the decade 
intervened directly in three countries - North Korea, Iran and Guatemala.41 In 
1957, the US became involved in Lebanon as well as in covert action in Indochina
Pemberton. Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer & Cold Warrior. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989, 
pl26-145.
39 In July 1948, the CIA estimated that the earliest possible time for the Soviets to attain atomic 
capabilities was mid-1950, but a more likely date was mid-1953. The Air Force disagreed with 
that estimate as it believed that the Soviets were very close, as was the case. J. Ranelagh. CIA: 
A History. London: BBC Books, 1992, pl46-147.
40 W.E Pemberton. Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer & Cold Warrior. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 
1989, pl52-153.
41 LaFeber argues that the United Fruit Company played a significant role in the US 
intervention in Guatemala, but there were other factors such as the passing of the Agrarian 
Reform Law and Arbenz’s refusal to drop Communists from his government. W. LaFeber. 
Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America. NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1993, 
pi 13-127.
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and Indonesia.42 Eisenhower, however, was able to capitalise on the armistice in 
Korea, the improved relations with the Soviet Union and the decline of McCarthy 
to create the image that the period was rather stable. But, by 1957, the Cold War 
entered a new era with Khrushchev assuming supreme power in the Kremlin and 
the retirement of other members of the collective leadership. Khrushchev was 
determined that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States.43
In domestic terms one saw a change in conservative ideology, as 
capitalism (one of the major tenets of American conservatism) was re-defined 
from a Hooverite laissez-faire-type to a more active, albeit modest involvement 
of the state (federal government) in society.44 Barry Goldwater complained about 
this in his 1960 book where he argued that many conservatives - and by this he 
meant Republicans (and he also pointed to President Eisenhower as a prime 
example) - had been forced to make excuses for their conservatism. Conservatism 
was seen as only a mechanistic economic theory and not as a comprehensive 
political philosophy.45 This highlights the dominance of post-war liberalism that 
was inherently built on the New Deal coalition which sought to infuse limited 
federal government intervention, primarily in welfare, and more traditional 
American individualism.
The 1950s have often been dubbed the ‘Baby Boom’ decade, as American 
society grow rapidly. During the 1930s the number of births was usually less than 
2.5 million per year, by 1943 the figure rose to 3 million. It was, however, in the 
postwar period that one saw the great rises in the number of births (in 1946 alone 
there were 3.4 million births). This was followed by a steady climb, passing 4 
million in 1954, (the total number of babies bom between 1946 and 1960 was
42 For the role of the CIA in the Philippines, Iran, Guatemala and Indonesia see J. Ranelagh. 
CIA: A History. London: BBC Books, 1992, p69-81 and throughout. The picture that Ranelagh 
portrays is that the US was far from lax during the 1950s as its involvement in international 
relations through covert operations and aid (by 1954 aid to the French in Vietnam amounted to 
$1 billion a year, and over S300 million was spent between 1954 and 1961 to keep the Pathet 
Lao at bay) was huge.
431. Bernstein. Promises Kept: John F. Kennedy’s New Frontier. NY: Oxford University Press, 
1993, p9.
44 J.L Himmelstein. To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990, p23, p25.
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59.4 million). The ramification of this demographic change was that 
American population reached 180.6 million by 1960, up from 141 million in 
1946. Improvements in health care and living standards also raised the life 
expectancy rate to 69.7 in 1960, up from 62.9 in 1940. This was coupled 
with a new pattern of population distribution that was focused on the 
suburbs. The number of people living on farms continued to fall, from 30.5 
million in 1940, to 15 million in 1960. These people migrated to towns, but 
the cities did not grow: of the sixteen cities with a population over 600,000 
in 1960, eleven declined in size over the preceding decade. Of the five that 
grew, three were in the booming Southwest - Los Angeles, Houston and 
Dallas.44
The new suburbs that emerged were inhabited by former GIs and 
their families who lived in “Little Boxes”47 which in turn were instrumental in 
creating the suburban myth of happiness. Millions of mainly white middle 
class families deserted the cities, for a supposedly better existence in the 
suburbs.48 Tacit support from the federal government insured that the suburbs 
remained inherently white as the FHA, for example, refused to guarantee 
loans for integrated housing projects. As a consequence, in 1957 some 
60,000 people lived in Levittown, Pennsylvania, and not one was black. 
Instead white couples (middle-aged and middle-income, Catholics, 
Protestants, and Jews) with children lived in the suburbs. Parents were 
prepared to live a relatively boring existence of conformity so that they could 
furnish their children with the joys of consumerism and homogenisation. The 
suburbanites looked and acted the same. The men idolised John Wayne or 
William Holden, while the women modelled themselves after June Allyson, 
Debbie Reynolds, or Audrey Hepburn, actresses who played sweet girls who 
became wholesome and cheerful wives like Dinah Shore. This was the
46 Los Angeles, however, was hardly a typical concentric city while the Texas towns 
increased largely due to annexation of fringe areas. I. Bernstein. Promises Kent: John F. 
Kennedy’s New Frontier. NY: Oxford University Press, 1993, pi 1-12.
47 S. Donaldson. The Suburban Mvth. NY: Columbia University Press, 1969. The title of 
Chapter 6 is “Little Boxes” in which Donaldson describe the suburban home.
48 W. Chafe. The Unfinished Joumev: America Since World War II. 3rd ed., NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, pi 19.
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Wonder Bread decade, Campbell soup, Spam, Velveeta.49 It was also the decade 
that the credit card and the hire purchase system emerged with the result that in 
1960, consumer indebtedness stood at $196 billion.50
The transformation of postwar American society was very much due to 
the emergence of new industries and businesses. The aircraft industry, for 
example, changed the Pacific Coast economy during the 1940s and ‘50s. 
Government expenditure for defence and space programs were very important in 
the development of economic growth of states such as California, Texas, 
Massachusetts and Ohio (the South itself was changed because its geography 
attracted the new industries). The defence industries often were able to avoid 
competition or to secure contracts for huge amounts of money. A good example 
of this is was General Dynamics which received contacts totalling $2.2 billion in 
1966 from the government.51 This was still a time when Americans believed in 
their military might and that their country was wealthy enough to spend on 
increasing and improving its military arsenal and power.52
The transformation of America during the 1950s continued due to such 
legislation as the Highway Act of 1956, which saw Congress appropriating $32 
billion to build 41,000 miles of highway in the United States. The average family 
in suburbia earned $6,500 - 70 percent higher than the average income for the rest 
of the nation. During the 1950s, four million boats were purchased, while 
swimming pools and expansive vacations were taken in the richer suburbs (more 
than eight million people travelled abroad in the 1950s). With the new highways 
and automobiles, a domestic tourism industry emerged in full force. Receipts for
49 T.H Anderson. The Movement & the Sixties: Protest in America from Greensboro to 
Wounded Knee. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p8.
50 R Garson and C. Bailey. The Uncertain Power: A Political History of the United States since 
1929. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990, p77
51 By early 1969, about 2,072 retired military officers of high rank were employed by 100 of the 
major defence contractors. Lockheed was saved from bankruptcy by the federal government in 
1971, despite being the recipient of defence contacts in 1968 for the sum of $2 billion, thanks to 
a congressional loan of $250 million. D.W Grantham. The United States Since 1945: The 
Ordeal of Power. NY: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1976, pi 14,118.
52 During the Kennedy years, military expenditure consistently increased: in fiscal year 1961 it 
totalled $44.7 billion, and by 1964 it was $52.4 billion. M.E Goldstein. Arms Control & 
Military Preparedness from Truman to Bush. NY: Peter Lang Publishers, 1993, p73.
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the motel industry alone increased by 2,300 percent between 1939 and 1958.53 
Thus, at least domestically the 1950s appeared to be happy decade as 
consumerism engulfed society, Americans could buy an array of electrical goods, 
they could travel not only in the US but abroad and enjoy their power.54 The 
impact of this geopolitical and social transformation would be felt much later with 
the Nixon administration and even more so with Reagan as both these Republican 
presidents would rely on the South and the Southwest for much of their support.55
The immediate post-World War II period carried within it the seeds for 
the tumultuous Sixties: the Holocaust, the terrible devastation of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki left a potent mark on humanity. The loss of atomic monopoly coupled 
with a ferocious anti-communist crusade created fear in American society,56 while 
the spread of capitalism and the power of the market, encouraged belief in the 
system.
The situation, however, could not continue as a growing number of people found 
the injustices in American society unacceptable which led to the development of 
two movements. One group was based in the North, and was composed of a few 
alienated students and professors; while the other group was in the South, and 
was made up of many blacks who were tired of being denied the American dream. 
The people of these movements rejected the Cold War culture, as did the future 
leaders of the counterculture movement. They had all grown up during the 
foreign and domestic anti-communist crusades which brought about a conformist 
society bent on consensus.57 This was part of an overall international force that 
saw the disintegration of the colonial world. The new thinking although still 
rather subtle in the 1950s meant that a clash with American corporate and
53 W. Chafe. The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II. 3rd ed., NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, pi 19.
54 G. Lipsitz, “Who’ll Stop the Rain? Youth Culture, Rock ‘N’ Roll, & Social Crises”, D. 
Farber. (ed.) The Sixties: From Memory to History. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1994, p219-220.
55 K.P Phillips. Post-Conservative America: People. Politics. & Ideology in a Time of Crisis. 
NY: Vintage Books, 1983.
56 Fried provides many examples of persecution during the 1950s and the type of questions that 
people were forced to answer. R.M Fried. Nightmare in Red: the McCarthy Era in Perspective. 
NY: Oxford University Press, 1990.
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strategic interests was almost inevitable. Suburban life, as well, was slowly 
developing as despite its affluence and apparent comfort something appeared to 
be missing.58
The issue of civil rights, is essential for understanding the development of 
modem America because by the 1980s the Reagan administration and many other 
conservatives came to feel that the peaceful and effective civil rights revolution 
that began in the postwar period had turned sour, especially with affirmative 
action programs.59
The Second World War helped to advance the cause of Black America as for 
example, membership in the NAACP grew from 50,000 members and 355 
branches in 1940, to 500,000 members and over 1,000 branches in 1945, while 
from 1944, Roosevelt began allowing black journalists to his news conferences.60 
The war also saw the intensification of black demands for equal rights (as the 
March on Washington Movement in 1941, led by A. Philip Randolph showed). 
Those who could not enlist joined the war effort (the number of blacks employed 
in shipyards more than doubled from 6,000 to 14,000, in the aircraft industry the 
number of blacks increased from 0 to 5,000, while in government service, it grow 
from 60,000 to 200,000). The number of black women who held positions as 
servants fell from 72 percent to 48 percent, while the number of factory operators 
rose from 7.3 percent to 18.6 percent.61 Many black Americans joined the armed 
forces, but despite risking and losing life and limb, they were segregated and 
treated appallingly as they endured discrimination, intimidation and death.62 The
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59 See for example B. Clinton. Between Hope and History: Meeting America’s Challenges For 
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movement received its first real boost with an Executive Order in July 1948 
banning segregation in the armed forces and federal employment. The problem, 
however, was that Truman was a prisoner of the Southern Democrats whom he 
needed if he was to have his Fair Deal agenda approved by Congress (it was 
either civil rights or widespread domestic reform). One could not fail to notice the 
impressive showing of Strom Thurmond in the 1948 presidential election,43 which 
in many ways paved the way for George Wallace’s astounding success in the late 
1960s.
The civil rights movement began to take full swing with the landmark case 
of Brown (1954) which led to integration, as the concept of “separate but equal” 
(in education) was no longer accepted. Brown had wider implications as it 
brought about an end to the Jim Crow laws after sixty years of hardship and 
discrimination. Although the civil rights movement was still in its infancy in the 
1950s, it laid the foundation for the great upheavals that were to shock America 
in the 1960s to its very core. The power of Black America was shown clearly a 
year after Brown in Montgomery, Alabama, when Mrs. Rosa Parks refused to 
hand-over her seat to a white person and the famous Montgomery Bus Boycott 
began. The boycott not only ended segregation on buses in Montgomery and 
showed the power of blacks, but it also allowed the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., 
to emerge as a great national leader. The whole issue of the civil rights during the 
1950s was integral in awakening Americans from their lethargic existence and 
although the movement was still relatively dormant (as compare to the activism of 
the following decade) it led Americans to ask how could the US lead in its 
international moral crusade with such internal injustices?
All these changes had a profound effect on the up and coming generations, used 
to seeing their fathers coming home late and their mothers living an unfulfilled 
life. These relatively educated youngsters heading toward state, and out-of-state 
colleges, where they would mingle with other men and women of their
Best War ever: America and World War II. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1994, p82-84.
42
backgrounds and slowly challenge much of their parents’ accepted existence by 
the end of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s. They would also be greatly 
influenced by a variety of books ranging from Ralph Ellison The Invisible Man 
which captures the experience of blacks and the fear of communism rather aptly 
to Jack Kerouac’s famous book On The Road. The calls for political, social and 
economic equality which began in the 1950s by the 1970s and early 1980s 
polarised American society, as many found it difficult to accept the new goals, 
which rose to prominence with the 1960s and the Johnsonite reforms as they felt 
that they infringed on their rights, while increasing the size and power of the 
federal government.64
The Kennedy era is fascinating for students of American development 
because it is such an enigma. The Kennedy presidency and family are surrounded 
in such an aura that it is no wonder that some commentators have contrasted it to 
Camelot.63
During his 1960 campaign, Kennedy sought to create the image that under 
Eisenhower, America had fallen behind. He encouraged the idea that his 
predecessor had allowed a missile gap to develop, which was coupled with the 
loss of the first battle in the conquest for the stars, as the Soviet Sputnik 
emphasised in 1957.66 Americans, the argument went, were too concerned with 
consumerism which enabled the Soviet Union to overcome the gap that existed 
between the two superpowers. Kennedy’s aim following the election (especially 
as he did not have a clear mandate) was to unite America in the pursuit of the 
New Frontier.67 His inaugural speech embodied all of these ideas.68 In his quest,
63 Thurmond in 1948 won 1,176,125, which was more than the 1,157,326 votes that Henry 
Wallace - a seasoned campaigner by 1948 - won. Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1981, 
102nd ed., Washington DC: US GPO, 1981, p478.
64 P.N Carroll. It Seemed Like Nothing Happened: The Tragedy & Promise of America in the 
1970s. NY: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1982.
65 N. Chomsky. Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War & US Political Culture. London: 
Verso, 1993.
66 The truth was that America was not that far behind in the space race as on January 31, 1958, 
the first satellite (Explorer I) was successfully launched from Cape Canaveral.
67 M.A Jones. The Limits of Liberty: American History. 1607-1992. 2nd ed, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p544-550; I. Bernstein. Promises Kept: John F. Kennedy’s New 
Frontier. NY: Oxford University Press, 1993.
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Kennedy recruited the best and the brightest, men and women determined to do 
all that they could to counter communism and improve standards of living in 
America and the world.69
It was during the Kennedy presidency that liberalism began its 
radicalisation, as its goals and methodologies became more linked to theory, 
technology and sociology. Computers and science became the blueprint of the 
Kennedyites liberals who wanted to stimulate consumer buying, spark economic 
growth, reduce unemployment and increase the revenue of the federal 
government.70 Kennedy’s economic policy was based on the belief that 
government intervention was necessary. Under Kennedy one saw an increase in 
the minimum wage, the extension of social security, aid to regional development 
and wage “guidelines” to help dampen inflation.71 The new liberalism meant that 
the Democratic Party chose to abandon the Jacksonian and Trumanesque 
ideology of rural Missouri and steel-making East Baltimore for a liberalism 
advocated by professors, urban planners, social welfare workers, minority causists 
and international economists.72 It was they, rather then blue-collar workers who 
now led the movement and Democratic Party, thus making the Republican Party 
more attractive to the more conservative-oriented blue-collar workers. The 
politically astute Nixon was able to appeal to these conservative Democrats once
68 T.C Sorensen, (ed.) “Let the Word Go Forth” The Speeches. Statements. & Writings of John 
F. Kennedy. 1947-1963. NY: Dell Publishing, 1988, pl2-15.
69 For a very favourable view of the Kennedy administration see I. Bernstein. Promises Kent: 
John F. Kennedy’s New Frontier. NY: Oxford University Press, 1993.
70 J.N Giglio. The Presidency of John F. Kennedy. Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 1990,
pl21.
71 Kennedy in his State of the Union Address on January 30, 1961, not only pointed to the 
economic stagnation that was stifling America, as he also spoke of some of his economic 
policies which clearly show that under him the federal government will be far more involved in 
social welfare. T.C Sorensen, (ed.) “Let the Word Go Forth” The Speeches. Statements. & 
Writings of John F. Kennedy. 1947-1963. NY: Dell Publishing, 1988, pl47-149; R. Heilbroner 
and A. Singer. The Economic Transformation of America: 1600 to the Present. 3rd ed., Fort 
Worth: Harecourt Brace College Publishers, 1994, p328.
72 Many of these people were associated with the ‘evil’ Eastern Establishment who often
supported many of the more revolutionary approaches to politics. Robertson provides an 
excellent attack on the Establishment (especially on Rockefeller and Margaret Sanger). P. 
Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991, p i90 and throughout.
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George Wallace was removed from contention before the 1972 presidential 
election,73 thus helping him win the election by a landslide.
The 1960s were truly unique in American history as it was during that 
time that one saw the development and the rebellion of a generation.74 Middle 
class America after taking on Kennedy’s message involving the Peace Corps, 
foreign aid and Indochina, began to question the legacy that they had inherited. 
The sixties could be seen from several different perspectives, two of which lie in 
the mainstream of American politics - “liberal” and “conservative.” The “liberal” 
approach views the decade as a time when millions of Americans challenged and 
questioned the practices of the establishment. These Americans were not prepared 
to accept or tolerate the gap that existed between the American ideal and reality. 
Inspired by early civil rights activism and Kennedyite rhetoric, young people 
demanded that their country lived up to the values that they had been taught. 
Conservatives, on the contrary, saw the sixties as a time of extremism with the 
youth revolt as a product of the permissiveness and affluence that spawned from 
the post-World War II period. They sought to reverse the liberal policies of the 
decade, relax the aggressive civil liberties programs, end or reduce federal 
involvement in social services etc.75
The counterculture movement of the 1960s was remarkable because it 
embodied so many new ideas, images, themes and philosophies that were to have 
such a tremendous impact on the development of contemporary society, and not 
just in the United States. In the words of one commentator: “Often bright, 
innocent, tender, spontaneous, playful, joyful, spiritual, mystical, sensual, and full 
of reverence, it could just as easily be dark, dirty, terrifying, mindless, self- 
indulgent, lonely, mad, and hurtful. It throbbed with feeling; it anesthetized
73 T.H Anderson. The Movement and the Sixties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p396, 
p397.
74 R. Jacobs. The Wav the Wind Blew: A History of the Weather Underground. London: Verso, 
1997. The Weather Underground was not unique, as blacks and Native-Americans had their 
militant groups which is why many conservatives in the US were fearful of the way the country 
was moving.
75 E.P Morgan. The 60s Experience: Hard Lessons About Modem America. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1991, p6, p7.
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feeling. It abhorred violence, yet it attracted violence. It rejected technology, but 
its music depended upon electronics. Its rejection of politics was implicitly 
political. It was both holy and satanic. It was Woodstock; it was Altamont.” The 
movement was composed of such themes as civil rights, anti-war, the New Left 
and so forth.76
The civil rights movement which began peacefully also turned ugly as it 
developed its own momentum. It is unclear whether dissatisfaction with 
politicians or simply the realisation that progress was not been achieved fast 
enough pushed black militants to call for “black power”.77 Whatever the main 
reason for the growing militancy of black Americans, one thing is certain, and that 
is, that white middle class America was frightened by the unleashing of this anger. 
The rise in black militancy must also be seen in conjunction with the growing 
raucousness of the anti-war movement. Affluent Americans, who escaped the 
draft by going to university (something that their rather conservative parents were 
responsible for due to their hard work) turned against mainstream bourgeoisie 
society.7*
The Vietnam war features very highly in any understanding of the 1960s, 
in the development of the New Right and the Reagan coalition. Although 
American involvement in Indochina could be traced back to Truman,79 it was 
really with Kennedy and even more with Johnson that America became entangled
76 E.P Morgan. The 60s Experience: Hard Lessons About Modem America. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1991, pl69; T.H Anderson. The Movement & the Sixties: Protest in 
America from Greensboro to Wounded Knee. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p241-291.
77 Colburn and Pozzetta argue that black activists who went down South and lived with poor 
black families in Mississippi and saw the hardship and violence that they encountered in the 
pursuit of the vote, pushed the SNCC to adopt a more radical agenda. D.E Colburn and G.E 
Pozzetta, “Race, Ethnicity, & the Evolution of Political Legitimacy”, D. Faiber. (ed.) The 
Sixties: From Memory to History. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994, pl22; 
S. Carmichael and C.V Hamilton. Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America. NY: 
Vintage Books, 1967.
78 Reagan claims that before he became governor, students cheered him, once he entered the 
governor mansion the students turned against him. R. Reagan. An American Life. London: 
Hutchinson, 1990; R. Jacobs. The Wav the Wind Blew: A History of the Weather Underground. 
London: Verso, 1997. Some of the members of the movement received financial support from 
their parents and the state to facilitate their ability to rebel against the system.
79 R.J Donovan. Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman. 1949-1953. NY: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1982.
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in the conflict that was raging in the country and the region. To American minds, 
indoctrinated into accepting the domino theory, Vietnam became crucial both 
politically and militarily to the survival of Western democracy.*0
The Tet Offensive of January 1968 has been identified by many as the 
turning point of the war as it caused a military and a psychological shock. 
Americans had not imagined that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong had the 
capacity to launch a full scale attack against them (it has been estimated that 
about 100,000 troops struck at more than 150 different places). “The reporting of 
the Tet Offensive on television undoubtedly shocked many people, especially after 
previous coverage of the war had been comparatively tame.”*1 Tet, although 
failing to change the environment within which the Defence Department existed, 
drove home to Americans the notion that: “...the United States, despite its 
overwhelming military force, did not possess the power to achieve its goals of an 
independent, viable South Vietnam.”82 Americans were forced to realise that 
despite sending hundreds of thousands of American combat troops and investing 
billions of dollars in the war effort, victory was still nowhere in sight.83 This led to 
such as questions as how would the US do against the Soviet Union? The 
Offensive had such an impact on the United States that the success of Eugene 
McCarthy - running on a peace platform at the Democratic primary in New
80 Lamy notes the importance of Vietnam to the mentality of survivalists for whom “...Vietnam 
was a sign that the military and ideological balance of world power was shifting.” P. Lamy. 
Millennium Rage: Survivalists. White Supremacists, and the Doomsday Prophecy. London: 
Plenum Press, 1996, p75 and throughout.
81 C.J Pach Jr., “And That’s They Way It Was: The Vietnam War & the Network Mighty 
Ways”, D. Faiber. (ed.) The Sixties: From Memory to History. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994, pl07, p i 12; Greene claims that following Tet, both Nixon and Kissinger 
gave up any hope of a military victory. J.R Greene. The Limits of Power: The Nixon & Ford 
Administrations. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, p83; Karaow notes that men 
such as General Westmoreland and Peter Braestrup suggested that the media created all of the 
hype surrounding Tet. S. Kamow. Vietnam: A History. London: Pimlico, 1991, p558; 
Buzzanco, however, argues that there were plenty of high ranking military men who publicly 
opposed the war, such as Ridgway, Shoup, Gaun, Lauris Norstad. They wrote books and 
articles, appeared before congressional committees and so forth, with the message that the 
Vietnam war was “a political, strategic, and moral blunder from the United States should 
quickly disengage.” B. Buzzanco, “The American Military’s Rational Against the Vietnam 
War.” Political Science Quarterly 101 (4, 1986) p559-576.
82 L.J Korb. The Fall & Rise of the Pentagon: American Defence Policies in the 1970s. 
Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979, p7.
83 American planes dropped 6.7 billion tons of bombs on Indochina between 1965 and 1973 
which amounted to three times the total tonnage dumped on all enemy nations in World War n. 
T.G Paterson. Meeting the Communist Threat. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p260.
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England which in turn led to Johnson’s sudden announcement that he would not 
seek a second term - was attributed to it.*4
American confidence was further eroded when they saw their own Secretary of 
State appearing before the Fulbright’s foreign relations committee to testify for 
eleven hours over a two-day period. Although according to one commentator, 
Secretary Rusk acquitted himself well during Fulbright’s questioning, the image 
that was portrayed - as the debate was televised during the day, and in the 
evening excerpts were replayed - was that there was a growing mood within 
Congress of misgivings concerning the administration’s policy in Vietnam.*5
Richard Nixon helped to divide American society further than it was when 
he became president in 1968. It was he who at the Miami Convention created in 
many respects a new Republican Party which was beholden to Southern 
conservatives while also seeking to reverse much of the New Deal-Great Society 
programs.*6 Nixon came to realise that many people in the United States were 
unhappy with the way the country was progressing. The majority of Americans 
existed in what could be seen as the middle of the political sphere as they 
occupied a place which disliked the “hawks” and the “doves” solutions that were 
being offered by each party to the problems faced by the country. The backbone 
of political America (white working and lower-middle class men and women) 
came to feel that their voices had been demoted to an unacceptable level.
84 R  Garson and C. J Bailey. The Uncertain Power: A Political History of the United States since 
1929. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990, pi 16. The New Hampshire primary was 
very interesting as Eugene McCarthy, an eccentric Democrat which not many people had heard 
of still managed to capture a large percent of the vote.
Kamow provides different explanation for Eugene McCarthy’s broad appeal, such as his name 
which some voters mistook for Joseph McCarthy. But even he concedes that Eugene 
McCarthy’s success was unexpected. S. Kamow. Vietnam: A History. London: Pimlico, 1991, 
p572.
85 S. Kamow. Vietnam: A History. London: Pimlico, 1991, p572.
86 In Miami, Nixon needed 667 delegates, he secured 692 votes with 228 votes out of 292 from 
the South. Thus, without Southerners’ support, Nixon would have been 203 votes shy of a 
majority in the first ballot, and according to at least one commentator, would not have been able 
to win the nomination. A.J Reichley. Conservative in An Age of Change: The Nixon & Ford 
Administration. Washington DC: The Brookings Institutions, 1981, p81, pl76; D. Brock, 
“Strom’s Thurmond’s Roots.” The New Republic March 3,1982. Brock suggests that the reason 
for the failure of the Justice Department in 1972 to force a change in South Carolina (to make 
representation more equal between whites and blacks) was because in 1968 Thurmond had 
delivered Nixon the Republican presidential nomination.
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“Predominately white, members of all economic classes, and politically active, by 
1968 Middle Americans had enough. They longed to replace the climate of 
welfare, violence, defeat, and deception with a leadership that championed the 
old-fashioned American values of peace, honor, and honesty. As they geared up 
for the 1968 presidential election, they searched for a candidate who would 
reform America and end the political experimentation of the sixties.”*7 These 
disgruntled Americans felt that their tremendous sacrifice in paying for the Great 
Society8* reforms had netted them nothing but higher taxes (Johnson was forced 
to raise taxes to pay for the butter and the guns; this was four years after the 1964 
tax cut which highlighted America’s economic prowess89), while those benefiting 
from the legislation became more militant, disorderly and ungrateful (especially 
with Stokely Carmichael clamour for “black power”). The race riots of the 
1960s,90 the occupation of Alcatraz by Native-Americans and so forth, were seen 
as examples of American society turning more disorderly, if not a lawless. Nixon 
understood this sentiment and was able to capitalise on it by transforming himself 
as the candidate of Middle America. In the words of one commentator: “No 
politician on the national scene in 1968 better understood exactly what the Middle 
wanted than did Nixon. Indeed, by virtue of both his background and the niche 
that he had cut out for himself in politics since 1952, he was one of them.”91
The Democratic Convention in Chicago of 1968 stressed the growing 
divisions within American society and politics. The decision to give Hubert 
Humphrey the presidential nomination angered many antiwar activists who felt 
that the Party’s hierarchy had failed to acknowledge the will of the popular 
majority. This was augmented by the brutality of the Chicago police when they
87 J.R Greene. The Limits of Power: The Nixon & Ford Administrations. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992, p4.
88 M.A Jones. The Limits of Liberty: American History. 1607-1992. 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p550-552.
89 The Kennedy tax cuts which took effect on January 1, 1964, and January 1, 1965, reduced 
marginal rates on personal income by an average of twenty percent. P.C Roberts. The SuppIv- 
Side Revolution: An Insider’s Account of Policymaking In Washington. London: Harvard 
University Press, 1984, p76.
90 R. Garson and C. J Bailey. The Uncertain Power: A Political History of the United States since 
1929. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990, plOO.
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“dealt” with the antiwar demonstrators outside of the convention (which was also 
captured and brought to the homes of millions of Americans via the media).92 The 
antiwar protesters who converged on Chicago were composed of essentially 
white youths, left-wing extremists, moderates, dissidents and hippies, some of 
whom were looking to cause trouble. On August 28, violence flared when police 
and National Guardsmen tried to stop the protesters from marching to the 
International Amphitheatre, where the Convention was being held. The 
demonstrators were chased through the downtown area, during which they were 
attacked with clubs, rifle butts and tear gas while the youths - some waving 
Vietcong flags - responded with rocks and bottles. Hundreds were arrested, but 
the following day thousands gathered as a rally at Grant Park to hear Tom 
Hayden warning that the battle had just began. The situation had negative impact 
on the Eugene McCarthy campaign according to one of his advisors Sam Brown, 
because the behaviour of the students alienated many Americans who were 
already concerned with the rise in the level of lawlessness in society.95
By the middle of the decade, the civil rights movement became more 
fragmented as a result of growing frustration and anguish. This had a direct 
impact on white participation, and when Martin Luther King Jr., Carmichael and 
McKissick led a march in Mississippi that summer, the lack of white participation 
was noticeable. The summer of 1966, in the words of one commentator: “...were 
the days of decision concerning the future of civil rights.”, as many whites began 
to question whether civil rights had gone too far. This was something that 
conservatives were suggesting at the time, especially following Goldwater’s 
presidential campaign. People were wondering whether the struggle was inspired 
by subversives who did not seek to share power but take power and'dominate
91 J.R Greene. The Limits of Power: The Nixon & Ford Administrations. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992, p4.
92 M.A Jones. The Limits of Liberty: American History. 1607-1992. 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p557.
93 The army, navy and air force intelligence services infiltrated some of the groups with covert
agents, which also included a team disguised as a television crew to photograph the youngsters 
for the federal records. The CIA was also present despite the fact that it was prohibited from
operating within the US. S. Kamow. Vietnam: A History. London: Pimlico, 1991, p594-595; R. 
Jacobs. The Wav the Wind Blew: A History of the Weather Underground. London: Verso, 1997.
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whites.94 White disenchantment with the movement was fed by such incidents as
the one that took place in California in 1967, when the California legislature was
considering legislation that would curb Black Panthers legal possessions of
weapons, thirty legally armed members of the Panthers marched to the legislature
and into the visitors’ gallery. The thirty were arrested for disturbing the peace in
front of the media.95 As one commentator had written:
“The specter of armed blacks invading the legislature was transmitted 
across national news media, triggering near hysteria in some quarters, 
and a massive campaign of repression.”96
These conflicts were based on the fact that the real problem that the country faced 
during this time was that its politicians could pass enlightened and progressive 
legislation but one could not eradicate regional, social and historic differences 
simply and quickly97 and this was something that those demanding reforms were 
not prepared to accept. They felt that they have existed as secondary citizens for 
too long and this was their time.
The presidency of Richard Nixon although often remembered for 
Watergate also saw great changes in traditional US foreign policy. This was 
essentially because in foreign policy Nixon was probably at his best. Nixon loved 
foreign policy as its intricacy and complexity appealed to his devious nature, and 
with a Political Realist side-kick in the form of Henry Kissinger, Nixon had found 
himself the perfect partner. The Nixonian foreign policy style was essentially
94 T.H Anderson. The Movement & the Sixties: Protest in America from Greensboro to 
Wounded Knee. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p i54, 157. Anderson quotes Roger 
Wilkins’ comment to his wife following the televising of Carmichael call for “Black Power”. 
Wilkins said: “There’s a whole lot of white people gonna have diarrhea tonight.” pl55. 
Anderson cites Wilkins A Man’s Life. pl44.
For militant black activist language see S. Carmichael and C.V Hamilton. Black Power: The 
Politics of Liberation in America. NY: Vintage Books, 1967. In the book the authors claim that 
racism is institutionalised in the US and that white middle class America is racist and cannot be 
trusted.
95 E.P Morgan. The 60s Experience: Hard Lessons About Modem America. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1991, p82.
96 E.P Morgan. The 60s Experience: Hard Lessons About Modem America. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1991, p82.
97 T.H Anderson. The Movement & the Sixties: Protest in America from Greensboro to 
Wounded Knee. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pl57.
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conservative and nationalistic98 thus embodying two main strands of American 
society, especially with the proliferation of US involvement in Indochina. This 
policy, however, turned to a more balance of power paradigm (especially with the 
belief that the Soviets were becoming more powerful) which caused much 
anguish and concern to Americans who for decades if not centuries believed in an 
idealistic foreign policy. They tended to equate balance of power theory and 
Realpolitik with Europe (Old World). Americans could not really forget the 
legacy of Wilson, Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy which called upon the US to 
use its great power to the betterment of mankind (not to mention Washington 
warning against “permanent alliances with foreign nations”99). With the rise of 
Nixon, they were suddenly asked to play politics and ignore morality, just like the 
old European countries100 while also seeing their great power diminish.
Nixon was responsible for the development of detente which led to a lull 
in the strong confrontationalist rhetoric between the superpowers. The era of 
detente is very important as it meant that the superpowers sought to work 
together to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war.101 The Moscow Summit of 1972 
led to the signing of the Basic Principles Agreement on May 29, 1972, which has 
been seen as the charter of detente, although in time it would lose some of its 
majesty for the Americans. SALT I saw the imposition of a ban on the testing and 
the deployment of air, space, or mobile based land-based ABM systems. 
Provisions were laid for restricting ABM sites to no more than two for each 
country. This part of the treaty was of unlimited duration. The Interim Agreement 
on the Limitation of Strategic Arms was the second part of SALT. It set down a 
ceiling on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic
98 AJ Reichley. Conservatives in an Age of Change: The Nixon & Ford Administrations. 
Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1981, pl24-125.
99 The quotation is from M.A Jones. The Limits of Liberty: American History. 1607-1992. 2nd 
ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p84.
100 For the lack of morality in Nixon’s foreign policy see A  J Reichley. Conservatives in an Age 
of Change: The Nixon & Ford Administrations. Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 
1981, pl09.
101 One reason behind Nixon’s pursuit of arms limitation was that after eight years in Vietnam, 
the arms race was a considerable burden, especially as by the late 1960s the US economy was 
feeling the strain of the two (three if one adds the Great Society reforms). Nixon also hoped that
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missiles (SLBMs), and missile carrying submarines. This part of the agreement 
was to expire in 1977, although the superpowers agreed to pursue this watershed 
treaty in the form of SALT II later.1”
The economic situation in the first and second Nixon administrations was 
far from positive. The war in Vietnam reduced American economic wealth as 
Johnson’s refusal to raise taxes to pay for the war and subsidise his Great Society 
reforms increased the deficit, weakened the dollar and led to a rise in inflation.103 
The economic growth and affluence that Americans were used to suddenly came 
under threat. Moreover, American dominance in economics was slowly fading as 
Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan all experienced greater rates of 
economic growth in manufacturing output than the US.104 This was very 
unnerving for Americans as economics was the one area that they always felt 
confident about, as they believed that American capitalism was unbeatable. The 
increasing potency of the European and Japanese economies (which on many 
occasions were headed by Social Democrats with a firm commitment to social 
welfare) forced Americans to pause and wonder whether their system of 
capitalism could not deal with social welfare. Economics simply become another 
stick to beat the Statue of Liberty with.
The Americans reliance on foreign oil in particular from the Middle East 
was placing them on a collision course with disaster. The late 1960s and the 
1970s saw an intensification of the Arab-Israeli conflict that reached a new level 
with the terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics. America’s close relations 
with Israel and the strong ties between the Arab world and the Soviet world were 
making matters worse even though the superpowers were developing detente. As 
the economic conditions in America worsened due to the domestic policies of
an arms agreement would defuse some of the militant anti-war sentiments. J. Ranelagh. CIA: A 
History. London: BBC Books, 1992, pl62.
102 A.J Reichley. Conservatives in an Ace of Change: The Nixon & Ford Administrations 
Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1981, pl41-142.
103 W.H Chafe. The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II. 3rd ed., NY: Oxford 
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104 R. Garson and CJ Bailey. The Uncertain Power: A Political History of the United States 
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Johnson and Nixon, the OPEC countries decided to raise the price of oil because 
of America’s aid to Israel during the Yom Kippur war. Thus, America’s reliance 
on foreign oil, led to severe hardship emerging and by the middle of the decade as 
the country could not function without foreign supplies.105 
Nixon’s manipulation of the economy to prop up his chances for re-election did 
not help the matters. In the words of one commentator his economic policy was 
“...a zigzag of competing, sometimes contradictory steps, designed both to boost 
Nixon’s reelection bid of 1972 and to readjust U.S. economic power in a more 
competitive world.”106 In August 1971, Nixon decided to drop his hostility 
towards economic control and impose a ninety-day price and wage freeze, thus 
restricting the money supply because of the continuous rise in inflation and 
unemployment. He also called for tax cuts to stimulate the economy and began 
taking the first steps in devaluing the dollar.107 These policies were successful in 
the short-run (increased prosperity) but once price and wage controls were 
removed inflation rose dramatically throughout 1973.100 This tinkering and course 
changing was only making matters worse for the American people as Nixon was 
unprepared to take the hard decisions as he feared that his popularity would be 
affected and that might hinder his chances for re-election.
The 1970s were probably the most corrupt decade in modem American 
history.109 They began with Watergate which was followed with several highly 
placed politicians acting inappropriately and therefore embarrassing themselves 
and the country. During the Nixon administration the CIA, the FBI and the IRS 
were used for political purposes and Americans throughout the decade
105 America in 1970 spent only $4 billion on imported oil, ten years later it spent $90 billion. 
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increasingly found out more about their secret agencies.110 In 1975, confidence in 
government fell even further when newspapers and congressional investigation 
revealed improper activities of the CIA. Americans discovered that since the 
Kennedy administration the agency had been involved in plots to overthrow a 
number of foreign governments and assassinate their leaders. Americans learned 
that internally, infringements of their civil rights took place as their mail was 
tampered with, their telephone calls were monitored and records were kept on 
thousands of individuals and groups illegally.111 With the rise in education and 
awareness of political rights Americans were no longer prepared to accept such 
intrusions. They would demand that their rights were respected by their elected 
representatives. In other words, whereas Americans in the 1950s accepted greater 
government intervention because they had faith in the system and in the American 
leadership, by the 1970s that faith had been replaced with deep-seated 
scepticism.112
It was a desire to reduce and hopefully eliminate all corruption in 
Washington (which Watergate uncovered) coupled with increasing campaign 
expenditure, that led Congress to pass several pieces of legislation to deal with 
election procedures. The process began with the Legislative Reorganisation Act 
of 1970, which had the effect of widely dispersing and de-centralising power. The 
president, due to the reforms had to court 535 members instead of having to 
liaison with a handful of senior oligarchs in order to get his measures supported in 
Congress. The reform movement also had the effect of opening Congress up to 
greater public scrutiny and participation. The publication of members’ votes 
pushed legislators more toward servicing their constituents rather than to working 
with the executive. This caused the president to face a more complex and
110 M.A Jones. The Limits of Liberty: American History. 1607-1992. 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p563; J. Ranelagh. CIA: A History. London: BBC Books, 1992; T.G 
Paterson. Meeting the Communist Threat. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. The 
“oversight revolution” that took place in the 1970s saw Congress examining clandestine 
operations much more closely than ever before which led to the release of much more 
information; J. Ranelagh. CIA: A History. London: BBC Books, 1992.
111 M.A Jones. The Limits of Liberty: American History. 1607-1992. 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p565.
112 T.G Paterson. Meeting the Communist Threat. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p234- 
255; J. Ranelagh. CIA: A History. London: BBC Books, 1992.
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competitive legislative process.113 Another important piece of legislation was the 
1974 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) which revised finance rules as it set 
out overall and state-by-state spending limits for candidates (in 1988, Robertson’s 
campaign would bump up against the overall spending limit). FECA limited 
individual contributions to a candidate to $1,000 per election; Political Action 
Groups (PACs) could contribute no more than $5,000. This forced candidates to 
build a broader base of financial support and develop a large network of small 
donors which is difficult and time-consuming, which is why candidates are 
encouraged to begin campaigning early on. FECA’s rules governing federal 
matching funds provided further encouragement for candidates, as to qualify for 
matching funds in a presidential nominating contest, a candidate had to raise 
$5,000 in at least 20 states utilising donations of $250 or less. Once that is 
achieved, the candidate qualifies for federal matching of the first $250 of each 
donation he or she receives.114 Thus, throughout the decade accountability in US 
politics was greatly increased because Congress sought to raise its oversight 
powers, often at the expense of the presidency.
The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 was meant to usher in a new era in 
American politics. Carter, the outsider from Georgia, rode into the White House 
by being anti-establishment. This born-again Christian was meant to clean house 
while also infusing a high dosage of morality that had been lost due to the 
numerous scandals that America had to endure. Carter projected a kinder image 
in foreign policy,113 while not advocating dramatic restructuring domestically. He 
differed from Gerald Ford in that he promised morality, optimism, and a vision for 
the country’s future. The 1976 election result did not give Carter a clear mandate,
113 J.J Hogan, “Legislative Liaison in the Reagan Administration”, J.D Lees and M. Turner, 
(ed.) Reagan’s First Four Years: A New Beginning?. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1988, p68.
114 D.M Oldfield. The Right & The Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican 
Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, p76-77. On campaign finance, Oldfield 
cites C. Wilcox, “Financing the 1988 Prenomination Campaigns”, E.H Buell Jr., and L. 
Sigelman. (ed) Nominating the President. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1991.
115 Rosati shows how the administration moved from being very optimistic and seeking a global 
community in its first three years into adopting a more pessimistic stance by its fourth year. J.A 
Rosati. The Carter Administration’s Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and their Impact on 
Behavior. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987.
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which is always a problem. Moreover, because he could not rely on party
allegiance when dealing with Congress116 his job was made much harder. Even
without his problems at Washington, Carter’s task was truly monumental. The
war in Indochina, the disgrace of the Nixon administration, the breakdown of the
party system, the break in the congressional system of seniority and the
proliferation of hundreds of PACs had jeopardised and reduced the power of the
presidency. Questions over executive action and the manner in which the country
was being ran were being asked far more frequently.117 This was very much
because for members of Congress their first priority was to their constituents and
not to a president especially one who rode into the White House by claiming that
Washington and big business were decadent and banal.11*
“In Carter’s eyes, America had been humiliated by Watergate and 
Vietnam, but it could be rebuilt economically, politically and morally.
He pledged to break the control of the insider Washington clique, 
open up the government, bring in a new generation of younger, honest 
and accountable politicians, involve the people and inject a sense of 
ethics, justice and morality into decision-taking at home and aboard.”119
In foreign policy, just as in the domestic realm, Carter espoused a high 
moral attitude. He very often risked confrontation with the Soviet Union because 
of his denunciation of their internal policies. This was very much counter to what 
the Soviets felt was the norm of not interfering in the internal affairs of the other 
superpower.120 It is probably because of Carter’s attitude that his administration 
was far more aware of the rise and presence of the Third World (compared to 
Nixon who tended to ignore the developing world121). The Carterite White House
116 B.I Kaufman. The Presidency of James Earl Carter. Jr. Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1993; E.C Hargove. Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership & the Politics of Public 
Good. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993.
117 B.I Kaufman. The Presidency of James Earl Carter. Jr. Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1993, pi.
1181. Derbyshire. Politics in the United States: From Carter to Reagan. England: W&R 
Chambers, 1987.
1191. Derbyshire. Politics in the United States: From Carter to Reagan. England: W&R 
Chambers, 1987, p25.
120 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian Revolution and the increased Soviet and 
Cuban involvement in Africa led to a change in Carter’s stance concerning the Soviet Union. 
J.A Rosati. The Carter Administration’s Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and their Impact 
on Behavior. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987.
121 Apart from Vietnam and the Middle East, the US did not give much attention to Third 
World regions, and therefore did not develop a coherent policy. Nixon, the president, never
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accepted that the less developed world had its own agenda which it pursued. The 
Third World sought development and was much less interested in the East-West 
debate as such (unless they could gain something from it). Moreover, as Carter 
entered the White House in an optimistic frame of mind he and his administration 
were willing to work with the Soviet Union and Soviet-backed societies (until the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan US-Soviet relations were very much improve 
under Carter).122
The 1970s were a difficult period for many Americans as they were let 
down time and time again by their national leaders, although the problems began 
in the mid-’60s. Many Americans believed Johnson when he said that he was not 
going “...to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do. They 
ask us to take reckless action that would risk the lives of millions, engulf much of 
Asia, and threaten the peace of the entire world. Such action would offer no 
solution to the real problem of Vietnam.”123 But Johnson had let them down. He 
was followed by Richard Nixon who brought shame and ignominy on the White 
House, the Presidency and American politics in general as no other president had 
ever done. Gerald Ford, a man with a great reputation, managed to tarnish it with 
his pardon of Nixon and his inability to solve America’s economic and social 
woes while his constant gaffes caused much discomfort in the US. Americans 
exasperated with traditional or conventional politicians turned to a “born-again” 
Christian, an outsider, a man who had spent most of his adult life outside of 
politics while still serving his country. But he too failed them, and failed them 
abysmally, as instead of injecting new vigour into American society, he 
propagated a sense of malaise and decline. Thus, the theme of the 1980 election 
from the Reaganite camp was about restoration.
visited a Latin American country (except Mexico), or went to Africa. Kissinger and Nixon’s 
interest in Latin America were confined to Cuba and Chile. M.A Genovese. The Nixon 
Presidency: Power and Politics in Turbulent Times. NY: Greenwood Press, 1990, pl58.
122 RA Rosati. The Carter Administration’s Quest For Global Community: Beliefs and Their 
Impact on Behavior. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987.
123 L.B Johnson. Mv Hope For America. London: William Heinemann, 1964, p59.
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The failure was not restricted to the executive branch of the government, 
as Congress which although in the Seventies attempted to re-assert itself against 
the ‘imperial presidency’ was still inefficient and ineffective, especially as its 
members were more concerned with their own constituencies rather than the big 
picture. Its ability to provide a clear policy was effected by the challenging of 
party and committee leadership. This led Congress, on the one hand, to be more 
democratic and decentralised, but at the same time it made it less manageable and 
predictable.124 This was coupled with some very embarrassing scandals throughout 
the decade ranging from sexual to misappropriation of funds. America appeared 
to be lacking an effective leadership, something that Ronald Reagan with his New 
Right agenda promised to rectify.
For the New Right the immediate decline of the US began with Nixon 
who had recognised Communist China and signed various treaties with the Soviet 
Union. The recognition of the PRC meant that the world was no longer bipolar 
and that America could not stand alone against the Soviet Union and communism. 
The various treaties with the Soviet Union showed that America did not have 
military superiority and that the Soviets could bring about the effective 
destruction of the United States.
The fall in the dollar and the economic potency of the United States was 
extremely frightening to Americans as it made them wonder whether social 
democracy (the European model as seen in Italy, West Germany, France or even 
Britain) would be imposed upon them? They also began to question their own 
survivability as a world leader. This is why American society by the end of the 
1970s was dejected and deflated as it appeared that it was forced to retreat on 
almost every conceivable front while the Soviet Union and Communism were 
marching into America’s own backyard through the New Jewel Movement in 
Grenada and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
124 R  Haass. Congressional Power: Implications for American Security Policy. London: The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers 153, 1979, p8; C.J Bailey. The 
Republican Party in the US Senate. 1974-1984: Party Changes & Institutional Development. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.
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In sum, American society had gone through great change since the end of 
the Second World War. In 1945, Americans were comfortable with the future 
that awaited them and the world. They would shape the world in their own image 
and create the ideal society. As opinions and attitudes changed due to Soviet 
development Americans’ peace of mind began to dwindle, but their economic 
supremacy kept them composed. The social revolution of the 1960s and the rights 
revolution of the 1970s coupled with the numerous foreign policy failures led 
Americans to lose their belief in their supremacy and therefore their ‘manifest 
destiny. ’ The effect of this was to set the stage for the rise of the New Right and 
the entry of Ronald Reagan, the ultimate optimist and national chauvinist.
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CHAPTER II
THE NEW RIGHT:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN IDEOLOGY
The defeat of Jimmy Carter by Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential 
election ushered in a new era in American history, as a new force entered the 
political fray under the ambiguous title of “New Right”. This enigmatic 
movement went on to cause much havoc in American society which is perhaps 
why it and Reagan have attracted so much interest from scholars. Much effort 
has been put by commentators to understand how, for example, this force 
emerged, how much power it had in American politics, and what was its impact.
The “New Right” officially appeared in 1976, when a group of 
conservative men decided that Gerald Ford was unsuited to continue as 
President of the United States due to his inability to deal with the economic 
situation, his gaffes over Eastern Europe, the appointment of Nelson 
Rockefeller as vice-president and most importantly his pardon of Richard 
Nixon.1 These activists were almost successful in removing Gerald Ford from 
the Republican Party presidential ticket in 1976, but fortunately for Reagan and 
the movement, Ford was able to secure the nomination. Although the immediate 
forebears of the New Right failed in 1976, both with Reagan and the American 
Independence Party, 1976 was seen as a setback and not a defeat and the New 
Right continued with its mobilisation.
The ability of the New Right to grow politically had begun in the 1970s 
when the Republican Right gained access to a number of committees and 
leadership positions within the Party primarily because the Chairman of the 
Republican Conference, Carl Curtis (for whom Paul Weyrich had once worked 
as a special assistant), selected conservative Senator Jack Gam of Utah, as
1 The pardon incensed Middle America which felt that it had been betrayed, especially by a 
President whom they did not elect. Viguerie makes much of the appointment of Rockefeller, 
the betrayer of Goldwater in 1964 and the epitome of the Eastern Establishment. R.A 
Viguerie. The New Right: We’re Ready to Lead Falls Church: The Viguerie Co., 1981, p50.
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a special assistant), selected conservative Senator Jack Gam of Utah, as Chairman 
of the Select Committee which distributes committee assignments. The 
consequence of this appointment was that the Right had a sympathetic member in 
a powerful position to promote freshmen in Congress (Gam was able to 
substitute Orrin Hatch, another ‘new conservative’ for himself on the Republican 
Policy Committee).2 This internal political manoeuvring coupled with the growing 
unhappiness with New Deal liberalism led conservative politicians to improve in 
the space of four years (1976-1980) their standings in the Plains States from a 
rump consisting of Senators Carl T. Curtis (R-Neb), Milton Young (R-ND.), 
Robert Dole (R-Kansas) and James Pearson (R-Kansas) to that of being the 
dominant party in the region holding seventy-five percent of the region’s Senate 
seats. By the 97th Congress the number of right-wing Republicans representing 
Rocky Mountains states rose to eleven, but it was in the South that the 
Republicans made their largest gains. In the 97th Congress there were eight right- 
wing Republicans from the South which was compounded by the gains made 
earlier in New England in 1978 with Gordon Humphrey (R-NH.) and Warren 
Rudman (R-NH.).J Through such increases and much hard work, the New Right 
was able in 1980 to reach such a level of importance in American politics that 
Republican candidates largely adopted its conservative/populist agenda.4 
Moreover, in the congressional elections of 1978, about eighteen new Democratic 
conservatives won their respective elections (people such as Congressman Kent 
Hance of Texas, president of the Democratic freshman class, were elected). 
Richard Viguerie claimed that these: “...are Democrats who have good ties to the 
conservative movement, owe nothing to Big Labor bosses and largely avoided 
links with the Carter administration. Many of these Democrats received
2 G. Peele. Revival & Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984, pl37.
3 C.J Bailey. The Republican Party in the US Senate 1974-1984: Party Change & Institutional 
Development. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, p57, p73; C.J. Bailey, “The 
United States Senate: The New Individualism and the New Right.” Parliamentary Affairs 39 (4 
1986).
4 Reagan in a speech before the Conservative Political Action Conference on March 20, 1981, 
stated that his November victory was a result of the efforts of the members and therefore his 
victory was theirs. The speech epitomises much of the New Right thinking - economic 
efficiency, end to welfare profligacy, cutback in federal government. R. Reagan. Speaking Mv 
Mind Hutchinson: London, 1990, p93-101.
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significant aid from New Right groups, usually in primaries.”5 Thus, the country 
since the mid to late 1970s had been voting for more conservative politicians to 
represent them which is why the success of Reagan and the New Right in the 
1980 elections was not that surprising when the above changes are noticed.
A central feature of the New Right and an essential factor in its growth 
was the infusion of a new style of populism. The term “populism,” is exceedingly 
difficult to define because in American politics it had often been used to point out 
that there are populism of the left and of the right. The former is associated 
mainly with the Progressive era, while the latter is linked to the politics of Senator 
McCarthy as well as with the tradition of Southern demagogues as exemplified by 
Huey Long and George Wallace.6
The New Right populists (neopopulism7) stood in opposition to elitists 
(the Eastern Establishment) who maintained that the people (the American public) 
are not capable of managing their own affairs. The “Establishment” for New 
Righters had existed for many decades if not centuries, and often prevented truly 
conservative leaders from emerging within the Republican Party.* The 
“Establishment” based on the Eastern seaboard (mainly New York City) was and 
is interested in protecting its supremacy at whatever cost often to the detriment of 
the interests of the average American.9 The reason for the animosity between the
5 R.A Viguerie. The New Right: We’re Ready to Lead. Falls Church: The Viguerie Co., 1981, 
p73.
6 G. Peele. Revival & Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984, p77-79; M.P Federici. The Challenge of Populism: The Rise of Right-wing Democratism 
in Postwar America. NY: Praeger, 1991, p25-42.
7 Crawford argues that the style of the New Right is in accordance with Jacksonian Democracy 
(populism) which was continued by Bryan, Father Coughlin and Huey Long - all great populists 
if not demagogues. From this tradition the New Right developed what Crawford terms 
neopopulism as New Righters realised that through fear (rabble-rousing) they could create a 
viable coalition that would support them. A. Crawford. Thunder on the Right: The “New Right” 
& the Politics of Resentment. NY: Pantheon Books, 1980, p290-310.
8 The Establishment cheated Tail from the Republican nomination in 1952. J.M Kolkey. The 
New Right. 1960-1968 (with Epilogue. 1969-1980). Washington: University Press of America, 
1983.
9 In the ‘Introduction’ Jasper writes that the term “Establishment” or “Insiders” refers to “...the 
elite coterie of one-world-minded individuals...”. W.J Jasper. Global Tyranny... Step bv Step: 
The United Nations and the Emerging New World Order. Appleton: Western Islands, 1992. 
This theme is advanced by contemporary right-wingers, especially those who are anti-Semitic. 
R. Abanes. Rebellion. Racism and Religion: American Militias. Downers Grove: InterVarsity 
Press, 1996.
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New Right and the Establishment was that the former opposed the liberal nature 
of the Eastern Establishment with its Wall Street and large multinational 
corporation connections.10
The qualifications, New Righters maintained, for the positions that Establishment 
people held and hold are based upon the degree that the individual conforms to 
the Establishment stereotype.11 The anti-Establishment sentiment was epitomised 
very well by Pat Robertson who has suggested that the “Eastern Establishment” is 
responsible for the decline of America and the development of a new world order 
which is not conducive to American interests.12
The world of the New Right of the 1980s was highly complex and 
intricate which is why it would be wise to note its lineage before analysing its 
immediate backgrounds and aims. The movement was composed of many 
different types of people who may at first glance appear to be ideologically 
opposite to each other. The New Right drew much from American history and 
was largely built on traditional American conservatism which could be traced as 
far back as 1776 and to the ideology of the Founding Fathers.13 New Righters 
argued that the America of the post 1960s (if not earlier) had betrayed the ideals 
of the founders.14 The essence of the movement was therefore the revival of the 
United States through the restoration of traditional values which would have the 
effect of making the country great again.
10 J.M Kolkey. The New Right. 1960-1968 (with Epilogue. 1969-1980). Washington: University 
Press of America, 1983, p2.
11 R.A Viguerie, “A Populist and Proud of It.” The National Review October 19, 1984, p42-44.
12 P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991; W.J Jasper. Global 
Tyranny... Step bv Step: The United Nations and the Emerging New World Order. Appleton: 
Western Islands, 1992.
13 J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980; G. Peele. Revival & Reaction: The 
Right in Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984; J.M Kolkey. The New Right. 
1960-1968 (with Epilogue. 1969-1980). Washington: University Press of America, 1983; “The 
Right: A House Divided?” Newsweek February 2, 1981, p40.
14 A good example of this is the attitude of Robertson’s toward the Federal Reserve Board which 
he claims is contrary to the wishes of the Founding Fathers who opposed the creation of a 
Central Bank. P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991, pi 19-120, 
p246. For more recent views on the growth of the federal government and its so-called threat to 
American liberties see for example R. Abanes. Rebellion. Racism and Religion: American 
Militias. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1996; P. Lamy. Millennium Rage: Survivalists. 
White Supremacists, and the Doomsday Prophecy. London: Plenum Press, 1996.
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BARRY GOLDWATER AND THE R ISE OF THE NEW RIGHT
The ideological right experienced a great loss in 1952 when Dwight 
Eisenhower was chosen over Robert Taft as the Republican Party presidential 
candidate as it meant that pragmatism (or politics) triumphed over ideology. What 
made the defeat of Taft so incredible was the fact that the early 1950s was a 
period of growing conservatism in the US (especially as McCarthy, McCarran 
and Nixon were at the pinnacle of their power) and yet the Republicans instead of 
choosing a man who had represented their values for years selected someone who 
had stayed out of politics most of his adult life. The Eisenhower selection 
emphasised that the Republican Party was in serious trouble following the long 
presidency of Franklin Roosevelt and the success of Truman in 1948. Eisenhower 
showed that the Republicans were lacking an effective leader as a career soldier 
who for a time was undecided on which party he should join became presidential 
candidate.13 Eisenhower was a man who appealed to the electorate, a leader who 
was not an ideologue16 and under whom the Republican Party drifted toward what 
had been described as “Modem Republicanism” which encompassed support for 
the New Deal while seeking to reduce the cost of excessive bureaucracy.17 In 
other words, the prime concern of the GOP was political appeasement rather than 
the implementation of a strict conservative ideology which would restore the 
country to its more traditional roots. Moreover, the effect of the Taft-Eisenhower 
fight was that it divided the Republican Party was into two almost equally 
powerful personal coalitions. Taft had the support of the more fierce anti-New 
Deal and isolationist members while his regional appeal was concentrated in the 
mid-West and the South. Eisenhower, on the other hand, had the support of the
15 Eisenhower spent eight years in the Oval Office but he was not a Republican man. This 
explains why in 1948 Truman let Eisenhower know that he, Truman, would be willing to step 
aside and support him for the Democratic presidential nomination that year which Eisenhower 
declined. R.J Donovan. Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman. 1949-1953. 
NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1982, p258.
16 In his first term Eisenhower approved the extension of the Social Security budget, raised the 
minimum wage from 75 cent to $1.00, accepted farms subsidies, and created a cabinet-level 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). Eisenhower “...would not slash services 
to serve an economic ideal.” M. Schaller, V. Scharff and RD  Schulzinger. Present Tense: the 
United States Since 1945. Boston. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1992, p i23.
17 J.M Kolkey. The New Right. 1960-1968 (with Epilogue. 1969-1980). Washington: University 
Press of America, 1983, p27-28.
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north-eastern internationalists, and his victory installed the moderates as the 
leaders of the party for a time.1'
The 1964 presidential election was a watershed in the sense that although 
Goldwater was thoroughly trounced,19 he was still able to lay the roots for the 
New Right, and show that conservatism in America was far from dead despite the 
apparent potency of the counterculture movement and postwar liberalism. 
Goldwater, it must be remembered, was a Republican first and foremost,20 but his 
Republicanism was that of a traditional conservative. He claimed that America 
was an inherently conservative nation that was not comfortable with welfarism as 
it sought to uphold the ideal of self-reliance which explains his opposition to large 
government (a focal point of traditional Republicanism and later New Rightism). 
In 1976 (the same year that the New Right officially emerged), Goldwater 
highlighted his ties to the embryonic New Right movement when he argued in 
another book that America was reaching its “breaking point” and was in danger 
of losing itself due to the growth of the federal government in terms of power and 
bureaucratisation.21 This point would become the war-cry of especially supply- 
siders who circled within and around the Reagan administration. The clearest 
example however, that Goldwater was not real a New Right man but a traditional 
conservative was his belief that the Founding Fathers did not seek to establish a 
democracy as they feared that it may lead to demagoguery. This is very much in­
line with traditional conservative thought which carries a fear of the masses,22
18 G. Peele. Revival & Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984, pl29.
19 Johnson and Humphrey won 43,129,566 votes to Goldwater’s and Miller’s 27,178188, out of 
70,644,592 votes. The electoral college vote reveal the true depth of the defeat as the Democrats 
won 486 to the Republicans 52. R.M Scammon. (ed.) America Votes. 7, 1966, Washington: 
Governmental Affairs Institute, 1968, pl-2.
20 J.M Kolkey. The New Right. 1960-1968 (with Epilogue. 1969-1980). Washington: University 
Press of America, 1983, p205.
21 B. Goldwater. The Coming Breakpoint. NY: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1976.
22 B. Goldwater. The Conscience of a Conservative. Sheperdsville: Victor Publishing Co., 1960, 
pl7-18; M.J Throne. American conservative Thought Since World War II: The Core Ideas. 
Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990, pl24-125; Viguerie has stated that the United States “...is 
basically a conservative country. The potential for conservative revolt has always been there, 
under the most favourable condition. But those conditions have to be made.” R.A Viguerie. The 
New Right: We’re Ready to Lead. Falls Church: The Viguerie Co., 1981, p3.
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which is why they believe in government, while New Righters (especially 
contemporary ones) call for almost no government.23
The impact of Goldwaterism on the development of the American New 
Right was considerable, none more so than the fact that he was able to carry in his 
1964 presidential bid five Southern states, something that was unprecedented for 
a Republican. This laid down the seeds for the rise of Southern Republicanism. 
However, it was not just Goldwater’s conservative stand that won Goldwater 
support in the South but his view on race,24 as he held that issues dealing with 
race should be left to the individual states to deal with, and that federally enforced 
re-alignment was unconstitutional.23 This issue is important as it emphasised the 
belief that the federal government had exceeded its authority.26 The South was 
crucial to the New Right not only because it furnished the movement with a 
tremendous amount of religious support, but because it enabled the Republicans 
to mount a serious challenge to the Democratic Party New Deal coalition.27 The 
progress toward the political re-alignment began as early as 1948, when Governor 
Storm Thurmond of South Carolina, ran for president on a States’ Right ticket. 
Thurmond’s campaign “..was of profound importance”, because “It 
demonstrated the power of the issue of race to break the lock of the national 
Democratic party on the South, a step of critical consequence in a thirty-two-year
23 R  Abanes. Rebellion. Racism and Religion: American Militias. Downers Grove: InterVarsity 
Press, 1996.
24 T.B Edsall and M.D Edsall. Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race. Rights. Taxes on American 
Politics. NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992, p40; W.C Berman. America’s Right Turn: From 
Nixon to Bush. London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994, p5.
25 B. Goldwater. The Conscience of a Conservative. Sheperdsville: Victor Publishing Co., 1960, 
p31-37. Another example of Goldwater’s trouble with racism was his attitude toward the John 
Birch Society. In the words of Bellant “...Goldwater expressed discomfort with both the Birch 
and other Radical Right support for his candidacy...”. R. Bellant. The Coors Connection: How 
the Coors Family Philantrophv Undermines Democratic Pluralism. Boston: South End Press, 
1991, p44.
26 Both Nixon and Reagan called for less federal government through their “New Federalism” 
program. J.R Greene. The Limits of Power: The Nixon & Ford Administrations. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1992, p27-54; M.A Genovese. The Nixon Presidency: Power & 
Politics in Turbulent Times. NY: Greenwood Press, 1990, p61-98; R. Reagan. An American 
Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990.
27 J.M Kolkey. The New Right. 1960-1968 (with Epilogue. 1969-1980). Washington: University 
Press of America, 1983, p4-5.
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long process that would produce a regional realignment in presidential elections 
by 1980.”“
The Goldwater campaign further assisted in the development and growth 
of the New Right by showing the importance of popular fund-raising. During the 
1964 campaign, Goldwater’s staff mailed more than 15 million fund-raising 
appeals which netted them $5.8 million at an estimated cost of slightly over a 
million dollars. Goldwater received 380,000 contributions under $100 each.29 
Moreover, it had been suggested that Reagan’s speech, which on paper seemed 
“...such a lifeless collection of antigovemmental, anti-Communist cliches, with 
scant mention of the Republican nominee...”, brought about a million dollars 
worth of donations from inspired viewers to the “foundering Goldwater 
campaign” and launched Reagan’s political campaign (a few months later wealthy 
Californians organised the ‘Triends of Ronald Reagan” committee to promote his 
candidacy for governor of California).30
The significance of political contributions was learnt by the New Christian Right 
so well that Pat Robertson’s first campaign finance report to the Federal Election 
Commission contained the names of 70,000 donors and had to be delivered on a 
sixteen-foot truck.31 However, as important as money is to a campaign what is 
essential for a successful candidate is the commitment of his followers. This is 
again another lesson that the New Right learned from the Goldwater campaign as 
in 1964, Nelson Rockefeller spent more money than anyone before him had ever 
spent in seeking the presidency, but it was still Goldwater who triumphed in the 
primaries, in the state caucuses and at the nominating convention. Goldwater 
proved that people who are motivated and are committed to a cause are more
28 K.P Phillips. Post-Conservative America: People. Politics. & Ideology in a Time of Crisis. 
NY: Vintage Books, 1983, p23; T.B Edsall and M.D Edsall. Chain Reaction: The Impact of 
Race. Rights. & Taxes on American Politics. NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992, p34.
29 A. Crawford. Thunder on the Right: The “New Right” & the Politics of Resentment. NY: 
Pantheon Books, 1980, p46-47.
30 M. Schaller, V. Scharff and R.D Schulzinger. Present Tense: the United States Since 1945. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1992, p495.
31 C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996, p39; D.M Oldfield. The Right & The Righteous: The Christian Right 
Confronts the Republican Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, especially 
pl52-154.
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zealous workers, than those who are driven by money or prestige. Moreover, 
Goldwater showed that the key to winning the nomination was through securing 
enough delegates for the national convention.32 This lesson was added to the 
experience of the 1952 and 1960 presidential elections when it was realised that 
the age of television had arrived and one’s candidate could not be luck-lustre.33
The Goldwater campaign of 1964 also had the effect of providing many of 
the leaders of the New Right with their first real taste of political activity. Richard 
Viguerie’s direct mail empire began in 1964, when he copied by hand, the names 
and addresses of over twelve thousand of Goldwater’s major contributors. He 
went on throughout the late 1960s and 1970s to improve his list of potential 
contributors, as he raised funds for an array of right-wing candidates and causes. 
Many future leaders of the New Right began their political careers during 
Goldwater’s presidential campaign. For example, Morton Blackwell, Goldwater’s 
youngest convention delegate, went to work for Viguerie, edit the New Right 
Report, and run training schools for young right-wing activists; while, Howard 
Phillips, an early leader in the pro-Goldwater Young Americans for Freedom, 
went on to co-found the Conservative Caucus.34
The development of the New Right received a significant boost with the 
1968 presidential election which saw the emergence of the Democratic populist 
George Wallace. In 1968, Wallace appealed to millions of working and lower- 
middle class, blue-collar Democratic voters who were unhappy with the direction 
of America and their own party. He was able to effectively build a bridge between 
these voters and their traditional Republican adversaries (corporate America) and 
he did this by providing a program that opposed high taxes and federal
32 J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. Televaneelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY. Heniy 
Holt & Co., 1988, p248-249.
33 J.M Kolkey. The New Right. 1960-1968 (with Epilogue. 1969-1980). Washington: University 
Press of America, 1983, p24; D. Burner. John F. Kennedy & A New Generation. New England: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1988, p52-54; J.R Greene. The Limits of Power: The Nixon & Ford 
Administrations. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, pl3.
34 Paul Weyrich began his Washington career in 1973, when with the financial support of 
Joseph Coors, he and Edwin Feulner formed the Heritage Foundation. D.M Oldfield The Right 
& The Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party. London: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1996, p96.
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intervention (in the form of forced integration).13 The problem that Wallace faced, 
however, was that he offended the delicate tastes of traditional Republicans who 
could not tolerate his racist and populist approach (after all it was Lincoln, a 
Republican, who ended slavery). Nixon was able to overcome this by attacking 
open housing and school integration and by re-affirming his commitment to the 
principles of equality by opposing federal intervention to enforce compliance. A 
good example of this is the way Nixon’s transition team attempted to clean-up the 
Department of HEW of members who believed in the Civil Rights legislation and 
sought to promote its provision on a rapid scale*
The revolutionary reforms of George McGovern were very instrumental in 
bringing about an end to the Democratic Party New Deal coalition and the rise of 
the New Right as a result. The Party after supporting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Great Society reforms in a desire to create a more egalitarian society, 
began to pursue the more marginal members of American society.37 The process 
of reforming the Democratic Party and American politics emerged in the midst of 
the commotion of the 1968 Convention, as the Rules Committee upheld 
McGovern’s minority report, calling for a commission to study reform in the 
delegate selection process.
The 1968 Chicago Convention led ‘New Democrats,” many of whom had 
participated in the campaigns of Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy to 
clamour for changes in the delegation selection for the next convention with 
greater emphasis placed on youth, minority, and women representation. Many of 
the party’s rules, it has been noted, had not been revised since the nineteenth 
century which meant that in some states, Democrats did not hold primary 
elections, while in two southern states the governor picked all of the delegates, 
and in ten states there were no written rules. McGovern was chosen to head the 
commission, and he appointed a staff of young activists which included Eli Segal,
35 G.C Wallace. Stand Up  For America. Garden City. Doubleday & Co., 1976.
36 J.R Greene. The Limits of Power: The Nixon & Ford Administrations. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992, p42; T.B Edsall and M.D Edsall. Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race. 
Rights. & Taxes on American Politics. NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992, p79, 75.
37 D.M Oldfield. The Right & The Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican 
Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996.
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a recent law school graduate who had volunteered for Eugene McCarthy in 1968, 
as had Ken Bode, who later joined Robert Nelson as aides to Senator McGovern. 
“These men saw the commission as a crusade against the Democratic 
establishment, the force that for years had cut deals behind closed doors, had 
refused black representation at Atlantic City, had led the nation into a disastrous 
war, and had clubbed activists in the streets of Chicago.”3*
In November 1969, the McGovern Commission proposed that the party 
set quotas for the number of black, women, and younger delegates. The reforms 
paid heavy dividends for McGovern in the 1972 Democratic Convention as one 
saw fundamental changes within the party. In 1972, for example, women totalled 
thirty-eight percent of the delegates (in 1969 the figure was thirteen percent); the 
number of black delegates stood at fifteen percent, up from five percent, and the 
people under the age of thirty saw their representation increase from twenty-three 
percent (up from more than two percent). Thirty-nine percent of the delegates 
held postgraduate degrees; thirty-one percent earned more than twenty-five 
thousand dollars a year; and black delegates were disproportionately educated 
and rich.39 The changes meant that: “The voting power on the floor of the 
convention thus shifted away from political bosses who had long controlled the 
makeup of their delegations to a coalition of factions that had long been excluded 
from the power base of both parties. This new political foundation would be 
expected to support a candidate who was progressive on economic policy and 
firmly against the war. In effect McGovern engineered a rules change that 
complemented his ideals, fit his strategy, and ended up guaranteeing him a 
convention packed with delegates who supported his candidacy.”40 It was 
probably this shift in representation that led labour unions to support Nixon in 
1972 (they had supported Wallace in 1968 - thus a logical development had taken 
place).41
38 T.H Anderson. The Movement and the Sixties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p392.
39 P.N Carroll. It Seemed Like Nothing Happened: The Tragedy & Promise of America in the 
1970s. NY: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1982, p85, p86.
40 J.R Greene. The Limits of Power: The Nixon & Ford Administrations. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992, p i59. Eugene McCarthy also recognised the importance of youth as he 
led a campaign which allowed eighteen year-olds to vote for President for the first time.
41 A  Crawford. Thunder on the Right: The “New Right” & the Politics of Resentment. NY: 
Pantheon Books, 1980, p246. In 1972, Nixon stood for upholding the status quo against the
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The early 1970s were most important for the development of the New 
Right, not only because of Nixon’s 1972 landslide victory, which highlighted the 
move of blue-collar Democrats to the Republican Party, but because of the 
Supreme Court ruling in the case of Roe v. Wade, which legalised abortion in 
America. The Roe ruling led a great emotional and intellectual debate that has 
not been resolved.42 By the early 1970s, the development of the energy crisis, 
the rise in international terrorism, the recognition of Communist China caused 
concern that the United States was in decline which meant to some Americans 
that the forces of liberalism and socialism would take-over America and turn it 
into another Soviet satellite ruled by Moscow. The oil crisis (price increase), for 
example, according to Moynihan, amounted to “...the greatest triumph for state 
capitalism since the Russian Revolution.”, because it was used to show that the 
free market could not price its most important commodity.43 These fears led 
anti-liberals, Christian evangelicals, and militant secular anti-communists 
(neoconservatives) to unite and form the heterogeneous movement that has 
been dubbed the New Right.44 Thus, the ideology of the New Right of the 1980s 
stood on three main tenets: economic liberalism, social traditionalism, and 
militant anti-communism. These issues are largely interdependent and in many 
instances the groups co-operated in order to promote their own vision of a 
conservative America. The themes themselves also carried within them sub­
tenets which in some ways complicated matters especially when one is trying to 
provide an effective definition for the whole movement.45
42 It was the abortion issue which galvanised an already discontented section of American 
society into political action - conservative Christian America. For Christian Right attitude 
concerning abortion see for example J. Falwell, E. Dobson and E. Hindson. (ed.). The 
Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The Resurgence of Conservative Christianity. NY: Doubleday 
& Co. 1981, pl89; P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991; H. 
Lindsey. Planet Earth 2000 A.D.: Will Mankind Survive?. Palos Verdes: Western Front, 
1996.
43 D.P Moynihan. A Dangerous Place. London: Seeker & Warburg, 1979, pl8.
44 Several authors have offered similar views: W.F Buckley Jr., and C.R Kesler. (ed.) Keeping 
the Tablets: Modem American Conservative Thought. NY: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988; 
J.L Himmelstein, “The New Right”, in R.C Liebman and R.W Wuthnow. (ed.) The New 
Christian Right: Moblization & Legitimisation. NY: Aldine, 1983, pl3-30.
45 “The New Right also believes that its economic, social, and national security concerns are 
causally related; economic stagnation, moral decline, and military weakness reinforce each
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THE ANTI-LIBERALS -  THE ECONOMIC AGENDA
One of the central groups within the New Right were the anti-liberals who 
are perhaps the most difficult to define as they are divided into three main sub­
groups: traditional Republicans, contemporary Republican ideologues, and 
supply-siders. A common denominator of the anti-liberals was their animosity 
toward postwar liberalism as seen in the European model in which government 
intervention is society was high. The opposition to this type of intervention was 
based on an ingrained sense of economic conservatism which could be traced to 
the prewar, if not pre-twentieth century period. These conservatives felt that 
postwar liberalism came to dominate American society and cause many problems 
by the 1970s by encouraging decadence, corruption of traditional and moral 
values, and economic chaos.44
The development of the American welfare state essentially began with the 
Rooseveltian New Deal and gathered momentum as the century progressed. The 
New Deal was very important for the anti-liberals as it transformed American 
society in at least two ways: first, it increased federal government intervention to 
a new level as government became committed to providing some sort of social- 
insurance programs while also increasing government control over economic life, 
through such things as regulation. Second, the New Deal brought about a huge 
political realignment which gave the Democrats the upper-hand. That is, from the 
1860s to the early 1930s, and especially after the election of 1896, the Republican 
Party had all but dominated American politics.47
other and equally reflect a loss of greatness.” J.L Himmelstein, “The New Right”, R.C Liebman 
and R.W Wuthnow. (ed) The New Christian Right: Moblization & Leatimisation. NY: Aldine, 
1983, pl7, pl3-30.
46 J.M Kolkey. The New Right. 1960-1968 (with Epilogue. 1969-1980). Washington: University 
Press of America, 1983, p87-88 and throughout.
47 From 1896 to 1932, the Democrats controlled the House and Senate each in only one of three 
eighteen Congresses. They won two presidential elections: one in 1912, when the Republicans 
were split between Taft and Roosevelt, and again in 1916 with Wilson. The Republicans won 
the presidential election in 1920, 1924, and 1928 by landslides (the Democrats never got more 
than 41 percent of the vote). Roosevelt won 57 percent of the popular vote in 1932 - the first 
time since 1856 when James Buchanan won the election with a popular vote. The Democrats 
arguably rode to power because from the mid-1920s and accelerating in 1930s, a large
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The New Right anti-liberal opposition to the New Deal was based on 
some firm foundation, as since the 1930s the program had its detractors. 
“Reactionary wealth” (mainstay radical conservatism) acting through the 
American Liberty League provided the initial serious opposition to the New Deal. 
In the 1960s, reactionary wealth gave financial support to many early New Right 
organisations such as the American Conservative Union, Americans for 
Constitutional Action, Christian Freedom Foundation, the John Birch Society, the 
Intercollegiate Society of Individuals, Liberty Lobby and the Young Americans 
for Freedom. Large corporations such as General Electric also had connections to 
the early New Right (General Electric employed Ronald Reagan as its travelling 
spokesman during the late 1950s and early 1960s).4* Thus, it was these 
organisations and people who lay the foundation upon which the New Right anti- 
liberal cell worked from the mid and late-1970s.49
The anti-liberal New Righters held that liberalism and communism shared 
a common belief in their desire to create a utopia. Both ideologies seek to 
eliminate evil in society through planning, which is a euphemism for state 
intervention and an end to individualism and the introduction of collectivism. The 
communists seek to utilise the extensive force of the state for the same objective. 
The liberals, on the other hand, adopt a slower approach as they want to build 
their utopia one brick at a time. This is why liberals often ignored the brutality of 
communism, according to their opponents.50 In the words of a traditional 
conservative Republican who played an important role in the development of the 
movement: “Conservatism is not an economic theory, though it has economic 
implications. The shoe is precisely on the other foot: it is Socialism that 
subordinates all other considerations to man’s material well-being. It is
constituency of urban ethnic and working-class voters - outside of the South - supported them. 
J.L Himmelstein. To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990, pi 6-17.
48 J.M Kolkey. The New Right. 1960-1968 (with Epilogue. 1969-1980). Washington: University 
Press of America, 1983, pi.
49 There were however, some anti-liberals who were not totally against the New Deal as even 
Reagan approved of it to an extent, although he attacked its bureaucracy. R. Reagan. An 
American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990.
50 J.M Kolkey. The New Right. 1960-1968 (with Epilogue. 1969-1980). Washington: University 
Press of America, 1983, p91.
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Conservatism that puts material things in their proper place - that has structured 
view of the human being and of human society, in which economics plays only a 
subsidiary role.”31 Thus, it is conservatives who take a view of the “whole man” 
while liberals only look at the material side of man’s nature. Goldwater asserts 
that man is not solely a material creature but a spiritual one with needs to be 
satisfied. Moreover, it is the spiritual requirements that take precedence over 
man’s economic needs and wants which is why conservatives seek to fulfil these 
needs first, while liberals seek to satisfy man’s economic wants, as to them, that is 
the dominant mission in society.32 David Stockman one of the leading supply- 
siders in the Reagan administration also argued that conservatism is more than 
just an economic policy, but a way of life which provides the individual with more 
rights and responsibilities, something that the ideologies of the left fail to do. As 
he noted:
“Implicit in the conservatism of the right is a profound regard for a 
complexity and fragility of the social and economic order; and a 
consequent fear that policy interventions may do more harm than good.
By contrast, the activist impulses of the left derive from the view that 
a free society is the natural incubator of ills and injustices. The left 
assumes that society has an infinite capacity to absorb the changes it 
imposes on it.”33
The anti-liberals found the existence of a welfare state a frightening 
precursor to the establishment of socialism in the United States which brought 
them the support of the Christian Right and neoconservatives both opponents of 
socialism and an exponents of traditional American values. The growth of the 
social security budget, they maintained, made the poor and the weak dependent 
on the state, which is sustained by hard-working Americans. In other words, 
people knew that the federal government would save and protect them, which is
51 B. Goldwater. The Conscience of a Conservative. Sheperdsville: Victor Publishing Co., 1960, 
plO.
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Affects the World. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986, p33.
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why they need not look after themselves and their families.54 George Gilder, a
leading member of the anti-liberals argued that the welfare state played a
significant role in the breakdown of families, as benefits helped to undermine the
traditional role of the father. Thus, the welfare state not only helped cripple the
United States in general, but it had direct implications on the development of
American society by making men feel worthless:
“Nothing is so destructive to all these male values as the growing, 
imperious recognition that when all is said and done his wife and 
children can do better without him: the gradually sinking feeling that 
his role as the provider, the definitive male activity from the primal 
days of the hunt through the industrial revolution and on into modem 
life, has been largely seized from him; he has been cuckolded by the 
compassionate state.”55
An important feature of the anti-liberals is their attitude toward central 
authority and its role in society. In this area they shared a close affinity with the 
Religious Right who mobilised against what it saw as federal support for secular 
humanism. This view was seen very clearly in Goldwater’s 1976 book where he 
claimed that America was being governed by bureaucrats who dictate policy 
rather than the elected representatives.56 It was often felt that it was the 
bureaucracy, this monolithic, unseen group of people that pushed the country 
down the wrong path. In may respects the successors of the 1980s New Right 
have developed an even stronger distrust and hatred toward the federal 
bureaucracy, which they view as a very sinister force.57
The growth of the federal government due to its increasing intervention 
also led to a rise in the number of regulations imposed upon Americans in their
54 M. Feldstein, “The Social Security Explosion.” The Public Interest (81 Fall 1985); G. Gilder, 
“The Coming Welfare Crisis.” Policy Review (Winter 1980); R. Starr, “Twenty Years of 
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homes and their workplace. These regulations had the effect of increasing the 
power of the federal government and, according to the anti-liberals, were 
detrimental to the survival of American business by making it less competitive. 
Thus, it was claimed, that unless matters were reversed the: “...Republic [would] 
collapse and our democracy smother to death under a mountain of government 
debt, regulation, and red tape.”58 The call against regulations was very much part 
of the anti-liberal philosophy who held that business, and especially ffee-market 
capitalism was an integral part of the American creed and thus must remain free 
of government interference. Adherents truly believed that it was limited 
governmental intervention that enabled the United States to become the leading 
industrial power that it was.59
In short, the anti-liberals wanted government to stay out of the everyday 
management of individual life. The knowledge that people could turn to 
government for support, according to the anti-liberals, countered at least hundred 
and fifty years of American pioneering spirit and experience. For the New 
Righters, the people who headed to the West - before it disappeared in the 1890s 
- did so on their own volition not knowing what to expect. They faced many 
horrors and untold suffering but they never gave up and because of that they were 
able to build towns which over the years blossomed into great cities. Hardship 
and self-reliance was what made America great.60 Whether it is due to the 
ingrained conservative nature of Americans or their Puritan ancestry, the 
American system almost demands that one must suffer to succeed, as after all 
those epitomising the American dream rose from nothing to create empires (“rags
58 B. Goldwater. The Coming Breakingpoint. NY: Macmillan Publishers, 1976, pi.
59 Under Reagan, budgets for such agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration, and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
were severely reduced. Reagan also appointed agency heads - such as Anne Burford Gorsuch 
(EPA) and James Watt at the Department of Interior who were hostile to the very concept of 
regulation. Gorsuch and Watt came under heavy attacks from liberals and environmentalists for 
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to riches stories”).61 This is why for example, anti-liberals cheered Reagan’s 
deregulation efforts62 as the Reaganites were dismantling the interventionist state 
that was hindering American growth (although they wanted more63). Furthermore, 
by decreasing federal intervention one could reduce the size of government and 
therefore of taxes as less money would be required to sustain the government and 
more importantly the bureaucracy, for which the anti-liberals had a particular 
aversion to.
The anti-liberal movement had within it, a group of people who adhered 
to the doctrine of supply-side economics which “...originated as a way of 
describing an alternative to the demand side emphasis of Keynesian economics.”64 
The attraction of the new economic ideology was that although it was very 
complex it applied to a whole catalogue of policy changes ranging from tax cuts 
to natural gas deregulation, to abolition of the minimum wage, to repeal of milk 
marketing orders, to elimination of federal certificates for truckers, airlines and 
anything else that people desired to produce. It even included reform of the 
World Bank.63
Supply-side economics prefigures very highly within the Reagan 
administration because so many of its members and supporters either followed the 
new economic doctrine directly or at least hoped that it could or would help save 
America from its economic woes. Supply-side economics was an innovative 
approach which its adherents felt could revive the country’s fledging economy
61 Many Republicans and conservatives in general take great pride in highlighting their 
childhood poverty. This is done to emphasis that America is truly a meritocratic society and that 
through hard work and determination any one can succeed. See for example R. Reagan. An 
American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990; D.T Regan. For the Record: From Wall Street to 
Washington. London: Hutchinson, 1988.
62 See for example, B.R Okun, “Let Markets Be Markets: How Deregulation Has Strengthened 
the American Economy.” Policy Review (35 Winter 1986), p63-65. Okun when he wrote this 
essay was the executive director of the House Republican Research Committee.
63 See for example what some conservatives thought of Reagan and his policies: “What 
Conservatives Think of Ronald Reagan: A Symposium.” Policy Review (27 Winter 1984), pl4- 
19.
64 M. Feldstein, “Supply-side Economics: Old Truths and New Claims.” The American 
Economics Review 76 (2 1986), p26.
65 D.A Stockman. The Triumph of Politics: The Crisis in American Government & How It 
Affects the World. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986, p42-43.
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especially by providing “...a frontal assault on the American welfare state.”" The 
leading supply-siders within the Reagan camp were David Stockman at the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) and Jack Kemp at Congress and they were 
able to enlist the support of people who shared their views so that a 
transformation in America’s economic policy could take place, such as Ture and 
Sprinkel.67
The supply-siders themselves were rather divided as some focused more on the 
gold standard, while others felt that the budget deficit posed a greater threat.68 
The confusion within the supply-side camp may hinder the development of an 
effective definition of supply-side economics. However, at the core of the 
doctrine lies the belief that by reducing taxation, one would stimulate saving 
which would provide needed capital for investment. Reducing taxation would also 
have the benefit of forcing government to curtail its exuberant spending especially 
on Social Security programs.69
In sum, the anti-liberals were essentially concerned with economics and 
that was extended to social policy, as it is economic conditions that largely 
facilitate the size and scope of the social budget. To the anti-liberal big 
government meant inefficiency and waste as big government brings about a large 
federal bureaucracy whose main interest is to sustain itself. In the words of 
Ronald Reagan: “The first rule of a bureaucracy is to protect the bureaucracy. If
66 D.A Stockman. The Triumph of Politics: The Crisis in American Government & How It 
Affects the World. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986, p9.
67 D.T Regan. For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington. London: Hutchinson, 1988.
68 The diversity that Stockman describes was seen especially in a luncheon where monetary 
policy was discussed by what amounted to a supply-side central committee: Kemp, Wanniski, 
Bell and others. There were divisions over the gold standard and although at the time they 
appeared superficial in reality the debate divided the supply-siders deeply. Bell and Wanniski 
wanted immediate restoration of the gold standard something that Stockman was unsure of for 
tactical and conceptual reasons as the press and the Republican Convention focused on the 
Equal Rights Amendment. Stockman writes that all of the supply-siders at the meeting agreed 
that the proximate cause of inflation was the excessive creation of money by the central bank. 
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the people running the welfare program had let their clientele find other ways of 
making a living, that would have reduced their importance and their budget.”70 
The anti-liberals were determined to make government more efficient and 
effective while also aiding many other badly managed areas in American society. 
This had a dual importance as the financial demands of the social budget were 
huge and the anti-liberals’ conservative heritage also required that they support 
measures calling for as much self-sufficiency as possible. Thus, their opposition to 
welfare was not solely based on financial considerations but on ideological 
considerations as by changing the style and nature of the contemporary 
government, America would be able to pick up the gauntlet that the Soviet Union 
had thrown down through its expansion and deal with that threat successfully. 
The ideas of the anti-liberals were meant to help restore the loss of pride and 
remove the sense of gloom that seemed to had taken over the country in the late 
1970s. They hoped in many ways to see a return to the glory days of the 1920s or 
even the 1950s for example, where prosperity existed while government was 
small relatively small. It is therefore not a surprise that Calvin Coolidge was a 
hero of Ronald Reagan.71
NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT -  SOCIAL CONSERVATISM
The second group that made-up the New Right was the Religious Right 
coalition or the t£New Christian Right” as it became known. There is much 
confusion about the New Christian Right essentially because many in the secular 
world have either ignored, misunderstood or failed to appreciate its full potential, 
or at worst followed an Elmer Gantry stereotype when describing or examining 
it.72 Thus, when the Christian Right emerged with great ferocity in the late 1970s 
and with even greater vigour in the 1980s following Jerry Falwell’s address to the 
Republican National Convention, people were surprised.73 During Reagan’s first
70 R  Reagan. An American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990, p69.
71 K.P Phillips. Post-Conservative America: People. Politics & Ideology in a Time of Crisis. 
NY: Vintage Books, 1983.
72 J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. Televaneelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry 
Holt & Co., 1988.
73 Capps argues that in 1978, not many people were ready for the commotion that the New 
Religious Right would cause and the idea that a televangelist would have the support of the
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term one: “...saw evangelicals enjoying unprecedented access to the presidency 
and the White House, with theological liberals and moderates virtually locked out. 
Reverend Jerry Falwell replaced the more established evangelical Billy Graham as 
the White House’s unofficial chaplain.”74
An effective understanding about the rise of the Religious Right is made 
even more difficult by the fact that the movement was composed of many 
different denominations with their own distinct theology.75 A prime example of 
this could be seen in the animosity between Bob Jones and Billy Graham and 
Jerry Falwell. The quarrel with Graham was based on Bob Jones U’s refusal to 
support the evangelistic crusade that Graham sponsored in Greenville, North 
Carolina. Jones threatened to expel any student of the university who was 
involved in the crusade in any way. His argument with Falwell, was that Falwell 
appeared to have become more like Graham, he was too soft on Catholics and he 
fraternised with people who did not hold fundamentalist beliefs. It was also said 
that Falwell used his evangelistic office for personal gain.76 The situation 
concerning the Christian Right became worse when groups within the Protestant 
Christian Right chose to co-operate with Catholics or Orthodox Jews, two groups 
which they traditionally had been rather hostile toward.77 This led to a debate 
within the movement between the separatists who support a complete break 
between Church and State, and therefore oppose the involvement of preachers in
President would have shocked many. By 1984, candidates for important national offices sought 
the support of Religious leaders, and four years later a major figure within the Religious Right 
would seek the office of President. W.H Capps. The New Religious Right: Pietv. Patriotism & 
Politics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994, pi.
74 Hadden and Shupe assert that no president until Reagan had so snubbed the established 
liberal religious leadership in the US. J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. Televaneelism: Power and 
Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry Holt & Co., 1988, p35-36 and throughout.
73 Maguire claims, that fundamentalism was never homogeneous and it remained fragmented. 
Many who describe themselves as fundamentalists distance themselves from Falwell’s 
fundamentalism. D.C Maguire. The New Subversives: Anti-Americanism of the Religious 
Right. NY: The Continuum Publishing Co., 1982, p22; W.H Capps. The New Religious Right: 
Pietv. Patriotism & Politics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994, p98-99.
76 W.H Capps. The New Religious Right: Pietv. Patriotism & Politics. Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1994, p98-99; E. Dobson and E. Hindson, “Apocalypse Now? What 
Fundamentalists Believe About the End of the World.” Policy Review (38 Fall 1986), pl6-22.
77 J.M Kolkey. The New Right. 1960-1968 (with Epilogue. 1969-1980). Washington: University 
Press of America, 198 \  pl-20; D.C Maguire. The New Subversives: Anti-Americanism of the
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politics, and the accomodists who accept that the Constitution prohibits an 
established national religion as the First Amendment bars governmental support 
of one religion over another. However, it does not mean that preachers could not 
be involved in politics.78 Leaders of the Christian Right such as Falwell, 
Robertson, Bakker and others, called upon their supporters to participate in 
politics as they did.
The New Christian Right was truly a unique phenomenon particularly 
because one does not usually equate religion, especially fundamentalist religion 
with highly industrialised countries. However, the United States although being a 
leading industrial society has surprisingly retained a strong affinity with religion.79 
This is arguably because the first settlers were essentially religious refugees, 
seeking a place to worship God in their own way.80 Thus, “Religious imagery, 
language, and concepts pervade public discourse, appear on currency, and are 
present in the pledge to the flag. Many Christians see America as somehow 
chosen by God to fulfil His Will. The Puritans frequently likened their new 
covenant with God to that of God with Abraham and sought to create “God’s 
New Israel.” This infusion of religious belief and national purpose persists 
today.”81 In many Christian Churches American flags hang behind the pulpit,
Religious Right. NY: The Continuum Publishing Co., 1982, pl06-113; J.D Hunter. Culture 
War: The Struggle to Define America. NY: Basic Books Publishers, 1990, especially p67-106.
78 C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996, pl3-15.
79 Bruce argues that one of the reasons why the Christian Right arose in the US and not in 
Britain is because Britain is far less religious than the United States. Secondly, American 
fundamentalism is more “prophetic” in nature; it sees the world as a mess of signs and pointers 
that announce the coming of Armageddon. S. Bruce. One Nation Under God?: Observations on 
the New Christian Right in America. Belfast: The Queen’s University of Belfast, 1983, p37; J. 
Hitchcock, “The Old-Time Religion.” Commentary 57 (1 1974), p49.
80 J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980, especially p25-43; J.D Hunter. 
Culture War: The Struggle to Define America. NY: Basic Books Publishers, 1990, p67-106. 
Chandler writes that the roots of Fundamentalism are deep in American histoiy as “...the 
theocratic idea of a Holy Commonwealth in America was part of the Puritan vision in 1620- 
1630 and has been periodically manifested in American civil religion ever since.” R.C 
Chandler, “The Wicked Shall Not Bear Rule: The Fundamentalist Heritage of the New 
Christian Right”, D.G Bromley and A. Shupe. (ed.) New Christian Politics. Macon: Mercer 
University Press, 1984, p57.
81 C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996, pl6; J.D Hunter. Culture War: The Struggle to Define America. NY: 
Basic Books Publishers, 1990; P. Lamy. Millennium Rage: Survivalists. White Supremacists, 
and the Doomsday Prophecy. London: Plenum Press, 1996.
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beside the Christian flag, and children in Sunday School classes pledge allegiance 
to both. Supporters of this way of life believe that the president has a moral 
prophetic role as well as a political one. This perhaps explains, for example why 
Ronald Reagan often used religious language in his speeches although he rarely 
attended church; and why President Clinton has called for a return to religious 
values in public debate.82
The history of the Religious Right is very important in understanding what 
the movement desired because the type of political involvement of the New 
Christian Right coupled with its social agenda was unprecedented. Religious 
leaders such as Father Coughlin, Cardinal Spelman, Billy Graham, Carl Mclntire, 
who can be seen as the forerunners of the New Christian Right had nothing like 
the power that Falwell or Robertson wielded in the 1980s.83 The Old Religious 
Right took a varied interest in politics as its attention was mainly on foreign 
matters, whether American participation in the Second World War or the postwar 
communist situation and the need to eradicate it. Thus, until 1976, “...the chief 
preoccupation of the far right had been resistance against the growth of the 
welfare state and hardline opposition to the Soviet Union.”84 There may be a 
debate over how much influence and impact the Old Religious Right had, but its 
importance is that it kept religion (especially the activist type) alive in American 
society, which the New Christian Right was able to build upon.
82W.K Muir. Jr., The Bully Pulpit: The Presidential Leadership of Ronald Reagan. San 
Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1992; R. Evans and R. Novak. The Reagan 
Revolution. NY: E.P. Dutton, 1981, p204-225; C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? The 
Religious Right in American Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996, pl7; J.K Hadden and A. 
Shupe. Televangelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry Holt & Co., 1988, 
especially p212, and throughout; B. Clinton. Between Hope and History: Meeting America’s 
Challenges For the 21 St Century. NY: Random House, 1996.
83 J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. Televangelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry 
Holt & Co., 1988. The authors argue that Falwell and the Moral Majority were instrumental in 
placing Protestant fundamentalism more in mainstream American society.
84 A.J Reichley, “Religion and the Future of American Politics.” Political Science Quarterly 
101 (101 1986), p25; E. Jorstad. The New Christian Right. 1981-1988: Prospects for the Post- 
Reagan Decade. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1987, pi 1-19. Jorstad notes Graham’s 
usage of patriotism and anti-communism in his religious sermons which was what propelled 
him to national prominence; D.M Oldfield. The Right & The Righteous: The Christian Right 
Confronts the Republican Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, especially on 
Mclntire and Harrgis; J. Falwell, E. Dobson and E. Hindson. (ed.) The Fundamentalist 
Phenomenon: The Resurgence of Conservative Christianity. NY: Doubleday & Co., 1981.
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At the core of the New Christian Right are the evangelicals who are linked 
to “...white denominations such as the Southern Baptists and the Assemblies of 
God.”85 which is why evangelicalism is in many respects an umbrella term.86 
Evangelicals believe in the inerrancy of the Holy Scripture; they accept a 
creationist rather than an evolutionary explanation for the origins of the universe, 
earth and mankind; they put their faith in Christ’s crucifixion, atonement, and 
resurrection for salvation; and they believe that they must spread the word of 
Christ (the Great Commission).87
From conservative evangelicalism two separate groups developed as a response 
to certain social and theological questions, and it was members of these Churches 
who came to form the major nucleus of the New Christian Right: the 
fundamentalists (with Jerry Falwell) and the Pentecostal/Charismatics (with Pat 
Robertson).88 These two are highly diverse and complex groups as they 
encompass so many different ideas and views89 but due to their prominence in the 
New Christian Right it is important to examine their development and theology in 
more depth as it helps to understand their position in politics.
The evangelical fundamentalists were the first to emerge due to their 
desire to defend Protestantism from theological modernism in the early part of the 
twentieth century. The term “Fundamentalism” is derived from a twelve-volume 
paperback entitled The Fundamentals published from 1910 through 1915. The 
compilation is an anthology of writing of conservative American and British 
scholars and popular writers, edited by Bible teachers and evangelists. It was
85 D.M Oldfield The Right & The Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican 
Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, p i4; C. Wilcox. Onward Christian 
Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996, p25.
86 Hadden and Shupe write that in the early twentieth century, almost all Protestants in the US 
regarded themselves as evangelicals in their Televangelism: Power and Politics on God’s 
Frontier. NY: Heniy Holt & Co., 1988, p79-80.
87 J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. Televangelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry 
Holt & Co., 1988.
88 C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996, p4 and throughout; J.K Hadden and A  Shupe. Televangelism: Power 
and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Heniy Holt & Co., 1988.
89 J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. Televangelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry 
Holt & Co., 1988, p79-81.
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financed by Southern California oil millionaires Lyman and Milton Stewart. Thus, 
“Fundamentalism came to flower in the 1920s as a dramatically politicized 
movement directed against the Social Gospel, Bolshevism, and especially 
Darwinism. But its roots are deep in American history.”90
The fundamentalists have largely been dormant in political terms for many 
decades (they were last in action during the Progressive Era) as they have chosen 
to exist on the periphery of American mainstream culture. This was primarily due 
to the 1925 Scopes trial which embarrassed the movement by highlighting its anti- 
intellectualism.91 The Scopes debacle was eventually followed by the growing 
liberalisation of religion in the 1950s, and Eisenhower’s replacement by a Roman 
Catholic, but fundamentalism refused to die. Its adherents instead retreated from 
the public stage and consolidated themselves. Bible schools and fundamentalist 
radio and television shows kept the faithful on the straight and narrow, waiting 
for the proper time to re-emerge.92 By the early 1970s fundamentalist America had 
its own radio and television networks, books, universities, schools and so forth.93
Fundamentalism is composed of three main doctrines that help one 
understand why its adherents had chosen to participate in American politics. At 
the core of the movement is the belief in millennialism. Fundamentalists following 
an interpretation of obscure parts of the books of Daniel and Revelations believe
90 R.C Chandler, “The Wicked Shall Not Bear Rule: The Fundamentalist Heritage of the New 
Christian Right”, D.G Bromley and A. Shupe. (ed.) New Christian Politics. Macon: Mercer 
University Press, 1984, p40-43 (quotation p40). C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? The 
Religious Right in American Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996, p25-28.
91 J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. Televangelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry 
Holt & Co., 1988; D.M Oldfield. The Right & The Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts 
the Republican Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996; C. Wilcox. Onward 
Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996; 
J. Falwell, E. Dobson, and E. Hindson, (ed.). The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The 
Resurgence of Conservative Christianity. NY: Doubleday & Co., 1981;
92 S. Brace. One Nation Under God?: Observations on the New Christian Right in America. 
Belfast: The Queen’s University of Belfast, 1983, p4; C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? 
The Religious Right in American Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.
93 J. Falwell, E. Dobson and E. Hindson. (ed.). The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The 
Resurgence of Conservative Christianity. NY: Doubleday & Co., 1981. D ’Souza describes the 
power and role that Falwell plays within his congregation in “Jerry Falwell’s Renaissance: the 
Chairman of the Moral Majority is Redefining Both Politics and Fundamentalism.” Policy 
Review (27 Winter 1984). Hadden and Shupe have argued that the Liberty University is 
designed to promote the fundamentalist cause, which again emphasises the notion of a separate
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that at some point the Jews will return to Israel which would lead to the Beast 
and the Antichrist unleashing the upheavals of the “great tribulation” in which the 
Jews will once again suffer persecution. The unworthy Christians would endure 
an unsavoury time of tribulation under the rule of the Antichrist. Christ with an 
army of saints would then defeat the combined forces of the Beast and the 
Antichrist and install the millennial - a thousand year - reign of peace and justice 
on earth. Only the true Christians will be saved from the tribulation. They will not 
suffer as they will be pulled from the earth in the “second rapture” and will meet 
Christ in the air. Christ would then return and would lead the faithful in a 
successful battle against the Antichrist. As the Second Coming succeeds the 
tribulation, fundamentalists hope for its onset.94
The second main tenet of fundamentalism deals with the doctrine of 
dispensationalism, which is the belief that God has dealt with humans under 
different covenants in different eras. Most fundamentalists believe that there were 
seven dispensations, and the world was at its sixth, because the seventh was the 
Kingdom of Heaven. The importance of dispensationalism is that it serves to 
heighten expectations that the Rapture or Second Coming would take place very 
soon. It is also an area of contention between the fundamentalists and the 
Pentecostalists as the latter believe that the “age of the Spirit” began in the early 
1900s and marked a time when Christians should expect to receive spiritual gifts.95
evangelical fundamentalist society. J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. Televangelism: Power and 
Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry Holt & Co., 1988.
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on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry Holt & Co., 1988; S. Bruce. One Nation Under God?: 
Observations on the New Christian Right in America. Belfast: The Queen’s University of 
Belfast, 1983; C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American 
Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996; E. Dobson and E. Hindson, “Apocalypse Now? What 
Fundamentalists Believe About the End of the World.” Policy Review (38 Fall 1986), pl6-22; 
G. Halsell. Prophecy and Politics: Militant Evangelists on the Road to Nuclear War. Westport: 
Lawrence Hill & Co., 1986.
95 C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996, p27, p29. Although accounts vary many dispensationalists believe that 
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Fundamentalists Believe About the End of the World.” Policy Review (38 Fall 1986), pl6-22;
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The third important feature of fundamentalism is the belief of its adherents 
in the inerrancy of the Bible. Many fundamentalists subscribe to the notion that 
every word of the Bible is true, and that the best way to know God’s will is 
through the studying of the Bible. The most contentious issue that emerged as a 
result of this strict adherence to the Bible is the debate about creationism and 
evolution. Fundamentalists do not accept evolution to be true as they believe that 
the world was created on October 25, 4000 BC, a date established in 1654 by 
Bishop Usher.96 In several instances beginning with the Scopes trial in 1925, 
fundamentalists had taken their case to court to preserve their belief in 
creationism.97 Following their commitment to a literal interpretation of the Bible 
and belief in Biblical inerrancy, fundamentalists look to current events for signs of 
the beginning of the apocalypse. The Bolshevik Revolution confirmed for many 
fundamentalists the earlier prophecy that the Beast would come from Russia, 
while the creation of the state of Israel, fits with the prophecy that the Jews 
would return to the Holy Land. The tribulation will begin with a Russian attack 
on the City on the Hill, Jerusalem. For the old fundamentalists (of the 1920s) the 
end was a giant battle for Armageddon, while for the new fundamentalists, it is a 
nuclear war."
The importance of these beliefs is that the fundamentalists have largely 
remained very true to their doctrines, especially concerning the literal 
interpretation of the Bible which has caused secularists to view them as 
extremists. However, it is this devotion that made fundamentalism such a potent
G. Halsell. Prophecy and Politics: Militant Evangelists on the Road to Nuclear War. Westport: 
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97 J.D Hunter. Culture War: The Struggle to Define America. NY: Basic Books Publishers,
1990, pl37-139, and throughout.
98 R.C Chandler, “The Wicked Shall Not Bear Rule: The Fundamentalist Heritage of the New 
Christian Right”, D.G Bromley and A. Shupe. (ed.) New Christian Politics. Macon: Mercer 
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force in the 1980s, as to them their activism was based on the notion that they 
were working to save American society and therefore the world because of the 
importance of the United States to the survival of the world. Politicians had to 
take the New Christian Right more seriously because of the resources that the 
movement had at its disposal coupled with an incredible commitment of its 
members to the ‘cause.’
The other important body in the Protestant evangelical movement which 
provided the New Christian Right with much of its support (especially through 
Pat Robertson and the Christian Broadcasting Network - CBN) were the 
Pentecostalists. Pentecostalism like fundamentalism and neoevangelicalism99 
emphasises the authority of the Bible and the need to be “bom again,” but what 
distinguishes Pentecostalists are their beliefs concerning the Holy Spirit. The 
“gift” of the Holy Spirit is, for Pentecostalism, an experience that is a step beyond 
that of being “bom again.” Glossolalia (speaking in tongues) and faith healing are 
the most common forms of “gift.” Fundamentalists, on the other hand, views 
these practices as “...misguided enthusiasm or, worse, evidence of demonic 
possession.”
Out of Pentecostalism, the Charismatic movement emerged in the 1960s. The 
Charismatics place greater emphasis on the gifts of the Holy Spirit which is why 
the term “charismatic” is often used to refer to both Pentecostalists and 
Charismatics. Members of this movement have brought the Pentecostal message 
to a new and more diverse audience, including significant numbers of Catholics. 
The Pentecostalists and Charismatics have been especially prominent on 
America’s airwaves as many of the leading televangelists have been from these 
groups, from pioneers of the medium such as Oral Roberts and Rex Humbard to a
99 Neoevangelicals differ from fundamentalists in their approach to society, as they hope to 
participate in and influence the society in which they live, which is why they are less likely to 
quarrel over narrow points of theological difference. D.M Oldfield. The Right & The Righteous: 
The Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
1996, p22-3.
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younger generation that included Jimmy Swaggart, Jim and Tammy Bakker, and 
Pat Robertson.100
The New Christian Right provided a prime example of the political re­
alignment that had taken place with the election of Ronald Reagan as 
fundamentalists traditionally were members of the once solid New Deal 
constituencies, from the “poor” churches. The liberal Protestant churches, on the 
other hand, stressed a quasi-pacifist liberalism in foreign affairs, a concern for 
minority rights, gender equality, and “equity” for the poor as domestic priorities. 
They therefore drew their support mainly from those who had traditionally been 
Republicans, especially among Presbyterians and Episcopalians.101 
An important reason as to why the 1980s New Christian Right was successful 
was that initially unlike its predecessor the ‘Old Religious Right’ (1920-60s) there 
were less arguments among its ranks (as the development of the Moral Majority 
highlights). The Old Christian Right also suffered from the lack of two 
technological innovations that were essential to the New Christian Right in its 
rise: television102 and direct mailing by computers.103 The Old Christian Right used 
extensive radio broadcasting, personal appearances, and hand-processed mailings.
100 D.M Oldfield The Right & The Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican 
Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, p23-4; J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. 
Televangelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry Holt & Co., 1988.
101 A.D Hertzke. Representing God in Washington: The Role of Religious Lobbies in the 
American Polity. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988, pl06; D.M Oldfield. The 
Right & The Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party. London: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, 1996.
102 On the role of television see for example J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. Televangelism: Power 
and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry Holt & Co., 1988; S. Bruce. The Rise & Fall of the 
New Christian Right: Conservative Protestant Politics in America. 1978-1988. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990.
103 The three things that could be done with direct mailing are: inform the recipient, solicit 
funds, request action. The average item of direct mail would do all three. A letter for example 
from the Pro-Family Forum wanting help against ‘the big banks’ who were aiding communists. 
Enclosed would be three postcards addressed to one’s senator and congressmen expressing ones 
feelings on the issue. All that one needs to do is tear the cards off, sign them and post them to 
ones representatives. If one is willing to do this than one is pretty much willing to send some 
money so that the work that you support could be continued. S. Bruce. One Nation Under God?: 
Observations on the New Christian Right in America. Belfast: The Queen’s University of 
Belfast, 1983, pl9.
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Yet, these failed to carry the message into the market where, later the New Right 
would be able to attract much more support.104
The Christian Right had many specific grievances against contemporary 
mainstream America which the term “secular humanism” encompassed. The 
concept seemed to have first appeared in a legal context in the 1961 Supreme 
Court case of Torcaso vs. Watkins105 though it must be said that secular humanism 
came to mean much more for members of the New Christian Right than the 
interpretation provided by the Supreme Court.
Secular humanism should be regarded, like evangelicalism, as an umbrella 
term. To the New Christian Righters it comprised of a toleration of pornography, 
abortion, homosexuality, the de-legitimatisation of the traditional family as 
normative or even ideal, while allowing socialism and welfarism to creep in. It 
describes the moral degeneracy characterised by godlessness, moral relativism, 
and permissiveness that came to exist in secular American society. The secular 
humanist approach to society, for the Christian Right, also supports a lack of 
interest in a strong national defence, and an attack on religion.106 In the words of 
Jerry Falwell: “Humanism is man’s attempt to create a heaven on earth, 
exempting God and His Laws. Humanists propose that man is in charge of his 
own destiny. Humanism exalts man’s reason and intelligence. It advocates 
situation ethics, freedom from any restraint, and defines sin as man’s 
maladjustment to man. It even advocates the right to commit suicide and 
recognizes evolution as a source of man’s existence. Humanism promotes the 
socialization of all humanity into a world commune.”107 In other words, it is the
104 E. Jorstad. The Politics of Moralism: The New Christian Right in American Life. 
Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1981, pl6.
105 J.K Hadden and A  Shupe. Televangelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Heniy 
Holt & Co., 1988, p65. Torcaso was appointed to the office of notary public by the governor of 
Maryland but refused to affirm an article in the state’s constitution that required acceptance in 
the belief of the existence of God. Torcaso won the case.
106 D. Heinz “The Struggle to Defend America”, R.C Liebman and R.W Wuthnow. (ed.) The 
New Christian Right: Moblization & Legitimisation. NY: Aldine, 1983, pl34; J. Falwell, E. 
Dobson and E. Hindson. (ed.) The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The Resurgence of 
Conservative Christianity. NY: Doubleday & Co., 1981. R.C Chandler, “The Wicked Shall Not 
Bear Rule: The Fundamentalist Heritage of the New Christian Right”, D.G Bromley and A. 
Shupe. (ed.) New Christian Politics. Macon: Mercer University Press, 1984.
107 J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980, p56.
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secular humanists who are responsible for the chaos within America which is why 
it is essential that the younger generations be saved from their clutches.10*
Secular humanism is composed of another feature that is described as 
‘naturalism’ which “...looks on man as a kind of biological machine. To those 
who believe this philosophy of life, sexual immorality is just another bodily 
function, as is eating or drinking. The birth of a child is no different than the birth 
of an animal. Man lives a sort of meaningless existence in life, and it really doesn’t 
matter what significance he thinks he has or what goals he is headed for. The only 
thing that really is important for man is to try to make himself happy in the 
immediate now.”109 Man is interested in keeping himself happy in the here and 
now. This is why basic values like morality, individualism, respect of one’s 
national heritage and the benefits of a free-enterprise system are essentially 
censored. “From kindergarten right through the total school system, it almost 
seems as if classroom textbooks are designed to negate what philosophies 
previously had been taught. Under the guise of sex education or value 
clarification, many textbooks are actually perverting the minds of literally millions 
of students.”110
The fixation with “secular humanism” has led to great interest in “social 
traditionalism” which sought to deal with the breakdown of the family, 
community, religion and the traditional morality that had existed in American life. 
Abortion, school busing, affirmative action, the Equal Rights Amendment, sexual 
freedom, drugs, refusal to allow prayer in schools, the secular curriculum in 
public schools, were all contributing examples of the moral decay and the social 
breakdown faced by contemporary America. The Religious Right held the liberal 
federal government responsible for undermining the family, religion and morality. 
“Society is pictured as a web of shared values and integrating institutions that 
binds individuals together and restrain their otherwise selfish, destructive drives.
108 R.B Flowers. Religion In Strange Times: The 1960s & 1970s. USA: Mercer University 
Press, 1984, pl69.
109 J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980, p56.
110 J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980, pl79.
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It appears, in other words, to be more than a mere collection of rationally self- 
interested individuals.”111
At the core of the secular humanist campaign two branches of government 
existed, and it was they who were the great promoters of humanism: the Supreme 
Court and the bureaucracy. The New Christian Right could not tolerate such 
judicial rulings as Torcaso, Engel, Schempp, Griswold, Roe, to name but a few, 
which it felt were creating legislation that was viewed contrary, if not hostile to 
the American Constitution and the American way of life. These rulings were 
paving the way, according to members of the Christian Right, for the radical 
liberalisation of American society upon which secular humanism stood. The 
bureaucracy was also instrumental in assisting in the assault on moral American 
except that it used government agencies in its attack. A prime example of the 
bureaucracy assaulting traditional American morality was seen in the case of the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Bob Jones University (BJU) which 
highlighted the expansion in the authority of the ‘secular humanist* federal 
government, as the IRS became an agent of government policy enforcement.112
The New Christian Right was not a homogeneous group as different 
leaders and different religious denominations had made it up. In 1979, these men 
came together and created the Moral Majority which was the product of several 
concerned pastors who urged the Rev. Jerry Falwell, a fundamentalist, to put 
together a political organisation that could provide a vehicle to address the issues 
that they were worried about. The Moral Majority was inherently a 
fundamentalist organisation although during the 1980s it worked closely with the 
Eagle Forum, and other movements and people who were not Protestant 
fundamentalist in their religious orientation113 in order to attain their goal of a
111 J.L Himmelstein, “The New Right”, R.C Liebman and R.W Wuthnow. (ed.) The New 
Christian Right: Moblization & Leeitimisation. NY: Aldine, 1983, pl7.
112 S. Brace. One Nation Under God?: Observations on the New Christian Right in America. 
Belfast: The Queen’s University of Belfast, 1983, p33.
113 Paul Weyrich is Eastern Rite Catholic; Phyllis Schlafly of the Eagle Forum and STOP ERA 
and Richard Viguerie are conservative Catholics. Howard Phillips converted from Judaism to 
Christianity. Jerry Falwell, Bob Billings, and Tim La Haye are fundamentalists. D.M Oldfield 
The Right & The Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party. London: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, plOO; S. Brace. The Rise & Fall of the New Christian
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moral America. Thus by the mid 1980s, the Moral Majority was composed of 
millions of Americans who were anxious about the moral decay in America and 
the Majority became the pole-carrier of the New Christian Right flag114 and its size 
and influence could not be easily dismissed. In the words of its leader: “Moral 
Majority is a political organization and is not based on theological considerations. 
We are Americans who share similar moral convictions. We are opposed to 
abortion, pornography, the drug epidemic, the breakdown of the traditional 
family, the establishment of homosexuality as an accepted alternate life-style, and 
other moral cancers that are causing our society to rot from within. Moral 
Majority strongly supports a pluralistic America.”"5
The main interest of the Christian Right lay in domestic policy but the few 
comments that they made regarding foreign policy further help to understand their 
ideology and interest in the United Nations. The Christian Right believes that 
America has a mission which is the promotion of its ideology across the seas (in 
many ways their approach resonates of nineteenth-century missionary rhetoric 
seen especially in China). The US must defend life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness and show its commitment to freedom beyond its immediate borders 
because people want freedom and “...America has an ethical responsibility to help 
these people win their freedom.”116 The fierce anti-communist policy of the 
evangelical members of the Christian Right was based on the Bible prediction that 
the ultimate battle between the forces of Christ and the Anti-Christ would be 
fought in Israel, with the latter’s forces coming from the land which the Soviet 
Union occupied. The Soviet Union was held by the New Christian Right to have a 
global strategy of expansion and subversion. For this the communists use guerrilla
Right: Conservative Protestant Politics in America. 1978-1988. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990,
p86.
114 S. Bruce. The Rise & Fall of the New Christian Right: Conservative Protestant Politics in 
America. 1978-1988. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, p82-83.
115 J. Falwell, E. Dobson and E. Hindson. (ed.). The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The 
Resurgence of Conservative Christianity. NY: Doubleday & Co., 1981, pl89; P. Robertson. The 
New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991. Robertson’s provides a more recent attack 
on the moral decline of the US and the inappropriate direction that the country is on.
116 P. Robertson, “Dictatorship and Single Standards: Restoring Faith in American Foreign 
Policy.” The Policy Review (39 Winter 1987), p2; J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton 
Books, 1980.
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warfare, terrorism, disinformation, subversion, and any other method at their 
disposal to get their agenda.117 This was why America had to battle against the 
Soviet Union as if the Soviets were to win all freedom and democracy would 
disappear, because the Soviets are evil and very dangerous.118 Their concern 
toward the United Nations was that it had been taken over by anti-American 
forces and they were using the organisation (which depended on substantial US 
contributions - taxpayers’ money) to promote an agenda that was inimical to the 
United States interests.119
The Christian Right of the 1980s, therefore was primarily interested in 
domestic policy as it sought a return to a more traditional America. Its vision of 
America was more in-line with the early years of the Republic if not before.120 The 
aim of the movement was and still is to reverse the ‘achievements’ of 1960s and 
1970s revolutions, especially the sexual and gender ones. To their mind the 
separation of State and Church had been taken to a level in which religion no 
longer partakes in the running of the country, something which was never the 
intention of the Founding Fathers. America had been weakened by these ‘equality 
reforms’ which had made the US vulnerable to a communist takeover, especially 
at a time when the Soviet Union had spent an inordinately large amount of money 
and efforts shoring up its military while America’s had neglected its under the 
guise of “detente” and “mutual assured destruction.”121 With Reagan at the helm 
and a strong, conservative, morally responsible agenda the Christian Right
117 P. Robertson, “Dictatorship and Single Standards: Restoring Faith in American Foreign 
Policy.” The Policy Review (39 Winter 1987), p2-9; J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton 
Book, 1980; G. Halsell. Prophecy and Politics: Militant Evangelists on the Road to Nuclear 
War. Westport: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1986.
118 A good example of this attitude can be seen in Nitze’s writing who although not a member of 
the Christian Right was a member of the neoconservatives (Committee on the Present Danger), 
and the two did share some common views. Nitze wrote in 1976, that “...Americans think in 
terms of deterring nuclear war almost exclusively. The Soviet leaders think much more of what 
might happen in such a war.” P.H Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente.” 
Foreign Affairs (January 1976), p212; see also J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton Book, 
1980.
119 P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991; W.J Jasper. Global 
Tvrannv... Step bv Step: The United Nations and the Emerging New World Order. Appleton: 
Western Islands, 1992.
120 J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980. Falwell notes that the early settlers 
built churches before they even built their homes, and they lived according to God’s laws.
121 J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980.
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believed that they could reverse the tide and strengthen the country especially in 
its battle with the forces of Satan.
THE NEOCONSERVATIVES -  SECULAR ANTI-COMMUNISM
The final group that formed the New Right were the neoconservatives or 
secular anti-communists. Neoconservatism, although rather elusive122 was very 
important to American politics, as at least according to one commentator, its 
members “...contributed greatly toward the making the candidacy of Ronald 
Reagan and the kind of policies which the Republican Party advocated in 1980 
much more acceptable than they would earlier have been, and ensured that the 
Reagan assault on the White House was not dismissed by the media in the way 
that Barry Goldwater’s was in 1964.”123
The neoconservative agenda was based on their belief that communism provided 
the greatest threat to the survival of America and the ideals that it espouses. The 
irony, however, was that many of the early neoconservatives had been 
sympathetic, if not allied, with the communist movement of the 1930s.124 The 
neoconservatives were not solely engrossed with foreign policy as there were 
those within the movement such as Daniel Bell, Norman Glazer or Seymour 
Martin Lipset, who were very interested with social and domestic policy, and 
their impact as a result on neoconservative foreign policy thought had been 
limited.125
122 This point is developed in greater depth further down but as Lipset had noted: 
“Neoconservatism, both as an ideological term and as a political grouping, is one of the most 
misunderstood concepts in the political lexicon. S.M Lipset, “Neoconservatism: Myth and 
Reality.” Society 25 (5 1988).
123 G. Peele. Revival & Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984, p20. In her footnotes Peele notes that this point is made very forcefully by K.P 
Phillips, Post-Conservative America, (New York, 1979).
124 G. Peele. Revival & Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984. J. Ehrman. The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945- 
1994. London: Yale University Press, 1995. Steinfels sees the neoconservatives and the 
movement as essentially a product of the 1960s. P. Steinfels. The Neoconservatives: The Men 
Who Are Changing America’s Politics. NY: Simon & Schuster, 1979, pl-24; N. Ashford, “The 
Neo-conservatives.” Government and Opposition 16 (3 1981), p353-362.
125 Daniel Moynihan one of the leading neoconservatives began his career looking into social 
policy (he failed the foreign service exam in 1949). In 1963, he wrote with Nathan Glazer 
Beyond the Melting Point, and two years later he wrote a report on the condition of black 
families in the US “The Negro Family: The Case for National Action.” J. Ehrman. The Rise of 
Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. London: Yale University Press,
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The roots of neoconservatism could be traced to the 1930s and the 
support that communism had. This legacy was very important as it carried several 
heavy repercussions for the development of neoconservatism. During the 1930s, 
with fascism developing in Europe, the intellectual left in the United States was 
dominated by Communists and their Progressivist allies who saw the Soviet 
Union as a great state, with tremendous potential.126 The political debates of the 
1930s led many intellectuals to question their communist beliefs and political 
loyalties, especially once Stalin and Hitler signed their non-aggression pact in 
1939. The experience caused much disillusionment among the early 
neoconservatives which translated to an emphasis on realism and a rejection of 
sentimentality and emotion among the writing of neoconservatives. Their realism 
appeared far stronger than the normal preference on the right for solutions 
suggested by: “...common-sense practicality as opposed to those suggested by 
abstract theory. The toughness of the neo-conservative thus springs not from the 
paradoxical position of the intellectual in politics and his sensitivity to the charge 
of Utopianism, but from the historical memory of how easily the idealism of the 
intellectual can be exploited.”127
The neoconservatives early association with communism made them well-versed 
in Marxism and philosophy which meant that they were knowledgeable about the 
ideology that they were attacking. In the words of one commentator: “Thus, the 
major figures of the contemporary neo-conservative movement emerged in an 
atmosphere where it was not merely desirable to have read very large amounts of 
Marx and his commentators, but where it was also natural to see discussions 
about the interpretation of his doctrines as part of the daily intellectual fare.”12* 
The movement emerged in full force in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a
1995; N. Ashford, “The Neo-conservatives.” Government and Opposition 16 (3 1981), p353- 
362.
126 J. Ehrman. The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. 
London: Yale University Press, 1995.
127 G. Peele. Revival & Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984, quotation p27, p26.
128 G. Peele. Revival & Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984, p23. To counter the New Left critique the neoconservatives had to return to their 
philosophical studies. N. Ashford, “The Neo-conservatives.” Government and Opposition 6 (3 
1981), p355.
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reaction to the success of the radicalisation of the Democratic Party and the role 
of the New Left which was seen with the rise Eugene McCarthy and George 
McGovern.
An important feature of the neoconservatives is their cultural and racial 
background. The movement was largely Jewish oriented with backgrounds in 
Eastern Europe, an area that the Soviet Union dominated after World War n, 
which perhaps explains their fixation with human rights, totalitarianism and 
democracy. That is, one constant accusation and criticism levelled against the 
Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s was its refusal to allow Soviet Jews to 
leave, and the imprisonment of many of their leaders. The issue of human rights 
was often used by the neoconservatives to point to the basic failure and horror of 
the Soviet system, while shoring up the American system. It is perhaps their 
intellectualism (freedom of thought) that made the neoconservatives very much 
aware of the curtailment of freedom in general.
Irving Kristol who is regarded as the father of neoconservatism129 had 
argued that the term itself was developed by the liberal intellectual community - 
and especially the liberal-Left intellectual community who saw “neoconservatism” 
as representing such an awful prospect that it must be prevented. Kristol claimed 
that such supposed representatives of the new “movement” as Daniel Bell, Daniel 
P. Moynihan, Nathan Glazer, Norman Podhoretz, Aaron Wildavsky, Samuel 
Huntington, Roger Starr, Seymour Martin Lipset, and James Q. Wilson all shy 
away from the designation (some quite violently). Others, such as Robert Nisbet 
and Edward Banfield see themselves as “conservatives” without benefit of 
qualification. Kristol, however, had accepted the term and he further asserts that 
to his mind there is such a thing as neoconservatism, but it is misleading to see it 
as a “movement.” This is because neoconservatism held no meetings, had no 
organisational form, no specific programmatic goals, and when two
129 The reason why Irving Kristol is seen as the father of neoconservatives is because of his 
“unabashed conservatism.” In the early 1970s he openly supported Nixon, and by 1972 he 
became a Republican, switching parly affiliation about a decade before other neoconservatives. 
J. Ehrman. The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. 
London: Yale University Press, 1995, p46.
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neoconservatives met they were more likely to argue with one another than to 
confer or conspire.130
Neoconservatism, according to its father, has eight basic tenets which 
define it best: first, it is a current of thought emerging out of the academic- 
intellectual world and is provoked by disillusionment with contemporary 
liberalism. Its relation to the business community - the traditional source of 
American conservatism - is: “...loose and uneasy, though not necessarily 
unfriendly.” Second, unlike the Southern Agrarians or the Transcendentalists of 
the nineteenth century, for example, neoconservatism is anti-Romantic in 
substance and temperament. It views political romanticism - and political 
utopianism, its twin “...of any kind as one of the plagues of our age.” In other 
words neoconservatism, “...is a philosophical-political impulse rather than a 
literary-political impulse.” Third, the philosophical roots of neoconservatism are 
to be found mainly in classical - premodem, preideological - political philosophy. 
The writing and teaching of Leo Strauss are of importance, though many 
neoconservatives find him too wary of modernity.131 They are also admirers of 
Aristotle, respectful of Locke but distrustful of Rousseau. Fourth, the attitude of 
neoconservatives to bourgeois society and bourgeois ethos is one of detached 
attachment. They do not believe that liberal-democratic capitalism is the best of 
all imaginable worlds, it is simply considered to be the best under current 
circumstances. This modest enthusiasm distinguishes neoconservatism from the 
Old Right and the New Right - both of which are suspicious of it. Fifth, 
neoconservatism is inclined to the belief that a predominantly market economy is 
necessary if not sufficient precondition for a liberal society although there is some 
disagreement over how “predominant it should be.” They see a market economy 
as favourable to economic growth. Sixth, neoconservatives believe in the 
importance of economic growth, not because they have an enthusiasm toward the 
material goods of this world, but because they see economic growth as
1301. Kristol. Reflection of a Neoconservative: Looking Back. Looking Ahead. NY: Basic Books 
Publishers, 1983, p74, p75.
131 Ashford writes that adherents of Strauss were encouraged through their notion of social 
complexity not to attribute the failures of the social policies to mismanagement or misconceived 
objectives but to a false view of the mutability of man and society and the intractability of many
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indispensable for social and political stability.132 “It is the prospect of economic 
growth that has made it possible to think - against the grain of premodem 
political thought - of democracy as a viable and enduring sociopolitical system.” 
Seventh, neoconservatives, although respecting the market as an economic 
mechanism, are not libertarian on the Friedman or von Hayek model.133 A 
conservative welfare state is perfectly acceptable to neoconservatives, so is a state 
that takes a degree of responsibility for helping shape the preferences that people 
exercise in a free market. “The current version of liberalism, which prescribes 
massive government intervention in the marketplace but an absolute laissez-faire 
attitude toward manners and morals, strikes, neoconservatives as representing a 
bizarre inversion of priorities.”134 Finally, the neoconservatives regard the family 
and religion as “indispensable pillars of a decent society.” They support and 
approve of all intermediate institutions of liberal society that reconcile the need of 
the community with the desire for liberty.135
When seeking to understand neoconservatism it is perhaps worth while to 
pause and look at the term itself which is very interesting as it implies that its 
adherents have purported to create a new brand of conservatism which is rather 
confusing as true conservatives are not very supportive of ‘newism.’136 The 
neoconservatives were essentially intellectuals137 and their views in 1970s were
social problems. N. Ashford, “The Neo-conservatives.” Government and Opposition 16 (3 
1981), p355.
132 G. Gilder, “Moral Sources of Capitalism”, M. Gerson. (ed.) The Essential Neoconservative 
Reader. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1996.
133 See also N. Ashford, “The Neo-conservatives.” Government and Opposition 16 (3 1981), 
p356.
134 See also S.M Lipset, “Neoconservatism: Myth and Reality.” Society 25 (5 1988); I. Kristol, 
“A Conservative Welfare State”, M. Gerson. (ed.) The Essential Neoconservative Reader. 
Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1996.
135 The eight tenets of neoconservatism (as are all of the quotations) are taken from I. Kristol. 
Reflection of a Neoconservative: Looking Back. Looking Ahead NY: Basic Books, Publishers, 
1983, p73-77. On the importance of religion and Judaism to the neoconservatives see G. Peele. 
Revival & Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p25.
136 K.P Phillips. Post-Conservative America: People. Politics & Ideology in a Time of Crisis. 
NY: Vintage Books, 1983, especially p5.
137 Neoconservatism was regarded as the “party of the intellectuals” who had a great influence 
on the formulation of policy. The neoconservatives had good reputations as they spoke from the 
elite universities - Harvard, Berkeley, MIT, Stanford, Chicago. Steinfels also notes for example 
that Nixon upon taking office, recommended to his cabinet a The Public Interest article and one 
could be sure that Moynihan had a hand in it. Steinfels also notes many of the connections that
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expressed mainly in Commentary, The Public Interest, and The National Review. 
By 1976, the label of “new conservative” had been replaced by 
“neoconservative,” a term that Michael Harrington used to describe right-wing 
socialists, but which by the mid-1970s came to mean “...one who had been liberal 
but had since moved to the right.”138 The aim of Harrington, a leader of the 
Democratic Socialists, was to discredit the right wing of the dissolved party, 
Social Democrats USA, their intellectual fellow-travellers. Harrington hoped that 
the term would show the distinction between Left social democrats such as 
himself and Irving Howe as non-radicals, and right wing hawkish social 
democrats.139
The neoconservative movement itself emerged due to the changes in the 
Democratic Party140 as some democratic conservatives came to feel that their 
views were no longer adequately represented by the party following the 
tumultuous ‘60s.141 Moynihan has claimed that by the mid 1960s liberalism had 
developed a new orthodoxy, which had been assaulted by the left and thus 
transformed. He writes that: “The problem for liberals was of an awful simplicity. 
The war was liberalism’s war; ravaged Detroit was, as it were liberalism’s city. A 
kind of intellectual panic spread through the universities and the liberal press. It 
became a matter of great urgency to demonstrate somehow that our failures were 
not theirs, but failures of a false liberalism and pretended liberals. The President, 
of course, was the primary and indeed sacrificial victim.”142
neoconservatives have to those in power. P. Steinfels. The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are 
Changing America’s Politics. NY: Simon & Schuster, 1979, pl-24. The title of the book itself is 
interesting as it claims that the neoconservatives were the men who were changing America’s 
politics which is a pretty bold statement.
138 J. Ehrman. The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. 
London: Yale University Press, 1995, p45
139 S.M Lipset, “Neoconservatism: Myth and Reality.” Society 25 (5 1988); M. Gerson. (ed.) 
The Essential Neoconservative Reader. Reading. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1996, 
especially the “Introduction.”
140 This perhaps explains why two strands of neoconservatism emerged, one composed of 
Democrats, the other of Republicans. S.M Lipset, “Neoconservatism: Myth and Reality.” 
Society 25 (5 1988).
141 J. Ehrman. The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. 
London. Yale University Press, 1995; G. Peele. Revival & Reaction: The Right in 
Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
142 D.P Moynihan. A Dangerous Place. London: Seeker & Warburg, 1979, p5, p6 (quotation 
from p6).
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It is possible to distinguish three main themes which the neoconservatives 
promoted: first, they supported the McCarthyite assumption that the struggle 
between the West and Communism was one between unalloyed good and 
unalloyed evil. Second, that communism is established and maintained through the 
use of force (and therefore by implication the system is defunct); and finally, that 
post-war liberalism had prevented America - with its superior resources - from 
defeating communism. The neoconservatives advocated an increase in military 
spending, the abandonment of detente in favour of political and ideological 
mobilisation that would aid in rolling-back communism (total mobilisation against 
communism).143 This attitude was based on the belief that the United States had 
been weakened by detente which is why America must work very hard to reverse 
the situation. This is because detente “...was a form of disguised retreat, carried 
forward in a rapture of exalted dissimulation be persons whose assumption was 
that the American people would not face reality.” That is, for the Soviets, detente 
meant negotiations on arms limitations, trade, aid and technology transfer. It is 
coupled with political warfare against the West, not excluding local wars outside 
the NATO area.144 Thus, the neoconservative attitude toward international 
relations was that the ‘free world’ was engaged in a war against the totalitarian 
Soviet bloc which the West had to win if it is to preserve its freedom and all that 
its holds sacred to it. This view was summarised rather aptly by Senator 
Moynihan who argued that the “...standards of the democratic West, have been 
under more or less unremitting assault from totalitarianism. There have been 
peaks and valleys, slow times and crisis times. The assault has come sometimes
Peele has written that the neoconservatives “...trenchant reassessments both of the general goals 
of American federal policy and of specific themes in relation to such problems as crime and 
welfare did much to remould the agenda of American politics. While many of these neo­
conservatives would claim that they were not and perhaps never could be Republicans, they 
inevitably contributed to the success of the Republican Party.” G. Peele. Revival & Reaction: 
The Right in Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p5.
143 J.L Himmelstein, “The New Right”, R.C Liebman and R.W Wuthnow. (ed.) The New 
Christian Right: Moblization & Leeitimisation. NY: Aldine, 1983, pl7.
144 D.P Moynihan. A Dangerous Place. London: Seeker & Warburg, 1979, p279. [Italics in the 
text], W. Laqueur, “Containment for the ‘80s.” Commentary 70 (4 1980), p33-42.
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from the totalitarian right; but in the first instance, and most often, and now 
exclusively, it has come from the totalitarian left.”145
The New Right and especially the neoconservatives saw communism as a 
monolithic entity seeking to subvert freedom and capitalism. Their views of the 
Soviet Union and many other communist countries were based on a 
Solzhenitsynite-type imagery.146 To the neoconservatives, in the Soviet Union and 
the countries under its sphere of influence, individual freedom and the right to 
practice one’s religion were non-existent. One lives in an Orwellian society where 
Big Brother watches one’s every moves. It is the ultimate police-state. As a result 
of the planned economy poverty is rife, no luxury goods are available and one is 
forced into virtual slavery for a leviathan state. The neoconservatives maintained 
that it is futile to attempt to force the Soviets to pursue ‘a just’ foreign policy 
because such a thing is not within Soviet vocabulary because the Soviet Union is 
interested in gains. This could be seen as early as the post-Second World War 
negotiations when the Soviets captured territory first and negotiated later 
(although the negotiations usually amounted to little because the Soviets would 
not budge and the Americans were not prepared to initiate another war). History, 
the neoconservatives claimed, has shown that the Soviet Union was 
untrustworthy and must be watched very carefully.147
The secular anti-communists held that American interests should be 
pursued vigorously overseas because communism is a doctrine that even when it 
appears to be in retreat is seeking to expand. It is a highly intelligent force which
145 D.P Moynihan, “A New American Foreign Policy.” The New Republic February 9, 1980, 
pl9; A Dangerous Place. London: Seeker & Warburg, 1979; C. Layne, “The Real Conservative 
Agenda.” Foreign Policy (61 1985-1986), p73-93. This view is seen throughout 
neoconservatives writings, especially in Kirkpatrick’s and Kristol’s.
146 Carl Gershman who served with Kirkpatrick at the US Mission to the UN, wrote that the 
lesson of the ‘new Indochina’ (after the American withdrawal) “...is that Communism is a 
system based on terror and total power.” C. Gershman, “After the Dominoes Fell.” Commentary 
65 (5 1978), p54.
147 Nitze argued in 1976 that under SALT the Soviet Union “...will continue to pursue a nuclear 
superiority that is not merely quantitative but designed to produce a theoretically war winning 
capability.” P.H Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente.” Foreign Affairs 
(January 1976), p207.
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manipulates its environment.148 Thus, the neoconservatives, although often 
attacking or criticising Soviet intervention do not mind intervention if it is done to 
secure either strategically or economically the United States (in many ways they 
encourage it). Their approach to foreign policy was two-fold: first they believed 
that by fighting communism abroad they could prevent it from coming to 
America’s shores or even hemisphere. Second, America, they claimed, has an 
obligation to defend freedom everywhere because the United States is the bastion 
of individual freedom and enlightenment. The neoconservatives pointed to the 
reconstruction of postwar Germany, Japan, and South Korea, as examples where 
the American model had been applied at different levels and had proven a success. 
Freedom and economic prosperity is rife in these countries, while where the 
Soviet Union governed poverty, hardship and terror reign. At the core of the 
neoconservative argument which is a defence of Americanism is that their values 
and therefore the American system is better than any other and it has been the 
basis of other systems and societies.149
It was these three groups that composed the backbone of the Reagan 
camp and who enabled him to defeat Jimmy Carter in 1980. As one commentator 
noted: “The New Right and the Christian Right had played highly visible roles in 
that success. McAteer’s Religious Roundtable rallied ministers around the 
country to Reagan’s cause. The Roundtable and Moral Majority conducted 
registration drives. Christian Voice - an organization headed by the Reverend 
Robert Grant and, in its early years, publicized by Pat Robertson - widely 
distributed its moral “report cards” rating the voting records of members of 
Congress.”150 The development of the political movement that came to be known 
by 1980 as the ‘New Right’ officially emerged in the mid 1970s. However, the
148 P.H Nitze, “Living With the Soviets.” Foreign Affairs 63 (2 1984-85), p360-374; P.H Nitze, 
“Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente.” Foreign Affairs (2 1976), p207-232; W. 
Laqueur, “Containment for the ‘80s.” Commentary 70 (4 1980), p33-42.
149 N. Glazer, ’’American Values & Foreign Policy.” Commentary 62 (1 1976), p32-37;
150 D.M Oldfield. The Right & The Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican 
Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, pi 17; J. Ehrman. The Rise of 
Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. London: Yale University Press, 
1995; G. Peele. Revival & Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984.
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period between Goldwater’s defeat and Reagan’s victory very important as it was 
a time when “...American conservatism came of age, passing from an unsteady 
dissenting faith to a dominant political creed. In a single generation the American 
conservative movement advanced from critic of public policy to executive of 
public policy.”131
The movement was a reaction against the liberalism of the postwar world, which 
New Righters felt had corrupted America and made it weak therefore enabling the 
Soviet Union and communism to advance throughout the world. Although each 
group with the New Right had its own agenda it did not prevent the different 
members from uniting to achieve their desired goal: an American restoration. For 
example, the New Christian Right, had great interests in taxation as that would 
have an impact on the federal government and especially the IRS which brought 
them into an alliance with the anti-liberals who also sought a reduction in 
taxation. Another example is the alliance between traditional Republicans and the 
desire of the neoconservatives for a strong defence program.132 Thus, the 
boundaries between the groups were not very strong, but it does correspond to 
the growth of the New Right and the rise of Ronald Reagan and his agenda.133
The New Right built its foundation on traditional conservative values 
which is why men like William Buckley Jr., had played such an significant role in 
its development. Richard Viguerie has claimed that the two men most responsible: 
“...for the strength and vitality of conservatism in America today...” are William 
F. Buckley and Barry Goldwater. Buckley had been the editor of National Review 
“...the conservative intellectual journal for 25 years.” He had also hosted a 
television, program Firing Line “...the only regular conservative show on the 
nation’s most important mass medium.”,134 and through “...his wit, intelligence, 
and willingness to stand up for conservative principles, Bill Buckley, almost
151 C.R Kesler, “Introduction”, W.F Buckley, Jr., and C.R Kesler. (ed.) Keeping the Tablets: 
Modem American Conservative Thought. NY: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988, p3, 3-18.
152 “Who’s Who on the Right.” Newsweek February 2,1981, p39.
153 C.J Bailey. The Republican Party in the US Senate 1974-1984: Party Change & Institutional 
Development. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, p53-81.
154 RA  Viguerie. The New Right. We’re Ready to Lead. Falls Church: The Viguerie Co., 1981, 
p41.
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single-handedly, made the word “conservative” respectable and accepted.”155 
However, both William F. Buckley and Barry Goldwater played a very limited 
role in the New Right of the 1980s due to their adherence to traditional 
conservatism but their contributions to the development of the New Right must 
be acknowledged.
The question about the role of the New Right in American politics is a 
complex one due to the ambiguity that surrounds the New Right and the role that 
it played in Reagan’s election and administration.15<i Yet, certain themes are clear 
as the New Right carried an economic, social and foreign agenda to which it and 
the administration tried to stay true to. The New Right was also a movement that 
felt more at ease in opposition than in power.157 This is because of its populist 
attitude which inflamed opinions which is easier to do when one is out of 
government. The only real survivors of the New Right of the 1980s have been the 
Christian Right who are represented by various Christian conservative groups.151 
The two other groups from the 1980s New Right have either disappeared as in 
the case of the secular anti-communists,159 while the anti-liberals have been 
absorbed by the Republican Party whose ideology especially following the 1994 
Congressional election seem to dominate the GOP platform.160 All in all, one thing 
is certain, and that is, that the New Right made the 1980s extremely fascinating 
for anyone wishing to examine the Reagan years and its impact on the 
development of American society heading towards a new millennium.
155 R.A Viguerie. The New Right: We’re Ready to Lead. Falls Church: The Viguerie Co., 1981, 
p42.
156 New Righters often claimed that Reagan’s victory should be attributed to their efforts. R.A 
Viguerie. The New Right: We’re Ready to Lead. Falls Church: The Viguerie Co., 1981; M. 
Walker. Clinton: The President the Deserve. London: Fourth Estate, 1996, pl2 and throughout.
157 P. Weyrich, “Conservatism for the People.” National Review 42 (3 September 1990).
158 James Carney, “The G.O.P. Mantra: Keep Dobson Happy.” Time May 11, 1998. Carney 
writes that keeping James Dobson of the Focus on the Family and other “... Christian-right 
leaders happy has become the central preoccupation of Republican lawmakers.”
159 Lipset declared in 1988 that neoconservatism “has ceased to exist.”, essentially because 
several leading neoconservatives, such as Kirkpatrick had joined the Republican Party. S.M 
Lipset, “Neoconservatism: Myth and Reality.” Society 25 (5 1988).
160 Fiscal conservatism is seen very clearly in N. Gingrich’s. To Renew America. NY: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1995. Gingrich refers a lot to his friend and fellow Republican 
conservative Jack Kemp who was one of the leaders of the anti-liberal group of the 1980s New 
Right.
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CHAPTER III
THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY, 1981-1989 
SUCCESS & FAILURE OF A NEW RIGHT AGENDA
The election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States in 
November 1980 marked a turning point in American history. Reagan although 
one of the most conservative presidents since Calvin Coolidge1 presided over 
one of the most fascinating and revolutionary decades in modem American 
history. This ironic twist perhaps explains why Reagan has attracted so much 
attention over the years. Love him or loathe him, admire him or ridicule him, 
Reagan altered American society and with it world history. In domestic terms his 
policies placed the United States on a more conservative path, essentially by 
forcing the Democratic Party to adopt a more middle-of-the-road agenda 
especially following his comprehensive thrashing of Walter Mondale, the 
Democratic challenger in 1984. Four years later George Bush, Reagan’s 
successor, defeated Michael Dukakis by labelling him a ‘liberal’ thus severely 
crippling New Deal Democratic liberalism. In foreign policy, Reagan was 
arguably responsible for dealing the fatal blow to the Soviet Union2 while also 
fatally wounding the socialist idea.3
Reagan won the 1980 election on three main issues to which he remained 
largely true throughout his tenure. These themes developed sub-titles which 
often correlated with other issues which made them interdependent on each 
other. This was clearly seen in the area of defence which had serious 
implications for his economic policy.4
As a true conservative, Reagan claimed that the federal government had grown 
too big and was responsible for the dire state in which the country found itself by
1 K.P Phillips. Post-Conservative America: People. Politics & Ideology in a Time of Crisis. 
NY: Vintage Books, 1983.
2 G.P Shultz. Turmoil & Triumph: Mv Years as Secretary of State. NY: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1993.
3 M. Anderson. Revolution. Orlando: Harecourt Brace Jovanvich Publishers, 1988.
4 See for example Stockman’s arguments against the defence build-up in his book The 
Triumph of Politics: The Crisis in American Government & How It Affects the World.
London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986.
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1980. As he said in his inaugural address “...government is not the solution to our 
problems; government is the problem.”3 The argument was that the dominance of 
the tax-and-spend liberals in Congress allowed the welfare state to grow thus 
weakening the country as welfarism went against the basic ideology of 
Americanism of self-sufficiency and rugged individualism which dated back to the 
pioneers and the Founding Fathers. Reagan was therefore committed to reducing 
the federal government in terms of size, regulations, bureaucracy and so forth, 
thus ending the rut that the country was in.6
The second main theme of Reagan’s which was tied to traditional conservatism 
was that taxes in the US were too high. This approach was in perfect harmony 
with an affinity that Reagan developed with a new economic doctrine that had 
taken prominence by the late 1970s, under the name of supply-side economics.7 
Supply-siders held that high taxes and high inflation had stifled the essence of 
America - efficient business, positive competition and free-market mentality.*
The third and final central point in Reagan’s agenda was in foreign policy as 
Reagan maintained that America had surrendered the initiative in international 
relations. This had allowed the Soviet Union to expand and assume a more 
dominant position in the balance of power scale to the detriment of America and 
its allies' interests. If the US was to seek its proper place under the sun it had to 
re-assert itself Thus, the Reaganites largely revitalised the old anti-Soviet rhetoric 
reminiscent of the two “red scares” of the 1920s and 1950s when the Soviet 
Union was portrayed as an evil empire that had to be destroyed because it was an
5 “Inaugural Address”, January 20, 1981, R. Reagan. Speaking Mv Mind. Hutchinson: London, 
1990, p61; for a similar view see R. Reagan. An American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990.
6 R. Reagan. An American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990.
7 Reagan has stated that he was not a supply-sider but a practical man who throughout his life 
believed that government must be small and that taxation must be just. R  Reagan. An 
American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990, p227 and throughout. Stockman first impression of 
Reagan’s rehearsing for his debate against Anderson in Senator John Warner’s home in 
Virginia was that Reagan’s knowledge of supply-side economics was very vague. D.A 
Stockman. The Triumph of Politics: The Crisis in American Government & How It Affects the 
World. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986, p46-48.
Roberts who served in the administration, claims that Reagan was the first supply-side 
President. P.C Roberts. The Supplv-Side Revolution: An Insider’s Account of Policymaking in 
Washington. London: Harvard University Press, 1984, p i, p87-90.
8 H. Stein Presidential Economics: the Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan 
and Bevond. 2nd ed., Washington DC: AEI for Public Policy Research, 1988, Chapter 6-9.
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antithesis to freedom.9 This was very different from the 1970s that began with 
detente and saw America staying out of the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.10
The three main precepts of Reagan correlate quite nicely with his three 
main groups of supporters who came under the umbrella title of the “New Right.” 
His stand on welfare and the size of the federal government appealed to the anti- 
liberals who opposed the extension of the New Deal-Great Society philosophy. 
This was a constituency bred on traditional American values of self-reliance. Its 
members being unhappy with the largesse of the federal government especially at 
a time of economic hardship. The second group that backed the former governor, 
was the Religious Right with its large Protestant evangelical membership. This 
body wanted an end to federal support and promotion of secular humanism which 
included a call for a direct assault on the faceless, secular humanist, liberal 
bureaucrats who dictated how Americans should live their lives." The third main 
body of supporters of Reagan were the neoconservatives whose interest lay 
primarily in foreign policy (which naturally extended into defence policy) and was 
centred around their fierce opposition toward communism and the Soviet Union. 
Their opposition was not based so much religious symbolism as their hostility was 
based on a secular belief that the Soviet Union stood for totalitarianism and the
9 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. 1, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988; J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980; P. Robertson. 
The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991. The attacks were often quite ferocious, 
especially as among the New Christian Right the Soviet Union was seen as the Antichrist, bent 
on the destruction of the US and all that is good.
10 Carter although criticising the Soviet human rights record still sought a good relationship 
with them. See for example “UN: Common Needs in a Diverse World”, address by Cyrus R. 
Vance, before the 34th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, New York, September 24, 1979, 
Washington DC: State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, pl-7. Vance’s message especially 
when contrasted with that of Reagan, Shultz or Kirkpatrick is very soft and non-belligerent.
11 In his examination of the American militia, Abanes notes, its animosity toward the federal 
bureaucracy. Although Abanes’ work is essentially about the militia of the 1990s, it still 
provides an example of how the Radical Right came to regard to federal bureaucracy, especially 
if one sees the 1990s movement as products of the New Right of the 1980s. R  Abanes. 
Rebellion. Racism & Religion: American Militia. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1996; P. 
Lamy. Millennium Rage: Survivalists. White Supremacists, and the Doomsday Prophecy.
London: Plenum Press, 1996.
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curtailment of freedom while the US was the embodiment of democracy and 
liberty.12
An effective study of the Reagan administration requires one to 
acknowledge beforehand several important features of the administration. The 
first is to note Reagan’s effective usage of the Senior Executive Service (SES). 
The SES was employed to increase the number of appointees who did not fall 
within the career civil service rule. The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act (S-2640 
PL 95-454) allowed ten percent of SES to be held by non-career staff and, in any 
one department the figure could rise to twenty-five percent. Reagan utilised this 
to the fullest, as he made appointments in key agencies such as the OMB, Justice, 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Health and Human Services 
(HHS).13 Thus, Reagan was able to appoint people whom he knew shared his 
views to positions in his administration. Moreover, there was substantial 
interaction between the administration and outsiders. For example, Georgetown 
University provided the administration with such people as Jeane Kirkpatrick and 
Kenneth Adelman. The administration was also supported by such think-tanks as 
the Heritage Foundation who played an important role in pushing for certain 
policies and programs,14 while the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) provided 
the administration with a large number of personnel including Murray 
Weidenbaum, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, David Gergen, 
White House communication chief, and Lawrence Korb in the State Department.15
12 See for example I Kristol. Reflection of a Neoconservative: Looking Back. Looking Ahead. 
NY: Basic Books Publishers, 1983.
13 D.M Hill and P. Williams. “The Reagan Presidency: Style and Substance”, D.M Hill, R.A 
Moore and P. Williams, (ed.) The Reagan Presidency: An Incomplete Revolution?. London: 
Macmillan Press, 1990, pl7-18; R. Brownstein and N. Easton. Reagan’s Ruling Class: Portraits 
of the President’s Tod 100 Officials. Washington DC: The Presidential Accountability Group, 
1982.
At the time SES was criticised because it was felt that it would contribute to the politicisation of 
the civil service as without the civil service’s job security protection, SES employees would 
serve at the whims of the president’s top political appointees. Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac. 1978, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 
1979, p825.
14 R. Bellant. The Coors Connection: How Coors Family Philantrophv Undermines Democratic 
Pluralism. Boston: South End Press, 1991.
15 Ashford describes in some depth the relationship between the AEI and the administration. N. 
Ashford, “A New Public Philosophy”, J.D Lees and M. Turner, (ed.) Reagan’s First Four Years: 
A New Beginning. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, pl7.
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Thus, a brief examination of the administration shows that it was composed of 
essentially real conservatives who were members of the different groups that 
made up the New Right. This was coupled with the New Right’s efficient usage 
of the “score card” which helped to ensure that politicians kept their pledges as 
their record could easily be observed by potential voters.
The administration was also unique because of the way its chief executive 
interpreted events. This has had the effect that on occasions it is difficult to judge 
or even summarise the failures and successes of the administration when looking 
at Reagan’s interpretation of events. The situation is made even harder by the fact 
that members of the administration have a natural tendency to defend their own 
actions which may affect their portrayal of their role and that of others within the 
White House.16 Donald Regan provides an excellent example of Reagan’s unique 
interpretation of events when he discusses the arms-for-hostages' affair in his 
autobiography. Regan writes that the president “knew” that the US had shipped 
anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles to Tehran and that certain Iranians had used 
their influence over the holders of the American hostages to facilitate the release 
of American hostages. However, in Reagan’s mind that did not constitute a swap 
of arms for hostages, his reasoning being that if one uses a third party (an 
intermediary) to bring about the release, and through that person a release occurs, 
and if “in the end” the intermediary is rewarded by you for his services then one 
has not paid a ransom.17 Matters are made even more difficult by the fact that 
Reagan was also closely protected by a group of people who composed his ‘inner 
circle’.
The media was very important to the Reagan presidency even though 
members of the administration felt that it was dominated by liberals who were 
inherently against the White House and Republicans especially of the conservative
16 See for example the different accounts of Stockman, Haig, Shultz and Weinberger on the 
administration or the immediate events following the attempted assassination on Reagan’s life; 
or Regan on Deaver and Nancy Reagan during his tenure as Chief of Staff.
17 D.T Regan. For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington. London: Hutchinson, 1988, 
p31. A similar case could be made when looking at the economic situation. Reagan’s unique 
way of pointing to his role in the release of the American hostages highlights the way he often 
interpreted or rather misinterpreted events. R. Reagan. An American Life. London: Hutchinson, 
1990, p236-237.
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kind.1* The 1980 television debate between the two leading candidates has been 
seen as very important in Reagan’s effort to win the election, especially as 
Reagan’s charisma was complimented by an effective execution of his debating 
policy.19 One could also see the importance of the media for the administration by 
looking at the way the administration dealt with ceremonies. Donald Regan writes 
that if the president was scheduled to make a ceremonial appearance in the Rose 
Garden, he could be sure that the recipient of whatever greeting or award would 
be looking into the sun so that the cameras would have the light behind them. In 
the morning, when the sun was over the Treasury, Reagan stood on the steps 
outside the Oval Office; in the afternoon he would stand on the long side of the 
colonnade. Furthermore, Reagan was always placed in a position that put him 
away as far away as possible from reporters who hovered at the edge of these 
events with the intention of shouting questions. In the words of Regan: “Every 
moment of every public appearance was scheduled, every word was scripted, 
every place where Reagan was expected to stand was chalked with toe marks. 
The President was always being prepared for a performance, and this had the 
inevitable effect of preserving him from confrontation and the genuine interplay of 
opinion, question, and argument that from the basis of decision.”20 Thus, in order 
to appreciate the Reagan presidency one must remember the role that 
appearances and perception played in forming and fulfilling its agenda, and that
18 On why the media was hostile toward the Reagan administration: D.T Regan. For the Record: 
From Wall Street to Washington. London: Hutchinson, 1988; W.K Muir. Jr., The Bully Pulpit: 
The Presidential Leadership of Ronald Reagan. San Francisco: ICS Press Publications, 1992, 
pl61-173. On the belief by conservatives that the mass media is inherently liberal and the 
reason why it is important: J.D Hunter. Cultural Wars: The Struggle to Define America. NY: 
Basic Books Publishers, 1990, p225-249. Hunter argues that the media helps to shape the public 
agenda as it focuses on issues which then places the issues in the realm of mainstream public 
discourse.
19 K. Ritter and D. Henry, “The 1980 Reagan-Carter Presidential Debate”, R.B Feiedenberg. 
(ed.) Rhetorical Studies of National Political Debates. 1960-1992. 2nd ed., Westport: Praeger, 
1994. The authors provide an unconventional view to the 1980 presidential debate but what is 
significant is that even they accept the importance of debate to the presidential campaign. J. 
Morreale. A New Beginning: A Textual Frame Analysis of the Political Campaign Film. 
Albany: State University of New York, 1991.
20 D.T Regan. For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington. London: Hutchinson, 1988, 
p248.
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meant that the administration would at times interpret things for their media 
value.11
The Reagan administration, however, like others before, lost or rather 
reduced some of its ideological commitment with time.12 This was mainly because 
the American political system cannot sustain an ideological momentum due to the 
constant battles that rage between the two branches of government which force 
compromises. Reagan initially was able to prevent this by working with Congress 
and with the New Right activists who were prepared to keep an eye on politicians 
and politics in general.23 The attempted assassination on Reagan’s life had the 
effect of extending his honeymoon period,14 especially with a Congress that 
hungered for strong, effective and ideological leadership. This apparently was 
seen on February 19, 1981, when Reagan spoke to Congress. As David Stockman 
said: “They knew they had lost their way - and now they were looking to him for 
a new way. They applauded him again and again that night, leaving no doubt that 
they were predisposed to grant him extraordinary latitude in finding a new remedy 
for the nation’s ills. They were disposed to gamble, not because they understood 
the plan or even accepted it, but because they had lost all faith in the remedies 
tried before.”13
E c o n o m ic  P o l i c y  -  An A n t i - L i b e r a l  A g e n d a ?
The American economy, when Reagan entered the White House was in 
dire straits and this was something that Reagan had promised to rectify once in 
power. The key claims of Reagan’s economic policy was that the economy could
21 Grenada although no real match for the US military establishment was portrayed as a major 
conflict which vindicated the reform and investment in the armed forces.
22 One must remember that Reagan’s last two years were shrouded by the Iran-Contra 
investigations which caused his administration much embarrassment and hampered his 
legislative program.
23 G. Peele. “The Agenda of the New Right”, D.M Hill, R.A Moore and P. Williams, (ed.) The 
Reagan Presidency: An Incomplete Revolution?. London: Macmillan Press, 1990, p29-49.
24 D. Morgan, “The Peeling of Teflon: Ronald Reagan & the Mass Media”, J. Hogan (ed). The 
Reagan Years: The Record in Presidential Leadership. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1990, p90.
25 D.A Stockman. The Triumph of Politics: The Crisis in American Government & How It 
Affects the World London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986, p84.
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enjoy a rise in real gross national product (GNP) while inflation declined. 
Monetary policy would then stabilise and inflation would decline. Tax cuts would 
provide liquidity and incentives while also preventing the slower money growth 
from causing a recession. His economic policy, otherwise known as 
“Reaganomics,” according to the man who coined the phrase, was: “...a 
compromise from the beginning, a conglomerate if you will, of three points of 
view: supply-side economics, monetarism and traditional Republican budget 
balancing.” This explains why Reaganomics could only survive if the members of 
the coalition continued to support each other.26
The Reaganite economic policy sought to combine two different 
philosophies: traditional conservative Republicanism with the more modem 
radical New Right economic thought. The traditionalists, men such as Barry 
Goldwater, Howard Baker, John Tower and others firmly believed in limited 
government and that both Democratic and Republican administrations have 
allowed the federal government to grow too much. The New Right anti-liberals, 
men such as David Stockman, George Gilder, Jack Kemp, Norman Ture, Paul 
Craig Roberts were more radical in their demands and solutions to America’s 
domestic ills. One cannot and should not underestimate the positions that some of 
these people held in American politics.27
At the core of the Reaganite economic policy was a desire to severely 
reduce the size of the welfare state by promoting states’ rights, tax cuts and a 
balanced budget which would revive American capitalism (in the shape of 
economic laissez-faire) to its former glory. This attitude was summarised by 
Senator Goldwater in 1976 when he stated that unless the United States ceased to 
enlarge its welfare budget the country would reach a breakpointing which to him
26 P.C Roberts. The Supplv-Side Revolution: An Insider’s Account of Policymaking in 
Washington. London: Harvard University Press, 1984, p5, p93. On term “Reaganomics” p93n.
27 For more information see R  Brownstein and N. Easton. Reagan’s Ruling Class: Portraits of 
the President’s Top 100 Officials. Washington DC: The Presidential Accountability Group, 
1982.
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is “...a place in time where the taxpayers’ ability to withstand the load of 
unlimited government largesse finally gives way.”28
Many of Reagan’s economic policies (just like the New Right) had their 
roots in the 1970s with such people as Jack Kemp and William Roth (the Kemp- 
Roth bill), Marjorie Holt (the Holt Amendment), and Sam Nunn (the Nunn 
Amendment).29 This therefore meant that: “A bipartisan consensus for the major 
provisions of the tax measures proposed by President Reagan was in place before 
he was inaugurated.”30
In the 1970s several tax rebellions took place across the country as Americans 
mobilised against state taxes which explains why many politicians took an interest 
in taxation. For example, in 1978, Tennessee and Michigan approved general 
limits on the taxing power of the state, California approved a reduction in local 
property tax.31 The anger toward taxation was primarily due to the fact that from 
about the 1960s, federal tax receipts averaged about nineteen percent of GNP 
with little variation. During the Carter administration, however, the combination 
of rising inflation and increasing social security taxes increased the federal tax 
share of GNP from about nineteenth percent to almost twenty-one percent, and 
Carter’s last budget projected that this share would rise to twenty-four percent in 
fiscal year 1986 without a tax reduction.32 These conditions were facilitated by the 
passing of the Revenue Act in 1978 which represented a new approach to tax cut
28 B. Goldwater. The Coming Breakingpoint. NY: Macmillan Publishers, 1976, pi; “The Right: 
A House Divided?” Newsweek February 2, 1981, p39; M. Anderson. Revolution. Orlando: 
Harecourt Brace Jovanvich Publishers, 1988.
29 P.C Roberts. The Supplv-Side Revolution: An Insider’s Account of Policymaking in 
Washington. London: Harvard University Press, 1984; H. Stein Presidential Economics: the 
Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and Bevond. 2nd ed., Washington DC: 
AEI for Public Policy Research, 1988.
30 The annual reports of the Joint Economic Committee, under the leadership of Democratic 
Senator Lloyd Bentsen, supported a combination of restraint and a reduction in tax rates both in 
1979 and 1980. In August 1980, the Senate Finance Committee approved a tax measure very 
similar to that that candidate Reagan endorsed. W. A Niskanen. Reaganeconomics: An Insider’s 
Account of the Policies & the People. NY: Oxford University Press, 1988, p20-22 (quotation 
fromp21).
31 This attitude was not new as Americans throughout their history have shown a dislike toward 
paying taxes: the Shays Rebellion of 1787, the Nullification Crisis of 1832-33. W.A Niskanen. 
Reaganeconomics: An Insider’s Account of the Policies & the People. NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1988, p20-22.
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legislation as it provided one-off cuts for upper income earners and in business 
and capital gains' taxes. The more radical bill that Jack Kemp and William Roth 
proposed in 1977, sought to cut personal income rates by thirty percent over 
three years was rejected by Carter. However, their proposal gained support 
among Republicans in Congress and Democrats who also noted the success of 
Proposition 13 in California and chose to join the band-wagon.”
The anti-liberals felt that to reduce both the federal government, and the 
welfare budget, an assault on taxation was necessary34 which is why when dealing 
with Reagan’s economic agenda one has to approach the issue of taxation from 
two different angles. This is because on the one hand, Reagan used taxation as 
part of his broad economic policy on which he focused upon in his first term. As 
Regan said: “...people would work harder and more creatively if the burden of a 
discriminatory tax system was lifted from their shoulders, and business would 
expand if it was able to borrow money at rates of interest that made it possible to 
turn a fair profit. The Reagan Administration intended to change the way the 
government did business with the people in a fundamental way.”33 In his second 
term, Reagan, through the Treasury Department, tackled the tax system and 
brought about wide ranging reforms to it (he had wanted to do during his first 
administration, but at that time it was not politically prudent).36
32 W.A Niskanen. Reaganeconomics: An Insider’s Account of the Policies & the People. NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1988, p71.
33 J. J Hogan. “Reaganomics and Economic Policy”, D.M Hill, R. A Moore and P. Williams, (ed.) 
The Reagan Presidency: An Incomplete Revolution?. London: Macmillan Press, 1990. Reagan 
notes that when he was governor he tried to pass a similar measure to Proposition 13, but it was 
defeated because it was ahead of its time. He therefore writes that in 1978, the “...prairie fire 
I've talked about was really spreading across the land, and it shouldn’t have surprised anyone.” 
R. Reagan. An American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990, p207.
34 On the importance of taxation see for example Arthur Laffer response in C. Stubblebine and 
T.D Willett (ed) Reaganomics: A Midterm Report. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1983, p71-76.
35 D.T Regan. For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington. London: Hutchinson, 1988, 
pl75.
36 Reagan claims that he was always concerned with the tax system R. Reagan. An American 
Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990. On political consideration see Regan who suggests that he and 
the Treasury Department began the examination of the tax system during the first 
administration, even though the main transformation took place once Regan became Reagan’s 
Chief of Staff during the second term. D.T Regan. For the Record: From Wall Street to 
Washington. London: Hutchinson, 1988.
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Reagan himself had a great affinity with those who felt that the tax system 
(which included the level of taxation) was not only bad for economic growth but 
was unfair and therefore wrong.37 Thus, no piece of legislation better emphasised 
what the Reagan economic plan was about than the 1981 Economic Recovery 
Tax Act (ERTA). The Treasury Department and the Economic Affairs area of the 
administration were filled with people whose outlook was based around the basic 
desire of reforming America’s economic system.38 The person responsible for the 
tax policy in the administration was Norman Ture, the Under-Secretary for Tax 
and Economic Affairs, who was very much the epitome of an anti-liberal man.39
ERTA served as the centrepiece of the administration’s effort to stimulate 
growth and produce new investments as it fulfilled much of the supply-siders’ 
dream. The reduction in tax rates on personal income was claimed to be. “...the 
most substantial change and the major achievement of the initial Reagan 
economic policy.”40 The tax proposals were based very much on the ideas of two 
New Righters, Congressman Kemp (R-NY.) and Senator Roth (R-Del.) which 
Congress endorsed in 1978, and the Senate Finance Committee by 1980. ERTA 
called for a reduction of ten percent in individual income tax rates annually 
beginning on July 1, 1981. This would have reduced tax rates from the then- 
current range of between fourteen and seventy percent to between ten and fifty 
percent by July 1, 1984 - nearly a uniform twenty-seven percent reduction across 
income groups. The administration considered two other changes to the 
individual income tax which were not included in the initial proposal. An
37 Reagan points to his experience in Hollywood as because he was in the ninety-four percent 
tax bracket which “...meant that the government took most of what I [Reagan] earned.” Thus, it 
made more sense for him (and others like him) to turn down jobs. R. Reagan. An American 
Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990, pi 17, 231.
38 R. Brownstein and N . Easton. Reagan’s Ruling Class: Portraits of the President’s Top 100 
Officials. Washington DC: The Presidential Accountability Group, 1982, p3-104. There were 
some people who were not strictly anti-liberals such as Malcolm Baldrige but they were in the 
minority. For similar views see: P.C Roberts. The Supplv-Side Revolution: An Insider’s 
Account of Policymaking in Washington. London: Harvard University Press, 1984; M. 
Feldstein, “The Social Security Explosion.” The Public Interest (81 Fall 1985), p94-106.
39 Ture initially was a Democrat but in time his attitude became more conservative and he began 
working with several conservative organisations such as Heritage Foundation, and the Olin and 
Scaife Foundations. R. Brownstein and N. Easton. Reagan’s Ruling Class: Portraits of the 
President’s Top 100 Officials. Washington DC: The Presidential Accountability Group, 1982,
p6-10.
40 W.A Niskanen. Reaganeconomics: An Insider’s Account of the Policies & the People. NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1988, p71.
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immediate reduction in the top bracket on the income from property was rejected 
on the grounds that it may appear to be unfair. Indexing the individual tax code 
for changes in the general tax level (which Reagan had endorsed during the 
campaign) was rejected because of concern about the effect on tax receipts.41
The impact of ERTA (which Reagan signed into law on August 13, 1981) 
was tremendous especially as many had argued that the major benefactors of 
Reaganomics and the 1981 tax act were wealthy Americans. In general terms, the 
legislation mandated that rates would be reduced over a three-year period by 
twenty-five percent, with top rate coming down from seventy percent to fifty 
percent. In other words, estate taxes were reduced significantly, and rates on 
unearned income and capital gains were also targeted for relief. The result was 
that the income of the top 0.2 percent of all income filers had increased by 
twenty-one to twenty-six percent by 1984, whereas the gain in disposable income 
for those at the median point was a nominal 3.5 percent. Families under $10,000 
lost more than fifteen percent of their income due to various tax and budget 
changes enacted in 1981. Unified corporate America, due to business lobbying, 
received a handsome boost from the Reagan administration as it saw a $150 
billion tax cut over a five-year period, for services rendered to the Republican 
party by PACs and other forms of corporate financing and endorsement during 
the 1980 presidential campaign.42
By February 1982, the economic situation was dire. The prime rate was 
16.75 percent, unemployment was over eight percent and the GNP was shrinking 
at an annual rate of 0.1 percent. In other words, there was not enough money in 
the economy to pay the government’s bills and also finance a recovery by the 
private sector. This led to a demand from some quarters for a tax rise (promoted 
perhaps surprisingly mainly by Stockman with the unanimous support of the 
White House staff and the President’s CEA) as it was felt that further cuts in 
spending would be insufficient. Congress also demanded new taxes as the price of
41 W.A Niskanen. Reaganeconomics: An Insider’s Account of the Policies & the People. NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1988, p73.
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reform and blamed its need for new money on the deficit. Senator Dole, the 
Senate Finance Committee Chairman, for example, announced publicly that new 
taxes would be “unavoidable if the economy did not improve,” in three months. 
Republican conservative politicians wanted even stronger measures due to their 
animosity toward deficits (the national deficit had grown tremendously since 
198143). In the words of Treasury Secretary Regan: “...Capitol Hill, which in fiscal 
year 1982 had mandated spending $128 billion more than Treasury was receiving 
in taxes and other revenues, claiming it wanted more money so that it could 
balance the books and start over again with a clean slate.”44 However, despite 
growing calls from economists, members of the administration and congressmen 
for a rise in taxation, Reagan the committed ideologue, was not prepared (at least 
in his mind) to compromise on this issue.43
Conservatives such as President Reagan and Treasury Secretary Regan 
felt that the state of the American tax system was far more complex than was 
necessary, and as part of the revolution the administration sought to reform the 
tax system. This was an integral part of the Reaganite desire to reduce the size of 
government which would also make governing easier.44 The assault on the tax 
system (codes) took place during Reagan second term and its importance is that it 
helps show that despite being in office for six years and as a result losing some of 
its more militant conservatism, certain fundamentals remained as potent within the 
administration. Regan notes that he had asked the Commissioner of the IRS, 
Roscoe Egger, how much shelf space an accountant or tax lawyer just starting 
out in business would need “...for a basic, no-frills library of reference books.” 
Egger after a few days informed Regan that it would require one foot of shelf for
42 W.C Berman. America’s Right Turn: From Nixon to Bush. Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1994, p92-94; M. Walker. Clinton: The President They Deserve. London: 
Fourth Estate, 1996.
43 Reagan within a few days of becoming President had to ask Congress to raise the ceiling on 
the national debt. R  Reagan. An American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990,233-4.
44 D.T Regan. For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington. London: Hutchinson, 1988, 
pl73.
45 The 1986 Tax Reform Act in fact raised corporate taxes. It levied new rates that provided the 
Treasury with over $100 billion in a five-year span. R.A Ruthland. The Republicans: From 
Lincoln to Bush. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1996, p243.
46 R. Reagan. An American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990.
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the tax code plus three volumes of regulations; four feet for sixteen volumes of 
reference materials published by tax services; thirteen and a half feet for Internal 
Revenue Service manuals. The total shelf space that would be needed was sixty- 
three feet, with the instalment of the shelf (like the cost of the books) being tax 
deductible. This is just an example of the conservatives’ belief that the tax system 
as it stood was “...complicated, inequitable, expensive to administrate, and so 
filled with loopholes that it was entirely unnecessary to cheat on taxes in order to 
avoid them. Some individuals earned millions of dollars in a given year, reported 
every penny of this income and, by taking advantage of tax shelters and other 
provisions provided by law, paid no federal income tax at all. The inequity was 
even more glaring in the case of corporations. The underground economy alone, 
conducted in cash and unrecorded transactions, probably cost the Treasury at 
least $90 billion a year in unpaid taxes on an estimated $500 billion in unreported 
earnings.”47 Thus, in 1986 Congress passed the Tax Reform Act which overhauled 
the tax code drastically.4®
Reagan had a particular anathema for the bureaucracy which he 
maintained functioned primarily to sustain itself, and he attempted to launch a full 
scale war against the ‘faceless mandarins’ that run government.49 It was felt that 
bureaucrats were the ones hampering American development and growth with 
silly regulations, rules and polices which were making American businesses less 
competitive in the world’s markets.50 It was claimed by the administration that 
since the mid-1960s the number and the size of federal agencies dealing with
47 D.T Regan. For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington. London: Hutchinson, 1988, 
pl93.
48 The effect was that the legislation closed certain loopholes and brought about $300 billion in 
revenue lost under the old rules. R.A Ruthland. The Republicans: From Lincoln to Bush. 
Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1996, p242.
49 “The first rule of a bureaucracy is to protect the bureaucracy.” R. Reagan. An American Life. 
London: Hutchinson, 1990, p69.
50 Some members in the administration adhered to a “Public Choice” philosophy which 
maintained that the political system is biased in favour of big government. “The career 
bureaucrats are seen as hostile to reducing government and some attempts have been made in 
the Reagan administration to provide incentives for bureaucrats to be more efficient, based on 
the ideas of Niskanen who was a member of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers from 
1981 to 1985.” N. Ashford, “A New Public Philosophy”, J.D Lees and M. Turner, (ed) 
Reagan’s First Four Years: A New Beginning. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, 
pl2-14, (quotation from pl4).
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federal regulations had grown tremendously. The effect was that the direct costs 
of federal regulatory activities to the taxpayers rose from $2.8 billion in fiscal 
1974, to $5.5 billion five years later, and by 1981 to $7.1.51 The Reaganites 
claimed that the expansion in federal regulation had occurred despite the fact that 
the federal government has no right to regulate inter-state economic activity. 
“The 10th Amendment, which reserves to the States and the people all powers 
not delegated to the to the United States, confirms the States’ powers to enact 
laws to protect public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. The Federal 
Government was not given comparable powers, except as such activity affects 
interstate commerce.”52
The same type of criticism were levelled against the United Nations which the 
anti-liberals argued had created a massive bureaucracy which not only drained 
UN resources but hampered American national interests.53
The assault on regulation, which was part of the attack against the federal 
bureaucracy, was headed by the administrator of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, Christopher DeMuth who was also the Executive Director of 
the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief.54 The Reaganites objected to the 
whole idea of federal regulation because to their minds it represented a belief that 
the market had failed to function efficiently in the allocation of goods and 
services. It was also felt that government regulation was promoted due to special 
interest groups which provide benefits to the few at the expense of the mass 
consumers.55
Reagan’s desire to take-on the issue of federal regulation began with his 
Executive Order 12291 (February 17, 1981) which gave the OMB (run by the
51 Murray Weidenbaum of the Centre for the Study of American Business of Washington 
University, St. estimated that regulations cost $103 billion in 1979 or $500 per capita. N. 
Ashford, “A New Public Philosophy”, J.D Lees and M. Turner, (ed.) Reagan’s First Four Years: 
A New Beginning. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, pi 1.
52 J. Tobin and M. Weidenbaum. (ed) Two Revolutions in Economic Policy: The First 
Economic Reports of Presidents Kennedy and Reagan. London: The MIT Press, 1988, p452- 
455, (quotation from p458).
53 See chapter 4 of this thesis for New Right attacks on the UN bureaucracy.
54 DeMuth was another good example of a New Right man as he like his boss Stockman had 
connections with D.P Moynihan. R. Brownstein and N. Easton. Reagan’s Ruling Class: 
Portraits of the President’s Tod 100 Officials. Washington DC: The Presidential Accountability 
Group, 1982, p56-64.
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anti-liberal New Righter David Stockman) unprecedented authority to review 
agency regulatory proposals before they were published in the Federal Register. 
Standards for conducting cost-benefit analysis (CBA) which the order mandated 
for “major” regulations were also established. Existing regulations were to be 
dealt with through the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, which was 
chaired by vice-president George Bush and was composed of the secretaries of 
the Treasury, Commerce, and Labour, the Attorney General, OMB Director, the 
chairman of the CEA and the President’s Domestic Policy Adviser.56 The 
administration maintained that the biggest budgets were not for the independent 
regulatory commissions, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission or the 
Federal Communication Commission as the largest proportion of funds went to 
the broader regulatory commissions, such as those conducted by the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Agriculture (mainly 
food inspection). The introduction of CBA into the regulatory process was 
supposed to make the decision-making process concerning regulations far more 
efficient.57
The major successes in deregulation came in the shape of several pieces of 
legislation that managed to win the support of Congress. The Bus Regulatory 
Reform Act of 1982, deregulated bus fare as it permitted firms to make changes 
in routes and allowed shipping freer entry and exit into the industry. The Shipping 
Act of 1984, enabled shipping firms to adjust rates and types of service. During 
the 1970s, banks and saving loan institutions had lost vast sums of money and 
large number of depositors because unregulated money market funds paid a 
higher rate of interest. Congress responded by raising the federal insurance level 
to $100,000 on individual accounts and it permitted the institutions to pay higher 
interest rates, thus making banks and Saving and Loans (S&Ls) more 
competitive. The Reagan administration pushed Congress further with the Gran-
55 See for example J. Tobin and M. Weidenbaum. (ed.) Two Revolutions in Economic Policy: 
The First Economic Reports of Presidents Kennedy and Reagan. London: The MIT Press, 1988.
56 T.G Moore, “The Reagan Deregulation Program: An Assessment”, C. Stubblebine and T.D 
Willett (ed.) Reaganomics: A Midterm Report. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1983, pl59-168; R. 
Brownstein and N. Easton. Reagan’s Ruling Class: Portraits of the President’s Top 100 
Officials. Washington DC: The Presidential Accountability Group, 1982, p56.
57 J. Tobin and M. Weidenbaum. (ed.) Two Revolutions in Economic Policy: The First 
Economic Reports of Presidents Kennedy and Reagan. London: The MIT Press, 1988,452-455.
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St. Germain Act of 1982, which authorised banks to offer new types of accounts. 
Congress permitted saving and loans (thrifts) to make more commercial and 
consumer loans (S&Ls could invest depositors’ in virtually anything). The act 
liberalised the ownership of S&Ls, allowed deposit insurance funds to be used to 
bail out failing banks, reduce the interest rate differentials between banking 
institutions, and, in general revolutionised the banking industry.58
In sum, Reagan’s economic agenda was very much of an anti-liberal New 
Right one which declined the longer Reagan remained in power. ERTA was 
certainly one piece of legislation that was in-line with New Right thinking as it 
was essentially designed by the founders of the movement who had good access 
to the economic policy-makers within the administration. Reagan was responsible 
for getting the 97th Congress to take bold steps in reducing the scope of the 
federal government by cutting government spending, reducing taxes for 
individuals and businesses, slimming down federal regulatory activities and 
dispelling the belief that government could provide the solution to people’s 
problems.59 As the decade progressed Reagan came to experience difficulties with 
politicians on the Hill as Congress reacted to the deteriorating economic 
situation.60
The New Right anti-liberal section of the Reagan coalition believed that a 
reduction in the size of the federal government was imperative and the area that 
attracted much of their attention was the social security budget. OMB Director 
David Stockman (and others) saw the social security program as a New Deal 
product which was noble when it started out but over the years spun out-of­
58 A.S Campagna. The Economy in the Reagan Years: The Economic Consequences of the 
Reaean Administration. London: Greenwood Press, 1994, plOO; M. Schaller, V Scharff and 
R.D Schulzinger. Present Tense: The United States Since 1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1992, p519.
59 Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 97th Congress, 1st Session 1981, Washington DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1982, pl4. Congress enacted $35.2 billion in FY 1982 program 
cuts and cut nearly $4 billion more from appropriations. Its cut in business and individual taxes 
totalled $749 billion over a five-year period.
60 Congress for example passed a tax measure that raised $98 billion over the following three 
years. Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 97th Congress, 2nd Session 1982, Washington DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1983, plO-23.
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control with welfare benefits and earned pension annuities being twisted together 
concealed under the fig leaf of social insurance. Stockman argued that the pure 
idea of social security pension existed on the notion that actuaries could add up 
the approximate present value of a lifetime of payroll tax contributions and 
calculated what the resulting pension annuity should be and under any actuarial 
system for determining the pension the two had to equate. The argument was 
over what interest rate should be used in the calculations. However, what had 
transpired was that social security came to rest on the myth that everybody earned 
his or her social security benefits and was entitled to them. The problem, for the 
New Right, was that politicians had sweetened it so much that the notion of need 
disappeared and had nothing to do with what a worker had put into the fund. 
Stockman describes this as “closet socialism.”61
The opposition to the growing social security budget held the complex 
anti-liberal movement together, as members differed on how far and where cuts 
should take place. The problem as David Stockman noted in the title of his book 
was that politics triumphed over ideology and this was seen for example when 
conservative like Orrin Hatch of Utah (Chairman of Senate Human Resources 
Committee) informed the OMB director that the Job Corps program should be 
saved (this was perhaps because one of the Job Corps’ major facilities was in 
Utah).62
President Reagan, all in all, may not have had the all-embracing New 
Right economic revolution that he had envisioned at the beginning of his tenure 
especially with the huge budget deficit that America developed throughout his 
presidency. However, his impact was that he created the illusion that his
61 D.A Stockman. The Triumph of Politics: The Crisis in American Government & How It 
Affects the World. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986, pl94. On the effect that welfare has on 
America’s poor see G. Gilder, “The Coming Welfare Crisis.” Policy Review (Winter 1980), 25- 
36. On the danger of the huge Social Security budget see M. Feldstein, “The Social Security 
Explosion.” The Public Interest 81 (Fall 1985), p94-106. On the dangers of affirmative action 
(which was part of the social budget) see O. Hatch, “Loading the Economy.” Policy Review 
(Winter 1980), p23-37.
62 D.A Stockman. The Triumph of Politics: The Crisis in American Government & How It 
Affects the World London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986, pl53. The essence of Stockman’s 
grievance was that politics prevented the fulfilment of the conservative ideology that he and his 
colleagues held.
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economic policies brought about the prosperity of the 1980s which emerged 
around 1983 and were very instrumental in enabling him to win the 1984 
presidential election by a landslide. By the end of Reagan’s eight-years tenure 
there was a greater sense of apathy in American society as people ignored many 
of the deep-rooted problems that the country faced arguably because of the 
apparent of widespread prosperity.63 However, there were those people who 
voiced concern over the growing deficit the fixation with money and greed which 
Reagan seemed to encourage with his deregulation program (S&Ls industry being 
a prime example). The prosperity and care-free attitude that existed in the 1980s 
was a far-cry from the problematic and depressive 1970s, which explains why 
people chose to forget about the consequences of their economic actions, and 
lived for the moment.
S o c i a l  P o l i c y  -  T h e New C h r i s t i a n  R i g h t  A g e n d a
In 1976, the Christian Right played an important role in aiding Jimmy 
Carter, a “born-again” Christian win the presidency.64 Conservative Christians 
believed that because a devout Christian occupied the Oval Office the country 
would be provided with the moral kick-start that would restore traditional 
Christian values that had gone amiss in the postwar period. However, by the end 
of Carter’s term many felt that he failed as the descent into the abyss of 
immorality and vice continued, nor was the Soviet Union - the Antichrist - 
stopped, while the administration was not scandal-free. Thus, Reagan was able to 
win the 1980 presidential election because the issues that he chose to emphasise, 
coupled with the Republican Party platform appealed to religious conservatives of 
all denominations63 and conservative Democrats appealed to a broad coalition.
63 R.A Ruthland. The Republicans: From Lincoln to Bush. Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 1996, p242-245.
64 Menendez, however, notes that Carter had evangelical support but he believes that others 
were far more important. AJ Menendez. Evangelicals at the Ballot Box. Amherst: Prometheus 
Books, 1996, pl28, pl28-157.
65 Both Robertson and Falwell see and describe the Soviet Union as the anti-Christ, P. 
Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991; J. Falwell, E. Dobson andE. 
Hindson. (ed) The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The Resurgence of Conservative Christianity. 
NY: Doubleday & Co., 1981; A J Menendez. Evangelicals at the Ballot Box. Amherst: 
Prometheus Books, 1996, p i35. For the support and the reason for it that the Christian Right 
gave the Republican Party and Reagan in 1980 see J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. Televangelism:
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One, however, must wonder, how much of the affinity with Reagan was based on 
the belief that anyone was better than Carter?66
The support that the Reagan camp received from conservative Christians 
was the culmination of a growing process which saw this group becoming 
increasingly active in Republican Party politics and agenda setting.67 For example, 
in late 1979, Bill Brock, the Republican National Committee (RNC) chairman, 
invited over twenty evangelical leaders to RNC headquarters. In the meeting 
which lasted for over three hours, Brock and other top party officials invited the 
evangelicals to state their concerns and asked how the GOP could be more 
sensitive to them. Over the years similar meetings had taken place with the RNC 
as well as with the Senate and House Republican Committees.6*
In 1980 under the leadership of the Moral Majority coupled with support from 
Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich, Howard Phillips and several other leading 
conservatives, the Christian Right supported Reagan and worked for his 
election.69 The support manifested itself through such things as a “public affairs
Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry Holt & Co., 1988; Hunter writes that white 
evangelicals “...fled the Democratic party in droves to support the Republican candidate: 61 
percent voted for Reagan in 1980, 79 percent supported Reagan in 1984; and 72 percent voted 
for Bush in 1988.” The Catholic vote for Reagan increased from 47 percent in 1980 to 61 
percent in 1984. J.D Hunter. Cultural Wars: The Struggle to Define America. NY: Basic Books 
Publishers, 1990, p280.
66 Lipset and Raab have argued that the Americans who “turned Right” in the 1980 election 
“...did not by any means agree with the moral majority or New Right program...They wanted a 
government that would more demonstrably reflect their mood: a more assertive America on the 
world scene, and on the domestic front a serious campaign to fight inflation and refurbish 
America industry. That is the extent of their political conservatism.” S.M Lipset and E. Raab, 
“The Election of the Evangelicals.” Commentary 71 (3 1981), p31. [Italics in text].
67 The 1980 Republican Party Platform embraced many issues and ideals important to religious 
conservatives. The text of the Republican Party Platform is provided in Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac. 1980, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington DC, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 
1981.
68 D.M Oldfield. The Right and the Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican 
Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, p i 16. This is taken from Oldfield who 
received the information from a personal interview (March 16, 1989) with Robert Dugan, 
political director of the National Association of Evangelicals and a participant of many of these 
meetings. Dugan did not remember the exact date during which the first meeting took place, it 
was either December 1979, or January 1980. Oldfield adds that Charles Judd who went from a 
position in the RNC under Brock to being an executive vice-president in Falwell’s Moral 
Majority, also had strong words of praise for Brock’s efforts to reach out to evangelicals. 
(Personal interview, June 26,1989).
69 A good example of this is Bob Billings founder of the Hyles-Anderson College in Indiana, 
and former graduate of BJU who became in 1979 the Moral Majority executive director in 1979,
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briefing” for Ronald Reagan which James Robinson and Edward McAteer 
organised. Over 18,000 people came to hear Reagan and principal host, the Rev. 
Jerry Falwell speak. Falwell who knew that he was dangerously close to violating 
the tax-exempt status of his religious enterprises due to such political activity told 
the audience that he could not openly endorse Reagan but he urged the religious 
leaders in attendance to “vote for the Reagan of your choice.”70
The great support that Ronald Reagan and the Republican Party received 
from the Christian Right was despite the fact that Reagan’s religious record was 
far from a positive one (he was the only divorced man to win the presidential 
election and his church attendance was far from regular). However, Reagan had 
the backing of the Religious Right because he ran as a pro-family candidate and 
openly courted the support of conservative evangelicals. He appeased anti- 
abortionists who remembered that he had signed the most liberal abortion law in 
the nation while governor of California by having his supporters promise privately 
that he would appoint only pro-life justices and also appointing anti-abortion 
activist C. Everett Koop surgeon-general.71 Reagan also repudiated the Equal 
Rights Amendment, called for the abolition of the Department of Education and 
appointed Christian Right activists to visible posts in his administration.72
An integral part in Reagan’s success or failure in implementing a general 
New Right and especially a Christian Right agenda is the role of the federal
and in 1980 worked for Reagan’s election as liaison officer with conservative Christians. G. 
Peele. Revival & Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984, pl08. Peele in the chapter on the Religious Right looks at the impact and work of other 
Christian leaders and New Christian Right organisations on American politics and society.
70 R.C Chandler, “The Wicked Shall Not Bear Rule: The Fundamentalist Heritage of the New 
Christian Right”, D.G Bromley and A. Shupe (ed.) New Christian Politics. Macon: Mercer 
University Press, 1984, p55.
71 Falwell notes the work that Everett Koop has done in the crusade against abortion before his 
appointment as surgeon-general. J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980; J.K 
Hadden and A  Shupe. Televangelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry Holt & 
Co., 1988.
72 Robert Billings of the Moral Majority, for example, took a post in the Department of 
Education. C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1996, p84-85; R  Brownstein and N. Easton. Reagan’s Ruling Class: 
Portraits of the President’s Top 100 Officials. Washington DC: The Presidential Accountability 
Group, 1982, especially p272; AJ Menendez. Evangelicals at the Ballot Box. Amherst: 
Prometheus Books, 1996, pl35; R  Evans and R  Novak. The Reagan Revolution. NY: E.P.
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judiciary and the Justice Department played, as it is one thing to preach about 
conservatism but another to actually take on American society and system. The 
Supreme Court and the federal judiciary were essential to the Reagan New Right 
revolution as federal judges are selected by the president, and they not only 
interpret the Constitution but also what it implies morally which is why presidents 
have attempted to promote a federal judiciary that reflects their ideological 
leaning.73
At the centre of the administration ideology was a “Constructionalist” or 
“Original Intent” approach to interpreting the Constitution which meant 
opposition to the liberal interpretation that had been predominant from the days 
of the Warren Court of the 1950s. The administration held, according to Attorney 
General Edwin Meese, that the Constitution should not be regarded: “...as some 
kind of super-municipal code, designed to address merely the problems of a 
particular era - whether those of 1787, 1789, or 1868.”, because it is ever-lasting, 
so there are no grounds for a lax or liberal interpretation of it.74
During his eight years in office, Reagan was able to appoint about four 
hundred federal judges, as well as a chief justice and three associate Supreme 
Court justices.75 The Justice Department had to screen candidates very carefully to 
prevent judges with liberal views on abortion, civil rights, civil liberties and school 
prayer, obtaining posts. The effect was that gradually the Reagan appointees
Dutton, 1981, p204-225; J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. Televaneelism: Power and Politics on 
God’s Frontier. NY Henry Holt & Co., 1988.
73 J.D Hunter. Cultural Wars: The Struggle to Define America. NY: Basic Books Publishers, 
1990, p250-251.
74 E. Meese III, “The Battle for the Constitution: The Attorney General Replies to His Critics.” 
Policy Review (35 Winter 1986), p32-35; B.A Perry and H.J Abraham, “The Reagan Supreme 
Court Appointees”, W.D Peterson and N.W Provizer. (ed.) Great Justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court: Ratines & Case Studies. NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 1993, p317-354.
75 Reagan in his first term appointed 130 district court judges (26 percent of the 506 sitting 
judges) and 31 judges to the regional appeals courts (23 percent of the 133 sitting judges). He 
also appointed 2 justices to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal circuit and three judges to 
the US Court of International Trade. The majority of his appointments were white males, 
although he appointed in his first term 17 women to the federal bench, including the first 
women to the US Supreme Court. Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 1984, 98th Congress, 2nd 
Session, Washington DC, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1985, p214, p243; B.A Perry and H.J 
Abraham, “The Reagan Supreme Court Appointees”, W.D Peterson and N.W Provizer. (ed.) 
Great Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court: Ratings & Case Studies. NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 
1993, p317-354.
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changed the attitude of the Supreme Court.76 After 1984, the Court whittled away 
at previous decisions that had made police responsible for making suspects aware 
of their rights. It also approved limitations on bail, affirmed most state capital 
punishment laws, and allowed the introduction in court of some illegally seized 
evidence. Following the Kennedy confirmation, the Court conservative majority 
began to chip away at affirmative action.77 Thus, Reagan began the assault on 
secular humanism by placing conservatives on the bench.
If the United States was to be re-invigorated, members of the New 
Christian Right argued, an emphasises on traditional education and morality was 
needed78 and some of the fiercest battles between the secularists and religious 
were fought within the area of education.79 Leading conservatives came to argue 
that it was no wonder that the youth of America was losing faith in the system as 
they simply lacked knowledge about liberal democracy and their own history. 
American schools, conservatives claimed, no longer taught students the proper 
history of the country with the result that high school graduates did not know 
about the Magna Carta, the Bible, the Greek polis, the Federalist Papers, the 
Lincoln-Douglas debates and so forth.80 The failure of the educational system was 
also blamed on permissive teachers, sex education, wasteful spending and a lack
76 M. Schaller, V Schaiff and RD Schulzinger. Present Tense: The United States Since 1945. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1992, p521-523.
On June 11, 1986, the Supreme Court struck down a Pennsylvania law that regulated abortion 
by a vote of 5-4 and thus upheld the 1973 Roe vs. Wade decision. The significance according to 
the authors, which anti-abortionists pointed to, was the narrowness of the decision as in 1973 
was 7-2. J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. Televangelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: 
Henry Holt & Co., 1988, p216.
77 M. Schaller, V Scharff and R.D Schulzinger. Present Tense: The United States Since 1945. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1992, p521-523. For the hard work that the Justice Department 
did in order to reverse many of the liberal aspects of American society see D.W Kmiec. The 
Attorney General’s Lawyer: Inside the Meese Justice Department. NY: Praeger, 1992. Kmiec 
directed the Office of Legal Counsel, US Justice Department, 1985-1989. He also served as 
deputy and then as assistant Attorney General. He is a Catholic and ideologue who opposed 
abortion and supported an “Original Intent” approach.
78 See for example J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980.
79 On the importance of education see for example J.D Hunter. Cultural Wars: The Struggle to 
Define America. NY: Basic Books Publishers, 1990. For education and social conservatives see 
N. Glazer, “The ‘Social Agenda’ ”, J.L Palmer, (ed.) Perspectives on the Reagan Years. 
Washington DC: The Urban Institute Press, 1986, p5-30.
80 W. Bennett, “Lost Generation: Why America’s Children Are Strangers in Their Own Land?” 
Policy Review (33 1985). Bennett calls for the restoration of traditional education, especially 
history, in order to revitalise the American political system.
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of attention to Western cultural traditions and the ‘"three Rs.”81 In the 
administration the campaign for the restoration of traditional values was led by 
Terry Bell, the Education Secretary.82
The debate about education was polarised even further with calls by 
members of the Christian Right to allow school prayers. The battle for school 
prayer, for the Christian Right essentially began in 1962, when the Supreme Court 
in Engel v. Vitale ruled that a non-denominational prayer by the New York Board 
of Regents violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. This was 
followed in 1963, by a Supreme Court ruling in Abington School District v. 
Schempp which found a Pennsylvania statute requiring the reading of Bible 
verses, followed by the Lord’s Prayer, to be unconstitutional.83 Reagan from very 
early on in his presidency worked both directly and through members in Congress 
to reverse the Supreme Court rulings preventing school prayer. In the end a 
compromise was reached in 1984, which allowed “...student religious 
organizations to meet in public high schools on the same terms as other student 
groups.”84 This may not have been what the Christian Right wanted but it should 
be seen as a good start in the campaign to restore prayer in federal supported 
schools.
The Bob Jones University (BJU) episode highlighted Reagan’s attempts to 
fulfil the hopes that the Christian Right had in him. The case was important 
because “...during the Carter administration the same IRS had proposed very 
severe standards for private schools to guarantee nondiscrimination, in which they
81 M. Schaller, V Scharff and RD Schulzinger. Present Tense: The United States Since 1945. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1992, p525; R. Brownstein and N. Easton. Reagan’s Ruling 
Class: Portraits of the President’s Tod 100 Officials. Washington DC: The Presidential 
Accountability Group, 1982, p270.
82 R. Brownstein and N. Easton. Reagan’s Ruling Class: Portraits of the President’s Tod 100 
Officials. Washington DC. The Presidential Accountability Group, 1982, p270-275.
83 C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996, p87-88; J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. Televangelism: Power and Politics 
on God’s Frontier. NY: Hemy Holt & Co., 1988, p59, p231-232.
84 PL 98-377 was short of what Christian conservatives wanted, but it was a beginning, as for 
the first time since the early 1960s, religious students were allowed to hold voluntary meetings 
in schools that received federal funds. There were several sub-clauses to the legislation that 
were designed to prevent abuse of the “establishment clause.” Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac. 98th Congress, 2nd Session 1984, Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 
1985, p489.
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have had to pass a statistical test requiring enrollment of a certain number of 
minority students.”85
The BJU, in Greenville, South Carolina, had provided the New Christian Right 
with many leaders who received their undergraduate education as well as much of 
their training for the Christian ministry there.86 The university, it is said, seeks to 
be thoroughly competitive, with the very best universities and colleges in the 
region, in academic terms while encouraging individual independence. Students 
are motivated to become self-sufficient, always dependent on the grace of God, 
but never looking to the government or some other agency for assistance. The 
school attracted attention mainly due to the IRS which challenged the university’s 
tax-exempt status, (although provocative and sometimes inflammatory statements 
that one or another of the three Bob Jones who had served as its leaders had also 
helped in raising the University’s notoriety).87
The trouble with the IRS began in 1970 when the administration of the 
school was asked to sign the Civil Rights Compliance Act which it refused to do 
on religious grounds. The IRS due to the refusal informed the university that its 
tax-exempt status would be withdrawn. In 1974 the case reached the Supreme 
Court which ruled that the IRS could not be prevented from doing something that 
it had not yet done and two years later, the school’s tax exempt status was 
withdrawn. On December 23, 1978, a federal district court ruled that the 
university was entitled to its tax-exempt status as a religious organisation. The 
IRS appealed, and again the matter had to be resolved by the Supreme Court 
(during which time Reagan campaigning in Greenville promised to rectify the 
situation if he was elected). On January 8, 1982, the administration announced 
that it was abandoning the IRS policy and that it would move to dismiss the BJU 
case on the ground of mootness. Due to public outcry the administration was 
forced to reverse itself, declaring that it would initiate legislation to give the IRS 
the authority to deny tax exempt status to discriminatory private schools. The
85 N. Glazer, “The ‘Social Agenda’ ”, J.L Palmer, (ed.) Perspectives on the Reagan Years. 
Washington DC: The Urban Institute Press, 1986, pl2.
86 A good example is Robert (Bob) Billings, head of the National Christian Action Coalition, 
held a doctorate from the BJU. G. Peele. Revival & Reaction: The Right in Contemporary 
America. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pl08.
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initiative languished in Congress where it found no champion. The Reaganite 
Treasury Department, was prepared to grant tax exempt status to the university 
but on February 18, 1982, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit issued a temporary order restraining the IRS and the Treasury from 
granting tax exemption to racial discriminatory private schools. On October 12, 
1982, the case was heard by the Supreme Court and on May 24, 1983, the Court 
delivered its ruling against the BJU and the Goldsboro Christian School.88 The 
affair, however, ended by emphasising that although the Religious Right may have 
been instrumental in assisting Reagan in the election, its agenda was not 
guaranteed as a result.
The New Christian Right had hoped that with Reagan at the helm, and 
with the aid of an increasingly conservative Congress it could restore America’s 
lost morality. At the time one would have expected the Religious Right to be 
rather successful as they had both a willing President and a Congress that was 
inclined to take a more conservative stand on social policy. This is why it may 
first appear to be rather surprising that New Christian Right social revolution 
never reached the proportions that one had expected it to.
Gillian Peele has made an interesting observation as to why Reagan’s 
social agenda was not very successful. She suggests that the House Democrats, 
with the up-and-coming 1982 congressional elections, had to re-assert their 
partisan identity. They therefore refused to assign key committee appointments to 
southern Democrats who were unwilling to pay sufficient attention to the party 
line. The Democrats also adopted, procedural rules that limited the ability of 
Congressmen to attach non-germane riders to appropriations bills. This had a 
dramatic impact especially on the conservative coalition as it reduced its 
opportunities for Congressmen such as Henry Hyde of Illinois to assert social
87 W.H Capps. The New Religious Right: Pietv. Patriotism & Politics. Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1994.
88 G. Peele. Revival & Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984, pl64-165; W.H Capps. The New Religious Right: Pietv. Patriotism & Politics. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994, p89-93.
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policy riders into law, as he had done with the Hyde Amendment, limiting the 
availability of Medicaid for abortions.89
In sum, the eight years that Reagan spent in the White House could be 
seen as somewhat of a failure as the main issues of the New Christian Right such 
as school prayer, abortion, homosexuality, and so forth remained very much part 
of American society. In fact their continued existence in American society has 
been of great concern for many conservative Christian organisations who work 
very hard to have them repealed and curtailed.90
The various pieces of legislation that the New Christian Right wanted never fully
materialised as it often received half measures as was the case with school
prayers. However, to view the decade as one of total failure in terms of social
conservatism is a mistake, as Reagan elevated, acknowledged and encouraged
conservative Christian who had not participated in politics to enter the fray of
mainstream political discourse.91 The Reagan presidency was organised to achieve
a moral revolution as Reagan did not shy from using his office to promote his
ideas of freedom and community:
“ Virtually all of Reagan’s domestic policy achievements either 
ended in that moral goal or proceeded from it. The cuts in the 
federal budget, the domestic and international stabilization of the 
dollar, the reduction of income tax rates, “revenue neutral” tax 
reform, the increase in voluntarism, the reforms in social policy, the 
emphasis on excellence in education combined with an insistence on 
infusing moral values into school curricula, the withdrawal of central 
government from some of its former regulatory and fiscal responsibility, 
the adherence to free trade and resistance to protectionism all became 
part of the president’s agenda because they reinforced his moral
89 G. Peele. Revival & Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984, pl44, pl45.
Bailey had argued that initially the Reagan economic agenda was successful because ideological 
Republicans were prepared to focus on implementing Reagan’s agenda. This was coupled by the 
fact that Howard Baker in the early 1980s was able to marshal the troops effectively. C.J Bailey. 
The Republican Party in the US Senate. 1974-1984: Party Change and Institutional 
Development. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, p86-100.
90 Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign pledge to allow homosexuals into the military has 
shown how successful the ‘liberal lobby’ has been in American politics. However, Clinton’s had 
to adopt a less ‘radical’ policy in which one does not ask what is one’s sexual orientation, and 
thus homosexuals are able to serve.
91 J.K Hadden and A. Shupe. Televaneelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry 
Holt & Co., 1988, especially p20-37.
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objectives of preparing Americans for the task of living free.””
The most visible legacy of the 1980s social conservative revolution, however, did 
not come in the area of legislation but rather in the form of the power that the 
Religious Right has in contemporary American politics.” This has had the effect 
of leading to a growth of conservatism within the realm of social policy both 
within the executive and the legislative branches of government.” That is, due to 
the 1980s an explosion in support for conservatism both as an ideology and as a 
movement has taken place and that can be seen clearly with the growing number 
of conservative PACs, magazines and movements. America, at least ideologically, 
had began the process of returning to its historical affinity with social 
conservatism.
F o r e i g n  a n d  D e f e n c e  P o l i c y  -  A N e o c o n s e r v a t i v e  
A g e n d a
The third major theme of the Reagan agenda was foreign policy which 
was closely linked to defence policy. Reagan’s foreign policy doctrine was 
essentially formulated by his Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane J. 
Kirkpatrick.” Kirkpatrick - and the neoconservatives in general - held that 
Carter’s foreign policy was a complete failure due to its idealistic approach to 
international relations which allowed left-wing Soviet-backed or simply anti- 
American regimes to emerge throughout the globe and threaten freedom and 
Western democracy. This is why for the neoconservatives it was sometimes better 
to allow right-wing dictators - who were actively hostile toward the Soviet Union 
- to remain in power rather than have them replaced by anti-American autocrats
92 W.K Muir. Jr., The Bully Pulpit: The Presidential Leadership of Ronald Reagan. San 
Francisco: ICS Press Publications, 1992, pl8.
93 See for example C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American 
Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996; D.M Oldfield. The Right and the Righteous: The 
Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
1996; W.H Capps. The New Religious Right: Pietv. Patriotism & Politics. Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1994; J. Carey, “The G.O.P. Mantra: Keep Dobson Happy.” Time May 
11, 1998.
94 This attitude is very clear in N. Gingrich. To Renew America. NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 
1995.
95 J.J Kirkpatrick. The Reagan Doctrine & US Foreign Policy. Washington DC: The Heritage 
Foundation, The Fund for an American Renaissance, 1985, p5.
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(whether religious fundamentalists like Khomeini or communists like Ortega).96 
The Reagan Doctrine was therefore based on the idea that freedom is at the heart 
of everything: economics, politics, foreign policy and so forth. It is freedom - as 
understood by the American model - that motivates people and creates prosperity 
and happiness, and the bastion of freedom is the United States.97
The neoconservatives attitude complimented the traditional conservatives 
view of the Soviet Union which they regarded as an unscrupulous power-hungry 
state, governed by autocrats in the Kremlin whose only interest was the 
preservation of their totalitarian society at whatever cost.98 Secretary of State 
Shultz claimed that the Soviet Union was ruled by an ideology and a national 
ambition that was designed “...to aggrandize its power and undermine the 
interests of democracies.”, which is why the US and the Soviet Union could not 
have “true friendship and cooperation.”99 This view of the Soviet Union was 
essential in shaping the Reaganite defence and foreign policy, especially as 
according to them America’s defence policy had remained in a state of flux for 
twenty-five years through the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). To 
Reagan, MAD (being true to its acronym) was an insane policy, as no-one could 
win a nuclear war, although there were some people in the Pentagon who 
believed that such a war could be won, which is why Reagan claims he wanted to 
replace or remove the strategy. However, the problem was that the Soviet Union 
posed a real threat to the Western world which is why America had to revitalise
96 J.J Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships & Double Standards.” Commentary 68, (5 1979); “US Security 
& Latin America.” Commentary (1 1981); The Reagan Doctrine & US Foreign Policy. 
Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, The Fund for an American Renaissance, 1985. 
Similar sentiments were expressed in N. Glazer, “American Values & Foreign Policy.” 
Commentary 62 (1 1976), p32-37; C. Gershman, “The Rise and Fall of the New Foreign Policy 
Establishment.” Commentary 70 (1 1980), pl3-24.
97 J.J Kirkpatrick. The Reagan Doctrine & US Foreign Policy. Washington DC: The Heritage 
Foundation, The Fund for an American Renaissance, 1985, p5.
98 W. Laqueur, “Containment for the ‘80s.” Commentary 70 (4 1980), p33-42; P.H Nitze, 
“Strategy in the Decade of the 1980s: Do Negotiated Arms Limitation Have a Future?” Foreign 
Affairs 59 (1 1980), p82-101; N.D Sanchez, “The Communist Threat.” Foreign Policy 52 (Fall 
1983), p43-50.
99 G.P Shultz, “New Realities and New Ways of Thinking.” Foreign Affairs 63 (4 1985), p700. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Sanchez had written that the Soviet Union “...is an 
expansionist power, imbued with a mission to spread its system throughout the world by 
whatever means, including force.” N.D Sanchez, “The Communist Threat.” Foreign Policy 52 
(Fall 1983), p44.
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and military force from top-to-bottom.100 Thus, under Reagan, America's 
defence and foreign policy were designed to prevent war by maintaining its 
forces and demonstrating a preparedness to use those forces in such a way that 
would show America’s enemies that the cost of attack would exceed the 
benefits that would be gained.
The Reaganites to further justify their defence build-up also claimed that it 
would enable the United States to negotiate far more effectively with the Soviet 
Union (while curtailing its expansionist ambitions). The Soviets, it was believed 
could and would only negotiate when standing against an equal or a superior 
force.101 In other words, America had to spend on its defence in order to reduce 
its defence while pursuing quiet diplomacy.102
The rise in Soviet power, it was further argued, also had the effect of 
destabilising the balance of power model while emphasising that the whole 
policy of containment had shown itself to be ineffective as Soviet influence was 
seen in Central America, the Caribbean and southern Africa. The Soviets used 
the Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968 to support and equip Marxist insurgencies who 
were inspired by the Soviet philosophy. Moreover, Secretary of State Haig 
claimed that Soviet expansionism occurred because Carter had chosen not to 
resist it, which meant that American national interests suffered as a result.103
100R  Reagan. An American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990, p257-258, and throughout.
101 Nitze writes that the British Ambassador to Moscow, Sir William Hayter compared the 
Russians’ negotiation tactic to that of a defective vending machine. You put the coin in and 
nothing comes out, you can shake the machine and you may get the coin back, but there is no 
point in talking to the machine. Nitze asserts that the communists see the world through the 
notion of class struggle and their strategy is based on pouncing when they have the advantage, 
while when they are at a disadvantage they will either hold fast or retreat a little until the 
balance of power turns in their favour. P.H. Nitze, “Living With the Soviets.” Foreign Affairs 
63 (2 1984-85), p360-374. See also W. Laqueur, “What We Know About the Soviet Union.” 
Commentary 75 (2 1983), pl3-21.
102 R. Reagan. An American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990, pl3-14; C.W Weinberger, “US 
Defense Strategy.” Foreign Affairs 64 (4 1986), p675-697; C. Weinberger. Fighting For 
Peace: Seven Critical Years At the Pentagon. London: Michael Joseph, 1990; G.P Shultz, 
“New Realities and New Ways of Thinking ” Foreign Affairs 63 (4 1985).
103 AM  Haig. Jr. Caveat: Realism. Reagan. & Foreign Policy. NY: Macmillan Publishing, 
1984, p26-27.
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An integral link to this policy was a determination to aggressively promote the 
liberal democratic alternative to communism104 because Americans felt that their 
country’s righteous position had been toppled and the world was controlled by 
countries that were openly anti-American and therefore anti-democracy and 
freedom. To the Reaganites democratic countries are America’s natural allies 
against the Soviet Union.
An important feature of Reagan’s approach to foreign policy was his 
attitude to the “Vietnam Syndrome.”105 The debacle in Indochina was the first real 
military defeat that the United States had suffered in its two hundred years of 
history (Korea fell into a prolonged and bloody stalemate but essentially 
communism was curtailed, so it was half a victory).104 In Vietnam, a guerrilla force 
poorly equipped compared to the US, managed to humble a superpower and that 
seriously undermined the fundamentals of America and led to a period of self 
doubt. The psychological effect of Vietnam was that it also divided the country 
into two groups diametrically opposed to one another with little chance of 
reconciliation between them. Reagan was determined to end that.
It is important to remember that at least in conservative minds the rot 
began in the mid-to-late 1960s when the counterculture, or rampant left-wing 
liberalism was in full swing in the United States. This was followed by the 
Nixonite and Kissingerite pursuit of detente which led not only to less-then- 
favourable treaties between the superpowers, but also to the recognition of the 
odious Peoples’ Republic of China which had dire consequences for US- 
Taiwanese relationship - after decades of good relations. Carter aided the decline
104 R. Reagan. An American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990, pl3-14; N. Ashford, “The 
Conservative Agenda and the Reagan Presidency”, J. Hogan (ed.) The Reagan Years: The 
Record in Presidential Leadership. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1990, p i89.
105 T.G Paterson. Meeting the Communist Threat. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p256- 
272.
106 Adams notes that the Second World War created a certain image in the minds of future 
generations about war and its conduct. The problem was that war (in this case World War II) 
was very different from the images that were sent to the people as some Vietnam veterans for 
example found out.. These veterans “...understood that the movies had misled them about what 
war would be like. Others continued to think of the films as the way war really was in the 1940s 
and blamed themselves for having fought a “bad war” in Vietnam.” They failed to realise that 
the coverage in Vietnam was far less cosmetic. M.C.C Adams. The Best War Ever: America 
and World War II. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994, pl5.
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by his lax approach to communism and the Soviet Union. Taking Andrew Young, 
Carter’s Ambassador to the United Nations, as an example, his rather gradualist 
attitude in foreign policy was deemed incomprehensible. Young believed that one 
need not react aggressively if one found for example twenty Cubans somewhere 
as these few Cubans did not constitute a threat to peace.107 This was because 
Ambassador Young believed that with effective leadership one could win over 
Marxist countries because a Marxist ideology could not deliver to people, 
services that capitalism could.108
The neoconservatives claimed that America’s armed forces had been 
neglected for too long and the main effect had been a loss of morale. This, they 
argued was primarily because under Carter the armed forces were seen more as a 
place to learn a trade rather than an institution that needs and has to fight.109 As 
Reagan himself stated America’s military forces were “...so atrophied that our 
ability to respond effectively to a Soviet attack was very much in doubt: Fighter 
planes couldn’t fly and warships couldn’t sail because there were chronic 
shortages of spare parts; our best men and women were leaving the military 
service; the morale of our volunteer army was in a tailspin; our strategic weapons 
- the missiles and bombers that were the foundation of our deterrent force - 
hadn’t been modernized in a decade, while the Soviet Union had created a war 
machine that was threatening to eclipse our at every level.”110 Thus, a central aim
107 “I Don’t Mind Being The Lighting Rod.” Newsweek March 29, 1977, pl8-19.
108 “Outspoken Andy Young.” Newsweek March 28, 1977. Finger argues that both Young and 
McHenry cultivated relations by working with the organisation. African delegates, Finger 
argues, liked Young and believed in his sincerity which is why whenever possible they tried to 
avoid embarrassing him. S.M Finger, “The Reagan-Kirkpatrick Policies and the United 
Nations.” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1983-1984), p436-457.
1091. Kristol. Reflection of a Neoconservative: Looking Back. Looking Ahead. NY: Basic Books 
Publishers, 1983, p257-60. Kristol claims that America’s military problem has nothing to do 
with the expertise (in some ways the problem, Kristol argues, originated from too much focus 
on expertise). The problems that the military is faced with are to do with morale, discipline, and 
plain competence.
110 R. Reagan. An American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990, pl3. Reagan writes that Pentagon 
leaders told him appalling stories of how the Soviets were gaining on America militarily, both 
in nuclear and conventional forces. The Soviets were spending fifty percent more each year on 
weapons than the US. America’s armed forces suffered from very small paycheques which made 
some enlisted men and women eligible for welfare benefits; many military personal were so 
ashamed of being in the service that as soon as they left their posts they put on civilian cloths. 
Reagan was determined to reverse this. And to show that the American people supported him,
137
of Reagan was to revitalise the morale of America’s arms forces. This was 
pursued on two fronts, as on the one hand Reagan began to largest ever peace­
time defence expenditure in American history111 while also speaking up for the 
arms forces, thus providing it with morale and rhetorical support.
The election of Ronald Reagan brought a different approach to foreign 
policy which was assisted by the involvement and presence of many anti­
communists - of various degrees - in the administration.112 His attitude was highly 
ideological and that was imbued (to an extent) with conservative Christian 
theology. To the Reaganites the Soviet Union was “an evil empire” and the 
United States was engaged in a battle for the future of the survival of the free 
world. If the Soviet Union was to triumph, darkness would befall the world. 
Thus, Reagan’s foreign and defence policies were geared around these views. In 
the words of Secretary Shultz:
“The Soviets had to be made to realize that they could not succeed 
with aggression, nor could they win an arms race. But we did not want 
to spark conflict through fear or miss opportunities to resolve 
outstanding problems. President Reagan recognized the Soviet Union 
for what it was: aggressive, repressive, and economically bankrupt, 
but militarily powerful, with an arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons 
able to devastate us in thirty minutes. We must recognize this reality, I 
knew, but we should also be ready to deal with the Soviets more 
constructively if the opportunity arose. We had to gather support for 
this approach: from Congress, the press, and the public. Global stability 
depended on how we dealt with the Soviets.”113
The problem that scholars have now come to realise is that very much like 
the “missile gap” of the Kennedy campaign, the Reagan defence plan was far
he notes that when he travelled around the country and asked the people if they would rather 
have a balanced budget or a national defence, the people always came down on the side of 
national defence, p234-235.
111 It has been calculated that if one gave the annual defence budget for the year 1979 to Jesus 
Christ, he would have to spend $100,000 a day from the day he was bom right until 1982 and 
he would still have 750 years of spending left. D.W Maguire. The New subversives: Anti- 
Americans and the Religious Right. NY: The Continuum Publishing Co., 1982, pl7.
112 R. Brownstein and N. Easton. Reagan’s Ruling Class: Portraits of the President’s Too 100 
Officials. Washington DC: The Presidential Accountability Group, 1982, p433-640.
113 G.P Shultz. Turmoil & Triumph: Mv Years as Secretary of State. NY: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1993, p6.
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more complex than its patron made it out.114 The Reaganites claimed that under 
Carter the armed forces were neglected to such an extent that they could not only 
defend the free world but could not effectively defend the United States. 
However, OMB Director David Stockman writes that when he began examining 
the defence budget in greater depth he came to realise that the defence 
establishment would receive $1.46 trillion over five years. This was possible 
because at 1980 the defence establishment was to receive $142 billion which 
would rise to $368 billion by 1986. The GOP campaign proposal for defence 
increases of five, seven or nine percent had been predicted on Carter’s 1980 
defence budget of $142 billion. However, due to Desert One, Congress had raised 
Carter’s request for defence with nine percent real growth in it. Reagan than 
added another twelve percent and another fifteen percent on top of the 1981 
figures. Thus, instead of starting with a defence budget of $142 billion, the 
administration began with a $222 billion which was than raised by seven percent 
(and compounded over five years). Consequently, the defence budget increased in 
real terms by five percent between 1980 and 1986, double what Reagan promised 
during his campaign.113
The determination to be assertive in foreign policy began early on with the 
Poland crisis. This particular incident is most informative as it revealed that 
Reagan was prepared to damage relations with his European allies, refuse to take 
the advice of his Secretary of State to remain true to his conservative aggressive 
attitude concerning the Soviets. “The fact is, a credible Western deterrent is the 
only thing that will make the demands of the movement as credible to the 
Russians as they are now audible to the West, because it is the only thing that will
114 A number of members of the Snowcroft Commission who examined America’s defence 
status found that the “window of vulnerability” that had been discussed in 1979 and 1980 “had 
rather been exaggerated.” RJ Woolsey, “The Politics of Vulnerability: 1980-1983.” Foreign 
Affairs (Spring 1984), p805-819.
115 D.A Stockman. The Triumph of Politics. The Crisis in American Government & How It 
Affects the World London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986, pi 14-115.
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let democracy live long enough to deal with this fearful issue. The bomb will be 
banned only if democracy survives.”116
On December 29,1981, Reagan responded to the Polish authorities declaration of 
martial law and the arrest of prominent leaders of the Solidarity. He prohibited 
new credits and exports to Poland, imposing economic sanctions against Moscow 
which had assembled a large military force on the Polish border to dissuade Poles 
from rising against the authorities’ measures. Reagan also suspended Aeroflot 
service to American airports, deferred talks on a new long-term grain 
commitment, halted the issuance of or renewal of export licenses for electronic 
equipment and computers, and a stay of export licenses for certain oil and gas 
equipment, including pipelayers. On June 18, 1982, Reagan announced that any 
European firm operating on a US licence or any American subsidiary working in 
Europe must break all pipeline contracts. This caused uproar in Europe as the 
European governments claimed that American foreign policy was encroaching 
upon their sovereignty. One must remember that this policy came just before the 
most important year in the Reagan era in terms of foreign policy as 1983 was a 
year for nuclear arms negotiations. American missiles, as agreed by NATO 
members were due to be deployed in Europe in 1983 to counter the missile threat 
which the Soviets hoped would intimidate the West Europeans and divide the 
NATO allies. Thus, By 1983, US-Soviet relations, Shultz writes, were “virtually 
nonexistent.”117
One of the most decisive acts taken by President Reagan as part of his 
foreign policy agenda occurred in the Caribbean in October 1984. The invasion of 
the island took place after the United States was asked by the Organisation of 
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) with Jamaica and Barbados, to assist them 
“...to restore order and democracy in Grenada.” The administration further 
justified its actions by pointing out that there were about a thousand American 
nationals on the island, eight hundred of them medical students at St. George’s
116 AM  Haig. Jr. Caveat: Realism. Reagan. & Foreign Policy. NY: Macmillan Publishing, 
1984, p238-260, (quote from p237); M.E Goldstein. Arms Control & Military Preparedness 
from Truman to Bush. NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 1993, p204-5.
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University. Attempts were made to remove the Americans in case they would be 
harmed or taken hostage but that failed.118 It was felt by members of the 
administration that with the removal of Sir Eric Gairy “It became increasingly 
apparent that this small island was being used as a laboratory for the imposition of 
a far leftist regime, with what appeared to be active and growing Cuban and 
probably Soviet support.”119
The invasion of Grenada, just like the bombing of Libya, provided the 
administration with the ability to claim that it was fulfilling its initial pledge to 
take action against international anti-Americanism. Grenada coupled with the 
involvement in Central America showed that the administration was determined 
to deal effectively with the apparent Soviet encroachment upon what America 
regarded as its sphere of influence.120
Ronald Reagan initially began his term with a rather tame State 
Department as the three top officials at the department where all Kissingerites, a 
man loathed by the New Right. They had been part of the foreign service and 
diplomacy for many years, (Stoessel and Eagleburger almost from finishing 
university).121 These lesser ideologues, however, were slowly replaced, however, 
with people who were more committed to conservative ideology and who were 
prepared to take on the Soviet Union, sometimes with little consideration toward 
the feeling of America’s allies.
The first Reagan administration adopted a very aggressive attitude toward 
communism and the Soviet Union, which saw relations between the superpowers
117 G.P Shultz. Turmoil & Triumph: Mv Years as Secretary of State. NY: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1993, p5.
118 “Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada”, October 27, 1983, R. Reagan. 
Speaking Mv Mind. Hutchinson: London, 1990, pl93; G.P Shultz. Turmoil & Triumph: Mv 
Years as Secretary of State. NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993, p323-345.
119 C. Weinberger. Fighting For Peace: Seven Critical Years At the Pentagon. London: Michael 
Joseph, 1990, p73 and throughout; R.A Pastor, “The Reagan Administration and Latin 
America: Eagle Insurgent”, K. A Oye, R. J Lieber and D. Rothchild. (ed.) Eagle Resurgent? The 
Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1987, p359-392.
120 K.A Oye, “Constrained Confidence and the Evolution of Reagan Foreign Policy”, K.A Oye, 
RJ Lieber and D. Rothchild. (ed.) Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign 
Policy. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1987, p3-39.
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reaching their lowest point by 1982-1983. The huge defence budget that Reagan 
allocated coupled with his rhetoric which was backed by action made the world 
take notice that Reagan’s America was very different from that of Carter as 
American troops were dispatched to the Middle East, Central and Latin America. 
The United States took greater interest and involvement in world affairs and it 
aggressively promoted its own national interest agenda under the mask of 
Wilsonian idealism. The United States, under Ronald Reagan sought to show that 
the American eagle would triumph over the Soviet bear, and would lead the 
world to new heights. In his second term, Reagan did relax some of his bellicosity 
and that attracted some unhappy criticism from neoconservatives but even that 
was tamed when compared to the attacks that the administration was facing on 
the social and economic spheres.
CONCLUSION
The period of 1981 to 1989 was truly remarkable as it was during that 
time that much of the contemporary world was re-shaped, especially as it 
established the foundation of the end of the Soviet Union with which the Reagan 
administration has been associated. The Reagan era was certainly a confusing 
time, as its imagery is so contradictory (which is perhaps why it has remained so 
fascinating?) When seeking to see whether the administration fulfilled its New 
Rightist credentials one encounters many problems which highlight the magnitude 
and diversity of the movement. The problem however is that the American 
political system does not permit an administration to remain committed to an 
ideology, as it demands compromise which cannot co-exist with ideology.122
The Reagan administration was certainly influenced by New Right ideas as 
supply-side economics coupled with a free-market disposition played a significant 
if not crucial role in transforming the American economy. Legislation such as
121 R  Brownstein and N. Easton. Reagan’s Ruling Class: Portraits of the President’s Tod 100 
Officials. Washington DC: The Presidential Accountability Group, 1982, p539-555.
122 The refusal of the Christian Right under Gary Bauer to compromise over abortion highlights 
this. J. Carey, “The G.O.P.’s Troublemaker.” Time January 19, 1998, See also Stockman’s
142
ERTA were products of New Right - anti-liberal - ideas. In the social area, the 
administration attempted to bring about widespread reform, and although it 
suffered some of its worst defeats in this area, it had the effect of bringing about a 
serious debate about American morality and the direction of American society. 
The involvement of the administration in such issues as abortion, school prayer, 
tax-exempt status, showed that Reagan at least tried to appear to be a social 
reformer. Coupled with this moral debate a more pragmatic attitude was also 
adopted in the social agenda area and that was brought about by the anti-liberals 
and the neoconservatives who both (although in different measures) felt that 
America of the Great Society was in need of reform. The Reagan administration 
was responsible for a great and significant cut in social welfare. In the area of 
foreign policy the neoconservatives’ anti-communist attitude prevailed. Thus, all 
in all, the administration could be seen as one that was heavily influenced by New 
Right ideas with many members of the New Right (or people who were 
sympathetic towards their agenda) holding down important positions, none other 
than the post held by the leading neoconservative in the administration Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, as America’s permanent representative to the United Nations.
arguments over the ascendancy of politics in his book The Triumph of Politics: The Crisis in 
American Government & How It Affects the World. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986.
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CHAPTER IV
THE NEW RIGHT & THE UNITED NATIONS:
THE KIRKPATRICK ERA
The appointment of Jeane Kirkpatrick as America’s permanent 
representative to the United Nations combined with her long tenure at Turtle Bay 
revolutionised US-UN relations. Kirkpatrick’s post was very important, not only 
because it entitled its holder to a cabinet seat and the rank of ambassador but 
because: “...the U.S. mission to the United Nations is the focal point of U.S. 
relations not only with U N. agencies but with the other 153 member states of the 
U.N.”1 Thus, Reagan’s decision to entrust such a position to an academic and a 
novice in international diplomacy who often expressed her opinions forcefully2 
while also being an “avowed Democrat,”3 was very surprising. At first glance due 
to Kirkpatrick’s diplomatic inexperience one would not have expected her to 
cause such an uproar especially as in her nomination hearing she stated that part 
of the reason behind America’s growing influence in the United Nations was the 
quiet diplomacy of Donald McHenry, her predecessor. She in fact: “...hope[d] to 
model my own role, if confirmed, at the U.N. very much on the quite effective, 
persuasive style of operation that Don McHenry has illustrated for us.”4 However, 
Kirkpatrick rather than follow a tamed approach adopted an aggressive stance, 
which was very much at odds with the nature and style of the United Nations. 
The organisation after all is composed of sovereign members and that requires
1 The statement is by Chairman Percy of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations while at 
the same hearing Senator Pell also noted that the US Ambassador to the UN is second only to 
the Secretary of State - the person who guides American foreign policy. “Nomination of Jeane 
Kirkpatrick”, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 97th Congress, 
1st Session, January 15,1981, Washington DC: US GPO, 1981.
2 “Kirkpatrick has been criticized for her tendency to lecture Third World representatives as if 
they were undergraduates, for not learning the intricacies of UN politics, and for preferring to 
express her ideology rather than focus on concrete political goals.” S.M Finger, “The Reagan- 
Kirkpatrick Policies and the United Nations.” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1983-1984), p436-457. 
See especially his comparison between Kirkpatrick and Young.
3 “Nomination of Jeane Kirkpatrick”, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US 
Senate, 97th Congress, 1st Session, January 15, 1981, Washington DC: US GPO, 1981, p5. 
Reagan was a committed Republican ideologue who had a tendency to follow his advisers who 
were also ideologues, which is why a Democratic appointee would not theoretically fit in.
4 “Nomination of Jeane Kirkpatrick”, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US 
Senate, 97th Congress, 1st Session, January 15, 1981, Washington DC: US GPO, 1981, pl2-13.
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quiet diplomacy and compromise,3 something not really associate with the 
Kirkpatrick era.
Kirkpatrick’s appeal to Reagan, was in her dissatisfaction and unhappiness 
with President Carter’s foreign policy which she felt enabled the Soviet Union and 
anti-Americanism to expand throughout the globe and threaten the United States, 
its system, and its democratic allies.6 Thus, the administration found it beneficial 
to have someone with a similar outlook7 at the United Nations because it was 
already “...committed to an active and vigorous American role in the United 
Nations because we [the Administration] think that what goes on there is 
important.”8 It is perhaps rather ironic but also very telling about the importance 
of conservative ideology, that Republican conservatives were later to say that 
Kirkpatrick, a former Democrat and an academic was “...second only to the 
President himself in giving the Administration a sense of purpose and direction.”9
The Reagan-Kirkpatrick era in some ways is rather easy to summarise 
because their attitudes toward the UN was consistent and simple. Ronald Reagan 
entered the White House with the clear intention of restoring and reasserting 
American power in the world. The UN being a microcosm of world affairs was to 
play an important part in Reagan’s foreign policy, as just like in the world in 
general, American prestige had fallen in the organisation. Thus, by reviving 
American stock in the United Nations, the administration hoped to encourage a 
renaissance of Americanism throughout the globe, which will be invaluable in the
5 See Kirkpatrick’s testimony in “International Organization and Multilateral Diplomacy”, 
hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 99th Congress, 1st Session, 
April 16, 1985, Washington DC: US GPO, 1985.
6 J.J Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorship and Double Standards.” Commentary 68 (5 1979); “US Security 
and Latin America.” Commentary (1 1981); The Reagan Doctrine and US Foreign Policy. 
Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, the Fund for American Renaissance, 1985. In this 
Kirkpatrick was not alone as many other conservative Democrats were unhappy with Carter’s 
foreign policy.
7 “Nomination of Jeane Kirkpatrick”, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US 
Senate, 97th Congress, 1st Session, January 15,1981, Washington DC: US GPO, 1981, pl6.
8 “General View of the U.N. System”, address by Elliott Abrams before a Conference of U.N. 
Representatives of the United Nations Association-USA, New York, June 5, 1981. Washington 
DC: State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, pi.
9 The statement is by Richard Viguerie and is taken from A. Wolfson, “The World According to 
Kirkpatrick: Is Ronald Reagan Listening?” Policy Review (31 1985), p68. Throughout the 
article Wolfson praises Mrs. Kirkpatrick for what many conservative Republicans see as her 
great work in developing and promoting US foreign policy especially in the UN.
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ideological war. “The Reagan Administration was elected because it promised and 
in a sense embodied a resurgence of national spirit. And this new confidence in 
our values and our society will be reflected in what we do and what we say in the 
United Nations. We have lost control of the symbols and language of progress but 
we can regain this control.”10
Kirkpatrick’s as America’s representative and Reagan’s appointee, was at 
New York to do the following: first, protect and advance American interests, 
something that New Righters felt had been neglected for too long (Kirkpatrick 
was to guarantee an “America First” ethos).
Second, and this was very much a continuation of the “America First” policy, was 
the promotion of the American style political system. An integral part of Reagan’s 
foreign policy doctrine was the advancement of Western liberal democracy.11 The 
expansion of Soviet influence in the world seemed to give credence to the belief 
that the Soviets overall strategy for the 1980s was based on their quest for world 
domination.12 The United Nations attracts considerable media attention - 
something that the New Right was very aware of - and with Kirkpatrick, the 
administration had an opportunity to have an effective salesperson of western 
democracy who would also castigate the Soviet system. By highlighting the 
advantages of the American system and deficiencies of the Soviet one, the US 
could score substantial points in the ideological war. This was very important in 
the 1980s primarily because the two superpowers could not engage in outright 
war, which forced them to compete on other levels. Furthermore, part of the 
assault also dealt with what the Reaganites felt was a new interpretation of the 
UN Charter. In this area there was some affinity (if not a link) between the UN
10 “General View of the U.N. System”, address by Elliott Abrams, before a Conference of UN 
representatives of the United Nations Association-USA, New York, June 5, 1981, Washington 
DC: State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1981. See also Kirkpatrick’s statement in 
“International Organization and Multilateral Diplomacy”, hearing before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, US Senate, 99th Congress, 1st Session, April 16, 1985, Washington DC: US 
GPO, 1985.
11 “International Organizations and Multilateral Diplomacy”, hearing before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, US Senate, 99th Congress, 1st Session, April 16, 1985, Washington DC: US 
GPO, 1985.
12 P.H Nitze, “Strategy in the Decade of the 1980s: Do Negotiated Arms Limitation Have A 
Future.” Foreign Affairs 59 (1 1980), p82-101.
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and US internal politics, as the Reagan administration was seeking to see a return 
to a more ‘Constructionalist’ interpretation of the Constitution.
A third theme that Kirkpatrick promoted was concerning the so-called 
politicisation of the United Nations. It was felt that the organisation had 
abandoned its traditional aims and adopted a political agenda that was inimical to 
American and western interests while highly beneficial to the Soviet bloc and anti- 
Americans. An important function of the of the US Mission was mass conversion 
and the prevention of Soviet expansionism. This meant that it therefore had to 
effectively deal with the incessant harassment and criticism of the West and the 
US by the organisation and its members.13 This was coupled by the belief of some 
Americans that the programs and policies that the organisation was pursuing were 
not only political in nature but also expensive in implementation.14 This was 
unacceptable to Americans particularly because they were being asked to accept a 
domestic austerity program so that their country’s economic vitality could be 
restored, it was therefore only fair that the United Nations would do the same.13 
Finally, the administration was determined to deal with the whole issue of “rights” 
especially human rights and the way the United Nations was being used, if not 
manipulated, into attacking the western and pro-American states through the 
“rights debate.” This again struck a cord with conservatives in the United States 
who were unhappy with the evolution of the counterculture ‘rights’ revolutions 
which led to such things as affirmative action programs which they disliked.16
These themes that Kirkpatrick and her staff promoted during their long 
stay in Turtle Bay manifested themselves in speeches on the decline of the US 
within the United Nations and the world, the promotion of socialist-backed
13 Senator Percy’s statement is again very telling as he acknowledged the importance of both the 
US Mission to the UN and the organisation itself. “Nomination of Jeane Kirkpatrick”, hearing 
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 97th Congress, 1st Session, January 15, 
1981, Washington DC: US GPO, 1981.
14 See for example some of Kirkpatrick’s speeches in Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral 
Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: Transaction Books, 1988.
15 “The U.S. Role in the United Nations” prepared statement of Senator Nancy L. Kassebaum, 
hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organization of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 1st Session, September 
27, and October 3, 1983, Washington: US GPO, 1984.
16 See for example O. Hatch, “Loading the Economy.” Policy Review (Winter 1980); P. 
Schlafly, “Shall I Compare Thee to a Plumber’s Pay? Comparable Worth Collapse.” Policy 
Review (31 Winter 1985).
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policies and ideas, questions over liberty, a liberal interpretation of the Charter, 
and much more. The US Mission itself, at least at the top levels, had people who 
shared many of Kirkpatrick’s views (Kenneth Adelman and Charles Lichenstein 
being prime examples).
The most curious thing about the administration’s approach to the United 
Nations was that although the organisation was constantly harangued and there 
was talk about withdrawing from the UN or removing it from the territory of the 
United States,17 the consensus was that the administration and Congress18 were 
committed to it. This was possible because, it was felt that: “The cumulative 
impact of decisions of UN bodies influence opinions all over the world about 
what is legitimate, what is acceptable, who is lawless and who is repressive, what 
countries are and are not capable of protecting themselves and their friends in the 
world body.”19 The Reaganites felt that the problems that the UN faced were not 
structural so much, as the foundation of the organisation was sound (the same 
situation that one saw in domestic policy and the debate about the expansion of 
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court). Kirkpatrick herself stated that the United 
Nations had done well in mobilising “free nations” against aggression as happened 
with the Korean War, while it also “galvanized world public opinion against
17 In September 1983, Charles Lichenstein, the Deputy Permanent Representative, told a United 
Nations Committee that if UN members did not like the way they were being treated in 
America, they should “seriously consider removing themselves and this organization from the 
soil of the United States.” He farther added “We will put no impediment in your way and we 
will be at dockside bidding you a fond farewell as you set off into the sunset.” Taken from the 
Introduction in B. Y Pines. A World Without a U.N.: What Would Happen if the United Nations 
Shut Down?. Washington DC: Heritage Foundation, 1984. Pines also adds, that Lichenstein 
“...might not have realized it at the time, but Lichenstein was expressing the feelings of great 
numbers - perhaps most - of his country-men.”
18 “38th Session of the U.N. General Assembly”, September 19 - December 20, 1983, Report of 
Congressional Delegates to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 
September 30, 1985, Washington DC: US GPO, 1985. The Report is very much against 
relocating the UN, as being not only expensive, but for costing the US and the State of New 
York to lose $700 million annually, and several million in UN program purchases of American 
exports and equipment.
19 “US Participation in the United Nations”, statement by Jeane Kirkpatrick before the Sub­
committee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee, March 2, 1984, 
Washington DC: State Department, Bureau of Information, 1984, p2; “General View of the 
U.N. System”, address by Elliott Abrams, before a conference of UN representatives of the 
United Nations Association-USA, New York, June 5, 1981, Washington DC: State Department, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, 1981.
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inhumanity.”,20 especially as votes - and by implication actions of and within the 
organisation - attract world attention. “The agendas of the principal UN bodies 
have a unique influence on the perception of global problems because, to an 
extent not appreciated in the United States, discussions, debates, and votes in the 
United Nations are followed in the world press. Subjects discussed in major UN 
fora come to be widely regarded as important.”21 Moreover an important aspect 
when approaching the Reagan administration attitude toward the UN is to 
remember that to its mind the organisation was inherently American-created22 and 
American-sponsored which made the fact that it had turned against the United 
States incomprehensible.23 Thus, the United Nations in the early 1980s to 
American conservative politicians, was still salvageable if one was willing to work 
at it, and it appears that they were. This was coupled with the administration’s 
aim of reversing America’s apparent impotence in the organisation.24
THE CARTER YEARS
The assault on the United Nations by the Reagan administration was very 
much due to the approach of the Carter administration to the organisation. The 
Reaganites provided a new policy and a new interpretation to US-UN relations. 
Carter’s foreign policy in general was far more benign than Reagan’s, as Carter 
was not only aware of America’s inadequacies but he was prepared to admit them
20 “Nomination of Jeane Kirkpatrick”, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US 
Senate, 97th Congress, 1st Session, January 15, 1981, Washington DC: US GPO, 1981, p7. 
Kirkpatrick also points to the good work done by UNICEF, UNDP, WHO, UNHCR, and Office 
of UN Disaster Relief Coordinator, p8-9.
21 This is why the UN could damage a country’s reputation and Kirkpatrick points to the 
attempts by Israel’s enemies to disparage it as a prime example. “U.S. Participation in the 
United Nations”, statement by Jeane Kirkpatrick before the Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee, March 2, 1984, Washington DC: State 
Department Bureau of Public Affairs, 1984.
22 It was Roosevelt who coined the phrase ‘United Nations,’ while Archibald MacLeish was the 
author of the preamble of the UN Charter. “Prizes and Parking Tickets.” Newsweek October 30, 
1995.
23 “General View of the U.N. System”, address by Elliott Abrams, before a Conference of UN 
representatives of the United Nations Association-USA, New York, June 5, 1981, Washington 
DC: State Department Bureau of Public Affairs, 1981.
24 “General View of the U.N. System”, address by Elliott Abrams, before a Conference of UN 
representatives of the United Nations Association-USA, New York, June 5, 1981, Washington 
DC: State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1981. Abrams re-states America’s 
commitment to the UN and its determination to aid it back onto the ‘right’ path.
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to the world. In the words of ambassador Young: “Since the mid-1960s, 
however, changes have occurred. “Pawns” grew into major figures on the world 
chessboard with moves of their own strategies independent of the game of 
traditional power players. The entire nature of world and U.S. politics shifted. 
The United Nations no longer was “our” instrument. And in the interval, our 
perception of ourself [sic.] as a nation with global responsibilities also underwent 
drastic alteration. While still remaining in the absolute sense the major military, 
economic, and political power in the world, our relative strength has diminished in 
comparison, not only to the Soviet Union but to our Western partners and to 
significant numbers of Third World countries as well.”23
The Carterite foreign policy embraced the principles of interdependence as 
it was felt that the world and even the United States could no longer rely on just 
America to save it from the economic and social chaos that had developed by the 
mid and late 1970s.26 The United Nations being an international forum in which 
every country was represented could and should, the Carterites maintained, be 
employed to end the economic, social and political despair that many in the world 
found themselves in. Carter’s Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie for example, 
called upon the General Assembly: “...to adopt a realistic international 
development strategy that will help improve developments prospects.” 
Furthermore, Muskie added: “The vision we [Americans] share is a vision of 
opportunity and of peace. It is within our capacity to alter the fixture to fit that 
vision. The resources do exist. The solution can be found, together we can 
summon the will. Knowing what is at stake, we must not fail.”27 Statements such
25 “United Nations: Serving American Foreign Policy Interests” statement by Andrew Young, 
submitted to the Subcommittee on State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary & Related Agencies 
of the Senate Appropriation Committee, April 2, 1979, Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 79, 
2027, June 1979, p47.
26 J.A Rosati. The Carter Administration’s Quest For Global Community: Beliefs and Their 
Impact on Behavior. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987.
27 “Securing the World’s Common Future”, statement by Edmund Muskie, before the 11th 
Special Session of the UN General Assembly, August 25, 1980, Department o f State Bulletin, 
Vol. 80, No. 2043, October 1980; “U.N. Common Needs in a Diverse World”, address by Cryus 
R  Vance, before the 34th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 
September 24, 1979, Washington DC: State Department Bureau of Public Affairs, 1979; “The 
U.S., the U.N. & the Year 2000”, address by RL McCall, before the St. Louis Regional
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as this must have shaken such men as Robertson, Falwell, Helms and any other 
New Righter as they called for greater UN intervention while noting America’s 
apparent decline.
For the Carterites, criticism of the United Nations stemmed from a small group of 
people in Congress who were unable to reconcile themselves to America’s 
relative decline. These conservative legislators could not understand or accept the 
Third World’s occasional use of the UN as a forum to criticise or rebuff the 
United States.28 If taking human rights as an example of the disappointment that 
conservatives had in Carter’s foreign policy, one could turn to Kirkpatrick who 
noted that:
“ Viewing the Carter Administration’s human rights policy in 
retrospect, it seems fair to conclude that its principal aims were to 
infuse U.S. foreign policy with “moral content,” to create a 
broad domestic consensus behind the Administration’s foreign policy 
goals, and, generally speaking, to make Americans feel good about 
themselves. Whether the policy succeeded in achieving any of these 
objectives is debatable. One thing, however, is clear: the thrust of U.S. 
human rights policy, as it evolved under the Carter Administration, 
was directed mainly against U.S. allies. Instead of using the human 
rights issue to place the totalitarian states on the defensive, the U.S. 
frequently joined totalitarian in attacking pro-Western authoritarian 
states, and actually helped to destabilize pro-Western regimes in 
Nicaragua and Iran.”29
Ronald Reagan sought a foreign policy that would first “revitalize” the US 
and the world economy as a basis for the social and economic development of 
America and other nations; and second, provide adequate defence in a precarious 
period in world history.30 The Reaganites were not prepared to accept what they
Commerce & Growth Association, October 14, 1980, Washington DC: State Department 
Bureau of Public Affairs, 1980.
28 “U.S. Relationship with the U.N.”, address by Donald McHenry at the 35th Convocation of 
the U.S. United Nations Association, April 19,1980, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 80, No. 
2043, October 1980; “United Nations: Serving American Foreign Policy Interests”, statement by 
Andrew Young, submitted to the Subcommittee on State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary & 
Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriation Committee, April 2, 1979, Department o f State 
Bulletin, Vol. 79, No. 2027, June 1979.
29 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “Human Rights in the Carter Years”, address before Kenyon College, 
Human Rights Conference, Kenyon, Ohio, April 4,1981, pl44.
30 “Cooperative Strategy For Global Growth”, address by President Reagan before the World 
Affairs Council, Philadelphia, October 15, 1981, Washington DC. State Department, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, 1981.
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felt was a decade long American laxity in the UN which brought about a standing 
ovation for Idi Amin, an anti-Zionist resolution in the General Assembly and a 
UN official meeting with the PLO.31 This of course does not negate the fact that 
the Reagan administration itself suffered several set-backs in the United Nations.32 
US failures, however in the United Nations, the Reaganites felt, were due to the 
anti-Americanism that seemed to control the organisation.
THE UNITED NATIONS, THE NEW RIGHT AND 
THE "AMERICA FIRST" ETHOS
The New Right was a national chauvinistic movement which regards the 
United States to be superior to other nations which is why the decline of the 
1970s was unacceptable to it. New Righters maintained that America has a 
“Manifest Destiny” which is to spread the ideals of its system around the world, 
as it is an enlightened society. “When we hear about development, we 
[Americans] can rightfully say that there has never been a more astonishing 
example of economic development than the way political and economic freedom 
turned this empty continent into the most productive land in the history of the 
world.”33
The United Nations was considered by Americans when it was first 
established, to be an excellent medium to highlight the supremacy of their system. 
The problem, however, was that with the evolution of the organisation, America 
could no longer promote its values especially as the UN was regarded as having 
abandoned its traditional principles (which the founders had clearly set-out in the 
Charter). The United Nations, it was claimed, adopted an outlook that was 
inimical to American interests and by implications to the world which could only
31 The people who helped destroy Carter, were members of his own administration dealing with 
the UN in Washington and New York. They never understood their function and how to deal 
with the organisation. D.P Moynihan, ‘“Joining the Jackals’: The US at the UN, 1977-1980.” 
Commentary 71 (2 1981), p23-31.
32 One disappointment occurred with the Nicaragua case at the International Court of Justice
and another major disappointment for the Americans was the General Assembly’s 
condemnation of their decision to extradite Abu Ein, a Palestinian, accused of a terrorist act in 
Israel, A. Gerson. The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without Apology. America At the 
United Nations. 1981-1985. NY: The Free Press, 1991, p255-275, p69-80.
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benefit by embracing the American system as Japan and Germany did after World 
War n. Americans after all truly believed that they “...are in the fortunate position 
that the values asserted in 1776 have in large measure been accepted by the 
world.”54
The decline of American prestige in the United Nations could be traced to 
the decolonisation process that began in the mid 1950s and swung into full flow in 
the 1960s (in 1965 the Security Council was enlarged from 11 members to 15 
mainly because of Non-Aligned pressure35). The decolonisation process brought in 
new members into the United Nations who were deemed to be hostile towards the 
West and as a result a shift occurred in the United Nations in favour of the Soviet 
Union.
The Christian Right held that the decline of the US and the West in the 
United Nations began as early as 1956, when President Eisenhower broke-up the 
Anglo-French involvement in the Suez Canal. Robertson notes that following the 
intervention of the UN, Dag Hammarskjold used the occasion to attack European 
imperialism and extol the virtues of the so-called Afro-Asian non-aligned nations. 
Thus, it is “...instructive to note that neither the rhetoric nor the action of the 
general secretary [sic.] were ever directed against the Soviet Union, which had 
brutally repressed the freedom fighters in ’Hungary under the cover of the Suez 
Canal Crisis. Hammarskjold’s anger was carefully reserved for Western 
democratic nations.”36 Moreover, this was followed in 1960 by the Congo episode 
when “...a new philosophy emerged at the United Nations. Right was on the side 
of the emerging nonaligned nations. Tribal warfare, revolution, dictatorship,
33 “General View of the U.N. System”, address by Elliott Abrams, before a Conference of UN 
representatives of the United Nations Association-USA, New York, June 5, 1981, Washington 
DC: State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1981.
34 N. Glazer, “American Values & Foreign Policy.” Commentary 62 (1 1976), p32-37; Similar 
views are expressed by W.F. Buckley, Jr., “Human Rights and Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs 
58 (4 1980), p775-796. Kirkpatrick, Abrams and many others members of the New Right have 
also promoted this claim.
35 “Table of Vetoed Draft Resolutions in the United Nations Security Council, 1946-1993.” 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Research and Analysis Department Memorandum, January 
1996, RAD 2/96, DD 1996/005, p4.
36 P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991, p53. Robertson perhaps 
to show the affinity between the UN and the Soviet Union describes Hammarskjold as “general
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terrorism, torture, murder, graft, and corruption within these nations were 
glossed over. The former Western allies and the United States became in the 
words of a later nonaligned leader, “the Great Satan.”.” Robertson further asserts 
that the UN involvement occurred only after the Belgians intervened, and that the 
UN action was directed mainly against the Europeans rather than in support of 
peace which the Europeans were trying to establish. Robertson points to a Life 
magazine photo of a bullet-riddled Volkswagen with a dead woman and a child 
inside and a dazed Belgian settler raising his hands to implore his attackers, or to 
heaven, to understand why the United Nations forces had just done this thing to 
his family?37
The neoconservatives claimed that the fall from grace began in the mid 
‘60s and continued precipitously for about five to seven years when it reached a 
low level at which it stayed through different Republican and Democratic 
administrations. One possible explanation for placing the date of the decline about 
ten years after Robertson’s date is because of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) and the Sino-Indian war. Kirkpatrick, suggests that NAM changed once 
Nehru died, India lost a war to China, which led to a great decline in Indian 
prestige. The pacifist influence within NAM diminished as the Africans came to 
dominate the UN and they focused on South Africa especially from 1966.38 There 
are some problems with Kirkpatrick’s chronology as the Sino-Indian war took 
place in 1962 and was mainly over Tibet (Nehru died two years later). The reason 
for the war are rather complex but the consequences were not. The defeat 
significantly increased Chinese stock in the Third World (Pakistan sought an 
alliance with the China, as did Indonesia, and the Chinese became more involved
secretary” which is incorrect as the UN has a secretary general, while the Communist party has 
a general secretary.
37 P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991, p53. For a similar view 
on the failing of the UN 1960 involvement in the Congo W.F Jasper. Global Tvrannv... Step bv 
Steo: The United Nations and the Emerging New World Order. Appleton: Western Islands, 
1992, p32-35.
38 J.J Kirkpatrick. The Reagan Phenomenon & Other Speeches on Foreign Policy. Washington: 
AEI for Public Policy Research, 1983, “Standing Alone”, address given at Arizona State 
University, Tempe, Arizona, October 23,1981, p86.
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in Africa while India as a result went through a period of self-questioning and 
reform).”
Thus, one hypothesis that New Righters (Christian Right and neoconservatives) 
developed to explain America’s decline was that NAM emerged in the 1950s as a 
result of the decolonialisation process.40 The movement was inherently anti- 
American because that was the tendency of the NAM leadership. As the years 
progressed more members were recruited into NAM which became more anti- 
American as it increasingly fell under Soviet influence. The newly independent 
states from the Third World who had an affinity with the aims of NAM were able 
to assist the anti-Americans in the assault on US national interests. Although 
history seriously questions the above hypothesis it highlights the 
interconnectedness in outlook between the different members of the New Right. 
It also shows a lack of proper understanding of historical development, as New 
Righters misinterpreted events or simply chose to view certain events in a way 
that would provide credence to their claims. What is important to note is that the 
New Righters came to believe that the US faced serious opposition from the 
Soviet Union and its supporters in United Nations and that had to be countered.
The New Right, and Americans in general, made much of the fact that the 
United States was often outvoted within an organisation to which it contributed 
twenty-five percent of the regular budget. What made matters worse was the fact 
that Soviet contributions were minuscule when compared to theirs, especially 
with the organisation wasting valuable resources on such things as gardeners 
($81,700) at the Headquarters during the growing season ($11,000 on gardening 
equipment).41 Yet, the Soviet Union despite continuously breaking or disregarding
39 R. de Crespigny. China This Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p238-240; M.J 
Akbar. Nehru: The Making of India. London: Viking Penguin Inc., 1988, p533-561. Akbar 
places the blame for the aggression on China which was the aggressor, although he does note 
that Nehru made many mistakes especially China and its expansionism. This was coupled by 
several mistakes on the domestic front which Nehru also made.
40 See for example I. Kristol. Reflection of A Neoconservative: Looking Back. Looking Ahead. 
NY: Basic Books Publishers, 1983, Chapter 17 and 18. In Chapter 18, he argues that the UN in 
fact created the Third World and without the UN there would be no Third World which is anti- 
American.
41 See for example R.A Brooks and J.G Pilon, “The United Nations Is Not Exempt From Budget 
Belt Tightening”, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 492, February 28, 1986. The authors
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international conventions, laws and even the Charter, was not isolated in the 
organisation but enjoyed much support because of its satellite states and fellow 
travellers. These states guaranteed that Soviet interests were promoted and 
protected and that the Soviets never stood alone in the UN and usually voted with 
the majority.42
American critics of the United Nations found it incomprehensible that the 
UN was not forced to deal with its growth while Americans were being asked to 
be more frugal and patient.43 Those involved with the assault on the UN 
maintained that the organisation had grown too fast and too much and the result 
was that it became inefficient and ineffective (much was made of the mountain of 
paper-work and that many documents were translated into several languages).44 
Critics argued that there was a need for a pause on the expansion of the 
international organisation system that would help or at least not cause too much 
damage to the specialised agencies. By freezing the growth of an already large 
enough organisation one would see greater efficiency, particularly through the 
elimination of unnecessary programs (just what the administration was trying to 
do in domestic policy).45
The administration with the help of Congress was adamant about using 
America’s financial contributions to push the United Nations toward an agenda
compare American and Soviet contributions and show that the US puts much more into the 
organisation and yet it gets little back from the UN. They do not mention that the UN spent 
much of its money in the US.
42 J.J Kirkpatrick. The Reagan Phenomenon & Other Speeches on Foreign Policy. Washington 
DC: AEI for Public Policy Research, 1983, “Standing Alone”, address given at Arizona State 
University, Tempe, Arizona, October 23,1981, p79-91.
43 “The U.S. Role in the United Nations”, prepared statement of Senator Nancy L. Kassebaum, 
hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organization of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 1st Session, September 
27, and October 3, 1983, Washington: US GPO, 1984.
44 R.A Brooks and J.G Pilon, “The United Nations Is Not Exempt From Budget Belt 
Tightening”, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 492, February 28, 1986. The authors 
provide a list of what they see as unacceptable UN waste of money, p6-7 and throughout. The 
references to several languages is probably not to do with the addition of Arabic as the sixth 
official language.
45 “General View of the U.N. System”, address by Elliott Abrams, before a Conference of U.N. 
Representatives of the United Nations Association-USA in New York. Washington DC: State 
Department, Bureau of Public Affairs. June 5,1981, p2. The notion of a guarantee was probably 
just a misperception of reality by Abrams, which again highlights the animosity and lack of 
understanding of Reagan officials toward the UN and its system.
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that was in-line with American interests. The Siljander Compromise of 1984 
highlighted the determination of Congress to take a more effective or aggressive 
stance toward the UN. The Compromise headed off an amendment by Robert S. 
Walker: “...that would have barred military aid to countries that voted against 
U.S. position in the United Nations more than 15 percent of the time.” The 
Compromise that was adopted by voice vote: “...instructed the president to use 
votes in the U.N. General Assembly as a “major criterion” in deciding how to 
allocate foreign aid.”46 This was the same year that Jesse Helms and a “handful of 
conservatives” were able to block the Senate approval of the Genocide 
Convention of 1949. A year later Congress announced its new determination to 
deal more effectively with the United Nations through the Kassebaum 
Amendment whose aim was to: “...limit U.S. contributions to the United Nations 
and related organizations to 20 percent of those organizations’ annual budgets, 
unless the secretary of state certified to Congress that such organizations had 
adopted procedures for proportionate voting on budgetary matters and had 
adopted plans to reduce employee salaries and pensions to the levels comparable 
to those of the U.S. civil service.” This emphasised the impact that New Right 
ideology had on the Reagan administration and its relations with the UN. The 
administration was attempting to trim the size and cost of its own bureaucracy 
and by linking the pay and pension of UN employees to that of US civil servants 
thus also forcing the UN to adopt austerity programs.47
There may be differing opinions about when American decline began and 
Third World dominance emerged but there was a general agreement among 
conservatives that NAM by the 1970s came to dominate the United Nations.
46 Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 1984, Washington DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1985, pi 12, Genocide Treaty, pl23-124.
In a Congressional report a year later, the members felt that: “...the question of tying votes and 
speaking behavior in a multilateral institution like the U.N. General Assembly to grants U.S. 
bilateral assistance needs more examination as an instrument of policy...”. Taken from “38th 
Session of the U.N. General Assembly”, September 19 - December 20, 1983, Report of 
Congressional Delegates to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 
September 30,1985, Washington DC: US GPO, 1985.
47 Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 99th Congress, 1st Session, 1985, Washington DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1986. The Kassebaum Amendment (118. S. 1003) of the State
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NAM, it was claimed, was responsible for leading a general, all-embracing 
campaign against American interests (even in the Security Council) with 
encouragement from the Soviet Union. The former colonies of the European 
countries, who for decades if not centuries, were kept as secondary citizens in 
global terms, realised that by uniting they could exert greater pressure in 
international relations and in the UN, and thus get their agenda fulfilled, which 
was often tied to development and that meant heavy financial commitments. 
American conservatives found it inexplicable that former colonies instead of 
turning against the Soviet Union - an empire, dominating much of Eastern and 
Central Europe (to name just one region) - denounced the United States itself a 
former colony, which gave much more aid to their causes than the Soviet Union 
ever did. The explanation that has been provided for this unusual response was 
based on a theory that Irving Kristol a leading neoconservatives, developed. As a 
member of the administration put it: “...Marxist rhetoric provides an excuse for 
the elimination of democracy ostensibly with the purpose of achieving greater 
social justice. Our [America’s] own revolutionary political tradition, the tradition 
of Jefferson and Madison, offers no such excuses for the elimination of liberty. A 
Third World leader who intends to rule by dictatorship finds no comfort in our 
political tradition, and this may help explain why so many turn to the language of 
Marxism for comfort and shelter.”48
For the Reaganites, the Third World or NAM (being the bloc that 
promoted Third World interests) working under the control of the Soviet Union, 
had an agenda designed to hurt US interests. In the words of Kirkpatrick: “The 
non-aligned bloc is never cohesive unless it has united to support a position 
acceptable to the Soviets. The Soviets being extremely astute politically, long ago 
began encouraging nations associated with its blocs to join the non-aligned. So 
there are a great many Soviet client states inside the non-aligned movement. Cuba 
being a very clear-cut example of such interlocking relationship. There simply is
Department Authorisation, Fiscal Year, 1986-87, was adopted by a vote of 71:13 (Republican 
41:4; Democrats 30-9), on June 7,1985.
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no unity inside the non-aligned bloc except on the issues and positions acceptable 
to the Soviets. What happens very frequently is that a position acceptable to the 
non-aligned bloc and the Soviet bloc through this overlapping membership 
generates a very large, nearly two thirds, majority.”49 That is,, it was the Soviet 
Union that was acting like an old colonial power, not the United States.
NAM was therefore seen as an exceedingly powerful bloc in the UN when it was 
mobilised effectively. Its areas of interest were Namibia, Israel (and the PLO), 
South Africa and global negotiations, issues in which the United States had very 
definable interests. Moreover, the success of NAM was based on the notion that: 
“...it is easier to build consensus about opposing than supporting something. The 
negative positions on which the NAM has its greatest consensus are Israel and 
South Africa (and occasionally the United States). Some of its purplest prose 
delivered concerns the alliance between Zionism and racism backed by the 
American imperialists - painted as the worst of all possible human coalitions.”50
The “America First” agenda in the United Nations was pursued on two 
fronts by the New Right and therefore the administration. Domestically, Congress 
was used to pass legislation and resolutions making the United Nations more 
aware of its precarious position in the United States. This was seen especially in 
the Kassebaum Amendment whose aim was to: “...cause the members of the 
United Nations to engage in some productive soul searching about an 
organization that can - and must - play a vital role in international affairs.”51 The 
United Nations, it was felt, had to be made to realise that if it harmed American
48 “General View of the U.N. System”, address by Elliott Abrams, before a Conference of U.N. 
Representatives of the United Nations Association-USA in New York. Washington DC: State 
Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, June 5,1981.
49 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “The United Nations as a Political System”, address before the 
Institute for Comparative & Political Studies, Georgetown University, Washington DC, June 14, 
1983, p225; I. Kristol. Reflection of A Neoconservative: Looking Back. Looking Ahead. NY: 
Basic Books Publishers, 1983.
50 J.J Kirkpatrick. The Reagan Phenomenon & Other Speeches on Foreign Policy. Washington 
DC: AEI for Public Policy Research, 1983, “Standing Alone”, address given at Arizona State 
University, Tempe, Arizona, October 23,1981, p83-86.
51 “The U.S. Role in the United Nations”, prepared statement of Senator Nancy L. Kassebaum, 
hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organization of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 1st Session, September 
27, and October 3,1983, Washington: US GPO, 1984.
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interests, the US would respond in kind (through reducing/cutting its financial 
support). This is also why the Kasten and Nickles bills were important as they 
called upon the administration to launch a comprehensive review of US 
participation in the UN.” These legislative measures coupled with statements 
from the White House and the actual withdrawal from UNESCO in 1983-84, 
probably sent a very powerful message to the United Nations. That is, the 
organisation had to realise that under Reagan, American attitudes significantly 
changed from those of the 1970s, when UN deficiencies were noted usually in 
passing as more emphasis was placed on the effectiveness of the organisation.53 It 
therefore seems very likely that the reforms that were initiated by the UN 
(especially in the Secretariat) were a product of this new philosophy.54
LIBERTY & THE WESTERN POLITICAL SYSTEM
The New Righters believed that the United Nations was essentially an 
American-created organisation, and the Charter was a mirror image of their own 
Constitution.55 The US Constitution is about ‘rights’ as it stipulates what ‘rights’
52 See the introduction by B.Y Pines in: A World Without a U.N.: What Would Happen if the 
United Nations Shut Down?. Washington DC: Heritage Foundation, 1984; also, “FY 1985 
Assistance Requests for Organizations and Programs”, statement by Gregory Newell before the 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee, April 4, 1984, 
Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2086, May 1986, p83-87.
53 See for example: “United Nations: Serving American Foreign Policy Interests”, statement by 
Andrew Young, submitted to the Subcommittee on State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary & 
Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriation Committee, April 2, 1979, Department o f State 
Bulletin, Vol. 79, No. 2027, June 1979, p47-50; “US Participation in the U.N., 1978”, message 
by President Carter to Congress, July 3, 1980, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 80, No. 2042, 
September 1980, p69.
R. Pastor, “The Reagan Administration and Latin America: Eagle Resurgent”, K.A Oye, R.J 
Lieber and D. Rothchild. (ed.) Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy. 
Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1987, p359-392.
54 A Congressional Report stated that since 1982, Kirkpatrick had worked to reduce the total 
amount of add-ons to the regular budget, coupled with the UN‘s own reform measures, the 
biennial budget of 1981-1982 saw zero-growth, while in the budget of 1983-84, Secretary 
General Perez de Cuellar called for an increase of only 0.7 percent. “38th Session of the U.N. 
General Assembly”, September 19 - December 20, 1983, Report of Congressional Delegates to 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, September 30, 1985, 
Washington DC: US GPO, 1985.
55 See for example: “General View of the U.N. System”, address by E. Abrams, before a 
Conference of U.N. representatives of the UN Association-USA, New York, June 5, 1981, 
Washington DC: US State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1981; “Double Standards in 
Human Rights”, statement by Jeane Kirkpatrick, before the Third Committee, UN, General 
Assembly, New York, November 24, 1981, Washington DC: US State Department, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, 1981.
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the people, the states and the federal government have. It is a political and civil 
document, concerned with the rights of the people, freedom of speech, religion, 
travel and so forth. It is not so much about the promotion of social or economic 
conditions, but about creating an equal playing field for people to seek social and 
economic development. This is what New Righters felt the UN should be 
interested in: the defense and advancement of political and civil human rights. It 
was probably because of this alleged deviation from the path that the founders of 
the Charter set that Kirkpatrick claimed that the organisation has: “...not fulfilled 
even remotely the expectations of its founding fathers.”,54 as nations have failed to 
behave according to the visions of the founders. Inside the UN, nations did not 
act as dispassionate, disinterested single members seeking only to use their 
influence in ways that would advance justice and peace. The organisation 
developed a political system “...which features all the elements of power-seeking 
on behalf of some version of the public good common to more mundane political 
systems.”57 Thus, the Reaganites felt that the United Nations as it stood in the 
1980s had deviated from the path that the Founding Fathers had mapped out for 
it, which was primarily to guarantee international peace and security and the 
promotion of liberty which to New Righters would then provide social and 
economic benefits. This is probably why some New Righters were not against 
foreign aid per se, but rather against aid to countries with a different political 
system than that of a liberal democracy as they maintained that the social and 
economic betterment could not be achieved under an un-democratic system.
New Right ideology focuses on what its adherents believe is American 
supremacy which is not purely material. That is, the American model and 
experience have shown that by having political and civil rights, or in other words, 
an American-type democracy, one would not only have the highest social and
56 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “The United Nations as a Political System”, address before the 
Institute for Comparative & Political Studies, Georgetown University, Washington DC, June 14, 
1983, p222.
57 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “The United Nations as a Political System”, address before the 
Institute for Comparative & Political Studies, Georgetown University, Washington DC, June 14, 
1983, p222.
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economic standards of living but a better overall existence. The success of the US 
was based on its Constitution which inspired people to work hard, independently 
and thus transform themselves from poor immigrants to economically secure 
individuals.38 Thus, if the United Nations returned to the proper interpretation of 
UN Charter the whole organisation would function better thus benefiting all.
The belief that America’s position in the United Nations had declined was 
linked to the claim that the organisation adopted a political agenda. To the New 
Righters, Article 1 of the Charter not only calls for the United Nations to: 
“maintain international peace and security” and to ensure that peace is not 
threatened, but it also calls upon the application of the “principles of justice and 
international law” to deal with threats to international peace and security. 
Moreover, the purpose of the United Nations is to: “...develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples...”. In other words, the objectives of the UN as 
stipulated in Article I, are to: “...achieve international co-operation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, 
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;”.
New Righters felt that all these purposes were based on principles that western 
democracies advance. The notion that a Soviet-type society could respect 
international law, self-determination, or even international co-operation was 
impossible because liberty does not really exist in communist countries which to 
them were ruled by a decadent, ruthless, self-interested elite. The New Righters 
believed that to effectively create a Soviet-type society it is essential that the basic 
institutions of society are first de-legitimised as only then could one destroy the 
society. This must be done “...so as to detach the identifications and affections of 
its citizens from the institutions and authorities of the society marked for 
destruction. This delegitimization may be achieved by attacking a society’s
58 Kristol provides a veiy patriotic view about the American experience which is coupled with 
an attack on Third World countries that seek development aid. In his Reflections of a 
Neoconservative: Looking Back. Looking Ahead. NY: Basic Books Publishers, 1983, p231-235.
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practices in terms of its own deeply held values, or it may be achieved by 
attacking the values themselves.”59
For the Reaganites the Soviet assault on the legitimacy of a liberal democracy 
included a very complex, comprehensive, multifaceted strategy which involved a 
demonstration of the failure of Western democracies to meet their own standards 
which are considered as utopian measuring rods. The Soviet system was based on 
the examples of the Fascists and Nazis who attacked the values that the West held 
dear as they rejected democracy, liberty, equality and so forth. The communists, 
however, took a different approach, as they do not assail basic Western values 
forthrightly, rather they denounce Western society with its own values. They do 
not offer alternative values; they postulate a radical critique of Western society 
and institutions by expropriating Western language and values. Thus, democracies 
are attacked for not being truly democratic, because they cannot guarantee 
economic equality. From here the argument stems that political equality is 
therefore also impossible, which is why elections are never free.60 The attack is 
preceded by continuous falsification of Soviet practices and assertions of Soviet 
loyalty to basic Western values which means that Western flaws are exaggerated, 
while Soviet faults are denied. The conclusion that one therefore reaches is that 
there is, at best, not a dime’s worth of difference between the two regimes.61 This 
is why:
“The liberal democratic tradition is inextricably bound up with the 
long struggle against arbitrary power and with notions of liberty, 
individual rights, consent and representation. Its key beliefs and 
practices emerged and took shape in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. At the same time, new doctrines of legitimacy arose in Italy 
as well as in Great Britain, France, and the United States. These new 
doctrines of legitimacy argued that just government depends on the 
consent of the governed and, furthermore, that just power flows only 
from the people. They were accompanied by doctrines of representation
59 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “The Myth of Moral Equivalence”, address before the Shavano 
Institute, Hillsdale College, Washington DC, May 1, 1985, p75-76; Kristol, Gershman and 
others provide similar views.
60 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “The Myth of Moral Equivalence”, address before the Shavano 
Institute, Hillsdale College, Washington DC, May 1,1985.
61 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “The Myth of Moral Equivalence”, address before the Shavano 
Institute, Hillsdale College, Washington DC, May 1,1985.
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that claimed that each man is entitled to speak for himself about who 
should rule and to what broad ends.”62
The clearest example of the abandonment of the Charter’s fundamental 
principles was over the issue of liberty, which is linked to the whole idea that 
liberal democracy is the better political system. As President Reagan himself 
stated: “Political liberty and free enterprise provide a fertile environment to 
American scientists and engineers who have given us a standard of living 
unequaled in the history of the world.”63
New Righters enjoyed pointing to America’s own history in justifying their belief 
in the role of liberty and how other nations must adopt liberty and protect it. The 
United States was formed by refugees seeking liberty, whether to practise their 
own religion or pursue their dreams, and the Founding Fathers by guaranteeing 
liberty in all shapes and forms ensured that such objectives could be followed.64
An integral part of the administration’s approach to questions of liberty 
and political systems within the United Nations dealt with human rights as 
Americans held that the best way to promote and protect individual rights, is 
through democratic institutions (something that did not exist in the Soviet 
system). The democratic system ensures that those who are unhappy with 
something have other avenues in which they could pursue their grievances. 
Democratic systems protect minorities, dissenters and critics from government 
usage of arbitrary power. Thus, there “...would be no serious human rights abuses 
if all people enjoyed self-government and democracy.” This is because people do 
not impose tyrants upon themselves.65 In the minds of New Righters the situation
62 J.J Kirkpatrick. The Reagan Phenomenon & Other Speeches on Foreign Policy. Washington 
DC: AEI for Public Policy Research, 1983, “The Reagan Phenomenon and The Liberal 
Tradition”, address to the Centro Studi per la Conciliazione Banco Democratico Roma, Rome, 
Italy, May 28, 1981.
63 “Message to the Congress Transmitting the Annual Report on United States International 
Activities in Science and Technology”, February 17, 1984. The Public Papers of the Presidents 
of the United States: Ronald Reagan. Vol. I, January 1 to June 29, 1985. Washington: US GPO, 
1986.
64 Foreigners, however, played an crucial role during the American Revolution. M. A Jones. The 
Limits of Liberty: American History. 1707-1992. 2nd ed., NY: Oxford University Press, 1995, 
p51-57.
65 “Double Standards in Human Rights”, statement by Jeane Kirkpatrick, before the Third 
Committee, U.N. General Assembly, New York, November 24,1981, Washington DC: US State
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in the United Nations was that democratic institutions were spumed while Soviet 
totalitarianism was accepted, if not encouraged. The implication being that if 
more and more countries chose or are forced into adopting the Soviet system, the 
‘free world’ would suffer, and with it liberty in all of its shapes and forms. Thus, 
to the New Righters the UN must be forced to alter its present attitude and seek 
to actively promote democratic institutions while acting against the advancement 
of the Soviet system.66
It was during the 1970s, that neoconservatives, with Kirkpatrick at the 
fore, began developing and promoting the view that one should distinguish 
between authoritarianism and totalitarianism.67 The UN, provided Kirkpatrick - as 
the leading and most visible exponent of this philosophy - with an excellent outlet 
to advance these views. Kirkpatrick argued that the organisation focused too 
much on human rights abuses in countries with authoritarian regimes that were 
allies of the United States and located in Latin America. The neoconservative 
argument (which Kirkpatrick promoted in her essay “Dictatorship and Double 
Standards” which impressed Ronald Reagan) was that the UN should not focus 
too much on authoritarian regimes but rather on totalitarian ones. This is because 
in many instances authoritarian regimes still had the potential of developing into 
democracies, and generally speaking there was comparatively more freedom in 
authoritarian regimes than under totalitarian ones.68 Kirkpatrick often used El 
Salvador as a prime example of the merits of this argument by noting the 
improvements that were taking place within the country. She writes: “Some
Department, Bureau of Public Affairs 1981; “A New Era of Growth”, an address by Alexander 
Haig before the U.N. General Assembly in New York, September 21, 1981, Washington DC: 
State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1981.
66 Paul Nitze, a member of the Committee on the Present Danger and of the administration 
argued that America could not survive as the sole democracy as it needed allies to combat Soviet 
communism. P.H Nitze, “Strategy in the Decade of the 1980s: Do Negotiated Arms Limitation 
Have A Future.” Foreign Affairs 59 (1 1980), p82-101.
67 J. Ehrman. The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. 
London: Yale University Press, 1995, p97-136; J.J Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorship and Double 
Standards.” Commentary 68 (5 1979).
68 For an example of Kirkpatrick’s attack on totalitarianism see her speech “Violence and 
Peace” in Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: Transaction 
Books, 1988, plOl-112. The speech was given with Carl Gershman another important leading 
neoconservative writer; M.D Shulman, “On Learning to Live With Authoritarian Regimes.” 
Foreign Affairs 55 (1 1977), p325-338.
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people said that free elections could not be held in El Salvador. They were
wrong.”69 Moreover, in many instances she suggested that democratic
development in authoritarian countries had been prevented because the
government had to deal with Marxist and Soviet/Cuban backed guerrillas.
“ The Government of El Salvador continues to labor under the 
terrible burden of trying to oppose a well-armed, well-financed 
campaign brought against it by guerrillas, supported and sponsored 
by the Soviet bloc, Cuba and closer to home Nicaragua. Probably, 
most of the people who picketed consider themselves liberals, as 
does almost everybody who takes that position on El Salvador 
these days. Probably they consider that the liberal position is to 
oppose the small amount of U.S. aid to the elected Government of El 
Salvador.”70
The American patriotic belief in the supremacy of their system was 
certainly an important factor in its aggressive encouragement of the liberal 
democracy alternative in international affairs. However, there was also a belief 
that following the Soviet expansion in the 1970s, coupled with the economic 
turbulence within the Western world, the US could not survive as the sole 
democracy.71 Thus, the UN was to be used in two ways. First, America’s 
representatives would highlight the benefits of democracy. Second, by defending 
its allies, particularly those with authoritarian regimes, the United States would 
preserve the support of those countries while also providing elements within 
those states with enough encouragement to seek internal democratic reform as 
happened in many countries in Latin America.72 Furthermore, one must remember 
that this advocacy for the promotion of democracy was carried by the
69 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “Risking Power for Freedom: Democratic Elections and Democratic 
Government”, address at Conference on Free Elections, held jointly by the American Enterprise 
Institute and US State Department, November 4, 1982, pl3.
70 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “A Liberal Position?” address to Conservative Political Action 
Committee, Washington DC, February 19,1983, p29. The whole volume is full of examples and 
references as to how unfair the UN is to the countries of Latin America who are allied to the US.
71 J. Ehrman. The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. 
London: Yale University Press, 1995, p97-136, especially pl07; P.H Nitze, “Strategy in the 
Decade of the 1980s: Do Negotiated Arms Limitation Have A Future.” Foreign Affairs 59 (1 
1980), p82-101.
72 See for example Kirkpatrick’s Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, 
Oxford: Transaction Books, 1988, “To Live in Freedom”, address to the Inter-American Press 
Association. Los Angeles, California, October 31,1984, pl6-21.
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administration in conjunction with the work of such programs as Project 
Democracy and the National Endowment for Democracy, two neoconservative- 
led agencies.73 This again emphasised the interconnectedness between American 
policy in the United Nations and Washington’s general foreign policy, whose aim 
was the promotion of American-inspired liberal Western democracy.
THE POLITICISATIO N OF THE UNITED NATIONS
The debate about the politicisation of the United Nations flowed from the 
determination of the Reagan administration to assert its own agenda on the 
organisation. Americans take great pride in the fact that the organisation was 
initially ‘their creation.’74 However, the decolonisation movement had transformed 
the organisation as new policies, ideas and programs were pursued due to the 
dominance of the developing world, and that arguably turned the UN into a 
political forum with a world agenda (acting perhaps as a world government?)
An integral part of the accusation against the United Nations which 
manifested itself through the claim of politicisation was that the organisation was 
being used by anti-Americans and especially the Soviet Union to put 
disinformation into circulation.73 That is, the Soviets disregarded the Charter, 
which calls upon member states to ignore politics and work for greater 
harmonisation and co-operation. The Charter stipulates that members of the UN 
civil service shall be non-political: “In the performance of their duties the 
Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any
73 J. Ehrman. The rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. 
London: Yale University Press, 1995, pl61-162, and throughout.
74 Examples of this attitude are numerous especially in J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: 
Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: Transaction Books, 1988; “General View of the 
U.N. System”, address by Elliott Abrams, before a Conference of UN representatives of the 
United Nations Association-USA, New York, June 5, 1981, Washington DC: State Department, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, 1981; “38th Session of the U.N. General Assembly”, September 19 - 
December 20, 1983, Report of Congressional Delegates to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
US House of Representatives, September 30, 1985, Washington DC: US GPO, 1985. See in 
particular Andrew Young’s statement to the Committee.
75 See for example J.G Pilon, “Moscow’s U.N. Outpost”, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 
No. 307, November 22, 1983 (prepared with the assistance of S. Lechenko); R.A Brooks, “The 
U.N. Dept. Of Public Information: A House of Mirrors”, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 
No. 332, February 23, 1984.
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government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall 
refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international 
officials responsible to the Organisation.” (Articles 100 and 101) The Soviet bloc, 
however, it was claimed, used the Secretariat to promote its own agenda of anti- 
Americanism and that was being financed by the American taxpayer.76 
Congress and the administration intervened to deal with the claims of Soviet 
manipulation of the UN Secretariat and bureaucracy through the Roth 
Amendment (Roth being a leading member of the New Right anti-liberal group) 
which imposed: “...the same travel restrictions on foreigners employed by the 
United Nations as were imposed on foreign diplomats in the United States. The 
amendment would allow the State Department to restrict travel by some 800 
Russians at the United Nations.”77 The Amendment was a response to a report by 
the Senate Intelligence Committee which found that one-fourth of the 800 
Russians working for the United Nations were intelligence agents. A similar 
amendment had been proposed in 1984 by Leahy and Cohen but opposition from 
the State Department and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prevented it. 
The final version of the State Department Authorisation Bill (HR 20068, PL 99- 
93) established a policy that the numbers of diplomatic personnel should be 
roughly equivalent.7*
The adoption of an ideological agenda which is almost synonymous with 
politicisation could also be seen through the support and encouragement that the 
UN gave left-of-centre movements. Once a country adopted the socialist model it 
became anti-American and anti-freedom - as was the case with Nicaragua and 
Grenada. By 1980, many areas around the globe were involved in “wars of
76 M. Huber, “The United Nations Libraiy: Putting Soviet Disinformation into Circulation”, 
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 487, February 18, 1986. Huber argues that the Library 
had been used by the Soviets through its directors to promote the Soviet system and disparage 
capitalism and the US.
77 Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 99th Congress, 1st Session 1985, Washington DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1986, pl09. The amendment was adopted by a voice vote.
78 Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 99th Congress, 1st Session 1985, Washington DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1986, pl08. The bill contained a number of provisions dealing 
with the fact that there were more Soviet diplomats in the US than American ones in the USSR 
because of Soviet refusal to employ Americans in their diplomatic facilities (the Americans 
employed more than 200 Russians at their diplomatic facilities in the Soviet Union).
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national liberation,” which was translated as wars between Marxists - and like 
minded-groups - and pro-Western groups. The proliferation of these wars was of 
great importance as they highlighted Soviet expansionism. Wars of national 
liberation were deemed to be essentially Soviet-backed movements seeking to 
undermine the government of the country, even if that government was 
legitimate. This attitude was most visible in Latin America and southern Africa. 
The UN appeared to the conservatives to be excessively concerned with 
governmental behaviour when dealing with these groups while ignoring atrocities 
committed by guerrilla movements against civilian populations.79 Moreover, the 
United Nations did not hide or disguise the assistance and support that it provided 
Marxist-oriented, Soviet-backed guerrilla movements. The links appear in UN 
official documents, though the Charter does not authorise funding and political 
support for armed guerrilla warfare (Marxist or non-Marxist). The UN’s own 
records, according to Thomas Gulick, show that between 1975 and 1982 at least 
$116 million has been spent or budgeted to support what the United Nations had 
defined as “national liberation movements” (NLMs). The American taxpayer 
contributed twenty-five percent of this through the UN regular budget. What 
made matters worse, according to New Righters, was that UN aid to NLMs was 
selective, as for example, no support was given to pro-Western NLMs, such as 
UNIT A while been unwilling to recognise non-Marxist representatives of the 
Palestinians or the democratic political parties of Namibia in Southern Africa.80
The issue of development was a central bone of contention between the 
New Right and the United Nations. New Righters felt that the less developed 
world, which is composed of former colonies of the European countries, wanted 
the richer countries to pay for their development rather than earn economic and
79 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy7 & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “The Method of Violence”, address to the Third Committee of the 
37th UN General Assembly, December 7, 1982, p91-100; see also in the same volume 
“Violence & Peace”, pl01-l 12.
80 Both SWAPO and the ANC make wide use of UN-sponsored radio propaganda broadcasts. 
T.G Gulick “How the U.N. Aids Marxist Guerrilla Groups”, Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder, No. 77, April 8, 1982, p62-3. It is important to note that this document was 
attached to the Senate’s Committee on Judiciary; & Sub-committee on Security & Terrorism, 
“The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in South 
Africa", US Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, March, 1982.
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social success. This point is of great significance to Americans because they were 
accused by many in the Third World and especially by NAM and socialist states 
of being neo-colonial which horrified them, as they were very proud of their 
colonial heritage and the Revolutionary War. New Righters argued that the 
decolonisation movement created many new states that were in great economic 
and social hardship. These new states felt that because the Western powers had 
abused them for a very long time, it was up to the West to pay for their economic 
development. The US being the epitome of Western economic and social success 
was therefore targeted (albeit unfairly) by the Third World, which conveniently 
ignored the serious economic and social hardship that the US faced partly because 
of OPEC’s actions. One must remember that for many Americans scenes such as 
queues for gasoline, high inflation and many other economic problems were seen 
as things that happened during the Great Depression. Americans of the 1970s 
were used to affluence and not economic hardships, as to their minds such 
problems occurred in other countries. This issue is perhaps ironically linked to the 
debate about communication that was raging in UNESCO during the 1970s and 
early 1980s, as some in the developing world claimed that the Western media 
portrayal of the Third World was unfair. This possibly explains why firstly, 
Americans found their economic and social problems difficult to deal with as they 
were used to attribute such hardship to other countries;81 and, secondly why some 
Americans turned against the decolonised world as they could not accept that 
perhaps the reason for America’s economic woes were of their own making.82
The Reaganite attack on the UN approach to social and economic 
development led was ironic as the whole process for the first Decade of 
Development was an American-led initiative. It was on September 25, 1961, that 
President Kennedy speaking in the general debate of the 16th session of the 
General Assembly proposed that the 1960s be officially designated as the “United 
Nations Development Decade.” This would facilitate an expansion in UN efforts
81 For more on this point see Chapter 5 of thesis.
82 Americans after spending billions on domestic and foreign policy while reducing taxes also 
allowed Nixon to manipulate the economy to improve his re-election chances. M.A Genovese. 
The Nixon Presidency: Politics in Turbulent Times. NY: Greenwood Press, 1990, p61-98.
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in promoting growth. Kennedy claimed that through such a process development 
would become co-operative rather than competitive, which would enable “...all 
nations, however, diverse their systems and beliefs to become free and equal in 
fact as well as in law.” The American representative to the Second Committee 
said that his government felt that the Development Decade “...would give fresh 
impetus to national and international efforts to accelerate the development of the 
less developed countries and would help strengthen the role and enhance the 
authority of the United Nations and its related agencies.”83
Geopolitical considerations may also have been responsible for the New 
Right attack on the United Nations. The majority of the countries that proved to 
be difficult were primarily in the African continent. In terms of economic 
development the countries of Africa suffered most arguably because of their 
colonial past and the racism that was involved in it. These countries were now 
able to play a dominant role in UN politics and were also very important for the 
United States.84 The aim of these countries was to use any means at their disposal 
to develop their economic potential. This possibly threatened the New Righters 
because to their mind the programs that the less developed countries were 
seeking were highly ideological and more in-line with socialist thought ( as the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal showed for example). With the growing 
animosity that New Righters felt toward the UN Secretariat, the belief that the 
organisation was working against the national interests of the United States made 
perfect sense to them. The Soviet Union was using the Third World majority in 
the UN through its control of NAM (coupled with the domestic problems that the 
Americans were experiencing) to gain ground on America militarily, economically 
and socially. That is, the Soviets, who believed in balance of power and spheres
83 Yearbook of the United Nations. 1961, NY: Office of Public Information, UN, 1963, p228, 
p229. The Decade of Development resolution was 1710 (XVI), as proposed by Second 
Committee A.5056, unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on December 19, 1961, 
meeting 1084.
84 See for example J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980, p86.
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of influence theory were using the present condition to promote international 
communism.”
When taking the above argument into consideration it is important to remember 
that the New Right was and is a conspiracy-oriented/sympathetic movement and 
its interpretation of Soviet-UN relations was based on a belief that a two-front 
attack was being waged against the US and its allies. On the one hand America’s 
adversaries were getting the United Nations - through the Third World - to 
support highly ideological and costly programs while at the same time a 
propaganda war was being waged against the United States in a place that was 
very well covered by the world press, which in the developing world was often 
aided financially by UNESCO, an agency that had shown itself to be anti- 
American.86
An important theme in the New Right which was promoted mainly by the 
more conspiracy-oriented New Righters and which is also worth looking at as it 
helps to explain some of the fear that had been expressed against the United 
Nations is the belief that it is the harbinger of a world government This argument 
has been promoted mainly by members of the Christian Right, people such as Pat 
Robertson and Hal Lindsey although in the 1990s many secular “patriots” have 
also endorsed this view.87 They point out that the organisation was designed to be 
“a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations” in the fulfilment of “common
85 These points are developed from Moynihan’s thesis about the “British Revolution” and 
America’s post-Vietnam decline. In “The United States in Opposition.” Commentary 59 (3 
1975), and to a lesser extent in his book A Dangerous Place. London: Seeker & Warburg, 1979; 
and, “A New American Foreign Policy.” New Republic February 9,1980.
86 W.F Jasper. Global Tyranny... Step by Step: The United Nations and the Emerging New 
World Order. Appleton: Western Islands, 1992. Although Jasper’s book was written after the 
Reagan era, the author goes to great length to show how the US is often abused by the UN 
whose goal is world domination. See also Chapter 7 “Operation Enslavement” (in part 3 
“Conspiracy Unlimited” in R. Abanes. Rebellion. Racism & Religion: American Militias. 
Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1996. See also Chapter 5 of this thesis.
87 R. Abanes. Rebellion. Racism & Religion: American Militias. Downers Grove: InterVarsity 
Press, 1996. Abanes provides plenty of statements by American “patriots” against the UN and 
its designs; W.F Jasper. Global Tyranny... Step by Step: The United Nations and the Emerging 
New World Order. Appleton: Western Islands, 1992, see especially some of the books that he 
cites in his bibliography which cover the last four decades.
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ends.” (Article 1.4), and that Article 2, calls upon the members to: “...give the 
United Nations every assistance in any action it takes...”.88 
The strong opposition of some Americans toward the United Nations could be 
traced to the debate about politicisation which the 1980s New Right promoted. In 
their minds what had taken place since the early 1970s, was a bizarre attempt to 
build a non-ideological “One World.” The United Nations was deemed to be 
proposing a mandate which in effect called for peace at any price and which 
ultimately could result in the loss of all other human rights under a one-world 
dictatorship.89 In other words, the UN would lead to the disarmament of the 
United States and the West, which would than allow the Soviet Union to 
successfully complete its world conquest. This would mean an end to freedom, 
human rights and everything else that Americans hold sacred as the world would 
be controlled by a small elite not too different from the one that sits in the 
Kremlin. This is seen for example in resolutions on NIEO or the Charter on the 
Economic Rights and Duties of States. The aim of these programs was to set up a 
world devoid of ideological differences because it would be controlled by Soviet 
ideology. There would also be a built-in poor-versus-rich bias, a new information 
order restricting the freedom of the press, and so forth.
There was such concern over the path that the United Nations was on that 
Pat Robertson one of the leaders of the New Christian Right in 1987 called for a 
replacement of the UN. Robertson claimed that the United Nations since its 
creation in 1945 “...has been notoriously ineffective.”90 His new organisation 
replace the UN and would be “...based not on failed utopian idealism or but on 
realism, not on the shifting sands of ideological expediency but on a foundation of 
time-honored principles.”91 The organisation would be a community of sovereign
88 For a Christian Right view of the aims of the UN see for example H. Lindsey. Planet Earth 
2000 AD. Will Mankind Survive?. Palos Verdes: Western Front, 1996.
89 P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991, p54 and throughout; H. 
Lindsey. Planet Earth 2000 A.D. Will Mankind Survive?. Palos Verdes: Western Front, 1996; 
W.F Jasper. Global Tyranny... Step bv Step: The United Nations and the Emerging New World 
Order. Appleton: Western Islands, 1992. The fear of the usurpation of American freedom is 
shown throughout the three books.
90 P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991, p22.
91 P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991, p56.
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nations based on democratic institutions, representative government, and respect 
for the rule of law. It would respect individual freedoms, private property, and the 
right of free speech, assembly, religion, and the press. Only countries that did not 
use terrorism against other nations, or torture against their own people would be 
allowed to join. The new organisation, which Robertson called the “Community 
of Democratic Nations” would be open to all nations whose governments had 
achieved legitimacy by embracing democratic processes. Within the Community 
the distinction between First, Second and Third World would disappear. There 
would be no Western or Eastern power cliques, no non-aligned nations. The 
international institutional dynamics flowing from the anti-colonial period would 
be superseded by the new realities of the twenty-first century. Furthermore, as 
member nations would represent most of the world’s economic powers, the 
Community would be able to use its power constructively and efficiently without 
Soviet obstruction. “The present United Nations was created as a post-World 
War II mechanism and excluded both Japan and Germany from the Security 
Council. It also was a vehicle that gave the Soviet Union one seat in the General 
Assembly for each of its fifteen [sic.] republics, a veto in the Security Council, 
and key positions in both the personnel and security offices.”92
The notion of the United Nations becoming a world government may 
sound a little far-fetched, but even in some of Kirkpatrick’s work one feels a 
sense of fear concerning the growth of the UN and the style that it developed. 
The General Assembly was seen by her as a unique parliament. Kirkpatrick noted 
that the Assembly is composed of blocs, that when working together (and usually 
against the United States) could get the full weight of the organisation to criticise 
the West. The claim that the UN had grown in its interests and responsibilities is 
best seen when looking at the amount of regulations that have emerged from it. 
Kirkpatrick states that the volume of regulation that had been imposed on
92 P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas. Word Publishing, 1991, p57, p56. Robertson 
shows his ignorance regarding the UN, as only Byelorussia and Ukraine received seats 
additional to that of the USSR itself, while the RSFSR and twelve other SSRs were not given 
any seats.
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“...international business and commerce is simply awesome.”93 UN regulations 
cover a multitude of issues from the oceans to the heavens, from the Law of the 
Sea Convention to an Agreement Covering the Activities of States on the Moon 
and other Celestial Bodies. It also pursues regulatory codes of a more general 
nature - for example, the Commission on Transnational Corporations’ draft code 
on the conduct of transnational corporations - as well as some regulations which 
are aimed at more specific areas such as the infant formula code94 adopted by 
WHO in 1981. Kirkpatrick also notes the negotiations within UNCTAD on a 
code of conduct for the transfer of technology, and another code on the 
conditions for the registration of ships; efforts within the WIPO to revise the Paris 
Industrial Property Convention governing the international patent system; the 
FAO’s deliberation on a code of conduct in the trade and use of pesticides; work 
done under the aegis of the UNEP on toxic chemicals and on a convention for the 
protection of the stratospheric ozone layer; efforts within the UN Commission on 
Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) to develop international standards on 
accounting and reporting as well as on transborder data flow; etc. The aim of the 
regulations and the conventions is to force redistribution. “Regulation is the 
instrument for the redistribution of what is called the world’s wealth. The 
international bureaucracy functions as the “new class” to which power is to be 
transferred. Global socialism is the expected and, from the point of view of many, 
the desired result.”95
The whole point about redistribution was to emphasise the belief that the 
organisation had abnegated its non-political heritage and became a tool wielded 
either by the Soviets through the majority Third World bloc, or by an 
international secretariat to rob the industrial West of its wealth. The West was to 
pay for the development of the poor countries which still adhered to anti- 
American ideologies.96 UNCTC also came under criticism because it “...provides
93 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “Global Paternalism.” Regulation December 9, 1982, p232.
94 “Infant Formula Code”, statement by Elliott Abrams, May 15, 1981, Department o f State 
Bulletin, Vol. 81, No. 2052, July 1981.
95 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “Global Paternalism.” Regulation December 9, 1982, p240.
96 According to Kirkpatrick the four nations that voted against the Law of the Sea Convention 
and the seventeen that abstained not only produce more than sixty percent of the world’s GNP
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detailed information on Western multinational corporations to Soviet bloc 
governments and consistently distorts the valuable role played by Western 
multinational corporations in developing countries. The 1984-1985 UNCTC 
budget was SI 1.4 million, of which the U.S. contributed $2.8 million.”97
The danger for the United Nations due to its growing politicisation, the 
New Righters claimed, was that it would lose its integrity.98 If the UN failed to 
preserve its moral integrity, than its usage and importance let alone success would 
be greatly undermined, according to the administration.99 This notion was largely 
used by the administration to defend its withdrawal from UNESCO in 1984.100 
The same was said about the United Nations, although there was no serious 
threat to withdraw. The administration simply sought to appear as if its 
aggressiveness was based on a desire to help protect the United Nations.101
THE "RIGHTS DEBATE"
The issue of human rights provides an excellent opportunity to examine 
some of the criticism that New Righters levelled at the United Nations, its 
programs and aims because “At its inception, the United Nations seemed destined
and provide more than the sixty percent of the UN’s contributions, they also include virtually all 
of the nations likely to develop seabed mining technology. J. J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: 
Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: Transaction Books, 1988, “Global Paternalism.” 
Regulation December 9, 1982, p237.
97 R.A Brooks and J.G Pilon, “The United Nations Is Not Exempt From Budget Belt 
Tightening”, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, February 26, 1986, No. 492, p8. ,
98 “Double Standards in Human Rights”, statement by Jeane Kirkpatrick, before the Third 
Committee, UN General Assembly, New York, November 24, 1981, Washington DC: State 
Department Bureau of Public Affairs, 1981.
99 “Double Standards in Human Rights”, statement by Jeane Kirkpatrick, before the Third 
Committee, UN General Assembly, New York, November 24, 1981, Washington DC: State 
Department Bureau of Public Affairs, 1981.
100 See Chapter 5 of this thesis.
101 This is a little reminiscent of Kirkpatrick’s defence of America’s withdrawal from ILO 
(November 1977 to February 1980) which she maintained was done due to American 
unhappiness and to help save the organisation as the ILO adopted a more effective agenda once 
the US briefly left. “The U.S. Role in the United Nations”, hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Human Rights and International Organization, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives, 98th Congress 1st, Session, September 27, and October 3, 1983, Washington: 
US GPO, 1984, p71, p72; see also Newell’s testimony in “Human Resources Impact of U.S. 
membership in UNESCO”, hearing before the Committee on Labor & Human Resources, US 
Senate, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, December 10,1984, Washington: US GPO, 1985, p i 1.
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to be the engine of human rights.”102 It is an issue that encompasses the three main 
areas of concern of the New Right toward the organisation, due to the importance 
of the preservation and advancement of human rights to the UN.
At the core of the American promotion of human rights is the belief in 
democracy, as in such systems, New Righters maintained, human rights abuses 
are less likely to occur.103 This also suggests that the New Righters wanted to see 
the organisation involved in political development.
The end of the Cold War has enabled the United Nations to take a much 
more active part in discussions about human rights. This is primarily because 
during the Cold War it was used by the main actors to denounce countries as part 
of the effort to castigate the other side’s political and social system. From a very 
early period in the Cold War both sides - except for brief lulls when relations 
between the superpowers were calm - were very much involved in a war of words 
in an attempt to convert societies to their own ways of life. These included 
questions over the ways governments and systems treated people - a central issue 
in human rights.
Human rights has attracted so much interest because it deals with so many 
issues in society. The matter is made even worse because the term is rather vague 
and therefore complex as it is not really defined in any act of international law. 
The lack of an all-embracing definition explains why during the Cold War each 
side had its own interpretation of human rights which reflected its way of life. 
Although the Cold War has ended, cultural differences have ensured that the 
debate about human rights continues and the pursuit of human rights, or rather
i ° 2  y  j  p a r e r  g n d  p  Gaer, “The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning”, A. 
Roberts and B. Kingsbury, (ed.) The United Nations. Divided World: the UN’s Roles in 
International Relations. 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendeon Press, 1993, p245.
103 See for example: “Review of U.S. Human Rights Policy”, statement of Elliott Abrams, 
accompanied by Charles Fairbanks, hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and 
International Organization of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th 
Session, 1st Session, March 3, June 28, and September 21, 1983, Washington: US GPO, 1984; 
J.J Kirkpatrick. The Reagan Phenomenon & Other Speeches on Foreign Policy. Washington 
DC. AEI for Public Policy Research, 1983, “The Reagan Phenomenon and The Liberal 
Tradition”, address to the Centro Studi per la Conciliazione Banco Democratico Roma, Rome, 
Italy, May 28,1981.
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the prevention of human rights abuse has been central to many efforts by the 
individual governments, international organisations and the United Nations.1®4
Human rights are a prime concern of the United Nations, as after all, the 
organisation was created following a period in which one saw some of the most 
heinous crimes against humanity committed. The victorious powers, outraged and 
appalled at what they found out once the fighting ceased were determined to 
ensure that in the new world order such evil would never take place. Thus, the 
peoples of the United Nations were determined: “...to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person...”103 
However, although there was a desire to deal with human rights violations, in 
practice the matter was highly complex due to national, cultural and political 
differences. This is probably why the Charter does not permit intervention on 
purely human rights grounds, although the Security Council could call for 
intervention. If it is determined that the human rights situation poses a threat to 
peace, thereby bringing Chapter VII (Article 39) into play.106 Thus, toward the end 
of 1947 (the same year of the Truman Doctrine) the Commission on Human 
Rights due to political and ideological differences agreed to divide the Bill of 
Rights into three parts; a declaration of principles which the General Assembly 
adopted in 1948; a Covenant which is rhetorically tied to the Declaration under
104 Examples of international treaties dealing with human rights are: the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948); the European Human Rights Convention 1950; the two Human Rights 
Covenants of 1966; The Organisation of American States has its own Human Rights 
Convention (Pact of San Jose, 1969); the Warsaw Pact countries had their own provisions 
concerning human rights in the Declaration of Political Consultative Committee (1978). E.J 
Osmanczyk. Encyclopaedia of the United Nations & International Agreement. London: Taylor 
& Francis, 1985, p352; Farer and Gaer highlight some of the difficulties surrounding human 
rights. “The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning”, A. Roberts and B. 
Kingsbury, (ed.) The United Nations. Divided World: the UN’s Roles in International Relations. 
2nded., Oxford. Clarendeon Press, 1993, p240-296.
105 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. NY: UN 
Department of Public Information, 1995. The significant word is “reaffirm” as the founders 
acknowledged that their intention was to re-assert and uphold the belief in “fundamental human 
rights” which had been lost during World War II. It is also interesting that human “dignity” and 
“worth” are associated with “fundamental human rights” as these are ideas that could be linked 
more to economic and social conditions.
106 T.J Farer and F. Gaer, “The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning”, A. 
Roberts and B. Kingsbury, (ed.) The United Nations. Divided World: the UN’s Roles in 
International Relations. 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendeon Press, 1993, p240-296; Charter of the
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which the its members are subject to explicit legal obligations (1966 Covenants); 
and a separate detailed enforcement machinery.107
The New Right was very concerned with the rights of people, as central to 
its belief is the charge that the American government has progressively usurped 
power from the people, with the effect that American society has suffered 
accordingly. Governments, for many New Righters have a tendency to abuse 
people's rights, often through the claims that they are working to improve and 
better the lives of the people. The more internationalist members of the New 
Right (especially those who dealt with the UN) were very much interested in 
human rights, as they felt that the organisation should promote human rights. In 
the words of Kirkpatrick herself: “...the United Nations has no more important 
charge than the protection and expansion of the rights of persons. The charter 
[sic.] commits the United Nations to this task; several bodies in the United 
Nations are explicitly devoted to it.”108 By the 1980s, New Righters argued, that 
the UN’s approach to human rights had been transformed as more emphasis was 
placed on social and economic rights than on political and civil human rights. This 
new attitude meant that the organisation went beyond any previous American 
understanding of human rights. New Righters maintained that the UN mandate 
concerning the protection of human rights was a result of a compromise as the 
governments that established the United Nations wanted to contribute “...to a 
higher level of observance of human rights.”, but this was not to be done at the 
expense of member-state sovereignty.109 The United Nations and its international 
secretariat, to the New Righters was also seeking development without private
United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. NY: UN Department of Public 
Information, 1995, Article 2(7), Chapter VII.
107 T.J Farer and F. Gaer, “The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning”, A. 
Roberts and B. Kingsbury, (ed.) The United Nations. Divided World: the UN’s Roles in 
International Relations. 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendeon Press, 1993, p248-249; R  Higgins, “The 
United Nations Human Rights Committee”, R. Blackburn and J. Taylor, (ed.) Human Rights for 
the 1990s: Legal. Political and Ethical Issues. London: Mansell, 1991, p67-74.
108 “Double Standards in Human Rights”, statement by Jeane Kirkpatrick, before the Third 
Committee, UN General Assembly, New York, November 24, 1981, Washington DC: State 
Department Bureau of Public Affairs, 1981.
l0S*AG Mower, Jr., “The U.N. and Human Rights”, B Y Pines (ed.) A World Without a U.N.: 
What Would Happen if the United Nations Shut Down?. Washington DC: Heritage Foundation, 
1984, p94.
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enterprise while allowing political and civil human rights abuse take place in 
totalitarian (socialist) countries. For American conservatives private industry is 
far more successful in development than the UN due to the organisation's many 
failings - structure, waste, inefficiency, ideology and so forth.110 Although it must 
be said that there were those who felt that the United Nations was not solely to 
blame for this, as the policy of “damage limitation” coupled with neglect had 
allowed the UN to be taken out of its proper course.111
The Reaganite approach to human rights was two-fold. The 
administration felt that a negative policy (which previous administrations had 
pursued) was insufficient, which is why the promotion of democracy was added. 
The Carter administration used diplomacy when it could to respond to human 
rights abuse as it held that in the early 1950s and 1960s, the Cold War and the 
decolonisation process changed the United Nations. The organisation became 
“...an important terrain of contest between East and West in which newly 
independent countries appeared as a coveted prize in the fluctuating power 
struggle, pawns in the rivalry of the cold war.”112 The Reaganites, however, 
maintained that one could and should be more effective when dealing with human 
rights violations. The promotion of democracy is therefore an essential factor if 
one is to prevent human rights abuse as under a democracy such abuses are not 
very likely.113 In a democracy it is the people who hold the power and not a select 
elite as happened under the Soviet system, and this is why it is more difficult to 
commit human rights violations in democracies as governments know that if they
110 E.W Erickson and D.A. Sumner, “The U.N. and Economic Development”, B.Y Pines, (ed.) 
A World Without a U.N.: What Would Happen if the United Nations Shut Down?. Washington 
DC: Heritage Foundation, 1984, pl-21.
111 “General View of the U.N. System”, address by Elliott Abrams, before a Conference of UN 
representatives of the United Nations Association-USA, New York, June 5, 1981, Washington 
DC: State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1981. Abrams states that Americans should 
not blame the UN for their decline as Americans had lost faith in their own system with the 
effect that they withdrew to an extent from international relations.
112 “United Nations: Serving American Foreign Policy Interests”, statement by Andrew Young, 
submitted to the Subcommittee on State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary, & Related Agencies 
of the Senate Appropriations Committee on April 2, 1979. In Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 
79, No. 2027, June 1979, p47.
113 “Review of U.S. Human Rights Policy”, statement of Elliott Abrams, accompanied by 
Charles Fairbanks, hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International
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abuse their power the electorate would remove them114 In the words of 
Kirkpatrick:
“Authoritarian systems do not destroy all alternative power base 
in society. The persistence of dispersed economic and social 
power renders those regimes less repressive than a totalitarian system 
and provides the bases for their eventual transformation. Totalitarian 
regimes, to the contrary in claiming a monopoly power over all 
institutions, eliminate competitive, alternative elites. This is the reason 
history provides not one but numerous examples of the evolution of 
authoritarian regimes into democracies (not only Spain and Portugal, 
but Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Bangladesh, among others) and no 
example of democratic transformation of totalitarian regimes.”113
The claim by New Righters that the UN’s human rights agenda was 
misrepresented by the less developed world is a little tenuous, as the Charter is 
very much concerned with social and economic conditions. It calls for the 
employment of “...international machinery for the promotion of the economic and 
social advancement of all peoples,”.116 Thus, in many respects the interest of the 
United Nations in the advancement of social and economic conditions of less 
developed countries is very much within the limits of the organisation. The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) adopted 
unanimously by the United Nations in GA.Res. 2200 (XXI), gives those calling
Organization of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Session, 1st 
Session, March 3, June 28, and September 21,1983, Washington: US GPO, 1984.
114 J.J Kirkpatrick. The Reagan Phenomenon & Other Speeches on Foreign Policy. Washington 
DC: AEI for Public Policy Research, 1983, “The Reagan Phenomenon and The Liberal 
Tradition”, address to the Centro Studi per la Conciliazione Banco Democratico Roma, Rome, 
Italy, May 28, 1981.
115 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy.” Commentary Symposium, 
November 1981, pl39. [Italics in the text]. This quotation is just one example of Kirkpatrick 
and neoconservative belief that one should tolerate authoritarian regimes. The general policy of 
the Reagan administration was that although authoritarian regimes are awful they are better 
than communist regimes which are totalitarian and pose a real threat to the US and the survival 
of the Western democratic system. Pastor provides a view of Reagan’s approach to Latin 
America in his essay: “The Reagan Administration and Latin America: Eagle Resurgent”, K.A 
Oye, R.J Lieber D. Rothchild. (ed.) Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign 
Policy. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1987, p359-392. Reagan’s main interest was countering 
communism which is why human rights was downgraded.
116 Chapter EX of the Charter deals specifically with ‘International Economic and Social Co- 
Operation. ’
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upon the organisation to be more involved in the social and economic aspect of 
human rights added credence.117
The New Righters found the Carterite decision to focus on human rights 
per se to lead to a double standard that they found unacceptable on two levels. 
On the one hand, the Carterite policy was hurting US national interests, while at 
the same time reducing the moral fibre of American and UN opposition to human 
rights violations.118 The Carter administration tended to focus almost exclusively 
on human rights violations which governments committed, and to ignore the 
actions of guerrillas (even if their actions was more shocking).119 The New 
Righters believed that it was Carter’s clamour for human rights that led him to 
chastise some of America’s authoritarian allies and forced them to introduce 
reform which in the case of Iran led to the fall of the Shah and the rise of 
Khomeini.120
New Righters further felt that as far as the United Nations was concerned human 
rights violations (especially in political and civil terms) could take place with little 
if any condemnation in Soviet-backed states, but not within pro-Western 
authoritarian states. The reason being that the UN and its agencies when looking 
at human rights violations focused on relatively small, under-developed, non- 
Communist nations, that were not part of any real bloc, and which sought to 
protect themselves by using government violence against guerrilla violence. These 
countries were the target of national liberation movements with important ties to 
the Soviet bloc. The Reaganites, for example, pointed out that when human rights
117 Taken from E.J Osmanczyk. Encyclopaedia of the United Nations & International 
Agreement. London: Taylor & Francis, 1985, p359-361.
118 “Double Standards in Human Rights”, statement by Jeane Kirkpatrick, before the Third 
Committee, U.N. General Assembly, New York, November 24, 1981, Washington DC: US State 
Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1981; R. Pastor, “The Reagan Administration and Latin 
America: Eagle Resurgent”, K.A Oye, R.J Lieber and D. Rothchild. (ed) Eagle Resurgent? The 
Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1987, p359-392.
119 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “Human Rights in the Carter Years”, address before Kenyon College, 
Human Rights Conference, Kenyon, Ohio, April 4, 1981, pl42-143. On the re-definition of 
human rights as a result of the cultural revolution see also in same volume “Human Rights and 
US Foreign Policy.” Commentary Symposium, November 1981, pl34-140.
120 J.J Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorship and Double Standards.” Commentary 68 (5 1979); W.F 
Buckley, Jr., “Human Rights and Foreign Policy: A Proposal.” Foreign Affairs 58 (4 1980), 
p775-796.
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violations took place in Central American authoritarian countries the UN was in 
an uproar but when an anti-American socialist state committed heinous crimes 
such as genocide in Cambodia.121 When, however, an Islamic or African country 
became the target of violent guerrilla activity, it would be protected against 
United Nations human rights actions by its involvement in a web of protective 
alliances - regional organisations, the Non-Aligned Movement, the G-77 or some 
other bloc. Countries or movements linked to the Soviet bloc were protected 
from charges of human rights violations. New Righters felt that in human rights 
there was no uniform moral standard within the United Nations as they were 
applied vicariously with the simple purpose of scoring points off America’s allies 
while disregarding the Soviet Union and its satellites. This point is linked to the 
issue of politicisation, as human rights were used to embarrass the West by those 
wishing to castigate its way of life.122 Put simply, the UN bloc system ensured that 
some countries would be castigated for human rights violations while others were 
ignored. Thus:
‘Teople may be invaded, conquered, herded into cities, driven over 
borders, their fields tainted with toxins, their air poisoned with 
yellow rain, without them being regarded as victims of human 
rights violations. They may have their electric plants dynamited, 
their coffee crops destroyed, their leaders murdered, without being 
regarded as victims of human rights violations - providing that the 
perpetrators of this violence, of these gross abuses, are “progressive” 
national liberation movements, armed, trained, serviced by the 
professional purveyors of revolutionary violence. Only governments 
that seek to repress this violence will be cited for human rights 
violations.”123
121 Both Robertson and Moynihan were disgusted with the way Amin was received. A possible 
explanation as to they place Amin and Pol Pot at the same category is because both were anti- 
Americans even though Amin and Pol Pot ideologically were poles part. P. Robertson. The New 
World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991, p53-54; D.P Moynihan. A Dangerous Place. 
London: Seeker & Warburg, 1979, pl43.
122 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “The Method of Violence”, address to the Third Committee of the 
37th UN General Assembly, December 7, 1982, p94; J.J Kirkpatrick. The Reagan Phenomenon 
& Other Speeches on Foreign Policy. Washington: AEI for Public Policy Research, 1983, 
“Human Rights & Wrongs in the United Nations”, statement before the Third Committee of the 
United Nations General Assembly, November 24,1981, p46-53.
123 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force. Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “The Method of Violence”, address to the Third Committee of the 
37th UN General Assembly, December 7,1982, p95. [italics in the text].
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The problem when dealing with the Reaganites’ interpretation of human 
rights was that American foreign policy when it followed this thesis faced a 
paradox as one school of thought called upon the United States to adopt a more 
rational and less ideological attitude to foreign policy. Yet, on the other hand, the 
ideological conservatism of Reagan with its ingrained patriotism and desire to re­
assert American dominance kept ideology, and thus the conflict with communism, 
high on the agenda. This perhaps explains why one can see a deterioration in 
superpower relations during 1983 as a consequence of the more ideological 
stance of the administration as George Shultz replaced Alexander Haig.124
The proliferation in the definition of “rights” allowed the United Nations 
to expand its interests and programs. For the Christian Right (already incensed 
with the growing involvement of the federal government in American society and 
especially in the alleged promotion of secular humanism), UN programs simply 
added further ammunition. They pointed to such things as the unanimous passing 
by the General Assembly on February 14, 1977, of a special resolution 
establishing 1979 as the International Year of the Child (GA/33rd Sess. Res. 
33/93). The movement did not end at the close of 1979 as it continued to pursue 
its principles. Many people, according to Falwell, were deceived by International 
Year of the Child (IYC), thinking that its primary purpose was to alert people 
about child abuse and child neglect. A deeper look at the history of the roots of 
the movement however, according to him, show that IYC could not help children. 
The goals of IYC, according to the Rev. Falwell were: first, give children the 
“right” to sue their parents in retaliation for “unjustified” discipline, unwanted 
“indoctrination,” and/or “inadequate parenting.” Second, children should get a 
minimum wage for performing household chores. Third, children would have the 
“right” to choose their own parents. A child could move out from his parents 
home and select where and with whom he would like to live. Fourth, minor
124 J.J Kirkpatrick. The Reaean Phenomenon & Other Speeches on Foreign Policy. Washington 
DC: AEI for Public Policy Research, 1983, “Ideas and Institutions”, address to the Council on 
Foreign Relations, New York City, March 10, 1981, p39-45; see also “Human Rights in 
Nicaragua”, statement before the Senate Sub-committee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 
Washington DC, March 1, 1982, p62-69.
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female children would be given the “right” to have abortions on demands without 
parental consent or knowledge. Fifth, the federal government would supervise all 
“family planning” which would mean that parents would virtually be licensed to 
be parents. The care of children would be taken away from the parents and put in 
the hands of government. Sixth, legislation would be passed that would legalised 
homosexual marriages and homosexual adoptions. Seventh, there would be an 
equal rights amendment for children. Eight, the federal government would assume 
all responsibility concerning the rearing of children.123 The concerns of Falwell 
could be seen in the 1990s through such organisations as the CWA who are very 
much against the UN involvement in such things as “children’s rights.”12*
New Righters felt that since the 1950s and 1960s, when the anti-American 
majority had began to move emerge, the organisation had moved from the 
promotion of civil and political human rights to seeking social and economic 
human rights which as understood by the 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights meant the pursuit of equal standards of 
living. The UN became too interested in the development of economic systems 
rather than in the promotion of the development of democratic systems which in 
time would lead to better standards of livings for the inhabitants of the country. 
This to New Righters could be interpreted as socialism which seeks equality of 
social and economic standards for its populace.
American conservatives were unhappy with the UN human rights system because 
to their minds countries that committed grave human rights violations, such as 
mass murder were not ostracised or even denounced, while authoritarian 
countries who were working toward the development of a democratic system 
were often attacked within the organisation. This was something that the 
Reaganites were not prepared to tolerate and with Kirkpatrick at the helm they 
launched a serious counter-offensive within the United Nations to re-address the 
balance.
125 J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980, pl22-125. The quotations are from 
the text, which is also full of examples of terrible experiences that children have endured when 
government intervened in their up-bringing.
126 See for example a Policy Concern paper by CWA “U.N. Conventions on the Rights of the 
Child: A Treaty to Undermine the Family”, February 1995,18PC-014.
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The way the Reagan administration and the New Right dealt with the 
UN’s interpretation of human rights and its role in the promotion and 
preservation of human rights highlights the administration’s selectivity and its 
simplicity. That is, the belief that the United Nations had exceeded its authority 
when dealing with human rights was far too simplistic as was the belief that the 
organisation was largely anti-American. There is no doubt that the mechanisms 
dealing with human rights were and are very complicated (and that may have 
frustrated a highly ideological group of people determined to promote 
Americanism) but they emerged because of the ever-present conflict between 
ideology/morality and Realpolitik. The UN had and has to satisfy so many 
concerns that the mechanism and the whole system had to be very complex. The 
New Right and therefore the administration truly believed that the organisation 
had strayed from its proper path and it was up to them to lead it back to the 
righteous path. However, at the same time, the administration was determined to 
ensure that the UN would end its anti-American prejudice and return to its proper 
role of being an instrument of the US. The area of human rights afforded New 
Righters the opportunity to use UN sanctions and power to help forge new 
societies especially as the United Nations had access that national governments 
would love to have and the Reagan administration hoped to use it to promote 
democracy that would have the benefit of helping the US achieve a majority in the 
UN, secure American national interests and advance democracy, thus fulfilling 
American moral obligations.
CONCLUSION
The New Right levelled many criticisms at the United Nations. All of them 
centred on the belief that American prestige and influence in the organisation had 
fallen while Soviet stock had risen. The curious thing about the mainstream New 
Righters was that they never really thought about a US withdrawal from the 
United Nations, which they saw as fundamentally an American created
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organisation.127 In the 1980s the Christian Right’s interest in the United Nations 
was limited probably because it was more concerned with domestic issues; while 
the anti-liberals sought to deal with the burgeoning welfare state. Thus, the UN 
came under the dominion of the neoconservatives who dealt with it essentially 
through their critique of American foreign policy. Most of the interest in the UN 
in the 1980s was within the political dominion and the media. However, it must 
be said that on issues such as the downing of KAL-007, the US turned to the UN. 
In many ways one could understand American claims that the UN had turned 
against them and the West by the 1980s as they were often on the receiving end 
of some very strong denunciation by members whose record was far worse than 
theirs. Moreover, there is little doubt that the organisation was and still is 
dominated by the “Third World” which has its own agenda which it seeks to fulfil 
often to the detriment of Western interests. To Americans used to getting their 
own way, the idea of some small, poor state forcing them (through its 
membership in a bloc) to accept a resolution or a policy that they deemed to be 
anti-American seemed preposterous. This attitude - which could be seen as 
American arrogance - has prevailed even after the ending of the Cold War as the 
case of Boutros Boutros-Ghali showed, or the refusal to pay America’s financial 
arrears.
The Reagan era in many ways is about perception, and although in many 
areas about the UN the New Right was wrong, (in some cases very wrong). 
America still carried considerable influence within the organisation in 1980 and 
the Soviets did not have their way, nor did they control the NAM. The New Right 
approach to the UN was far too simplistic which led to complications. When 
Kirkpatrick left in 1985, many Americans felt that she had re-dressed the balance 
which is why possibly a less aggressive ideologue was brought in to replace her in
127 The Religious Right and the ‘patriots’ became more vociferous in their opposition to the UN 
in the 1990s. R. Abanes. Rebellion. Racism & Religion: American Militias. Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity Press, 1996; W.F Jasper. Global Tvrannv... Step bv Step: The United Nations and 
the Emerging New World Order. Appleton. Western Islands, 1992; H. Lindsey. Planet Earth 
2000 A.D. Will Mankind Survive?. Palos Verdes: Western Front, 1996.
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the shape of Vemon A. Walters, who was more of a diplomat.128 Although the 
Reagan administration with Kirkpatrick at the UN were able to show the world 
that America was prepared to huff and puff until it got its way, and that the US 
would no longer accept the crude politics of accusation that had been allowed to 
occur with little if any punishment under Carter the program had its own problem. 
This perhaps explains why a report by a Congressional delegation did not endorse 
the administration’s approach to the UN. The delegation in fact had some 
reservations about the negative attitude that was being promoted by the 
administration.129
The debate about the Reagan administration and the role that Kirkpatrick played 
in promoting the Reagan Doctrine would continue for many more years, but one 
thing is certain: the Kirkpatrick era would not be easily forgotten from the annals 
of the United Nations, especially when one looks at the case of UNESCO.
128 Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 99th Congress, 1st Session, 1985, Washington DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1986. Walters confirmed on May 16, 1985.
129 “38th Session of the U.N. General Assembly”, September 19 - December 20, 1983, Report of 
Congressional Delegates to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 
September 30, 1985, Washington DC: US GPO, 1985.
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CHAPTER V
UNESCO & THE UNITED STATES:
THE REAGAN YEARS , 1981-1984
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) like its parent, the United Nations, emerged out of the ashes of the 
Second World War. The idea of UNESCO originated with the first meeting of 
the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME) held on the initiative 
of R.A. Butler, President of the Board of Education for England and Wales, and 
Sir Malcolm Robertson, Chairman of the British Council, on November 16, 
1942. CAME was quickly enlarged to include other countries, most notably the 
United States. From the CAME meetings the idea of an organisation interested 
primarily in encouraging the development of co-operation between the wartime 
allies in education matters emerged. The hope was to make the organisation as 
universal as possible by making membership widespread and open which is 
perhaps why in UNESCO’s Constitution there are no references to the “enemy 
states” as there are in the UN Charter (Articles 53 and 107) which arguably 
places these states on a different level from the ‘victorious states.’1
UNESCO exists under the umbrella of the United Nations as stipulated 
in Article 57 of the UN Charter. As a result of Article 57, and the conditions of 
the world following the end of the World War II, UNESCO was to concentrate 
primarily on through which peace and greater international co-operation would 
be achieve. At the forefront of UNESCO’s Constitution it is stated that 
“...Governments of the States Parties to this Constitution on behalf of their 
people declare: That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of 
men that the defences of peace must be constructed.” This passage is attributed 
to the chairman of the American delegation to the 1945 London Conference 
Archibald MacLeish, and its significance is that it emphasises UNESCO’s
1 M.C. Lacoste. The Story of A Grand Design: UNESCO 1946-1993. People. Events & 
Achievements. Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 1994.
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commitment to education2 and to peace. It is probably because of that 
commitment, coupled with the organisation’s interest in culture (two very 
contentious and controversial areas in national and international society) that the 
growth and role of UNESCO have attracted so much attention, criticism and 
condemnation. However, it is also UNESCO’s involvement in the promotion of 
peace through education, science, culture and communication (which the US 
insisted be added to the jurisdiction of the organisation’s acronym) that has 
“...ensured that UNESCO would be broader and more complex than any other 
UN agency except the UN itself and that it would be inordinately difficult to 
manage.”3
Since its creation over fifty years ago, UNESCO has developed in 
mammoth proportions. It currently has 185 members, with 179 of them having 
National Commissions consisting of representatives of national educational, 
scientific and cultural communities. UNESCO itself has 2,200 civil servants, 
professional and non-professional, of whom almost 500 work away from its 
Headquarters in Paris in 57 bureaux throughout the world. It maintains regular 
relations of co-operation with 588 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
about 1,200 co-operate occasionally with UNESCO.4 This great diversity is the 
result of the liberal ethic that was embedded in the minds of the founders of the 
organisation who wanted the agency to transcend the state (which is also why 
UNESCO’s Constitution speaks of territories being members - Article II).5 
The organisation went through some structural reforms as it was felt that the 
member states’ control over UNESCO had waned, especially in the “political” 
region. This explains the American support for the British proposal to amend
2 Banquet address to the US National Commission, by Director General M’Bow, in “A Critical 
Assessment of U.S. Participation in UNESCO”, Special Meeting of the U.S. National 
Commission, Columbia: The University of South Carolina, June 1-3, 1982, Department of State 
Publication 9297, International Organization & Conference Series 158, Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs, October 1982, p23.
3 L.S Finkelstein, “The Political Role of the Director General of UNESCO”, L.S Finkelstein. 
(ed.) Politics in the United Nations System. London: Duke University Press, 1988, p389.
4 Fiftieth Anniversary of UNESCO. p4-5, brochure distributed by UNESCO; see also 
UNESCO’s Internet cite: www.unesco.org
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UNESCO’s Constitution and transform the Executive Board into a body 
composed of representatives of the member states. This was very much because 
US officials sought to: “...mobilize UNESCO and its facilities as propaganda 
instruments in what became known as the Korean campaign of truth.” The effect 
was that: “...no longer did Executive Board members technically serve solely in 
their own right as individuals, representing in theory the general conference as a 
whole.”6
UNESCO is composed of three main bodies. The first is the General 
Conference of the member states which is the agency’s supreme governing body. 
It assembles every two years to discuss an agenda for UNESCO. The Conference, 
following the principle of one vote per country approves the organisation’s 
Program and Budget. The second body is the Executive Board which is 
composed of 51 representatives of the member states. The Board meets twice a 
year and acts as a quasi-administrative council. It prepares the work of the 
General Conference and is responsible for the execution of conference decisions. 
The final body is the Secretariat which is under the direction of the Director 
General who is elected for a six-year term. The Secretariat staff implement the 
programs that are adopted by the member states.7
As the century developed many of the nations that had lived under the 
shackles of imperialism were emancipated either voluntarily, peacefully or 
violently. At first glance an organisation such as UNESCO may cause some 
concern for former colonies because it was created to promote education and 
culture of the Western European type who also dominated the agency. 
Imperialism brought about the removal of the indigenous culture by the 
colonialists who then sought to impose their culture upon on the native
5 L.S Finkelstein, “The Political Role of the Director General of UNESCO”, L.S Finkelstein. 
(ed.) Politics in the United Nations System. London: Duke University Press, 1988, p390; R. 
Hoggart. An Idea And Its Servants. London: Chatto & Windus, 1978.
6 R.A Coate, “Changing Patterns of Conflict: The United States & UNESCO”, M.P Kams and 
K.A Mingst. (ed) The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing 
Instrumentality and Influence. London: Routledge, 1990, p236, p235.
7 UNESCO Today. p8, brochure distributed by UNESCO; see also UNESCO’s Internet cite:
www.unesco.org
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population. Thus, one could argue that UNESCO (due to Western European 
domination) would seek to continue in this tradition, especially with the 
development of the Cold War. With the growth of the decolonisation movement, 
UNESCO like its parent, the UN, experienced a great transformation, as the 
balance of power shifted from the North to the South. The main problem as a 
result for the developed world was that unlike the United Nations, the major 
powers have no way to respond to intimidation or coercion by less powerful 
member states. That is, at New York, the five permanent members of the 
Supreme Court can get recourse through the usage the veto which makes them 
‘primus inter pares.’ At Paris, the major powers’ only real weapon is the 
withholding of funds or withdrawal from the agency, two far more drastic and 
complex options. This is arguably why at UNESCO the notion of equality is much 
more pronounced than it is at New York.1 However, as the century developed this 
difference was to cause serious friction between Washington and Paris as 
UNESCO could not easily be brow-beaten into submission by the Americans.
In December 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz, informed Amadou- 
Mahtar M’Bow, the Director General of UNESCO, that the United States 
intended to withdraw from the organisation. Shultz stated that America for a 
number of years had been troubled by the fact “...that trends in policy, ideological 
emphasis, budget and management of UNESCO were detracting from the 
Organization’s effectiveness.”9 With this statement the US effectively ended its 
forty year old membership in UNESCO and adopted an observer status that it has 
maintained since 1984. Both Secretary Shultz and Assistant Secretary of State 
Gregory Newell noted that the American withdrawal was not final, as satisfactory
8 Britain for example, belongs to a small group of richer countries whose voting power is 
“decisive.” Among the social and economic powers Britain’s “...voting power was and is no 
greater than that of the smallest Caribbean island...”, especially as after the 1960s the newly 
independent countries sought to use UN agencies “...from the General Assembly downwards, to 
impose social and economic policies with which Britain, could not agree...” which led to 
friction. D. Williams, “The Specialised Agencies: Britain in Retreat”, E. Jensen and T. Fisher, 
(ed.) The United Kingdom - The United Nations. London: Macmillan Press, 1990, p211.
9 “Letter from Secretary of State George Shultz to Director-General of UNESCO Amadou- 
Mahtar M’Bow.” Journal of Communication. 34 (4 1984), p82. Newell provides similar 
outlooks in many of his speeches on the subject see for example “Perspective on the U.S.
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reform would see an American return to UNESCO.10 To this date, however, there 
has been no American return.
The Reagan administration identified three main themes which it 
particularly focused upon in justifying its decision to withdraw from UNESCO. 
These were: involvement in political issues, “statist concepts” (the emphasis on 
the rights of states rather than individuals), and unrestrained budgetary growth.11 
The issues were not detached from each other as there was a great symbiotic 
relationship between them, which was made more complex as each could produce 
new criticisms or sub-themes. Furthermore, the communication debate to a large 
extent existed outside of the three main areas, especially as it involved the large 
US media corporations who feared that the possible licensing of journalists (to 
name but one aspect of the communications debate) would lead to international 
control of the media.
Ronald Reagan’s way of managing his administration is important when 
examining US-UNESCO relations as unlike the United Nations Reagan was much 
less involved in affairs dealing with UNESCO. This was primarily because the 
Reagan presidency was one in which the President did not deal with the nitty- 
gritty of policy.12 Reagan made general comments and points which people in the 
lower levels of the administration pounced upon, as was the case with the “arms 
for hostages” affair. This approach gave those at the lower levels of his 
administration - and who shared Reagan’s determination of re-affirming
Withdrawal from UNESCO”, address by Gregory Newell, Stanford University, Stanford, 
California, October 31, 1985, Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 85, No. 2094, January 1985.
10 “U.S. Confirms Withdrawal from UNESCO”, text of George Shultz’s letter to Amadou- 
Mahtar M’Bow, Director General of UNESCO, December 19, 1984, Department o f State 
Bulletin, Vol. 85, No. 2095, February 1985, p36; “The New US Observer Role in UNESCO”, 
address by Gregory Newell, to the L 'Association De Presse Diplomatique Francaise, Paris, 
France, January 15, 1985. Washington DC: US State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs.
11 “Improvements Needed in UNESCO’s Management, Personnel, Financial, & Budgeting 
Practices”, Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on Science and 
Technology, House of Representatives”, by the Comptroller General of the United States, 
Gaithersberg: US GAO, 1984, GAO/NSIAD-85-32, Digest and Chapter 1.
12 F.A Waldstein, “Cabinet Government: The Reagan Management Model”, p54-75, and M. 
Foley, “Presidential Leadership & the Leadership”, p24-53, J. Hogan, (ed.) The Reagan Years: 
The Record in Presidential Leadership. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990.
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America’s prominent position in the world - much more leeway.13 Over 
UNESCO, Reagan said very little about the organisation which is why most of 
the emphasis is placed on the State Department (especially Gregory Newell who 
served as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisation Affairs14). 
The two NSC Memorandums from Robert McFarlane highlight the State 
Department ascendancy in US-UNESCO relations as in the memorandums 
(especially the first one), McFarlane notes that the president had approved the 
recommendations of Secretary of State Shultz which strongly suggest that the 
initiative came from the State Department (by which time Newell was already 
well-positioned to begin his assault on UNESCO).15 Moreover, the State 
Department Authorisation Act of 1982 increased the White House’s leverage 
concerning UNESCO as it called upon the president to evaluate and assess the 
extent to which UNESCO’s activities “...serve the national interests of the United 
States;”. The Secretary of State was required to report no later than February 1 
of each year to Congress with respect as to whether UNESCO has taken action 
that may be deemed to be inimical to US interests.16 One must remember that in 
this area the Secretary of State and the President were reliant upon the Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Organisation.
The Heritage Foundation and other conservative think-tanks who either opposed 
UNESCO per se or simply disliked the ideal of the organisation or the way it 
developed, also participated in the assault. C.A Giffard has noted that following a 
content analysis of the Heritage Foundation documents on UNESCO, and the 
State Department press releases, briefings and statements at congressional
13 The main protagonists in the UNESCO saga were G.J Newell, the Heritage Foundation, 
political lobbying groups such as the Anti-Defamation League, and the mainstream media 
corporations. See for example C.A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. London: Longman, 1989.
14 RA Coate writes that Newell “...quietly attempted to isolate and discredit several leading 
conservatives who were knowledgeable in UNESCO affairs...”. In fact members of Newell’s 
own department feared “negative retribution” if they made known that a draft document looking 
into UNESCO was highly critical of the “State Department’s management of U.S. participation 
in UNESCO...”. R A  Coate, “Changing Patterns of Conflict: The United States and UNESCO”, 
M.P Karas and K.A Mingst. (ed.) The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of 
Changing Instrumentality and Influence. London: Routledge, 1990, p254.
15 The McFarlane memorandums are dated December 23, 1983, and February 11, 1984. Taken 
from appendix of “Assessment of US-UNESCO Relations, 1984”, Report of a Staff Study 
Mission to Paris - UNESCO, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 
99th Congress, 1st Session, January 1985, Washington DC: US GPO, 1985.
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hearings, it was shown that speakers for the State Department “...reiterated both 
the language and the emphasis provided by the Heritage reports.”17 In other 
words, the State Department followed the Heritage Foundation which was very 
much against UNESCO. There were some differences, as for example the 
Heritage Foundation criticisms of M’Bow, Giffard notes, were not reflected by 
the State Department, apparently as a matter of policy (fear that the attacks 
would be perceived to be racially motivated). The State Department also paid 
more attention to what would happen after the withdrawal - usually statements 
that the US would use its UNESCO contributions to fund other educational, 
scientific and cultural projects. Other than these differences in emphasis “...both 
the arguments and rhetoric were almost identical.”18 UNESCO was to further 
suffer due to the US media establishment who played an significant role in 
providing negative image of UNESCO in the minds of many Americans.18 
Congress played an important role in the UNESCO debate and was very much 
involved in the discussions about the future of American membership in 
UNESCO. The conclusions that Congress often arrived at reflected the opinions 
of politicians (or members of the administration) rather than that of professionals 
working with or in UNESCO who were called to testify before congressional 
committees.20 This was coupled with a number of resolutions and pieces of 
legislation that were inherently critical if not anti-UNESCO, ranging from the
16 United States Statutes At Large. 1982, Vol. 96, PaA 1, Public Laws 97-146 through 97-301, 
Washington: US GPO, 1984.
17 This point is significant as it highlights governmental deference to so-called UNESCO 
experts such as O. Harries who had served as Australia’s ambassador to UNESCO. By pointing 
to Harries or Lengyel the administration could claim that its action was based on the advice of 
those who knew UNESCO. The problem was that pro-UNESCO specialists were not accorded 
the same courtesy. The quotation is taken from C.A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. London: 
Longman, 1989, p257.
18 C.A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. London: Longman, 1989, pi 19-120.
19 C.A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. London: Longman, 1989, p249, and throughout the 
book; W. Preston Jr., E.S Herman and H.I Schiller. Hope & Follv: The United States and 
UNESCO. 1945-1980. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
20 “U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights & 
International Organisation and on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, April 25, 26, & May 2, 1984, 
Washington DC: US GPO, 1985. A variety of speakers were called to testify before the 
committee ranging from: O. Harries to J.B Holderman (Chairman of US National Commission 
for UNESCO), to E.P Hennelly (Chairman of US Delegation to 22nd General Conference of 
UNESCO).
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Department of State Authorisation Act, Fiscal Year 1982 and 1983 (PL 97-241), 
to the actual withdrawal and the support that Congress gave it.
The relationship between the United States and UNESCO was never an 
easy one21 and it came to a dramatic conclusion in 1984 when the US withdrew 
from the organisation and adopted observer status. What is even more puzzling is 
that the approach adopted by the Reagan administration was very much against 
the advice of professionals dealing with UNESCO who called upon the US 
Government to retain its membership and work from within the organisation for 
reform. The reasons for the pullout may be perplexing but it is also what keeps 
the issue still interesting more than a decade later.22
THE UNITED STATES & UNESCO: 1945-1980
For the first decade or so the United States and the West dominated 
UNESCO just as they did the general system of the United Nations. This meant 
that it was very easy for the main powers, Britain, France and especially the US to 
push UNESCO along their lines. Despite this domination (the Soviet Union only 
joined in 1954) the United States was still unhappy and the agency came under 
harsh and unfair criticism by American politicians and press.23 The clashes 
between the two could be seen as early as 1946 when the General Conference met 
at the Sorbonne for the first time.24 The uneasiness between the two was also 
aided by an Executive Order of President Truman that was applied to all
21 R.A Coate, “Changing Patterns of Conflict: The United States & UNESCO”, M.P Kams and 
K.A Mingst. (ed.) The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing 
Instrumentality and Influence. London: Routledge, 1990 p231-260.
22 See for example a Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum, “Stay Out of UNESCO”, 
January 27, 1995. The Clinton administration is called upon to stay out of UNESCO, because: 
1. it still suffers from “management shortcomings”; 2. it will send “wrong signal about U.N. 
management reform”; 3. “UNESCO’s mission lacks focus”; 4. “UNESCO’s activities are 
redundant”; 5. “U.S. already benefits from the best of UNESCO”.
23 W. Preston Jr., E.S Herman and H.I Schiller. Hone & Follv: The United States and UNESCO. 
1945-1980. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
24 In 1947, Jacques Maritain, the renowned author and French delegate to the General 
Conference, pointed to the dilemma that the values held by the founders as universal were in 
fact controversial and far from consensual. L.S Finkelstein, “The Political Role of the Director 
General of UNESCO”, L.S Finkelstein. (ed.) Politics in the United Nations System. London: 
Duke University Press, 1988, p390-391. Finkelstein also argues that the Director General’s
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institutions of the United Nations in which American nationals were employed. 
The importance of the Order was not only that it created more friction between 
the US and the UN in general, but that it showed American reluctance to take the 
United Nations at face value. It was paranoia taken to extreme, as Americans felt 
that the communists and other subversives would seek to manipulate the 
Organisation against the American way of life.25
UNESCO may have been created to help break down the barriers between 
nations through education, but the setting of the Cold War and the growing fear 
of communism in the United States was proving to be a real obstacle for the 
whole UN system and organisation. This is seen in Julian Behrstock’s book The 
Eighth Case: Troubled Times at the United Nations, where he describes at some 
length the hardship that Americans working at the United Nations had to endure 
because of communism and the Cold War. The issue of loyalty was eventually 
settled almost forty years after it first emerged when US District Court Judge 
John J. McNaught, ruled in Ozonoff v. Berzak that the entire procedure under 
which the American government had been investigating the loyalty of Americans 
as a condition of their employment by the United Nations was unconstitutional.”
The 1950s saw the beginning of a new era in world history with the 
development of the decolonisation process. It was also during this decade that the 
first transformation of UNESCO occurred with the first enlargement in 
membership. The process began with the Soviet decision to enter UNESCO in 
1954, which was followed by the Ukraine and Byelorussia, while Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary rejoined the organisation. Two years later Romania 
and Bulgaria also joined. This meant that in a very short time eight communist
political involvement is based on the vague nature of the Constitution and the great powers that 
its accords the Director General.
25 For general attitude toward communists in the US: R.M Fried. Nightmare in Red: The 
McCarthy Era in Perspective. NY: Oxford University Press, 1990; for more specific examples of 
early persecution within the UN: J. Behrstock. The Eighth Case: Troubled Times At the United 
Nations. Lanham: University Press of America, 1987; for a 1980s attack on how the UN was 
used by communists: J.G Pilon, “Moscow’s U.N. Outpost”, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 
November 22,1983, No. 307, (with assistance from S. Lechenko).
26 J. Behrstock. The Eighth Case: Troubled Times At the United Nations. Lanham: University 
Press of America, 1987, plO. Behrstock who worked at UNESCO experienced US anti­
communist persecution.
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countries became members of UNESCO at a time when anti-communism in the 
United States was heightened due to McCarthyism. This compositional change 
was rather less revolutionary than the one that took place in 1960, when 
seventeen new African states joined. The new additions meant that: “...the 
Western domination of UNESCO ended. By the later 1960s, the new African 
members had added a north-south dimension to the existing east-west dimension 
that the Eastern Europeans had brought to UNESCO in the mid-1950s. As the 
membership of African, Arab and Asian countries increased, UNESCO became an 
organization with a clear Third World majority.”27
The whole debate about information - which was to take centre stage by 
the 1980s - is closely linked to the Third World and NAM primarily because 
through information, power is obtained. In April 1955, the leaders of the newly 
independent countries of Africa and Asia met at Bandung and “...discussed ways 
and means of protecting their hard-won independence and sustaining economic 
cooperation among themselves.” This led to the Belgrade Conference of 1961 
which brought about the formation of NAM. The leaders of the nonaligned 
countries claimed that most of the news agencies, entertainment program 
producers, and information systems in the world were owned and operated by 
multinational communication corporations whose headquarters were either in 
London, New York, Paris or Moscow. They also maintained that international 
images of poor countries were formed by a few multinational news agencies 
whose messages were used not only by the media organisations of the rich 
countries but also by the poor countries.2* In other words, a few large Western 
corporations were determining the images that millions of people in the West and 
in the developing world were seeing, and with the growing influence of the media 
one had to be weary of upsetting these mighty institutions.29 Thus, the desire of
27 “Improvements Needed in UNESCO’s Management, Personnel, Financial, & Budgeting 
Practices”, Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on Science and 
Technology, House of Representatives, by the Comptroller General of the United States, 
Gaithersberg: US GAO, 1984, GAO/NAIAD-85-32, p9.
28 J.V. Vilanilam. Reporting A Revolution: The Iranian Revolution & the NIICO Debate. 
London: Sage Publications, 1989, p23, p24.
29 Giffard suggests that it is possible that one of the reasons why the large media corporations 
turned against UNESCO was because of New World Information and Communication Order
198
the newly independent states to expand their control of communications or 
information industry essentially placed them on a collision course with the 
industrialised countries.
The decline of American influence within UNESCO had been traced to 
1962 when Rene Maheu was elected Director General which was followed by the 
approval of his budget, which was bigger than the Americans wanted. The 
Americans were to have many difficulties with the French Director General who 
was determined to expand UNESCO’s development programs even further. The 
American unhappiness, however, had been developing since the 1950s, when its 
officials began to feel that they were losing their influence within the organisation 
which they initially hoped to use to conduct important foreign policy initiatives, 
especially during the Korean War but Torres-Bodet (at this instance) was 
successful in promoting his own agenda which had a ‘Tar-reaching effect.”, on 
US-UNESCO relations.30
In 1974, the introduction of the New International Information Order (NIIO) into 
UN politics could be regarded as the first serious attempt by the anti-American 
bloc to subvert UNESCO into promoting an agenda detrimental to US interests. 
NIIO was seen by Americans as an attempt to impose restrictions on the free flow 
of information by claiming that it would mean greater equality in reporting and 
distribution. One of the problems concerning the information debate was that 
initially UNESCO’s main function in the area of communication during the 1950 
and 1960s was to help build up communication infrastructures in the developing 
world on the assumption that these would aid in modernisation and development. 
Until the mid-1960, the UN itself was the major political forum for debates on 
problems relating to the free flow of information. UNESCO’s role was mainly
(NWICO) and the licensing of journalists debate. C.A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. 
London: Longman, 1989; C.J Pach Jr., “And That’s They Way It Was The Vietnam War & the 
Network Mighty News”, D. Faiber. (ed.) The Sixties: From Memory to History. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1994, p90-l 18.
30 L.S Finkelstein, “The Political Role of the Director General of UNESCO”, L.S Finkelstein. 
(ed.) Politics in the United Nations System. London: Duke University Press, 1988, p386. The 
second point is made in R.A Coate, “Changing Patterns of Conflict: The United States & 
UNESCO”, M.P Kams and K.A Mingst. (ed.) The United States and Multilateral Institutions: 
Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence. London: Routledge, 1990, p231-260.
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technical as it was meant to assist developing countries establish and operate 
news media, and promote the free exchange of books and periodicals.” To fully 
comprehend and appreciate the danger that Americans saw in NIIO and later in 
NWICO, one must remember that these UNESCO initiatives came on the back of 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO). NIEO was regarded as a 
socialist-oriented program, hostile to western democratic capitalism as one 
commentator noted: “[NIEO] ...is a simplistic scheme to redistribute the world’s 
wealth and resources to more than 100 under-developed nations, creating a global 
welfare state financed mainly by the U.S. and the Western industrial nations. 
UNESCO books and documents are filled with NIEO rhetoric, and the issue 
underlies all important UNESCO conference debates. In short, NIEO appears to 
be the UNESCO hidden agenda. The debate on the so-called New World 
Information Order, and the threat it poses to the free press, for example, stem 
from applying the NIEO concept to the field of mass communication.”32
It was during the 1970s, a time when Americans were already feeling 
rather vulnerable due to domestic failings that UNESCO appeared to be turning 
even more anti-American. Following the more ideologically benign Carterite 
foreign policy which allegedly was responsible to the appearance of two Soviet- 
backed societies at America’s backyard (Nicaragua and Grenada), a new foreign 
policy was demanded which was more assertive, aggressive and defended 
American national interests. Americans increasingly felt that their country had 
given much to the world (especially the developing world), but the Third World 
under the leadership of the Soviet Union in its desire to establish world 
communism was continuing its assault on the American way.33 The American 
people, therefore demanded more from their own government and from
31 C.A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. London: Longman, 1989, p20.
32 T.G. Gulick, “For UNESCO, A Failing Grade in Education”, Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder, October 21, 1982, No. 221, p3. This is just one example as such views were 
expressed by many other New Righters.
33 J.J Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1988, “The United Nations as a Political System”, address before the 
Institute for Comparative & Political Studies, Georgetown University, Washington DC, June 14, 
1983, p225.
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international organisations to which they were the main contributors, and Reagan 
riding on the rhetoric of the B-movies was determined to fulfil this demand.
REAGAN & UNESCO
On December 19, 1984, Reagan’s Secretary of State George Shultz 
informed Director General M’Bow that the United States had decided to carry 
out on its December 1983 ultimatum that unless UNESCO introduced serious 
reforms the US would withdraw its membership.
The State Department announcement highlighted America’s new foreign policy 
commitment and a re-affirmation of New Right ideological beliefs14 that America 
would honour its declarations, and would no longer allow itself to be pushed 
around.35 In the words of Assistant Secretary Newell: ‘The decision to withdraw 
is not a negotiating tactic or a ploy of any sort. We have taken this with full 
candor with the Director General and other member states of UNESCO.”36 
Newell, in fact used the ILO incident to justify the UNESCO decision as he 
argued that the ILO was given two years to respond to American criticisms 
before the US withdrew, and it still failed to reform itself. America re-entered the 
agency once sufficient reform occurred. As Newell stated: “...decisive action was 
taken in the ILO case when other attempts had failed and, during our absence, the 
organization hastened to make constructive improvements. The lesson conveyed
34 Harries writes that the decision in 1983 to re-appraise US-UNESCO relations was “...good 
also because the United States does not, as of now, have a coherent and effective political 
strategy for dealing with the Organisation.” In other words, the federal government was 
developing a coherent policy which it followed when it decided to withdrew. O. Harries, “The 
U.S. & UNESCO at a Crossroads”, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, October 19, 1983, No. 
298. Harries’ extract was attached to: “Human Resources Impact on U.S. Membership in 
UNESCO”, hearing before the Senate Committee on Labour & Human Resources, December
10,1984, Washington DC: US GPO, 1985.
35 In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Labour and Human Resources, Maxwell E. 
Greenberg, ADL honorary national chairman argued that if the US was to change its mind in 
regard to the withdrawal this would reward UNESCO for not reforming and undermine 
America’s efforts to reform the organisation. Press Release of Anti-Defamation League of B’nai 
B’rith, December 10,1984.
36 “On the Record Briefing on U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO by G. Newell, Assistant 
Secretary of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, December 29, 1983”, taken 
from the appendix of “U.S. Withdrawal From UNESCO”, Report of A Staff Study Mission 
(February 10-23, 1984) to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 
Washington DC: US GPO, 1984, p64.
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is a strongly appealing one.”37 US ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick in 
1983, declared before a congressional committee on the role of the United States 
in the United Nations, that “...when the ILO for a period - International Labor 
Organization - was in its functioning essentially betraying the purposes for which 
it was established, the American labor representatives, representing AFL-CIO, 
took the initiative in really bringing about United States withdrawal from the ILO. 
The United States stayed out of the ILO for several years, and I think that had a 
rather salutary effect, quite frankly.” Moreover, Kirkpatrick stated that unless 
UNESCO stopped pursuing policies and programs that are - or rather that 
American conservatives deemed - to be hostile to American interests, the US 
should withdraw from the organisation, as America should not spend $50 million 
annually on an agency that does not support its interests.38 A Congressional 
Report, however, noted that the ILO and UNESCO cases could not be compared 
although they did share some similarities.39
Secretary Shultz justified the withdrawal by stating that UNESCO had failed to 
provide the satisfactory reforms that the US had called for despite having had a 
year to do so. In closing his letter the Secretary of State stated that if sufficient 
reform was provided America would seriously reconsider its position but in the 
meantime the United States would continue “...to make significant and concrete 
contribution to international cooperation in education, science, culture, and 
communications. To advance that cause, we will seek to use other existing 
methods and work through other existing means.”40
37 “Human Resources Impact of U.S. membership in UNESCO”, hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Labor & Human Resources, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, December 10, 1984, 
Washington DC: US GPO, 1985, pi 1.
38 “The U.S. Role in the United Nations”, hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights 
and International Organization, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 
98th Congress, 1st Session, September 27, and October 3, 1983, Washington: US GPO, 1984, 
p71, p72; see also Newell’s testimony in “Human Resources Impact of U.S. membership in 
UNESCO”, hearing before the Senate Committee on Labor & Human Resources, 98th 
Congress, 2nd Session, December 10,1984, Washington: US GPO, 1985, p ll.
39 “Assessment of US-UNESCO Relations, 1984”, Report of a Staff Study Mission to Paris- 
UNESCO, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1st Session, 
January 1985, Washington: US GPO, 1985; M.F Imber. The USA ILO. UNESCO and IAEA: 
Politicization and Withdrawal in the Specialized Agencies. London: Macmillan Press, 1989.
40 “U.S. Confirms Withdrawal from UNESCO”, text of George Shultz’s letter to Amadou- 
Mahtar M’Bow of UNESCO, December 19, 1984, Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 85, No. 
2095, February 1985, p36. This was also promoted by other anti-UNESCO State Department 
officials, especially Newell, see for example: “The New US Observer Role in UNESCO”,
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The Americans had a strong case in claiming that the decision to withdraw 
was not taken lightly, as several studies were conducted by the American 
government into UNESCO to see whether the accusations were justified.41 This 
was coupled (unfortunately for UNESCO) with an un-organised assault by the 
American media establishment which had tremendous power in the United States. 
American media reporting on UNESCO suffered from an imbalance The reasons 
for the imbalance in the reporting, according to one commentator, which were 
due to: a strong tendency to rely on sources, particularly the US government, that 
were hostile toward UNESCO. Second, events that depicted UNESCO in 
unfavourable light and supported withdrawal were reported, while events that 
created a different image were either ignored or played down. Third, when events 
took place about which there was a difference of opinion, or at which conflicting 
viewpoints were expressed, pro-administration spokesmen usually got the bulk of 
the coverage (as the administration was hostile toward UNESCO the report was 
therefore negative). Fourth, when reports that provided both points of view were 
written, anti-UNESCO view were given prominence. Moreover, it has been noted 
that it is an accepted convention of American journalism that a news report 
should be written in the form of an inverted pyramid, with the most important 
elements at the beginning and the least important toward the end. This makes it 
easy for newspapers to shorten reports to fit limited space by simply cutting from 
the bottom. It also implies a value judgement on the part of the reporters and
address by Gregory Newell, to the Association de Presse Diplomatique Francaise, Paris, 
France, January 15, 1985. Washington DC: US State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs; 
“U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, statement of Jeane Gerard, during a meeting with the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights & International Organisation & the Subcommittee on 
International Operations (June 26, 1984), attached to a hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Human Rights & International Organisation and on International Operations of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, April 25, 26, & May
2,1984, Washington DC: US GPO, 1984.
41 For example: “Improvements Needed in UNESCO’s Management, Personnel, Financial & 
Budgeting Practices”, Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs & Committee on Science & 
Technology, House of Representatives, by the Comptroller General of the United States, 
Gaithersberg: US GAO, 1984, GAO/NSIAD-85-32; “Assessment of US-UNESCO Relations, 
1984”, Report of a Staff Study Mission to Paris - UNESCO, to the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1st Session, January 1985, Washington DC: 
US GPO, 1985. The Reports which generally recommended a stay of execution were largely 
ignored unless they were used to validate claims that the administration looked deeply into 
UNESCO and its decision to withdraw.
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editors when one aspect of a report is presented more prominently than others. 
This kind of bias occurred often when the media dealt with UNESCO.41 What was 
even more significant was that on the issue of withdrawal there was no opposition 
from the Democrats, as even Democratic presidential candidate Walter Mondale 
endorsed the administration’s decision.43
The basis for the attack on UNESCO was that it was designed to show 
those working for the United Nations and its system that the promotion of an 
ideological agenda would no longer be tolerated, and that if the United States 
could withdraw its UNESCO membership others could and would44 (as Britain 
and Singapore did on December 31, 1985). In other words, one should not 
diminish the symbolic nature of the withdrawal, especially when looking into the 
Reagan administration where symbolism was very important.
At least one commentator has pointed to the role that the Americans played in 
encouraging the British to withdraw. Ambassador Gerard and Owen Harries, 
were jointly engaged in London in the fall of 1984 to push for a British 
withdrawal. Gerard was in London meeting with British officials and media 
people on October 18,19, 20 and 22, 1984 (the same concluding dates of the 
120th Executive Board meetings). Roger Coate writes that Gerard although being 
the vice-chairperson of the Board and the head of the US delegation “...for which 
these board meetings were of critical importance...” was in London lobbying for a 
British withdrawal. Moreover, “A favorite theme of right-wing U.S. supporters of 
British withdrawal was that the U.K. representatives in Paris had been “captured” 
by the UNESCO reform process. Thus, the prime minister should disregard 
British officials’ advice to remain in UNESCO and should listen to Harries and
42 For the role of the media see C.A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. London: Longman, 
1989, p l3 1-134.
43 “Perspective on the U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, address by Gregory Newell, Stanford 
University, Stanford, California, October 31, 1985, Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 85, No. 
2094, January 1985, p54. Newell adds that Mondale joined the endorsement after The New York 
Times, and The Washington Post had done so.
44 See for example: “U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, prepared statement of E.J Derwinski, 
hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights & International Organisation and on 
International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th 
Congress, 2nd Session, April 25, 26, & May 2, 1984, Washington DC: US GPO, p261-264; see 
also O. Harries’ statement to the same committee at the same Hearings, p84-87.
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these U.S. citizens who could see UNESCO more objectively.”45 When one takes 
into consideration the close rapport between Mrs. Thatcher and Ronald Reagan 
this particular hypothesis receives more credence.44
When UNESCO was informed in December 1983 that it was technically 
being put on probation by the US government it introduced some reforms47 and it 
worked to facilitate many of America’s concerns throughout 1984.44 However, by 
December 1984 the administration reached the conclusion that the reforms were 
insufficient and the US withdraw and adopted an observer status in UNESCO.
MANAGEMENT AND INEFFICIENCY
One of the major criticisms levelled by the Reaganites at UNESCO was 
that its management was poor. Americans have historically felt that any 
organisation or institution receiving public funds must be accountable and useful 
as it was spending taxpayers money. Thus, to an administration committed to 
greater efficiency in public institutions, poor management was simply 
unacceptable. Shultz’s noted that there were many groups and organisations 
whose purposes the US approves of but because they are “...not effective at 
carrying out the kind of international cooperation that will contribute to the 
making of a peaceful world.”, they lost American support.49
At the core of the management criticism levelled at UNESCO and which 
incidentally New Righters also directed at the US federal government, was that 
the agency became too complicated due to its size. As one critic said. 
“...UNESCO is an extremely complex, intricate structure which is not easily 
fathomed. It has a labyrinthine quality, with mysteries within mysteries.”50
45 RA  Coate. Unilateralism. Ideology & U.S. Foreign Policy: The United States In and Out of 
UNESCO. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988, pl29-130.
46 R. Reagan. An American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990, p204.
47 “Main Events Since U.S. Notice of Withdrawal From UNESCO”, UNESCO Press, 
Information Note 2, Paris, February 11,1985.
48 R.A Coate. Unilateralism. Ideology & U.S. Foreign Policy: The United States In and Out of 
UNESCO. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988.
49 Secretary of State Shultz’s letter to Director General M’Bow, (“U.S. Notifies UNESCO of 
Intent to Withdraw”), December 28, 1983, Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2083, 
February 1984, p41.
50 Ambassador J.B.S Gerard Address to the U.S. National Commission, in “A Critical 
Assessment of U.S. Participation in UNESCO”, Special Meeting of the U.S. National
205
The management issue is divided into two main areas: one dealing with 
general management and the other with personnel management.51 General 
management refers to the role that the Secretariat plays in UNESCO’s activities. 
The Secretariat is responsible with the drafting of UNESCO’s medium term plan, 
the biennial program and budget. It also evaluates whether the objectives are met 
and that programs are implemented. A prime example that was cited for the poor 
general management was the failure to appoint a Deputy Director General (DDG) 
for about three years. This meant that an Assistant Director General (ADG) acted 
for M’Bow while he was absent, something that an ADG was not supposed to do, 
as according to UNESCO’s manual his responsibilities were limited to ‘routine 
matters’ such as signing correspondence to member states.52 The other part of the 
criticism of the agency’s management system was that it had a dual personnel 
system which was highly inefficient as it meant that regular staff* members and the 
supplementary staff were not subjected to the same recruiting procedures. As 
UNESCO failed to get - for whatever reason - regular staff, it had to rely on 
supplementary staff who due to the shortages were placed in regular positions to 
fill the vacant posts and perform the duties that were required of the regular staff. 
More than seventy percent of all staff members were located at the Paris 
Headquarters (2,768 out of 4,115 as of December 31, 1983) with the rest divided 
almost equally between established offices away from headquarters and field 
projects' sites.53 Thus, to American minds the agency had not only grown too big, 
it was also being run by people not equipped to run it.
Commission, Columbia: The University of South Carolina, June 1-3, 1982, Department of State 
Publication 9297, International Organization & Conference Series 158, Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs, October 1982, pl7.
51 The personnel issue was restricted mainly to general comments about mismanagement and 
inefficiency, although there were some criticisms of M’Bow and the concentration of staff in 
Paris.
52“Improvements Needed in UNESCO’s Management, Personnel, Financial & Budgeting 
Practices”, Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on Science and 
Technology, House of Representatives, by the Comptroller General of the United States, 
Gaithersberg: US GAO, 1984, GAO/NSIAD-85-32, p20-30.
53 “Improvements Needed in UNESCO’s Management, Personnel, Financial & Budgeting 
Practices”, Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs & Committee on Science & Technology, 
House of Representatives, by the Comptroller General of the United States, Gaithersberg: US 
GAO, 1984, GAO/NSAID-85-32, especially Chapter 4.
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The governing bodies of UNESCO, critics charged, also failed to 
regulate and ensure that the Secretariat followed its constitutional role. This 
was asserted especially concerning the General Conference, which to the 
critics had become too dependent upon the Secretariat which influenced its 
agenda and drafted many of the resolutions. The Executive Board was also 
censured because it was deemed to have abnegated its responsibility and was 
regarded by the critics as accepting too easily the budget and program that the 
Secretariat provided without seeking better information which was necessary 
for effective oversight. (Under Reagan the OMB had initiated a policy of CBA 
to ensure greater efficiency within government54). Poor management practices, 
meant that a large portion of the agency’s money was devoured by a top- 
heavy, over-centralised bureaucracy with a structure in which too much 
authority flowed from the Secretariat and away from the governing bodies and 
member states.55 Some eighty percent of UNESCO’s $400 million biennial 
budget was consumed in Paris, where about eighty-one percent of the 
organisation’s employees were located, which meant that only nineteen percent 
of the money was spent in the field.54 It was further pointed out that there was 
no real effort to control or reduce the number of conferences and major 
meetings (400 scheduled in 1984), publications (300 million document pages 
in 1983).57 Moreover, there was a feeling that UNESCO’s general management 
was highly centralised (the Reagan administration was trying to decentralise its 
own system with “New Federalism”), with the Director General having a 
tremendous amount of power. M’Bow for example appointed a DDG, ADG 
and Division Directors; he approved extensions to all employee contracts
54 J.T Tobin and M. Weidenbaum. (ed.) Two Revolutions in Economic Policy: The First 
Economic Reports of Presidents Kennedy and Reagan. London: the MIT Press, 1988, (for 
CBA see p452-484).
55 “U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, prepared statement of E.J Derwinski, hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Human Rights & International Organisation and on International 
Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 
2nd Session, April 25, 26, & May 2,1984, Washington DC: US GPO, p261-264.
56 “U.S. Confirms Withdrawal from UNESCO”, statement by Gregory Newell, December 19, 
1984, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 85, No. 2095, February 1985, p36.
57 These figures are somewhat suspect because one does not know with what Newell 
compares them. It seems that they were inserted simply for shock purposes as they sound 
awesome. “Perspective on the U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, address by Gregory 
Newell, Stanford University, Stanford, California, October 31, 1985, Department o f State 
Bulletin, Vol. 85, No. 2094, January 1985, p55.
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and was responsible for granting promotion.5* This could be interpreted as 
M’Bow installing his own people in senior position thus enabling him to 
consolidate his own post and ensure that his philosophy is prominent in the 
secretariat upon which the whole agency function.
One of the main critics of UNESCO was the Heritage Foundation whose 
campaign was led by Thomas G. Gulick, a policy analyst and Owen Harries, 
Australia’s ambassador to UNESCO from February 1982 to August 1983.
The general type of accusations that flew from the Heritage Foundation 
concerned the anti-American, anti-Western ethos of UNESCO, which was 
coupled with a perceived Soviet and Third World bias and an ineffective 
management style and system of the agency.59 The Foundation shamelessly 
attacked M’Bow for being responsible for UNESCO’s low standards (something 
that the State Department refrained from doing as a matter of policy60). Harries 
wrote that the power of M’Bow was: “...derived from the constitution, from the 
great patronage he wields, from his ideological compatibility with the Third 
World majority - is enormous. Formally he is the servant of member states; in 
practice he has been the undisputed master of UNESCO. He sets the tone, he 
provides the initiative, he is the boss. The confrontational, militant character of 
UNESCO reflects his personality. So do the inefficiency and the dubious 
management practices.”61 In other words, the Director General failed to manage 
the organisation effectively thus allowing unsavoury forces to lead UNESCO 
down the wrong path which was causing American alienation and unless matters
58 “Improvements Needed in UNESCO’s Management, Personnel, Financial & Budgeting 
Practices”, Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on Science and 
Technology, House of Representatives, by the Comptroller General of the United States, 
Gaithersberg: US GAO, 1984, GAO/NSIAD-85-32, p20-28.
59 See for example: O. Harries, “The U.S. & UNESCO at a Crossroads”, Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder, October 19, 1983, No. 298; and, “GAO’s UNESCO Report Card: A Failing 
Grade”, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, October 8,1984, No. 386; T.G Gulick, “UNESCO, 
Where Culture Becomes Propaganda”, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, December 13, 1982, 
No. 233.
60 C.A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. London: Longman, 1989.
61 “U.S. Withdrawal From UNESCO”, prepared statement of O. Harries, hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights & International Organisation and on International Operations 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 
April 25, 26, & May 2, 1984, Washington DC: US GPO, p86, (underlined in text). For similar
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changed, Harries maintained, the United States was perfectly correct and justified 
in withdrawing from UNESCO.62
UNESCO’s management failings were mainly general ones because the 
management structure of the organisation is very complex and its critics were 
unsure how much the public would understand them. (One must remember that 
this was the Reagan era when simplicity ruled the airwaves which Reagan had 
proven with his simple and clear themes). There were also fewer reasons to attack 
UNESCO’s personnel which had not grown very much since the 1970s, the only 
thing that changed was the concentration.63 That is, UNESCO’s decision-making 
process, it was felt, was far too centralised especially in the area of delegation of 
authority which reduced the effectiveness of the organisation.64 This was based 
partly on the style of the Director General and on the development of the 
organisation itself. It was UNESCO’s Constitution and the increased size of the 
organisation due to membership which led to greater expenditure, coupled with 
the failure to appoint regular staff which hampered the organisation. Furthermore, 
one must remember that during the early 1980s (especially 1982-83) Americans 
were very much concerned with the general management of public institutions, as 
this was after all a period of recession for them and a time when the 
administration was calling for greater accountability and efficiency in public 
institutions.
attitudes see for example T.G Gulick, “UNESCO, Where Culture Becomes Propaganda”, 
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, December 13, 1982, No. 233.
62 See for example the ‘Conclusion’ in O. Harris, “An Insider Looks At UNESCO’s Problems”, 
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, July 9, 1984, No. 364. The article is based on accusations 
that Peter Lengyel, former editor of The International Social Science Journal, levelled at 
M’Bow.
63 At December 31, 1981, the total number of full-time staff employed by UNESCO on 
permanent, fixed- and short-term contracts was 3,469 drawn from 130 different nationalities. Of 
these 1,468 were in the Professional or higher categories, and 2,001 were in the General Service 
and Maintenance Worker categories. Of the Professional Staff, 576 were experts serving in the 
field, while 497 General Service and Maintenance Workers were at field posts. Yearbook of the 
United Nations. 1981, NY: Department of Public Information, UN, 1985.
64 “Improvements Needed in UNESCO’s Management, Personnel, Financial & Budgeting 
Practices”, Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on Science and 
Technology, House of Representatives, by the Comptroller General of the United States, 
Gaithersberg: US GAO, 1984, GAO/NSIAD-85-32.
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THE QUESTION OF "PO LITIC ISA T IO N "
A second accusation placed by the Americans at the feet of UNESCO 
was that it became politicised and was pursuing ‘statist concepts.’ Thus, the 
term “politicisation,” according to at least one commentator, has become “...a 
synonym for procedural abuse...” while also being used as “...a term indicating 
displeasure with the duly adopted program of the agency in question.”65
The claim of politicisation centred essentially around the programs that 
UNESCO was pursuing, and particularly the role that the Secretariat played. It 
was felt that programs such as NWICO which had the support of some member 
states were aggressively pushed by members of the Secretariat, and especially 
by the head of the Secretariat, Director General M’Bow. As one critic put it: 
“.. .M’Bow and the UNESCO Secretariat see the Education and Social Science 
sectors of UNESCO as the means of realizing the ‘new international economic 
order’”.66 However, to understand the accusation one must look at UNESCO’s 
development as the politicisation of the organisation had been an evolutionary 
process.
The decline in the influence of the Western powers and especially of the 
United States within UNESCO was deemed by critics to have brought about a 
change in the agenda of the organisation. Initially the organisation was meant to 
promote peace through each of its fields particularly education.67 It was also
65 A legitimate usage of the term would cover such things as: harassment of a member state’s 
right to participate in the organisation; use of the issue of credentials to unseat delegates; 
ultra vires actions by the organisation. A more ambiguous use of the term would include such 
things as: irrelevant issues in the agency’s program; double standards practised by members; 
mismanagement by the Secretariat. A contrived use of the term would cover claims of tyranny 
by the majority, and anti-Western bias. M.F Imber. The USA ILO. UNESCO and IAEA: 
Politicization and Withdrawal in the Specialized Agencies. London: Macmillan Press, 1989, 
p2, p29-30.
66 T.G. Gulick, “For UNESCO, A Failing Grade in Education”, Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder, October 21, 1982, No. 221, p7. The same view is promoted in another essay 
by T.G Gulick, “UNESCO, Where Culture Becomes Propaganda”, Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder, December 13,1982, No. 233.
67 An example of this is a pioneered program by UNESCO which “.. .sought to revise school 
curricula and history text-books...” in France and Germany. The aim of the project was to 
end Franco-German mistrust. The co-operative revision of text-books involved a committee of 
historians and teachers from both countries concerned “...acting as an advisory editorial 
panel.” “They produced in 1951, recommendations on the revision of forty items ranging
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hoped that it would encourage the reproducation of a Westem-style economic 
liberalism and political values in the name of the free-flow concept of mutual 
understanding throughout the world: “Today, UNESCO, tomorrow the 
world”.68 This proposition was quite logical as for almost a decade the 
organisation had no Soviet membership, and was very much dominated by the 
West.
The rise of the Third World which had been preceded by the entry of 
several Communist countries following Stalin’s death in 1954, began the 
political transformation of UNESCO. The developing world with what 
appeared to be Soviet encouragement if not backing was pushing UNESCO to 
drop its previous non-ideological agenda and become “...a servant of one or 
another national policy;”69 as it began discussing such issues as racism, 
apartheid, and decolonisation (anti-colonialism) to name but a few.70 The period 
in which UNESCO became very much involved in political issues was from the 
mid-60s until the second half of the 1970s71 and it was during that time that 
America left the organisation briefly. This was due to attacks on Israel, 
especially concerning Israel’s exclusion from the European group (which 
virtually suspended Israel from the organisation).72 This perhaps explains why in 
the 1980s UNESCO had been “...less stridently anti-Israeli than in the past...” 
although it had retained its anti-US and anti-Western attitude.73
By the 1980s, the critics claimed, political issues became part and parcel 
of UNESCO’s agenda, and perhaps realising that the Israeli avenue was largely
from the French Revolution to Hitler in each other’s text.” M.F Imber. The USA ILO. 
UNESCO and IAEA: Politicization and Withdrawal in the Specialized Agencies. London: 
Macmillan Press, 1989, pl00-101.
68 W. Preston Jr., E.S Herman and H.I Schiller. Hone & Folly: The United States and 
UNESCO. 1945-1980. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p37.
69 Secretary of State Shultz’s letter to Director General M’Bow, (“U.S. Notifies UNESCO of 
Intent to Withdraw”), December 28, 1983, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2083, 
February 1984, p41.
70 W. Preston Jr., E.S Herman and H.I Schiller. Hope & Follv: The United States and 
UNESCO. 1945-1980. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
71 This corresponds roughly to the fourth political phase in UNESCO’s life which Hoggart 
writes about. R. Hoggart. An Idea And Its Servants. London: Chatto & Windus, 1978, p59-81
72 W. Preston Jr., E.S Herman and H.I Schiller. Hope & Follv: The United States and 
UNESCO. 1945-1980. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, pl36
73 “U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, statement of E.P Hennelly, hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights & International Organisation and on International
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closed (whether because of Reagan’s known support of Israel, or just because 
the Israeli issue had been hammered upon enough), the organisation began 
seeking a different path. It began calling for ‘statist concepts’ which meant 
advocating states’ rights rather than individual rights some of its programs. As 
Edmund Hennelly said: “Most UNESCO member states believe that the state is 
the most appropriate agent for advancing international cooperation in science, 
for combatting illiteracy, and so forth.”74 Thus, to the minds of UNESCO’s 
detractors, the organisation became a forum for the introduction of international 
norms and standards based essentially on increased state controls as a remedy 
for the world’s problems which come to cause so much harm for UNESCO. In 
the words of one anti-UNESCO State Department official: “UNESCO 
programs and personnel are heavily freighted with an irresponsible political 
content and answer to an agenda that is consistently inimical to U.S. interests.”75 
Part of the so called Third World agenda which New Righters found 
disturbing was an apparent attempt by UNESCO to equate “peoples' rights” 
with traditional human rights. It was felt that this new attitude would dilute 
efforts to promote traditional human rights as the notion of “peoples rights” 
would enable non-democratic states which claim to embody the will of the 
collective to further abuse human rights. This correlated nicely with the charge 
of the US Mission the extension of the definition of human rights into economic 
and social areas in the UN general system. Kirkpatrick and her colleagues felt 
that the UN should focus mainly on political and civil rights, rather than on
Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 
2nd Session, April 25, 26, & May 2,1984, Washington DC: US GPO, 1984, pl9.
74 “U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, statement of E.P Hennelly, hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights & International Organisation and on International 
Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 
2nd Session, April 25, 26, & May 2, 1984, Washington DC: US GPO, 1984, p27; 
“Improvements Needed in UNESCO’s Management, Personnel, Financial & Budgeting 
Practices”, Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on Science and 
Technology, House of Representatives, by the Comptroller General of the United States, 
Gaithersberg: US GAO, 1984, GAO/NSIAD-85-32.
75 “Perspective on the U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, address by Gregory Newell, Stanford 
University, Stanford, California, October 31, 1985, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 85, No. 
2094, January 1985, p54; Secretary of State Shultz’s letter to Director General M’Bow, (“U.S. 
Notifies UNESCO of Intent to Withdraw”), December 28,1983, Department o f State Bulletin, 
Vol. 84, No. 2083, February 1984, p41.
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The claim of politicisation also affected the non-ideological status of the 
Secretariat of UNESCO. The founders of the organisation believed that the staff 
would be inoculated against the most common infections of international 
collaboration and UNESCO was supposed to be run by a cadre of international 
civil servants free from the taint of national self-interest and government control.76 
UNESCO’s Constitution after all stipulates that: “In the discharge of their duties 
they shall not seek or receive any instructions from any government or from any 
authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which 
might prejudice their positions as international officials.” (Article VI, Sect. 5) 
However, according to UNESCO’s critics, the Secretariat had abandoned its ideal 
status and instead it: “...now presumes to direct too often, not to take direction; 
that it now undertakes to formulate program directions, not to implement them; 
that it now offers an idyllic Parisian respite from the rigors of existence in the 
Third World, not a self-effacing service to the “South” - in the “South”.77
The Reaganites felt that by the 1980s UNESCO came to reject its 
traditional role and became engrossed with promoting an ideological agenda, 
something which was prohibited by the organisation’s Constitution. This was 
because the General Conference was failing in its job as it was engaged in 
ideological discussions often inimical to US interests. Secretary Shultz in his 
December 1983 letter to the Director General conceded that some reform had 
been introduced into the organisation but yet “Viewed in a larger sense, however, 
the General Conference proves a different point: if the result of the conference 
demonstrates the best that can be expected from the Organization as it is 
presently constituted, and as it presently governs itself, there can be little hope for 
genuine and wholehearted return of the Organization to its founding principle.”78 
Secondly, the agenda was causing division among the member states.
76 W. Preston Jr., E.S Herman and H.I Schiller. Hope & Follv: The United States and UNESCO. 
1945-1980. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p35.
77 “Perspective on the U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, address by Gregory Newell, Stanford 
University, Stanford, California, October 31, 1985, Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 85, No. 
2094, January 1985, p56.
78 Secretary of State Shultz’s letter to Director General M’Bow, (“U.S. Notifies UNESCO of 
Intent to Withdraw”), December 28, 1983, Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2083, 
February 1984, p41.
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“...UNESCO, which was created to bring peoples together in cooperation, now at 
times seems to pit them against each other. So we have internal divisions and 
cliques. We have the Group of 77, the (Western) Information Group, and the 
Soviet bloc, which prefers to be called “Socialist,” all working to advance their 
own ends...”.79 In other words, the demands for greater equality between the 
nations of the world was pushing UNESCO down the path of ‘statism’ which 
New Righters equated with socialism and the Soviet Union which they abhorred 
with the American taxpayer financing the whole thing.
UNRESTRAINED BUDGETARY GROWTH
The third point upon which UNESCO was attacked was concerning its 
budget which had span out of control, or so the critics claimed. In this respect 
UNESCO was no different from many other UN agencies or even the UN itself, 
although what made it distinct was that it failed to stem the growth of its budget.80 
The reason why discussions concerning the budgetary problems faced by 
UNESCO were rather muted was because there was a general consensus that the 
budget was too large and much of UNESCO’s valuable resources were being 
squandered on inappropriate programs and policies. As Newell stated: “We feel 
that if they [UNESCO] have set resources that they will have to pick and choose, 
recognizing that all that needs to be done can’t be done; that we can’t take 
resources and spread them so thin that they have no effect.”81 These concerns 
were not new as they could be seen as early the 1950s and certainly since Rene
79 Ambassador J.B.S Gerard Address to the U.S. National Commission, in “A Critical 
Assessment of U.S. Participation in UNESCO”, Special Meeting of the U.S. National 
Commission, Columbia: The University of South Carolina, June 1-3, 1982, Department of State 
Publication 9297, International Organization & Conference Series 158, Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs, October, 1982, pl7
80 “U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, statement of E.P Hennelly, hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights & International Organisation and on International Operations 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 
April 25, 26, & May 2,1984, Washington DC: US GPO, 1984, p20.
81 “On the Record Briefing on U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO by G. Newell, Assistant 
Secretary of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, December 29, 1983”, taken 
from the appendix of “U.S. Withdrawal From UNESCO” Report of A Staff Study Mission 
(February 10-23, 1984) to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, US 
GPO: Washington 1984, p77.
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Maheu’s appointment as Director General.*2 This history provided opponents with 
more ammunition in their justification for withdrawal, as they could argue that 
since the 1950s and ‘60s UNESCO has ignored American anxiety over its budget.
UNESCO’s draft budget and program are worked out for two years and 
are prepared by the Director General who provides them to the Executive Board 
who in turn submits them to the General Conference for consideration and 
approval with its recommendations. The draft program and budget are also sent 
to member states for comment.
UNESCO has two budgets, a regular and an extrabudgetary one. The regular 
budget deals with programs designed to promote general change among nations. 
It supports substantive programs and is sustained by mandatory subscription 
funds, (assessed contributions from the member states). The operational programs 
deal primarily with educational programs but funds for them come from 
extrabudgetary funds which are provided mainly by the United Nations 
Development Program and other UN agencies. The Americans were especially 
unhappy with the fact that the regular budget approved by UNESCO’s General 
Conference had grown in the space of ten years (1973-74 to 1984-85) from 
$130.5 million to $374.4 million.83
The Reaganites came into office with the promise of making government 
more responsible with its money matters, which translated to a desire to see zero- 
growth in the budgets of public institutions. This aim was carried into the 
international organisation and foreign policy dimensions as it was felt that there 
was a need for a pause on the expansion of the international organisation system 
which would help, or rather not harm too much, the specialised agencies. By
82 L.S Finkelstein, “The Political Role of the Director General of UNESCO”, L.S Finkelstein. 
(ed.) Politics in the United Nations System. London: Duke University Press, 1988, p385-423. 
The second point is made in R.A Coate, “Changing Patterns of Conflict: The United States & 
UNESCO”, M.P Karas and K.A Mingst. (ed.) The United States and Multilateral Institutions: 
Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence. London: Routledge, 1990 p231-260.
83 “Improvements Needed in UNESCO’s Management, Personnel, Financial & Budgeting 
Practices”, Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs & Committee on Science & Technology, 
House of Representatives, by the Comptroller General of the United States, Gaithersberg: US 
GAO, 1984, GAO/NSAID-85-32, p59-77.
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freezing the growth of an already large enough organisation one would see 
greater efficiency, especially through the elimination of unnecessary programs. It 
was felt that the Specialised Agencies had been able to continue their growth as 
their budget rose more than inflation because they enjoyed a guarantee of 
indexation plus growth. In the words of one member of the New Right who 
worked within the Reagan administration: “...the specialized agencies have lost 
touch with economic reality. They have been living in a dream world, immune 
from the economic problems of the donor countries, from inflation or privation 
nor harsh budget cutting.”84
The Reagan administration claimed that it sought zero-growth in the UN 
and its agencies because of an increase from $276 million in the mid-1970s to 
$756 million in the 1980s in the assessed budgets. In a testimony before a 
congressional committee, Gregory Newell noted that working with the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) the budget proposal at the agency’s General 
Conference saw a negative growth of 0.31 percent. The ILO still spending at 
1978 levels, had an increase of 1.92 percent in its budget. The World 
Meteorological Organisation, the World Intellectual Property Organisation, both 
had a zero or near zero growth in their budgets; while ICAO was around the zero 
or slightly above. All in all, the UN budget came at about 0.7 percent in the 
biennium. However, turning to UNESCO one saw an increase of 9.7 percent 
before the Nordic proposal which was worked out in the end to 5.5 percent 
increase.85 Although the statistics that Newell provides in the above section are 
without a reference to a year, and should therefore be taken with a pinch of salt, 
they are important for their shock tactics. That is, Newell’s aim appears to have 
been to show not only how prodigal UNESCO is compared to other UN
84 “General View of the U.N. System”, address by Elliott Abrams, before a Conference of U.N. 
Representatives of the United Nations Association-USA in New York. Washington DC: State 
Department, Bureau of Public Affairs. June 5,1981, p2.
85 “On the Record Briefing on U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO by G. Newell, Assistant 
Secretary of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, December 29, 1983”, taken 
from the appendix of “U.S. Withdrawal From UNESCO” Report of A Staff Study Mission 
(February 10-23, 1984) to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, US 
GPO: Washington 1984, p66-67.
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specialised agencies who have taken US concerns to heart and introduce reform, 
but that it disregards American concerns concerning its budget.84
THE FREE PRESS DEBATE
The issue of communication as discussed by UNESCO became a central 
bone of contention between America and UNESCO. In the words of ambassador 
Gerard: “Communication is the sector that currently seems to have the most 
potential for causing alarms and excursions”.87
The preservation of a free press to the New Right was essential if they were to 
promote Americanism which is why any attempt to curtail, restrict or reduce the 
freedom of communication was not only an assault on the American way of life, 
but a threat to its survival.88 Outsiders, particularly the major media corporations’ 
were very important in the debate as they assisted in making UNESCO more 
unpopular in the United States.89 It was repeatedly claimed that the pursuit of such 
programs as NWICO were un-democratic and against the “free flow” of 
information.90
86 Another example of this selectivity and anti-UNESCO bias appeared when Newell was asked 
about Soviet contributions to UNESCO. His reply was that it was 12.5 percent. When asked 
whether it was Soviet or Soviet-bloc, the aide replied that it was the Soviet Union alone. Newell, 
however, said that he thought that it was probably the Soviet bloc. A man in his position should 
have known that the Soviet contribution alone was 12.5 percent. “On the Record Briefing on 
U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO by G. Newell, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of 
International Organization Affairs, December 29, 1983”, taken from the appendix of “U.S. 
Withdrawal From UNESCO” Report of A Staff Study Mission (February 10-23, 1984) to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, US GPO: Washington 1984, p80.
87 Ambassador Gerard address to the U.S. National Commission, in “A Critical Assessment of 
U.S. Participation in UNESCO”, Special Meeting of the U.S. National Commission, Columbia: 
The University of South Carolina, June 1-3, 1982, Department of State Publication 9297, 
International Organization & Conference Series 158, Bureau of International Organization 
Affairs, October 1982, p20.
88 The New Right movement, and especially the New Christian Right, rose from obscurity to 
great notoriety due to successful manipulation of the media. Falwell had noted how influential 
television is in the US especially when it comes to the younger generations. J. Falwell. Listen. 
America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980.
89 C.A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. London: Longman, 1989.
90 See for example the testimony of William J. Small, “U.S. Participation in the United 
Nations”, hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on 
International Operations on Europe and the Middle East and on Human Rights and 
International Organization, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, April 22, 27, May 4, 1982, US GPO: 
Washington, 1982; W. Preston Jr., E.S Herman and H.I Schiller. Hope & Follv: The United 
States and UNESCO. 1945-1980. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
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UNESCO’s entry into the political fray of the information debate began 
in 1965 when a report argued that the media should use space communication 
systems “for the benefit of all people.”91 The whole communication and 
information debate was based on some Third World countries’ unhappiness 
with the quality and quantity of news coverage of their territories in the 
predominantly Western controlled global news media. These countries “...felt 
that the major syndicated newspapers, press agencies such as UPI, Reuters and 
APF, and the broadcasting organisations such as the three American networks, 
the BBC and ORTF with their global, multilanguage broadcasting and 
widespread syndication are in a special position to report and manage the news 
both “.. .at home and abroad”91
UNESCO’s ability to distribute information throughout the globe was 
“formidable” because it could use the National Commissions and other 
UNESCO outlets in the UN member states, the Secretariat (which had access to 
national libraries, universities, ministries of education, school system and 
national media outlets) to promote its agenda. There was also talk that 
UNESCO was discussing with Intelsat the renting of radio and television 
channels on three international satellites (Intersputnik, the Soviet International 
Satellite Organisation). Thus, for the New Right the danger was that: “If 
UNESCO establishes such an international satellite TV network for its member 
states, it will acquire the potential to deliver news and information programs to 
even the most rural parts of the underdeveloped nations.”93
The concept of a new information order first appeared at a UNESCO 
conference in 1970 when developing countries, led by India, called for a more 
balanced flow of information. The 1972 General Conference of UNESCO, saw 
two major challenges to the free-flow doctrine, both in the form of resolutions
91 C.A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. London: Longman, 1989, p20. Giffard’s quote is 
from P.I Hajnal, Guide to Unesco (London: Oceana, 1983), p243.
92 M.F Imber. The USA ILO. UNESCO and IAEA: Politicization and Withdrawal in the 
Specialized Agencies. London: Macmillan Press, 1989, pl05. [Italics in text].
93 T.G. Gulick, “For UNESCO, A Failing Grade in Education”, Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder, October 21,1982, No. 221.
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submitted by the Soviet Union. One resolution insisted that the notion of prior 
consent be applied to television programs beamed from one country to another by 
direct broadcast satellites. The US was only country to vote against the 
resolution, which Giffard claims, demonstrated the growing support in UNESCO 
for statutory control of information flow. The second resolution which also had 
wide support from the developing countries, called for the preparation of a 
declaration on “...the fundamental principles governing the use of mass media.
The 1978 Mass Declaration was a major obstacle in easing Western and 
especially American fears with the direction that UNESCO was heading as the 
Declaration appeared as implying controls on press freedom, later linked to 
separate proposals (not adopted) for the licensing and protection of journalists.95 
Americans were unhappy with such aspects of the Declaration as Article 11(2) 
which stated that: “If the mass media are to be in a position to promote the 
principles of this Declaration in their activities, it is essential that journalists and 
other agents of the mass media, in their own country or abroad, be assured of 
protection guaranteeing them the best condition for the exercise of their 
profession.”9* This was seen as a fundamental assault on the foundation of 
Americanism where freedom of the press, speech and movement is enshrined in 
the Constitution. At the same time such notions were also interpreted as an 
attempt by the Soviet Union and the Third World to get UNESCO to bring about 
the regulation of the press and restrictions on journalists. To conservatives this 
was hypocritical particularly because many of the countries involved were 
regarded as having no free press as the press was a tool used by government to 
disseminate its views and values.97
94 C.A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. London: Longman, 1989, p20. Giffard’s quote is from 
“Draft Declaration of Fundamental Principles Governing the Use of Mass Media” (Unesco 
document COM-74CONF. 616/3, January 23,1974).
95 Vilanilam argues that when reporting a foreign culture the media coverage can be 
unbalanced, therefore control which imposes a balance, may be preferable to a freedom that 
condones imbalance. J.V Vilanilam. Reporting A Revolution: The Iranian Revolution & the 
NIICO Debate. London: Sage Publications, 1989. This could explain the thinking behind 
UNESCO’s attitude toward the media which is also an educating medium.
96 Taken from E.J Osmanczyk. Encyclopaedia of the United Nations and other International 
Agreements. London: Taylor & Francis, 1985, p503.
97 “Review of U.S. Participation in UNESCO”, statement of Millicent Fenwick hearings before 
the Subcommittees on International Operations and on Human Rights and International 
Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 97th Congress,
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The mood in the United States following the election of Ronald Reagan 
was far from conducive toward the new ideas emanating from UNESCO. The 
Reaganites saw these programs as anti-American, anti-Western and part of the 
Soviet and Third World agenda of humiliating the West. The pressure for a new 
world communication order which would distribute information with less of a 
‘Westem-bias’ came from the poorer and smaller nations of which many were 
relatively new members of UNESCO, and the UN. To the Americans, this meant 
taking from those who have and giving to those who have not.98 Thus, the 
Reaganites’ approach to the communications debate was as follow: first, America 
would reject any attempt to give nations a duty to control or supervise the media, 
making journalists comply with “standards” promoted by inter-govemmental 
agencies or by governments. Second, the US would oppose an NWICO that 
could make government the arbiters of media content. Third, the notion of a 
communication imbalance in favour of the West was not accepted by the 
administration. Fourth, interpretations that appeared to be anti-free market 
philosophy and free press would be opposed by America particularly if an attempt 
to translate that attitude into restrictions on Western news agencies, advisers, or 
journalists was made. Fifth, the United States would actively and strongly 
encourage others to follow its lead.99
The debate about UNESCO’s involvement in communications was very 
much part of the claim that it adopted a political agenda that the Soviet Union and
1st Session, March 10, July 9, and 16, 1981, US GPO, Washington, 1981; William J. Small, 
“U.S. Participation in the United Nations”, hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and its Subcommittees on International Operations on Europe and the Middle East and on 
Human Rights and International Organization, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, April 22, 27, May 
4, 1982, Washington DC: US GPO, 1982.
98 Ambassador J.B.S Gerard Address to the U.S. National Commission, in “A Critical 
Assessment of U.S. Participation in UNESCO”, Special Meeting of the U.S. National 
Commission, Columbia: The University of South Carolina, June 1-3, 1982, Department of State 
Publication 9297, International Organization & Conference Series 158, Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs, October, 1982; M.F Imber. The USA. ILO. UNESCO and IAEA: 
Politicization and Withdrawal in the Specialized Agencies. London: Macmillan Press, 1989, 
pl05-106.
99 “Freedom of the Press: The Need for Vigilance”, address by Gregory Newell to the Inter- 
American Press Association General Assembly, Los Angeles, California, October 30, 1984, 
Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 85, No. 2094, January 1985, p62-69.
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the Third World promoted at the interest of the West and especially the United 
States. Thus, to stifle UNESCO’s ideas about communications New Righters 
portrayed the organisation as seeking to establish an agency that would curtail 
journalistic freedom, prevent free reporting while making the developed world 
pay for the establishment of communication centres in the un-democratic Third 
World (whose leaders would use the press to propagate their anti-American and 
anti-western democracy beliefs). The administration and its supporters therefore 
reacted by pointing out the deficiencies within UNESCO’s communication 
proposals. Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick, for example, cited two studies that 
refuted the claim that the Western media was biased against the Third World. One 
study found that “...the majority of wire service news flowing into Third World 
regions was news about those regions.” The other disputed the view that Western 
news agencies have over-emphasised negative stories about the developing world. 
William Schramm, the author of the study, found that newspaper editors in Asia 
used a lower percentage of foreign relations and economic news than the world 
wire services provided, and carried a little more accident, disaster, and crime 
stories. All in all, Fenwick asserted that although the West communications 
capabilities were better than those of the less developed world, the West “...is 
certainly not engaged in a conspiratorial effort to tilt the flow of news around the 
world and denigrate the image of the Third World.” In actual fact, according to 
Fenwick, the West and the United States have endeavoured to help the Third 
World improve its communications facilities because information and freedom of 
communication are essential aspects of Western society.100
The Reaganites refused to accept UNESCO’s arguments that by licensing 
journalists (providing them with international identification) one could reduce the 
number of journalists killed in the fine of fire. The idea of codes for the protection 
of journalists was regarded as imposing “...restrictions on reporters and 
correspondents. That would have suited those developing countries with
100 “Review of U.S. Participation in UNESCO”, hearings before the Subcommittee on 
International Operations and on Human Rights and International Organization of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session, March 10, 
July 9, and 16, 1981, Washington: US GPO, 1982.
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nondemocratic regimes just fine, since it would mean the press would not be free 
to report the nature of the regime. It would also have pleased the Soviet bloc, 
which does not exactly encourage freedom of the press or of communication on 
its own territories.”101 The belief in freedom of speech is central to the American 
creed and thus the idea of government involvement, let alone of intervention by 
an international institution that was anti-American was unacceptable to the 
Reaganites. In Section 109(a) of the Department of State Authorisation Act, for 
Fiscal Year 1982-1983 (PL 97-241) it was stated that US funds could not be 
given “...if that organization [UNESCO] implements any policy or procedure the 
effect of which is to license journalists or their publications, to censor or 
otherwise restrict the free flow of information within or among countries, or to 
impose mandatory codes of journalistic practice or ethics.”102
The communications debate for the Reaganites coupled with the role of 
the big American media corporations was to push the US toward withdrawing 
from the organisation. UNESCO’s involvement in communications although 
being part of the politicisation debate, was essential in winning over Americans 
into believing that UNESCO was a Soviet/Third World dominated agency that 
sought to promote an end to free press, and this was something that Americans 
could not accept. Free speech after all was not only a sacred issue for Americans, 
traced all the way back to the Revolution, but it was a major difference between 
the ‘free world’ which the represented best and the dictators of the world.
These four issues were the main criticisms that the Reagan administration 
and its supporters levelled at UNESCO and used to justify withdrawal in 
December 1984. The issues were essentially treated separately but they were 
closely connected and could hardly sustain themselves independently. For 
example, the charge of poor management was tied to claims of poor budgetary
101 Ambassador J.B.S Gerard, address to the U.S. National Commission, in “A Critical 
Assessment of U.S. Participation in UNESCO”, Special Meeting of the U.S. National 
Commission, Columbia: The University of South Carolina, June 1-3, 1982, Department of State 
Publication 9297, International Organization & Conference Series 158, Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs, October 1982, p20.
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controls and procedures. Perhaps rather surprisingly, the main assault was carried 
out by groups and people who were not part of the political process which is why 
the role of the Heritage Foundation and Owen Harries coupled with the hostility 
of the main media corporation in bring about a withdrawal cannot be 
underestimated.103 All in all, each issue sought to emphasise American unhappiness 
with the position that UNESCO found itself in during the 1980s and was used by 
the administration to justify withdrawal.
WAS THE WITHDRAWAL JU ST IF IE D ?
At first glance the criticisms of the Reagan administration and other anti- 
UNESCO institutions and people, seem to justify the American withdrawal from 
the organisation. However, a closer inspection leads one to a different conclusion 
about the reasons behind the administration’s policy toward UNESCO.
Congress was very much involved in looking into US-UNESCO relations, 
and it called upon many people who worked for and with the agency in an 
attempt to allegedly develop a coherent understanding concerning American 
membership. A concurrent theme that resonates throughout, is that although 
many of those who appeared before the various congressional committees and 
subcommittees noted many deficiencies within UNESCO, the consensus was that 
withdrawal would not be beneficial for either party. As early as 1981, Robin 
Chandler Duke, head of the US Delegation to the Twenty-First General 
Conference of UNESCO, noted that the organisation had had some great 
accomplishments which the media had failed to report, while focusing on the 
agency involvement in the communications debate. Duke stated that the US 
“...came through this 21st Conference of UNESCO with strength, with some 
good policies, with a good deal accomplished. We didn’t lose freedom of the 
press. We do have serious problems in this area, but I would say we are in a good 
position to stand strong and to support the media in what they feel is a life-and- 
death battle here, and that the U.S. delegation did a good job and UNESCO
102 United States Statutes At Large. 1982, Vol. 96, PaA 1, Public Laws 97-146 through 97-301, 
Washington: US GPO, 1984.
103 C. A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. London. Longman, 1989. See also the “Introduction” 
in this thesis
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continues to.”104 Similar sentiments could be found as late as 1984 as many 
‘experts’ called for a stay of execution concerning the decision to withdraw. For 
example, Walter A. Rosenblith of the National Academy of Science noted that 
“Science-related programs represent in many ways Unesco’s most successful 
effort and fulfill and important function for the U.S. in terms of international 
science cooperation and science education.”105 A House of Representatives Staff 
Study Mission was sent to UNESCO’s Headquarters in Paris to attend the 119th 
and 120th session of the Executive Board. The Report that was produced did not 
endorse wholeheartedly the administration decision to withdraw as it pointed out 
that US officials had generally agreed that UNESCO was willing to reform itself. 
However, the Report also placed some of the blame for the withdrawal on the 
shoulders of the Director General who failed to support additional reforms, and 
was slow to react to American complaints which he did not take “seriously 
enough.”106
The United States National Commission for UNESCO established by an 
act of Congress in 1946, remained throughout the controversy firmly against 
withdrawal. The Commission although noting many failures within UNESCO 
constantly maintained that withdrawal would harm American interests rather than 
protect and improve them. In a special meeting of the National Commission at the
104 “Review of U.S. Participation in UNESCO”, statement of Robin Chandler Duke, hearings 
before the subcommittee on International Operations and on Human Rights & International 
Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Congress, 1st Session, March 10, July 
9 & 16, 1981, 1-4. This is just one example, throughout the Hearings there were plenty of 
people who supported UNESCO and American membership in it.
105 The letter (October 21, 1983) is enclosed in “U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organization and on International 
Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd 
Session, April 25, 26 & May 2, 1984, Washington: US GPO, 1984. There is also a statement 
from the National Board of the Young Women’s Christian Association of the United States and 
a testimony from Ruth Robins of League of Women Voters of the United States which opposes 
withdrawal.
106 “Assessment of US-UNESCO Relations, 1984”, Report of a Staff Study Mission to Paris - 
UNESCO, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1st 
Session, January 1985, Washington DC: US GPO, 1985, p2, p4; “Improvements Needed in 
UNESCO’s Management, Personnel, Financial & Budgeting Practices”, Report to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs & Committee on Science & Technology, House of 
Representatives, by the Comptroller General of the United States, Gaithersberg: US GAO, 1984, 
GAO/NSAID-85-32. The GAO report was published in November 1984, one month before the
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University of South Carolina in 1982 which saw the participation of such people 
as America’s ambassador to UNESCO, Jean Gerard (who also addressed the 
Conference); Thomas Gulick of the Heritage Foundation and several other 
eminent academics and UNESCO personnel such as Director General M’Bow. 
The conference ended with reports from five working groups who looked into 
UNESCO affairs and concluded that America must remain an active member (not 
an observer) in the organisation.107 Two years later the National Commission 
issued a statement that emphasised the loss - both financially and politically - that 
an end to American membership in UNESCO would bring.101 In both cases, the 
administration chose to ignore the advice of the ‘experts.’
In December 1984, after having given UNESCO one year’s notice, the 
United States pulled-out on the basis that the agency had failed to adequately 
reform itself in the previous twelve months.109 It must be emphasised that the idea 
that UNESCO could introduce serious reform in the space of one year was 
ludicrous due to the complexities of the organisation.110 UNESCO at the time had 
about 160 different members, each with its own agenda, and matters were made 
even more complicated by the fact that the organisation only meets once every 
two years (General Conference) which hardly gives the members time to 
effectively discuss policies.
UNESCO may have had the support of US experts but it lost the fight because 
the administration chose to surrender to the more populist and sensationalist 
members of the New Right with their ingrained dislike if not a fear of academics,
actual withdrawal and it certainly provided enough reasons for a stay of execution, but to no 
avail.
107 “A Critical Assessment of U.S. Participation in UNESCO”, Special Meeting of the U.S. 
National Commission, Columbia: The University of South Carolina, June 1-3, 1982, 
Department of State Publication 9297, International Organization & Conference Series 158, 
Bureau of International Organization Affairs, October 1982.
108 “U.S. Would Suffer Financial, Political Losses by Withdrawing from UNESCO”, Executive 
Committee, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Washington DC, August 8,1984.
109 “U.S. Confirms Withdrawal from UNESCO”, text of George Shultz’s letter to Amadou- 
Mahtar M’Bow of UNESCO, December 19, 1984, Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 85, No. 
2095, February 1985, p36. Following the Secretary of State letter is a statement from Mr. 
Newell also explaining and justifying the withdrawal.
110 See for example C.A Giffard UNESCO and the Media. London: Longman, 1989, p l21-122.
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especially from the Northeast of the United States.111 (The academics within the 
administration, such as Jeane Kirkpatrick were already hostile toward UNESCO 
because of its apparent anti-Americanism and anti-Israel programs).
One of the main criticisms that Americans levelled at UNESCO was that 
its budget was a runaway. It was felt that although Reagan called for zero-growth 
in the United Nations (which was answered by several other Specialised 
Agencies), UNESCO had not responded appropriately, and instead chose to 
expand its budget. M’Bow, however, in his letter to Shultz, claimed that the 
accusation was untrue and that he sought to reduce the budget. He wrote that 
during the 22nd Session of General Conference he had suggested, on the basis of 
a proposal by the Nordic countries, the adoption of a budget ceiling that was 
lower than the one that was first proposed and recommended to the Board which 
had the support of two-thirds of the member states. The budget that was adopted 
for 1984-1985, totalling $374,410,000, was therefore $56,247,000 less than the 
budget for 1982-1983 ($430,657,000). This meant that America’s contribution 
which amounted to $49,790,0000 for 1981-1983 financial period, would be 
reduced to $43,087,500. In other words, a reduction of over $6 million. 
Moreover, in accordance with the agency’s budgeting techniques, a sum of 
$17,703,250 (or twenty-five percent, of the provision for currency fluctuation 
under Part VIII of the Program and budget adopted by the General Conference at 
its Twenty-First session (1980) would be given to the United States, and would 
be deducted from its assessed contribution. Thus, US contributions for the first 
year of the 1984-1985 biennium was $25,384,250.112
The whole argument that UNESCO became politicised was used by its 
opponents to create an atmosphere that was conducive to an American
111 Some New Righters felt that it was essentially academics who pushed for the Great Society 
(secular humanism), detente and the dismantling of America’s national defence which 
undermined the fabric of moral America. On McNamara’s role in faltering America’s defence 
see J. Falwell. Listen. America!. NY: Banton Books, 1980, p87 and throughout. Falwell has 
several examples of Eastern universities’ perversion; P. Robertson. The New World Order. 
Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991, on Eastern Establishment.
112 Letter from Director General A.M M’Bow to Secretary of State G.P Shultz, January 18, 
1985, reference DG/1533.
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withdrawal. In the words of one UNESCO critic, the term “politicization” is a 
“...meaningless term when applied to any inter-govemmental organization. The 
act of any government is a political act. So, too, every act of UNESCO from its 
inception - whether in education, culture, science or communication - has had 
political implications.”113 The Reaganites pointed to attacks on Israel, apartheid 
and so forth as prime examples of UNESCO’s involvement in political issues 
which were outside of its scope. However, as Finkelstein noted, it is difficult to 
sustain the claim that UNESCO was outside of its constitutional rights when it 
discussed and passed resolutions about Israeli architectural digs in Jerusalem 
given UNESCO‘s mandate with respect to culture and education. It also has the 
right to educate about those things that come within the scope of its functions. 
Thus, “...the politicization charge of which we heard so much in the late 1970s is 
a red herring and a rather demeaning position for the United States to have been 
in.”114
The whole structure of UNESCO’s constitution, one should remember, was 
geared around political issues as what could be more controversial than 
education? There is no doubt that the founders of the organisation were naive in 
their hopes for UNESCO but the attempt by their successors to preserve their 
ideological vision of the organisation was foolish. The Americans simply wanted: 
“...UNESCO to serve the goal of peace through understanding. That was 
inescapably and intensely a political aspiration in a world of political, cultural, 
historical, and economic variety, even though the United States naively believed 
that those goals could be accomplish by noncontentious means...The nature of 
UNESCO’s envelopment in global concerns has changed its axis. Essentially, it 
has shifted from an East-West one to a North-South one.”113
113 “U.S. Withdrawal From UNESCO”, prepared statement L.R Sussman, hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights & International Organisation and on International Operations 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 
April 25, 26, & May 2, 1984, Washington DC: US GPO, 1984, p223-4.
114 “Introductionary Remarks”, L.S Finkelstein, “A Critical Assessment of U.S. Participation in 
UNESCO”, Special Meeting of the U.S. National Commission, Columbia: The University of 
South Carolina, June 1-3, 1982, Department of State Publication 9297, International 
Organization & Conference Series 158, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, October 
1982, p4-5.
115 “Introductionary Remarks”, L.S Finkelstein, “A Critical Assessment of U.S. Participation in 
UNESCO”, Special Meeting of the U.S. National Commission, Columbia: The University of
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The claim that UNESCO attacked the principle of free press was 
manipulated and twisted by those opposing the organisation in the hope of 
galvanising support for withdrawal. L.R Sussman, one of the “most persistent 
American critic of UNESCO’s communications programs.”, testified that 
although the organisation’s “...communications programs have reflected Third 
World criticism of the news and information media not controlled by 
governments. This criticism did not originate with the Soviet Union, though 
Moscow has tried to exploit it.” The debate about the flow of information had 
begun in NAM while the discussion about the new world information order was 
supported by the democratic Third World countries along with the authoritarians 
of the left and the right. Sussman maintained that M’Bow had worked 
successfully to block Soviet press-control initiatives.116 Perhaps the most empathic 
declaration that the communication debate in UNESCO did not merit an 
American withdrawal could be found in the words of the Chairman of the US 
Delegation to the 22nd General Conference of UNESCO, Edmund Hennelly: “...if 
anyone is looking for a reason to leave UNESCO, they will not find it in the 
communication program adopted at the conference.”117
The Imber Thesis
Mark Imber in his study of ILO, IAEA and UNESCO and the connection 
between politicisation, withdrawal and boycott has promoted several thought- 
provoking ideas. Imber sees a difference between the ELO, the IAEA and 
UNESCO, as with the latter, the Americans were rather interested in punishing
South Carolina, June 1-3, 1982, Department of State Publication 9297, International 
Organization & Conference Series 158, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, October 
1982, p4.
116 “U.S. Withdrawal From UNESCO”, prepared statement L.R Sussman, hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights & International Organisation and on International Operations 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 
April 25, 26, & May 2, 1984, Washington DC: US GPO, 1984, quotes from p211-212, and,
p212.
117 U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, statement of E.P Hennelly, hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights & International Organisation and on International Operations 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 
April 25, 26, & May 2, 1984, Washington DC: US GPO, 1984, p24. [My own italics].
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the agency rather than truly seeking reform. Thus, the withdrawal was not meant 
to be a corrective measure.118
The importance of Imber in understanding the American decision to withdraw 
from UNESCO concerns the role of functionalism, as for the Americans, the 
Specialised Agencies play a specific technical role. In the three cases, the 
Americans felt that the agencies had abandoned their functional role and entered a 
more political agenda which was beyond their jurisdiction and he provides 
examples of this. In the case of the ILO and IAEA the withdrawal were meant to 
be temporary while in the case of UNESCO it was far more final.
The Coate Thesis
Much of Roger Coate’s analysis of America’s decision to withdraw from 
UNESCO is based on examining America’s relationship with the agency which he 
maintains has been turbulent almost from day one.119 The problem that he has with 
the actual withdrawal is with the timing of the decision. That is, the US 
announced that it intended to withdraw in 1983, a time when UNESCO was 
actively working to try and appease American concerns about the organisation. 
The administration was so determined to pullout that it chose to ignore the advice 
of its own experts which included the US National Commission to UNESCO 
which was successfully emasculated by the ideologues in the administration who 
were often not well versed in UNESCO affairs and in history of the organisation. 
Coate asserts that those within the State Department who understood what was 
happening realised that it would be futile and costly to try and challenge the 
withdrawal and thus stayed out of the debate.120 The withdrawal, for him was 
therefore, part of an overall process of reform as the administration was engaged
118 M.F Imber. The USA ILO. UNESCO and IAEA: Politicization and Withdrawal in the 
Specialized Agencies. London: Macmillan Press, 1989.
119 R.A Coate. Unilateralism. Ideology & U.S. Foreign Policy: The United States In and Out of 
UNESCO. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988, p23-51. This is seen more clearly in his 
essay “Changing Patterns of Conflict: The United States and UNESCO”, M.P Kams and K.A 
Mingst. (ed.) The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing 
Instrumentality and Influence. London: Routledge, 1990, 231-260.
120 R.A Coate. Unilateralism. Ideology & U.S. Foreign Policy: The United States In and Out of 
UNESCO. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988. Lawrence Eagleburger is a good example 
of this according to Coate, pl46.
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in re-defining America’s relationship with the UN and other international 
institutions.
The Americans to further justify their decision to withdraw greatly 
encouraged the British (especially Mrs. Thatcher) to pullout from UNESCO. 
Coate notes that although the British government sought to portray the decision 
as a consensual one, it was reported that it was not one, as several ministers did 
not wish to pursue an action that was opposed by most EEC members. The 
relationship between Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher is a well-documented one which 
is why this premise makes great sense, especially as both leaders were known as 
anti-communists, national chauvinists and conservative.111 The British who were 
more precise than the Americans in their criticism of UNESCO122 provided the 
Americans with the backing to make their withdrawal decision appear more 
thoughtful and just, as after all another leading founding member was unhappy 
with the course that the organisation had taken.
The essence of Coate’s argument is that America’s case against UNESCO in the 
1980s was rather feeble as the agency tried to deal with American concerns. 
Coate spends considerable time pointing out all of UNESCO’s reform efforts only 
to argue that the American ideologues were so set on withdrawal that it would 
have been highly unlikely that any reform would have appeased them.
Both Imber and Coate are correct in their identification that the reasons 
for the withdrawal were essentially political. However, they fail to identify the 
engineers of the withdrawal process. That is, Coate describe the effort, as a 
conservative inspired agenda, when it was far more than that. The people 
involved both inside the administration and outside were members of the diverse 
New Right movement that emerged in American society and entered into politics 
with the 1980 elections which led to a tremendous change in American society. 
Coate does not place enough emphasis on the ideological convictions of the
121 Reagan writes that Mrs. Thatcher “...was warm, feminine, gracious, and intelligent - and it 
was evident from our first words that we were soul mates when it came to reducing government 
and expanding economic freedom.” R. Reagan. An American Life. London: Hutchinson, 1990, 
p204.
122 R.A Coate. Unilateralism. Ideology & U.S. Foreign Policy: The United States In and Out of 
UNESCO. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988, p89, p89-117, pl30-132.
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administration which was determined - as part of its New Right agenda - to ‘save’ 
the country from the abyss that it found itself in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Imber’s work, especially concerning the American functional approach is very 
interesting but UNESCO composes only one chapter of his seminal work, and the 
essence of the study “...is to investigate the connection between politicization, 
withdrawal and boycott that has occurred in these three cases.”123 However, his 
suggestion that it was American disappointment in UNESCO’s failure to live up 
to its functional purposes is highly useful. If taken a step forward, one could 
argue that the New Right (an essentially backward looking movement which saw 
the 1920s and 1950s as a golden or at least positive time124) wanted UNESCO to 
return to its golden period. This was the early 1950s when UNESCO was heavily 
dominated by the West and the US. In order for the United States to win back the 
initiative it had to be aggressive and nothing provided a more powerful and 
symbolic sign than the ending of membership in UNESCO.
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation was 
probably chosen by the Reaganites to point to their new agenda because it was a 
low-keyed agency within the UN system. The charges levelled at UNESCO were 
exaggerated and simplified. It seems that no matter what evidence was produced 
against withdrawal, the administration would have dismissed it because of its 
determination to be assertive.
American contributions to UNESCO averaged around the sixty million dollars 
mark, which is not a serious sum considering America’s overall budget. This is 
why it is very doubtful that an end to UNESCO membership would have aided 
the anti-liberal crusade against inefficiency and largesse of the federal 
government. Moreover, both Shultz and Newell repeatedly stated that America 
would simply divert the funds to support similar programs. Newell in fact claimed 
that the Reagan administration would remain “...committed to a program of 
alternative activities in education, science, culture and communications, for which
123 M.F Imber. The USA ILO. UNESCO and IAEA: Politicization and Withdrawal in the 
Specialized Agencies. London: Macmillan Press, 1989, p2.
124 K.P Phillips. Post-Conservative America: People. Politics & Ideology in a Time of Crisis. 
NY: Vintage Books, 1983.
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we would request funding. We believe that that these activities, which will include 
selected programs under UNESCO’s umbrella, will be more cost effective and 
thus be of greater direct benefit to the developing countries.”123 This if anything 
else would add to the already large-enough bureaucracy at Washington and 
increase federal spending.
It is important to remember that the Reaganites entered office with many 
promises concerning America’s future. At the core of their program was the re- 
invigoration of America and its restoration as the most powerful and successful 
country in the world. The administration was determined to reverse the tide which 
saw Soviet global advance which meant that unlike the Carter administration it 
would have to stand tall and strong against the Soviet Union. Initially the top 
members of the State Department were all Kissingerites126 but within two years 
they were replaced and more ideologically committed individuals were brought in. 
The prime examples were Gregory Newell and Elliott Abrams, men whose ties 
with the Right were very strong and who were prepared to rock the boat in their 
quest to restore America to the right path. This is exactly when the serious assault 
on UNESCO began. In June 1982, Ambassador Gerard could still speak 
supportively and hopefully concerning UNESCO’s future, but by 1983 any real 
hope seems to have been dashed because of the determination of the 
administration to show its mettle in international relations.
When the main part of the assault on UNESCO was launched toward the 
end of 1982 and throughout 1983, Reagan was busy asserting his ideological anti­
communist philosophy and alienating America’s allies as the Polish Crisis, the 
“evil empire” speech and the neutron bomb debate highlighted. This period saw 
US-Soviet relations reaching one of their lowest points in history as a result. 
Thus, this was the best time to launch an attack on the Soviet Union and its
125 G.J Newell statement in “Human Resources Impact of U.S. membership in UNESCO”, 
hearings before the Senate Committee on Labor & Human Resources, 98th Congress, 2nd 
Session, December 10, 1984, Washington: US GPO, 1985, pi 1; see also Secretary of State
Shultz’s letter to Director General M’Bow, (“U.S. Notifies UNESCO of Intent to Withdraw”), 
December 28, 1983, Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2083, February 1984, p41.
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perceived domination of the UN system, which was being led by Jeane 
Kirkpatrick at Turtle Bay. By having Mrs. Gerard127 at UNESCO and having her 
backed by Gregory Newell, the administration was proving, especially with the 
help of the big media corporations128 that it was sticking to its guns in its 
determination to thwart Soviet expansionism. The period between 1982 and mid 
1983 also saw a deterioration in America’s economy as the Reaganite economic 
miracle failed to materialise and the administration needed a whipping boy and 
UNESCO fitted the bill.
The timing of Shultz’s letter coupled with the preparedness to withdraw, 
is also significant as 1984 was an election year, by which time the economy had 
already picked up which meant that those supporting UNESCO had little to fall 
back upon as the administration was rather popular by then. In the words of one 
commentator "... in an election year, opponents of the pullout were reluctant to 
speak up for Unesco, which was identified as being anti-Western, anti-Israel and 
anti-free press. The record of congressional hearings on the Unesco issue 
suggests an intense awareness of its domestic political implications. Even Walter 
Mondale, who was running as the Democratic party candidate for president 
against Reagan, sensed the political folly of opposing the groups who favored the 
withdrawal and went along with the decision.”129
The involvement of Congress in the withdrawal discussions was very 
important, as many of its reports and hearings emanated from the House of 
Representatives which is arguably more voter-conscious as elections are held 
every two years for its members.
126 R. Brownstein and N. Easton. Reagan’s Ruling Class: Portraits of the President’s Top 100 
Officials. Washington DC: The Presidential Accountability Group, 1982, p539-555.
127 Jean Gerard’s main qualification for the UNESCO ambassadorship appears to have been her 
important role in “Women for Reagan” in the 1980 political campaign. The US media did not 
examine Gerard’s or Newell’s qualifications or even performance as the press had deemed US 
officials as honest and competent professionals. W. Preston Jr., E.S Herman & H.I Schiller. 
Hope & Follv: The United States and UNESCO. 1945-1980. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1989, p234.
128 See for example the testimony of William J. Small, (president of NBC News) “U.S. 
Participation in the United Nations”, hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its 
Subcommittees on International Operations on Europe and the Middle East and on Human 
Rights and International Organization, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, April 22, 27, May 4, 1982, 
US GPO: Washington, 1982.
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The interesting part is that although the various committees called for numerous 
experts to testify, Congress was not persuaded to oppose the administration’s 
decision. This was probably because it was felt that especially with the hostile 
attitude of the main media corporations toward UNESCO130 such a move would 
invite negative coverage. In 1982-83, when the economy was still in recession and 
the administration was suffering as a result, Congress still opted to adopt the 
White House line, rather than seek its own way.131 Congress could easily have 
used the US National Commission and many of the experts who appeared before 
its committees to highlight flaws in the administration’s arguments, but it chose 
not to. This is arguably because of politics, rather than intellectual arguments. 
UNESCO after all had no real support amongst the more powerful members of 
the administration or the media. This meant that its opponents could ensure that 
very few people would hear of its achievements which could have been used to 
shore up support for the agency132 which overall had done some great work, and 
thus hamper those calling for withdrawal.
The great involvement of the media in American politics, especially during 
the Reagan administration would have made it very unwise for congressional 
politicians to support a cause that the major media corporations were very much 
against. American politicians are forever vigilant and aware of the impact that 
negative press can have on their careers, particularly with the watchful eyes of 
New Right movement using ‘report cards’ to highlight legislative deficiencies. 
Moreover, one must remember that this was a time when the Reagan 
administration, under Kirkpatrick launched a fierce attack on the whole UN 
system for being anti-American and wasteful. Thus, it is more than likely that had
129 C.A Giffard. UNESCO and the Media. London: Longman, 1989 p274.
130 The media “...tended to interpret the steady flow of probes and allegations against UNESCO 
and its officials as indicating that the charges were valid.” W. Preston Jr., E.S Herman and H.I 
Schiller. Hope & Folly: The United States and UNESCO. 1945-1980. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1989, p239.
131 This is possibly because of the influence that Baker, Dole and Laxalt exerted on the party 
especially in the Senate. C.J Bailey. The Republican Party in the US Senate. 1974-1984: Party 
Change and Institutional development. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.
132 H.S Challenor points to some of UNESCO’s most notable programs in education, science, 
culture and communication. “UNESCO: With or Without the United States”, by H.S Challenor, 
Director of UNESCO Liaison Office in Washington DC, on the Occasion of the African- 
American Institute Seminar for Congressional Aides, “African Concern and United Nations 
Responses”, New York City, July 24-25, 1984.
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Congress attempted to use UNESCO to embarrass or attack the administration it 
would have failed.
The debate about UNESCO, however, has continued in the US even 
though it had not been a member for over a decade, and one can expect 
discussions about the organisation to continue with the British re-entry after more 
than a decade of absence. Among conservative circles, however, animosity 
toward UNESCO is still very fierce. For example, the Concerned Women for 
America (CWA) in one of its policy papers launched a bitter denunciation of 
UNESCO and the United Nations’ attempt to subvert American sovereignty 
through Biodiversity. The World Heritage, a UNESCO sponsored program, has 
prevented, according to CWA, American companies and individuals from 
pursuing their economic interests. The paper concludes by stating that the United 
States should “...stop cowering at the feet of UNESCO and the extreme 
ecologists who are pushing the biosphere philosophy. It’s time to question our 
state and federal legislators. We must stand up for our rights as free citizens and 
sovereign nation - before it’s too late.”133 This only highlights the fact that the 
Reagan and New Right legacy has continued.
133 “Sovereignty Under Siege: U.N. Biosphere Take U.S. Land” Policy Concerns, Concerned 
Women for America. May 1997, 18PC-018. There are plenty of other examples of this attitude 
about UN attempts to subvert American sovereign rights in other policy papers by the CWA for 
example “U.N. convention on the Rights of the Child: A Treaty to Undiennine the Family”, 
December (revised) 1996,18PC-014.
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CONCLUSION
Ronald Reagan spent eight turbulent years in the White House 
revolutionising the United States and with it the world. Irangate and the 
scandals that surrounded and followed it caused the administration to lose much 
of its gloss, but despite them Reagan was still able to leave the White House a 
much loved president. The success of his eight-year vice-president, George 
Bush, in 1988 in following him into the Oval Office emphasised Reagan’s 
continuing legacy. The world that Bush inherited was very different from the 
one that he and Reagan faced when they first entered the White House. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, gloom was predominant in the United States due to 
economic hardship and military failures which undermined confidence in the 
country. US-Soviet relations were at a nadir primarily because of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and the grain embargo, to name but two incidents. For 
the next two to three years, events in Poland, arms control negotiations and 
other affairs caused relations between the two superpowers to deteriorate even 
further.1 Yet, by 1988, relations between the two had improved very much 
mainly because of summits and greater understandings between the two leaders 
which in turn helped ease tensions particularly in the area of disarmament (a 
major area of contention). Internally Americans felt that Reagan was responsible 
for their affluence, after the hardship of the 1970s as they chose to ignore what 
was bad in their society.2 Thus, the transformation in America and in its position 
in the world was attributed to Reagan’s eight years in office.3
The Reagan administration was very distinctive in American history 
because Reagan was an ideologue who tried to keep his pre-election agenda, as 
his attitude toward taxation clearly showed. The Reaganites epitomised a new
1 Shultz writes that by 1983, US-Soviet relations were ‘Virtually nonexistent.” G.P Shultz. 
Turmoil and Triumph: Mv Years as Secretary of State. NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993, 
p5.
2 RA Rutland. The Republicans: From Lincoln to Bush. Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 1996, p244-245.
3 This is seen very clearly in N. Gingrich. To Renew America. NY: HarperCollins Publishers,
1995. Gingrich notes Reagan’s contributions to the restoration of American prestige, but there 
is nothing really on the fact that much of America’s economics woes are a result of Reagan’s 
policies.
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brand of conservatism which had been developing since the end of World War II 
and which began to take shape during the turbulent 1960s, especially with the 
Goldwater presidential campaign. The slow collapse of the New Deal coalition by 
the late 1960s and early 1970s led to the official rise in 1976 of the New Right, a 
heterogeneous movement that sought the revitalisation of America both internally 
and externally. At the core of the movement laid the premise that the conditions 
that the country faced at the end of the 1970s were simply unacceptable and a 
new vigour was needed. The new determination was associated with calls for a 
more positive stand in international relations especially when dealing with the 
Soviet Union, whose continued expansion was regarded as posing a serious threat 
to American interests and those of the free world.4
The New Right achieved political prominence in 1980 with the election of 
Ronald Reagan, a conservative who embedded, especially in his administration, 
many of the ideas and notions of the New Right which was composed of three 
main groups.5 The election of Reagan enabled the New Righters to get a much 
stronger foothold in American politics, as not only did they have more members 
in Congress (coupled with assistance from traditional conservatives who shared 
or were at least sympathetic to their agenda), they were able to manoeuvre many 
of their members or supporters into important positions within the administration. 
The anti-liberals who made up one of the main groups of the New Right had most 
of their influence in economic policy as several of their members obtained posts 
within the Treasury Department and its affiliates (such as the OMB). This is 
perhaps why in this area the New Right saw much joy throughout the Reagan era,
is nothing really on the fact that much of America’s economics woes are a result of Reagan’s 
policies.
4 A. Crawford. Thunder on the Right: The “New Right” and the Politics of Resentment. NY: 
Pantheon Books, 1980. Crawford represent the New Right as a movement that is 
quintessentially based on resentment and opposition. Its members were unhappy with the state 
of the country and the path that it was on. This fundamentally is a relatively correct observation 
about the New Right especially if one reads R A  Viguerie. The New Right: We’re Ready To 
Lead. Falls Church: The Viguerie Company, 1981.
5 See for example Hadden and Shupe’s argument on Reagan and the Christian Right as Reagan 
pushed some of their agenda more into mainstream society. J.K Hadden and A  Shupe. 
Televaneelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier. NY: Henry Holt & Co., 1988.
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as several New Right anti-liberal sponsored measures were passed during the 
1980s with wide-ranging effect on American society.
The Religious Right although being less successful in getting its supporters into 
the administration6 (although more successful in Congress) were able to utilise 
their potent grassroots movement into exerting pressure on the administration and 
Congress. The main interest of the Religious Right was in social policy, an area 
that has traditionally caused problems in American politics due to such questions 
as to how far the federal government should be involved in society. The fact that 
the movement was led by religious leaders who were not (and are not) very keen 
on compromise simply hampered matters because of questions over the 
relationship between Church and State.7
The neoconservatives saw much of their calls for a defence build-up being carried 
through, while in foreign policy the administration received a mixed reaction.8 The 
group was rather successful in placing its members within the administration 
especially in the foreign policy establishment, with Jeane Kirkpatrick, Charles 
Lichenstein, and Carl Gershman at the UN, Elliott Abrams at the State 
Department, and Paul Nitze at arms control.9 What is also significant is that these 
people had a very close rapport with many other neoconservative intellectuals
6 Oldfield notes that the Christian Right rewards went beyond assistance in legislative battles, as 
some of its leaders were appointed to positions within the Reagan administration. Morton 
Blackwell was appointed a special assistant to the president for public liaison. Robert Billings, 
after leaving the Moral Majority to join Reagan’s campaign, received a post in the Department 
of Education. The Justice Department backed the fundamentalist BJU in its suit against the IRS. 
“Symbolic acts on the part of the administration were designed to reach out to evangelicals as 
well. Reagan promoted 1983 as “the year of the Bible” and appeared at National Religious 
Broadcasters conventions.” D.M Oldfield. The Right and the Righteous: The Christian Right 
Confronts the Republican Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, pi 19.
7 Some of Pat Robertson’s 1988 Christian supporters were unhappy with his willingness to work 
and compromise with secular leaders. D.M Oldfield. The Right and the Righteous: the Christian 
Right confronts the Republican Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996.
It has been suggested that many Americans in the 1992 presidential elections were concerned 
with the strong Christian rhetoric the came from the Republican Convention which therefore 
assisted Bill Clinton in his bid to become the forty-second President of the United States. M. 
Walker. Clinton: The President the Deserve. London: Fourth Estate, 1996, especially pl51-152.
8 The intellectuals, Podhoretz, Kristol, Tucker criticised Reagan (especially during the second 
half of the 1980s), while Kirkpatrick, Abrams, Perle, for example, supported the administration. 
J. Ehrman. The rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. London: 
Yale University Press, 1995, pl37-172.
9 Brownstein and Easton provide a list of people who were members of the Committee on the 
Present Danger and of the Reagan administration. R. Brownstein and N. Easton. Reagan’s 
Ruling Class: Portraits of the President’s Top 100 Officials. Washington DC: The Presidential 
Accountability Group, 1982, p534.
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(who worked outside of the administration and provided the theoretical defence 
for a change in policy).10
The influence of these ‘New Righters’ was felt within the administration 
and it was they who ensured that the 1980 campaign agenda would be carried 
forth, as in many respects it was. There is little doubt that as the decade 
progressed the administration lost some its ideological commitments but that was 
to be expected. However, the placing of ‘New Righters’ throughout the 
administration ensured that the assault on the postwar liberalism would continue.11 
Thus, one should not underestimate the power that conservatism had within the 
administration as well as outside of it.
It is significant to note that the influence of the New Right revolution was 
not restricted to the White House as it also penetrated Congress which assisted 
the administration in pursuing its agenda.12 Outside of the political arena the 
movement was sufficiently reinforced by the involvement of think-tanks and more 
importantly single-issue interest groups and PACs who kept a watchful eye on 
politicians and clamoured when their agenda failed to be carried through with 
varying degree and success (one could compare the ERA and the BJU 
controversy as examples of success and failure of New Righters).
The New Right phenomenon by 1988 had lost much of its gloss and 
potency. The heaviest casualties were among the Christian Right which was 
ravaged by a number of severe scandals that ranged from sexual to 
misappropriations of funds. This was coupled by the embarrassing failure of Pat 
Robertson to mount an effective challenge in the 1988 presidential election.13 The
10 J. Ehrman. The rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. 
London: Yale University Press, 1995.
11 By 1992, for example, the pro-life coalition was one Supreme Court Justice short of over­
turning Roe. P.R Abramson, J.H Aldrich and D. W Rohde. Change and Continuity in the 1992 
Election. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994, p2-3.
12 Bailey points to the revival of the Republican Party by the late 1970s and early 1980s which 
could be seen with the rise of such conservative politicians like Helms, McClure, Laxalt and 
Gam. C.J Bailey. The Republican Party in the US Senate. 1974-1984: Party Change and 
Institutional Development. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988. All of these 
senators had very close and positive relations with the Reagan administration, while also 
maintaining their membership in the New Right.
13 In 1988, Jimmy Swaggart was caught in a motel-room with a prostitute, the Bakkers were 
facing financial and sexual scandals. This was following earlier Christian Right support of
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movement, however, responded by turning inward and reforming itself, with the 
effect that today it is as vibrant and as powerful as it was, if not more.14 
The other groups that composed the New Right also went through a 
transformation. The anti-liberals, particularly the supply-siders, lost the hold that 
they had on society especially when one compares their position at the end of the 
decade to that of the early 1980s.13 This was also because the supply-siders were 
largely absorbed into mainstream Republican Party politics.16 The anti-liberals 
who were rather successful in getting the administration and Congress to support 
several of their economic measures in the 1980s, saw their conservative economic 
management become part and parcel of the Republican Party agenda. What is 
even more striking is that the Democratic Party once the epitome of postwar 
liberalism abandoned its McGovemite leftism and has taken more of a 
conservative stand in economic and even social policy.17 A possible explanation 
for this could be the apparent success and appeal of New Right economic theory 
which calls for limited federal intervention which appealed to Americans.
The neoconservatives some of whom had even questioned their affiliation to the 
movement1* also lost their hold, particularly because of the new rapprochement 
between the superpowers following the huge military build-up that Reagan had 
initiated. Their service in the Reagan administration, their ongoing estrangement 
from the Democrats, and their intellectual leadership of the Right made the
South Africa, anti-Semitic statements and so forth. C. Wilcox. Onward Christian Soldiers? The 
Religious right in American Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996; D.M Oldfield. The Right 
and the Righteous: the Christian Right confronts the Republican Party. London: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1996; J.K Hadden and A  Shupe. Televangelism: Power and Politics on 
God’s Frontier. NY: Henry Holt & Co., 1988.
14 On the rise of the Christian Right and how it has come to dominate the Republican Party see 
the following for example: D.M Oldfield. The Right and the Righteous: the Christian Right 
confronts the Republican Party. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996; C. Wilcox. 
Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious right in American Politics. Boulder: Westview Press,
1996.
15 An excellent example of the fall of supply-side economics by 1988 was the way Bush turned 
against ‘Voodoo economics” which epitomised supply-side economics. R.A Rutland. The 
Republicans: From Lincoln to Bush. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1996, p245.
16 N. Gingrich. To Renew America. NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995.
17 Clinton early on in the 1996 presidential campaign sought to portray himself as a “New” 
Democrat. I. Hohenberg. Reelecting Bill Clinton: Why America Chose a “New” Democrat. 
USA: Syracuse University Press, 1997; M. Walker. Clinton: The President the Deserve. 
London: Fourth Estate, 1996.
18 I. Kristol. Reflections of a Neoconservative: Looking Back. Looking Forward. NY: Basic 
Books Publishers, 1983.
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conservative movement their natural home.19 However, they continued to be 
distinct from traditional mid-western and southern conservatives such as Patrick 
Buchanan and Russell Kirk who “...have viewed them as interlopers and the two 
factions have assaulted each other over allegations of anti-Semitism and in debate 
over who is the true conservative.”20
The Reagan legacy, however, even though the New Right was in 
disrepute by the time Reagan left office, continued to have a serious impact on 
American society and world affairs. With the succession of George Bush, 
America’s standing in international relations had improved from that of 1980, 
especially with the Gulf War. Due to the Reagan presidency serious changes had 
taken place concerning the United Nations especially as Kirkpatrick’s tenure 
caused much commotion.21 It is quite logical to assume that the internal UN 
reforms of the mid-1980s were largely inspired by Kirkpatrick’s attitude 
especially when the organisation saw that her strong words were often backed by 
Washington and the American people. In the words of one commentator: 
“...although UNESCO was an immediate target of the Heritage Foundation and 
Reagan administration officials, the United Nations more generally was the 
ultimate target.”22
The New Right attitude toward the United Nations has carried through to 
the 1990s as congressional resistance towards the payment of America’s huge 
debt to the UN continues, with many of the arguments reminiscent of those 
offered during the early 1980s. Throughout the 1990s ultra-right movements -
19 J. Ehrman. The rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. 
London: Yale University Press, 1995. Ehrman further notes that William Kristol served as Dan 
Quayle’s chief of staff, Daniel Pipes edits Orbis. These are just two examples of new generation 
neoconservatives working within mainstream conservatism.
20 J. Ehrman. The rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. 
London: Yale University Press, 1995, pl73-174, and throughout.
21 This point is made by Gerson who served under Kirkpatrick at the US Mission. A  Gerson. 
The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without Apology America at the United Nations. 1981- 
1985. NY: The Free Press, 1991. However, despite Gerson’s obvious self-interest and bias, his 
point is valid when looking at some of the things that had taken place following and during 
Kirkpatrick’s tenure, particularly in the area of reform and American attitude to the 
organisation which has remained relatively harsh.
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which could be regarded as by-products of the New Right movement of the 
1980s - emerged in great potency. The link essentially is that both (conservatives 
in Congress and far-right movements outside of the mainstream political sphere) 
have shown great animosity toward the federal government and the United 
Nations. Themes, accusations, and claims about the ‘New World Order’ 
conspiracy continue to resonate with great ferocity in conservative circles. At the 
centre of the ‘New World Order,’ the United Nations sits and this attitude could 
be seen for example in Pat Robertson’s The New World Order. Hal Lindsey’s 
Planet Earth - 2000 A.D. or W.F Jasper’s Global Tyranny... Step bv Step: The 
United Nations and the Emerging New World Order.23 In the words of one 
powerful conservative senator, the UN as it exists: “...does not deserve continued 
American support. Its bureaucracy is proliferating, its costs are spiraling, and its 
mission is constantly beyond its mandate - and beyond its capabilities.”24
The United Nations was essential to the New Right and to the Reagan 
administration in its effort to restore American prestige because America had 
been very instrumental in creating it. The UN could act as an example of how an 
aggressive Washington could re-gain American supremacy in the world, after the 
complacency of the 1970s. In the words of Secretary Haig: “The United Nations - 
this parliament of man - offers us a unique opportunity to examine the human 
condition. We are each called upon to declare our national purposes. And we are 
all obligated to address those problems that obstruct the vision of the charter.” 
This is because the UN’s ideals are the ideals of the United States.23 Although 
Haig was certainly a tamed conservative and arguably a member of the 
Establishment, similar sentiments were expressed by more vocal and committed
22 R.A Coate. Unilateralism. Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy: The United States In and Out of 
UNESCO. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988, pl33.
23 P. Robertson. The New World Order. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991; H. Lindsey. Planet 
Earth - 2000 A.D. Will Mankind Survive?. Palos Verdes: Western Front, 1996. Robertson’s 
book was the New York Times best seller, while Lindsey is a best seller author, which highlight 
the appeal of such books. Both authors hold the UN as being in the centre of a well-financed 
campaign by very sinister forces seeking to subvert American sovereignty and freedom.
24 J. Helms, “Saving the UN - A Challenge to the Next Secretary-General.” Foreign Affairs 75 
(5 1996), p2.
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conservatives in the shape of Kirkpatrick, Newell, Abrams, Reagan, to name but a 
few. This attitude helps explains why there was no real movement within the 
administration to push for an American withdrawal from the United Nations 
which was largely seen as a positive organisation, albeit one that was in need of 
serious reform, which Kirkpatrick was in the process of encouraging and 
promoting. The fact that the UN is an international forum which the international 
press covers in great depth was also very important to an administration very 
much aware of the power of the media.
By appointing Kirkpatrick, a national chauvinist and a former Democrat 
with good access to the president (through William Clark26 and her own cabinet 
post), and to intellectual conservative circles, the administration was hoping to 
effectively bring about a new era in US-UN relations. Kirkpatrick by focusing on 
certain themes such as democracy, American national interests, politicisation, 
unfairness and human rights, sought to sell Americanism to a world polarised 
between two ideologies, one of which was left-of-centre and the other existing 
essentially on the centre-right. One must remember that much of the world was 
still grappling with the effects of colonisation and decolonisation as new nations 
had to forge a new way of life for themselves. To Kirkpatrick and the 
administration the world was largely a bipolar one divided between those 
supporting the United States and those against it, which explains the 
administration’s measured support of right-wing governments.
Kirkpatrick’s strategy at Turtle Bay was to first assert an “America First” 
ethos which meant that the United States would no longer permit other nations 
(especially members of NAM with the support of the Soviet Union) to use the 
organisation to embarrass and take advantage of the United States. This point 
was made even more forcefully with the implementation of Section 101(B) of the 
Continued Resolution of November 14, 1983, as well as Section 117 of the State
25 “A New Era of Growth”, address by Alexander Haig before the U.N. General Assembly in 
New York, September 21, 1981, Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, State Department, 
1981, Current Policy No. 314.
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Department Authorisation Act for fiscal years 1984-85. The Resolution 
demanded that the US Permanent Representative to the UN provide Congress 
with: “...country-by-country reports on the voting patterns and practices at the 
United Nations during the previous year...” and that Authorisation the Secretary 
of State “...furnish annual reports regarding the policies which each member 
country of the United Nations pursues in international organizations of which the 
United States is a member.”27
Second, Kirkpatrick effectively sought to sell western liberal democracy 
(particularly the American model) by emphasising the supremacy of that ideology. 
She was aided by the economic improvements experienced by the United States 
by 1983 and even more by 1984, which were attributed to Reaganomics - an 
amalgamation of New Right economic theory and traditional capitalist thought. 
The third aspect of Kirkpatrick’s plan, was to highlight the inadequacies of the 
United Nations by pointing to the politicisation of the organisation. This included 
an array of charges ranging from budgetary inefficiencies to the promotion of an 
ideological agenda due to NAM and Soviet manipulation of the organisation. This 
was coupled with claims that the United States was isolated in the United Nations 
due to the existence of bloc politics.
The final theme of Kirkpatrick’s argument in the UN was in the realm of human 
rights which embodied claims from her previous points. That is, human rights was 
a meeting-point for Kirkpatrick’s program in the United Nations. By promoting 
human rights, she was able to re-emphasise the supremacy of western liberal 
democracy which America championed as her argument was that human rights 
violations are less likely to occur in a western democracy as the people hold 
power they punish governmental abuse of it at the ballot box. The debate over 
human rights also enabled Kirkpatrick (through her differentiation between 
economic and social rights and political and civil rights) to note the politicisation 
of the United Nations. The organisation, she argued came to seek development, 
financed by the western powers who were also chastised for colonialism or neo-
26 A  Gerson. The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without Apology America at the United 
Nations. 1981-1985. NY: The Free Press, 1991.
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colonialism. By standing up to what was felt was excessive UN criticism of 
America’s allies human rights record, America was defending its interests and 
binding certain countries closer to its camp.28
By pursuing these themes the US Mission in New York was able to fulfil 
its part in Reagan’s overall foreign policy doctrine (which Kirkpatrick herself had 
developed unofficially) which was essential to the restoration of American 
prestige. Moreover, a prime example of the link between American policy in the 
United Nations and general foreign policy initiatives could be seen with the 
establishment of such programs as Project Democracy and the National 
Endowment for Democracy,29 whose core aim was to promote democracy 
overseas.30
The case of UNESCO was of great importance to the Reaganite agenda. 
The Americans provided several reasons for justifying their decision to withdraw 
from the agency, although there were three fundamental themes. These were: 
involvement in political issues, “statist concepts” (the emphasis on the rights of 
states rather than individuals), and unrestrained budgetary growth.31 However, a
27 “U.S. Participation in the United Nations”, statement by Jeane Kirkpatrick, before the 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee, March 2, 1984, 
Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, State Department, 1984.
28 Kirkpatrick had argued that it is easier for a country to move from authoritarianism to 
democracy than it was from totalitarianism. See for example some of her speeches in J.J 
Kirkpatrick. Legitimacy & Force: Political and Moral Dimension. Vol. I, Oxford: Transaction 
Books, 1988.
29 Reagan place the request for the establishment of a new program to promote democracy 
overseas in the State Department Authorisation bill for 1984-85 (HR 2915). The House Foreign 
Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations committees approved for each of the fiscal years 1984 
and 1985, $31.3 million for the National Endowment for Democracy. Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac. 98th Congress, 1st. Session, 1983, Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 
1984, pi 48.
30 With Carl Gershman (a former member of the US Mission while Kirkpatrick was at New 
York) as president of the Endowment one would expect that organisation to carry at least 
neoconservative principles if not Kirkpatrickian ones. J. Ehrman. The rise of Neoconservatism: 
Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. London: Yale University Press, 1995, pl62, and 
throughout. Ehrman writes: “The guiding philosophy of Project Democracy showed 
Kirkpatrick’s influence.”
31 “Improvements Needed in UNESCO’s Management, Personnel, Financial, & Budgeting 
Practices”, Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on Science and 
Technology, House of Representatives”, by the Comptroller General of the United States, 
Gaithersberg: US GAO, 1984, GAO/NSIAD-85-32, Digest and Chapter 1.
In the words of Secretary Shultz “...trends in policy, ideological emphasis, budget and 
management of UNESCO were detracting from the Organization’s effectiveness.” “Letter from
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careful study of the situation fails to satisfy the student that the reasons given 
were responsible for the withdrawal.
The Reagan administration with its policy of re-asserting American 
prestige chose UNESCO to highlight its new determination in foreign policy. In 
other words, the real reasons for the withdrawal were primarily political and 
ideological (in the sense of supremacy over the Soviet system and a re-affirmation 
of conservatism). UNESCO was warned that unless it reformed itself it would 
lose American membership and therefore contributions, which were substantial. 
This was possibly built on the experience that the United States had with two 
other Specialised Agencies, the ILO and IAEA.32 Despite its size and the great 
complexities involved in instituting change, the agency did managed to introduce 
some limited reforms. However, members of the administration decreed that it 
was insufficient and despite unhappiness from America’s allies and from American 
experts on UNESCO, withdrawal was recommended and in 1984 the US pulled- 
out of the agency and adopted an observer status.33
There are several possible reasons as to why UNESCO was chosen to 
emphasis the new commitment in America’s approach to international relations. 
One explanation is that because UNESCO had a long history of anti- 
Americanism34 it made perfect sense to use it to point to the new vigour in 
American politics. The agency, it was argued, had been promoting especially from 
the late 1960s and 1970s policies and ideas that Americans found distasteful if not
Secretary of State Shultz to Director General of UNESCO, Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow.” Journal 
of Communication 34 (4 1984), p82.
32 For Kirkpatrick view on the similarities between the ILO and UNESCO see: “The U.S. Role 
in the United Nations”, hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International 
Organization, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 
1st Session, September 27, and October 3, 1983, Washington: US GPO, 1984; M.F Imber. The 
USA ILO. UNESCO. IAEA: Politicization and Withdrawal in the Specialized Agencies. 
London: Macmillan Press, 1989.
33 Coate argues that UNESCO instituted considerable reforms, especially considering that it is 
an intergovernmental organisation with over one hundred different members. R.A Coate. 
Unilateralism. Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy: The United States In and Out of UNESCO. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988.
34 R.A Coate, “Changing Patterns of Conflict: The United States and UNESCO”, M.P Kams 
and K.A Mingst. (ed.) The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing 
Instrumentality and Influence. London: Routledge, 1990, p231-260.
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offensive, while also having serious managerial and budgetary problems.” This 
attitude was unacceptable for Americans who were in the process of making their 
country economically and socially leaner while also seeking to restore it to its 
prominent position in international relations.
A more cynical view would be that UNESCO had the first African Director 
General of any Specialised Agency, and Africa was one region that was causing 
the United States increasing concern due to its militancy, and growing affiliation 
with socialist ideology and the Soviet Union. Thus, perhaps by punishing 
UNESCO the administration hoped to teach the African countries, who were 
rather dependent on development funds which UNESCO had been promoting, 
what would happen to their aid, unless they toned down some of their bellicosity. 
One must remember that in UNESCO, the United States and Britain were treated 
as equal with all other members. Their contributions may have been larger than 
most member states but that did not place them in a different category, something 
that they enjoy in the Security Council.
Another possible explanation for the decision to withdraw was that it was also 
promoted to please the anti-liberals. Roger Coate notes that David Stockman, 
barely a week after Ronald Reagan had been sworn in as president in January 
1981 proposed that America might wish to withdraw from UNESCO which 
would be done as part of America’s overall retrenchment in foreign aid.” This 
premise is certainly sound when one takes into consideration Stockman’s 
(particularly after February 1981) growing concern with the budget and later on, 
the national deficit.37 The problem, however, was that the money designated for
35 See for example. T.G Gulick, “For UNESCO, A Failing Grade in Education”, Heritage 
Foundation Backgrounder, October 21, 1982, No. 221; O. Harries, “The U.S. & UNESCO at a 
Crossroads”, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, October 19, 1983, No. 298; O. Harries, 
“An Insider Looks at UNESCO’s Problems”, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, July 9, 1984, 
No. 364; R.A Coate, “Changing Patterns of Conflict: The United States and UNESCO”, M.P 
Kams and K.A Mingst. (ed.) The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of 
Changing Instrumentality and Influence. London: Routledge, 1990, p231-260.
36 R.A Coate. Unilateralism. Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy: The United States In and Out of 
UNESCO. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988, pl25. Coate cites a John Forbes 
Memorandum to members of the Executive Committee and Task Force of the US National 
Commission for UNESCO entitled “OMB Suggestion of U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO”, 
February 1, 1981.
37 For Stockman’s calls for budgetary cutbacks and his failure to achieve significant cuts see his 
The Triumph of Politics: The Crisis in American Government and How It Affects The World.
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UNESCO, went in fact for similar projects.38 Thus, no real saving was made. This 
emphasises the point that the reasons why the Reagan administration picked on 
UNESCO were cynical and political. The administration was seeking to use the 
organisation in its overall policy of showing the new determination of the United 
States in international politics.
The conclusion that one reaches is that the assaults that the administration 
led against UNESCO and the United Nations were based on the neoconservative 
belief which reached prominence during the mid 1970s that: “...the United States 
could not survive as the sole democracy in the world once its allies and 
supporters had been taken over or neutralized by pro-Soviet forces.”39 Ronald 
Reagan and his administration were determined to ensure that the New Right 
ideology, in which the survivability of the United States was paramount, was 
actively promoted whenever and wherever possible. This would be a good way of 
preserving American national interests, converting ideologically flexible states, 
and thus preventing a Soviet take-over.
The UN and UNESCO with their huge development programs therefore offered a 
highly motivated administration, assisted by a willing Congress, the ability to 
effectively promote and achieve their objective of American restoration. 
Washington would use America’s economic and military clout to ‘persuade’ 
countries that the American way was better and that would ensure aid and 
support from the mightiest western power.
It is uncertain whether the decision to withdraw from UNESCO was made 
to enforce American calls for greater reforms in the United Nations in general, 
and whether the formation of the Committee of Eighteen was a direct result of it.
London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986. Stockman by his own admission notes that after February 
1981 he was concerned with the growing budget.
38 See G.J Newell statement in “Human Resources Impact of U.S. membership in UNESCO”, 
hearings before the Senate Committee on Labor & Human Resources, 98th Congress, 2nd 
Session, December 10, 1984, Washington: US GPO, 1985, pi 1; Secretaiy of State Shultz’s 
letter to Director General M’Bow, (“U.S. Notifies UNESCO of Intent to Withdraw”), December 
28, 1983, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2083, Februaiy 1984, p41-2.
39 J. Ehrman. The rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs. 1945-1994. 
London: Yale University Press, 1995, pl07, and throughout.
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But it is very unlikely that the withdrawal from UNESCO did not cause some 
concern in UN circles, especially with statements attacking the organisation by 
Charles Lichenstein, a high ranking official in the US Mission, coupled with 
congressional obstinacy over the Genocide Convention or the support that was 
accorded to the Kassebaum amendment for example. The linking of support of 
America in the United Nations to US aid sent a clear message to many potential 
adversaries that the United States would use any means possible to pursue its 
objectives and continue its ideological conflict with the Soviet Union. The era of 
Carter, where appeasement was prominent, was over.
In many ways both America’s attitude toward UNESCO and 
Kirkpatrick’s stand in the United Nations played a very important part in re­
asserting the New Right philosophy and therefore Reagan’s foreign policy agenda 
of American resurgence. The most worrying thing, however, is that the UN very 
much because of Reagan’s eight years and despite its relative success in terms of 
reform and international politics, is increasingly scoffed at by American 
conservatives. That is, the Reagan legacy has continued even though its leader 
has been out of politics for many years: this is why the New Right phenomenon of 
the 1980s has been so important in shaping US-UN relations. Animosity toward 
the United Nations and many of its programs and ideas have remained in 
American politics, and one must conclude that American politicians aware of the 
growing conservatism in their country know that it is more beneficial to oppose, 
criticise or just ignore the UN. The failure of Americans to recognise the 
importance of the United Nations is perhaps the greatest hindrance for the 
development of better UN programs to assist many of the world’s woes and one 
could only hope that in time this attitude would diminish, so that the organisation 
could fulfil many of the hopes of its founders.
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